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Abstract 
This thesis analyses the corporatisation of Australian society, by examining the discursive 
construction of knowledge, identities and values and the contribution of these constructions 
in shaping of Australia’s policy environment. I focus this research on the case study of wheat 
export market deregulation, which I argue should be viewed as part of the broader 
restructuring of Australian society and economy.  
To understand the liberalisation of the wheat export market and how it was made possible, I 
have drawn on mainstream policy discourses around policy areas relating to competition, 
employment, social services, economic and industry policy, to understand the society which 
policy makers have sought to create. I draw on these broad policy discourses, to analyse how 
concepts such as competition, efficiency, individualism and ‘the consumer’ have been 
constructed as policy truths, which have been uncritically used by policy makers to shape 
how policy problems are identified, conceptualised and addressed. I argue that in doing so, 
policy discourses construct a reality of markets, firms and consumers, aided through the re-
construction of ‘what matters’, and the roles of key actors within society and the relationships 
between these actors. For example, the State portrays its role as creating an environment 
which enables the most efficient and productive actors, firms, producers and consumers, to 
prosper. Liberalised markets are constructed as integral to this. Policy makers portray markets 
as disinterested and therefore fair. As efficient mechanisms in facilitating the productive use 
of the nation’s resources. People are reduced to consumers. Citizen power is distilled as 
consumer power. Firms are portrayed as efficiency-maximisers, who are able to produce what 
it is that improves consumers’ material living standards. Thus, the liberalisation of markets 
and firms, is constructed as necessary in enhancing the well-being of rational, individualised 
consumers. This emphasis on markets, firms and consumers draws attention from people as 
workers, including farmers. This construction, I argue, externalises the negative social 
implications caused by economic restructuring in Australia in recent decades, such as 
increasingly precarious employment, diminished rights for welfare recipients, farmer exits 
and the decline of rural communities.   
These constructions create a reality which makes the shift from the public to the private 
appear as a logical, common sense solution to the challenges facing society. I use the case 
study of farming and, specifically, wheat export market deregulation, to show how this shift 
has been made possible in this context.  To make this reality operable, I show how 
governmental technologies, such as audit, the entrepreneurial individual, cost-benefit 
analysis, performance objectives, econometric modelling and the consumer were used to act 
upon society, to make the shift towards liberalisation of the wheat export market happen. The 
construction of firms as efficiency-maximisers which are relatively powerless in relation to 
markets and consumers is central to this shift. As a consequence, policy makers have either 
ignored, or failed to recognise, the capacity of firms to shape their external environments to 
create favourable operating conditions: a ‘business friendly environment’. Thus, the interests 
of firms have been portrayed by policy makers as essentially reflecting the interests of the 
broader society. In the case of wheat export market deregulation, the liberalisation of this 
market has enabled transnational firms to expand their geographical footprint and extend their 
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global value chains. On the other hand, farmers, whom policy makers claimed were the 
primary beneficiaries of wheat export market deregulation, contend with consolidated 
markets instead of choice, declining autonomy rather than individual freedom and, in some 
cases, feelings of disempowerment and disenfranchisement. 
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Introduction 
Throughout the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, successive Australian Governments engineered 
extension programs of economic reform, aimed at deregulating key industries, privatising 
State-owned assets and authorities, and rescinding trade barriers. This shift in policy focus 
was particularly pronounced in agricultural industries. As such, the restructuring of 
government intervention in agricultural industries has had a significant impact on farmers and 
their communities, which has been extensively documented by authors such as Lawrence 
(1987), Gray and Lawrence (2001a), Tonts and Jones (1997), McKenzie (1994), Cocklin and 
Dibden (2002), Botterill (2012) and Head, Atchison and Gates (2012).  
In this thesis, I aim to contribute to this literature by to examining how such seismic shifts in 
policy were made possible, and in whose interests. In particular, I focus my analysis upon the 
discursive dimension of power relations, expressed through the economic rationalist 
programs enacted by successive Australian Governments. Specifically, I analyse the 
Australian wheat industry as a case study. The deregulation of the Australian wheat export 
market is under-represented in geography and sociology research in particular, with literature 
on this topic dominated by scholars from the field of agriculture and resource economics, 
whose research has primarily centred on analysing and predicting the changes to wheat prices 
and supply chain costs resulting from this shift (Mugera, Curwen and White 2016, 
McCorriston and MacLaren 2007; Irving, Arney and Linder 2000; Allen Consulting 2000a; 
Royal Commission into Grain Handling, Storage and Transport 1988). As such, scholarly and 
government-produced literature, which emphasises the impact of market structure upon 
wheat prices and costs has narrowed ‘what matters’, in relation to this policy area. 
Furthermore, as I suggest in my research, knowledge, values and identities around the wheat 
industry and farming have been constructed to value market-driven data as credible, and 
objectives such as maximising wheat prices as the only legitimate industry policy aims.  
Drawing on geography and rural sociology literature in particular, I focus on how policy 
discourses have sought to construct market-produced data as legitimate, how the construct of 
the good farmer has been shaped to promote self-reliance and entrepreneurialism as a good 
farming attitude, and how policy values have been shaped to prioritise efficiency and 
marginalise equity. As I argue in this thesis, these discursive constructions are all integral to 
making deregulation possible. In analysing the neoliberalisation of Australian agriculture, 
through focusing on the reconstruction of knowledge, identities and policy values while 
underpin Australian society, I draw upon Higgins and Lockie’s (2002, p.420) 
conceptualisation of neoliberalism, which they argue: 
[…] needs to be seen as more than just the application of a political philosophy, 
ideology or the evolution of a new state form. Rather, it comprises an assemblage of 
rationalities and technologies of governing that seek to govern in an advanced liberal 
way […] rather than portending an abandonment by the state of the will to govern, 
advanced liberal rationalities of government seek to transform critiques of the welfare 
state into strategies for governing conduct in more effective ways. 
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Therefore, whereas this thesis analyses what is an apparently simple shift from state 
intervention (through statutory wheat marketing) towards liberalised markets, I use this 
research to show how technologies of government have been employed, in the past three 
decades in particular, to make this shift appear to be a logical and common sense response to 
the deceptively simple question of which market structure is best equipped to maximise 
growers’ returns. In drawing this research together in the discussion and conclusion in 
Section 5, I argue that these shifts are not confined to the wheat industry, and help us to 
understand how Australian society has been corporatised.   
The Australian wheat export market was one of the last remaining markets to be deregulated. 
In 2008, the statutory marketing of wheat was ended by the Australian Government, which 
allowed private grain traders to export Australian bulk wheat for the first time since 1948 
(Botterill 2012). This shift was framed by Government Ministers as essential for the industry, 
but, most importantly, for the viability and longevity of Australian wheat growers. Growers, 
it was argued, needed choice and freedom to market their wheat on their terms, which would 
enable them to use the market to obtain the best possible prices (Commonwealth of Australia 
2008a; Productivity Commission 2005a, 2000a, 2000b; Irving et al. 2000). The deregulated 
wheat market was predicted to feature multiple grain traders competing amongst themselves 
for growers’ wheat, empowering growers and enabling them to exercise choice over whom to 
sell their wheat to (Commonwealth of Australia 2008b, 2012). However, as I show later in 
this thesis, this scenario has not eventuated (O’Keeffe 2017c). Regional markets have become 
concentrated, whereas growers have expressed concern that the promised benefits of 
deregulation have not materialised (O’Keeffe and Neave 2017; Baker 2016).  
In seeking to understand the deregulation of the Australian wheat industry, it is necessary for 
this work to address a number of commonly held misconceptions. First, the myth that ‘good’ 
industry policy must be developed to maximise efficiency, competition and productivity. 
Second, the notion that markets, and therefore consumers, have conclusive power. As will be 
discussed in greater detail in the chapters to come, policy discourses regularly portray firms 
as having limited power, who are compelled by the market to maximise efficiency and return 
efficiency gains to consumers. Third, the myth that frames wheat growers as self-reliant, 
independent individuals who are primarily concerned with maximising their incomes. Fourth, 
the myth that wheat export market policy must maximise efficiency by, on the one hand, 
facilitating entry of firms which have the capacity to use resources efficiently, and on the 
other, supporting ‘good’ farmers who are willing and able to use their skills and self-interest 
to obtain the best prices for their wheat.  Fifth and finally, the myth that the externalities 
created through this process of deregulation - farmer exits and the decline of rural 
communities in particular - are regrettable, though essential, by-products of the greater aim of 
enhancing the efficiency and productivity of the wheat industry.  
I start this thesis by exploring these misconceptions, and I propose that, rather than resulting 
from some sort of accidental misunderstanding, these points have been carefully constructed 
by specific policy discourses. This work therefore explores these constructions to understand 
how they helped make wheat export market deregulation possible. I divide this work into five 
sections. The exegesis the first section, where I outline the rationale, structure and theoretical 
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approaches used in this research. Next, Section 2, ‘Creating a reality of markets, firms and 
consumers’, analyses policy constructs such as efficiency, the power of markets, and 
conversely, the limited power of firms in markets, to understand how these constructs are 
used to shape policy. In Section 3, ‘Making society governable: The case of Australian wheat 
export market deregulation’, I explore the operationalisation of these policy constructs, by 
focusing on wheat industry deregulation. In that regard, I look at how discourses were 
produced and re-produced to shape the policy environment which made deregulation appear 
as a logical shift. In particular, I focus on the shaping of farming and farmer identity to 
accord with this deregulatory goal, as well as the use of performance objectives, audit and 
assessment to govern and shape the AWB’s conduct, and the co-optation of farm lobby 
groups to accept and re-produce these constructs. In Section 4, ‘Emerging corporate power in 
Australian agriculture’, I explore the outcomes of this shift in the policy environment. In 
particular, I analyse the increasingly consolidated wheat export market by using resource 
dependency theory to interpret firms’ strategies for developing and using power over markets 
and policy makers. In this section, I challenge two key assumptions which underpinned 
deregulation: that competition would naturally develop with the removal of regulatory 
barriers to market entry; and that firms would lack the will or the capacity to influence 
markets and policy development. I provide a more detailed outline of these sections, and the 
chapters contributing to these sections, in Chapter 4 of this introductory section. Section 5 
includes a discussion of the broader implications of this work and the conclusion, where I 
draw together the results from the preceding sections to argue that wheat industry 
deregulation has facilitated a shift in power, away from farming communities, and towards 
consolidated farms and agricultural corporations.  
The remaining sections in this introductory chapter first examine the changing relationships 
between the state, the market and society in Australia and discuss how this has influenced 
economic restructuring in recent decades. Next, I focus on deregulation in agricultural 
industries and regional Australia, drawing on the historical events which have contributed to 
this shift, and sociology and geography literature which analyses the social implications of 
deregulation throughout rural Australia. I then turn to the Australian wheat industry and the 
history of wheat marketing policy, before analysing wheat export market development 
following deregulation. I then examine the recent investment activity in the Australian wheat 
export market and the firms engaging in this activity, which I suggest are typically well-
capitalised transnational firms which are seeking to expand their geographic footprint through 
their Australian investments. Following this, I reflect on my use of the PhD by Publication 
format, which enables me to explore the topic of economic restructuring and wheat export 
market deregulation in particular, in all its complexity.  
 
The State, the market and society 
The privatisation and deregulation of Australian industries and markets is a highly complex 
topic. In this research, I analyse the deregulation of the Australian wheat export market, 
implemented by the Federal Government in 2008. This issue cannot be sufficiently 
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understood by analysing this policy change in isolation from other broader societal and 
economic changes which have occurred in recent decades.  
Economic restructuring, which commenced in Australia throughout the 1980s, reflected 
programs of reform similar to those implemented by governments in the United States, UK, 
Canada and New Zealand (Magnan 2015; Konings 2011; Larner 2006; Le Heron and Roche 
1999; Pusey 1996; Coleman and Skogstad 1995; Quiggin 1995). As Pusey (1996, p.69) has 
stated, “These reform programs issue from an economic rationalism which presumes that 
economies, markets and money offer the only reliable means of setting values on anything”. 
According to Pusey (1996, p.69), the aim of economic rationalism is to “shift the burden of 
coordination from state, bureaucracies and the law to economies, markets and money”. This 
shift was motivated by two key constructions. First, the construction of the State as the cause 
of economic malaise through its inefficiency and complacency and, second, the construction 
that liberalised markets and firms were motivated by self-interest and commercial disciplines, 
which were necessary to improve Australia’s economic performance (IAC 1988).  
Policy discourses problematised the State as the central cause of the apparently stagnating 
productivity and efficiency which was undermining Australian well-being (Fairbrother, 
Svenson and Teicher 1997; Keating 1992; Mauldon and Schapper 1974). Examples 
commonly cited for State-driven stagnation include the imposition of tariffs, the use of 
statutory marketing arrangements, government underwriting for commodities prices, the 
assistance to industries such as agriculture and manufacturing, the regulation of labour 
markets and finance, and in some cases the restriction of foreign companies from entering 
markets (Pritchard 2005a; Griggs 2002; Keating 1992; Martin 1990; Campbell 1974; 
Mauldon and Schapper 1974; Harris, Crawford, Gruen and Honan 1974). Policy makers 
agitating for change claimed that these policies restricted the Australian economy and its 
citizens by curtailing individuals’ freedom, limiting choice and undermining incentives to 
work hard and be innovative (Aulich and O’Flynn 2007; Keating 1992; Industry Commission 
1991). Within Australia, the economic rationalism of the Hawke and Keating Governments in 
the 1980s and early-to-mid 1990s, focused on abruptly ending the State’s intervention in 
markets and industries, essentially shifting control towards markets (Beer et al. 2016; 
Meagher and Wilson 2015; Pusey 1991; Gerritsen 1987). This included the corporatisation of 
federally owned airports (later privatised by the Howard Government), the privatisation of 
the publicly owned Australian Airlines, Qantas and the Commonwealth Bank, and the 
deregulation of currency and financial markets (Beer et al. 2016; Aulich and O’Flynn 2007; 
Quiggin 2002, 1995; Fairbrother et al. 1997). In addition, reforms such as Working Nation 
and The Accord, developed by the Australian Council of Trade Union and the Labour 
Government, sought to restructure unemployment, industrial relations and policy relating to 
wage growth in Australia (Humphrys 2018; Jose and Burgess 2005; Stilwell 1994).  The 
Howard Government, which was elected in 1996, continued this policy trajectory through 
substantial reforms to healthcare, welfare, unemployment and industrial relations policies 
(Morris and Wilson 2014; Wilson, Spies-Butcher, Stebbing and St John 2013; Cooper and 
Ellem 2008; Aulich and O’Flynn 2007; McDonald and Marston 2005; Wilson and Turnbull 
2005).  
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The abrupt shift away from post-World War II Keynesian policies, towards the deregulation 
and privatisation programs of the Hawke, Keating and Howard Governments, markedly 
changed the governance of the Australian economy. Indeed, it could be said that this shift 
changed how Australian society was governed - a change which Pusey (2016, 2003) suggests 
occurred at the expense of society. Rather than developing policy for the betterment of 
Australian society, Pusey argues, policy was developed to support a growing economy. 
Society, on the other hand, “slowly comes to be seen as a break on the market, or worse a 
generic externality and a stubbornly resisting sludge through which we must drive the 
economy” (Pusey 2016, p.7). This policy shift relied on the underlying assumption that the 
strength of the Australian economy is central to the well-being of its citizens and of the 
broader Australian society. Driven by this assumption, policy makers could present economic 
growth and multi-factor productivity as key indicators of economic performance, with the 
implication that strong performance against such measures reflects Australia’s prosperity and 
the prosperity of Australian citizens. After all, economic remuneration for work is closely 
associated with living standards. As Stilwell (1991, p.28) argued:  
Wages are important for workers and their families because they are the principal determinant 
of their standard of living (in conjunction with prices, taxes and the social wage). This 
reminds us that wages policy is not simply a technical macroeconomic issue, but also one 
with major personal and social ramifications for the majority of the community whose 
material wellbeing depends on wage levels. 
 
In this regard, wages, which are an economic measure of labour, are implicitly tied to notions 
of well-being and societal health (Stilwell 1991). However, this measurement then raises 
questions of how the gains of good economic performance are distributed throughout society. 
The urgency of this question is evident, given that in recent decades wage growth has 
stagnated (Ryan 2015; Parker 2012; Quiggin 2009; Stilwell 1991), and work has become 
increasingly precarious (Watts 2016; Healy 2016; Beer et al. 2016; Benach 2014; Campbell 
2008; Western 2007). Despite the growing inequalities within Australian society (Morley and 
Ablett 2016; Spies-Butcher 2014; Baird, Cooper and Ellem 2009; Stilwell and Jordan 2007; 
Pusey 1998a, 1998b), policy discourses maintain that markets are a great arbiter of fairness 
(Harper et al. 2015; Murdoch 2013). This argument, which has underpinned Australian 
competition and economic policy for the past three decades, suggests that liberalised markets, 
featuring competition between firms, delivers benefits to consumers. In this vision of the 
Australian economy, firms compete amongst each other by developing better products and 
services, in a wider range of options and at a lower cost, to attract the custom of consumers. 
However, in policy discourses, the satisfaction and well-being of consumers is conflated with 
the well-being of Australians. As stated by Harper et al. (2015, p.23), in their review of 
Australia’s National Competition Policy: 
Competition policy, like other arms of government policy, is aimed at securing the welfare of 
Australians. Broadly speaking, it covers government policies, laws and regulatory institutions 
whose purpose is to make the market economy better serve the long-term interests of 
Australian consumers. 
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Thus, it is claimed that the welfare of Australians is directly related to their experience as 
consumers. Consumers, according to this report, are, “not just retail consumers or 
households, but include businesses transacting with other businesses. In the realm of 
government services, consumers can be patients, welfare recipients, parents of school-age 
children or users of the national road network” (Harper et al. 2015, p.31). According to this 
definition, there is no important distinction in competition policy discourses between people 
or business. What is important is the capacity of the market to function efficiently. The 
implication of this claim is that what is good for business is also good for consumers. The 
argument is underpinned by a number of assumptions, including the assumption that firms 
lack significant power to influence markets and are therefore best understood as governed by 
the needs and wants of consumers. Business is framed here as a largely benevolent actor 
whose presence in social and economic life benefits consumers. The role of government is 
therefore free to shift from providing direct support to its citizens, towards creating a 
‘business friendly environment’, which is assumed to be essential in attracting the business 
and private investment that is necessary to enhance the Nation’s economic performance 
through which citizens will then benefit as employees and consumers. 
As I will argue in this thesis, these assumptions, and policy makers’ desire to create an 
economic environment which facilitates firms’ access to previously restricted areas of 
Australian society, have created the conditions for corporate control of Agriculture. As Pusey 
(2016) has argued, this shift has been at the expense of Australian society, through this 
singular focus on attracting investment, increasing efficiency and productivity, and improving 
the contribution of agriculture to the national economy.    
Thus, my research is concerned with understanding how people – workers, farmers, 
communities – have become marginalised in policy discourse, which appears indifferent 
towards their needs and values. In the context of the Australian wheat industry, this research 
examines the discursive constructions which have enabled this shift to happen.   
  
Deregulation in Australian agricultural and regional policy 
The problematisation of the State is particularly evident in discourses around Australian 
agricultural and regional policy, and has contributed to substantial policy change in these 
areas in recent decades.  Following the Second World War, Australian agricultural policy was 
characterised by a high level of government intervention. This policy environment supported 
a collectivist, co-operative approach to agricultural organisation. This is evident in policies 
such as statutory marketing of commodities, Government underwriting of commodities prices 
and the use of tariffs. Policy makers focused on ensuring the security and stability of farmers, 
reducing their exposure to risk and uncertainty (Ryan 1984). Through providing farmers with 
guaranteed commodities prices, and restricting farmers’ exposure to what were perceived as 
volatile global markets and unscrupulous agricultural commodities traders, policy makers 
intended to increase farmers’ sense of security. In turn, it was assumed that farmers would 
respond to this stable environment by increasing their productivity. This logic was founded 
on the assumption that farmers would be more likely to sow crops, for example, if they knew 
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that they would receive adequate financial remuneration for this effort and financial outlay 
(Ryan 1984).  
This approach changed across the 1970s and 1980s. Global commodities markets began to 
weaken, which placed considerable pressure on this approach to agriculture (Cockfield and 
Botterill 2007; Kingwell and Pannell 2005; Coleman and Skogstad 1995). National 
Governments had to decide whether to continue to protect and subsidise agriculture, or to 
retreat from this position. In Australia and New Zealand, governments chose to restructure 
agriculture, exposing industry to global competition (Woods 2006; Liepins 2000; Coleman 
and Skogstad 1995). Successive Australian Governments deregulated agricultural industries 
and markets, and privatised government-owned assets and authorities (Tonts and Haslam-
McKenzie 2005; Alston 2004; Vanclay 2003; Cocklin and Dibden 2002; Vanclay and 
Lawrence 1993). The development of the Industries Assistance Commission (IAC) in 1974 
was a critical aspect of this shift (Edwards 1987). The IAC was created by the Whitlam 
Government to assist the State to maximise productive use of resources, and to develop 
policy which would not harm domestic consumers (Warhurst 1982; Industries Assistance Act 
1973). This change in policy focus, and the subsequent withdrawal of State support for 
agriculture, fundamentally altered the policy environment in Australia (Edwards 1987; 
Warhurst 1982). Examples of this change include the 25% across-the-board drop in tariffs in 
1973, which arguably impacted industries such as manufacturing to a greater extent than 
agriculture, and signalled the intention of the Whitlam Government to shift policy emphasis 
away from protectionism, towards market-based approaches to economic organisation 
(Anderson, Lloyd and MacLaren 2007).  
The 1971 Rural Reconstruction Scheme was the first attempt of the post-war Australian 
Governments to facilitate the removal of assistance for farmers whose farms were deemed to 
be ‘unviable’, and to re-allocate resources towards more profitable, efficient farmers 
(Cockfield and Botterill 2007, 2006; Higgins 2001a, 2001b; Musgrave 1979).  Musgrave 
(1990) provides an example of the positive construction of adjustment through farm re-
organisation and resource re-allocation:  
In the final analysis, the process of labour shedding and farm reorganisation should be 
regarded as desirable in terms of economic efficiency. Presumably those who leave the 
industry have good reason and are better off for doing so. Similarly, those staying in the 
industry should also benefit. However, in an ongoing adjustment process there is no final 
analysis and the process is not without its costs either to individuals or the nation as a whole. 
Evidence of the cost to individuals is seen in terms of chronic and ephemeral poverty among 
rural people which, in turn, is a cost to the nation if it finds this form of poverty abhorrent. In 
addition, there may be other costs to society, springing from inefficient resource use due to 
lags in the adjustment process […] The conclusion would seem to follow that, if there is a 
problem requiring government intervention, it would be because adjustment is not occurring. 
In this respect the persistence of low farm income problems could be an indication that 
adjustment is not occurring fast enough. 
 
In this regard, the ‘problem’ of government intervention is framed, not as one of preventing 
inefficient farmers from exiting the industry, but as one of concern that this process may not 
be occurring quickly enough. This perspective gained traction across the 1980s in particular. 
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The State withdrawal of agricultural assistance accelerated with the election of the Hawke 
Government in 1983, which further reconceptualised the relationship between farmers and 
the State. Rather than providing passive assistance to farmers, the Hawke Government 
perceived its role as creating an economic environment which enabled the most efficient 
farmers to be successful (Hawke 1986; Kerin 1986). Questions around agricultural policy 
became focused on how to maximise efficiency and productivity of resource use. 
Subsequently, the value of agricultural industries and the contribution of farmers to 
Australian society was judged according to these ambitions. Although this thesis focuses 
upon the deregulation of the Australian wheat industry, similar processes of deregulation 
have been implemented across other agricultural industries in Australia, including barley 
(Botterill 2012), dairy (Margetts 2007; Cocklin and Dibden 2002; Davidson 2002, 2001), 
beef (Pritchard 2006), wine grapes (Pritchard 1999), egg (Alston 1986) and wool (Vanclay 
2003). Highlighting its influence over policy, the Industry Commission (1991, p.23) claimed 
to have: 
[…] examined the effects of statutory marketing arrangements in recent inquiries into apples 
and pears (1990), the food processing and beverages industries (1989), the dried vine fruits 
industry (1989), the wheat industry (1988), the fresh fruit and fruit products industries (1988), 
the tobacco growing and manufacturing industries (1987) and the rice industry (1987).  
 
These examinations typically reached similar conclusions - namely, that statutory marketing, 
particularly involving compulsory acquisition, undermined efficient resource use (Industry 
Commission 1991).  
This retraction of agricultural assistance has contributed to a steep decline in the number of 
farmers managing their own properties (Alston 2012; Alston 2004; Tonts 1999). In particular, 
as larger farms have increasingly subsumed smaller properties through amalgamations, the 
number of individual farms dropped from 201,000 in 1960 to 120,000 in 1995 (Tonts 1999, 
p.581). This trend has continued, as the number of farmers in Australia dropped by 40 per 
cent from 1981 to 2011, from 263,200 to 157,000 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2012). The 
exit of farmers from their land, and from the farming industry, affects farmers, their families 
and their communities, in many different ways.  
For many farmers, their identity, well-being and sense of belonging is particularly grounded 
in their rural, farming environment (Kuehne 2012; Wiseman and Whiteford 2009; Wythes 
and Lyons 2006; Pretty, Chipauer and Bramston 2003). This is particularly evident in many 
farmers’ connection to their land, their communities and the occupation of farming. 
Furthermore, in some instances, farmers have inherited the family farm, which may have 
been in the family for a number of generations. The farm property may incorporate the family 
home, which may also have been the childhood home of the farmer. This heritage not only 
provides farmers with a significant attachment to the physical property, but also an 
attachment to their personal history and their family history. As Kuehne (2012, pp.2-3) 
explains in his auto-ethnographical article on his experience of having to sell the family farm, 
this connection to past and future generations becomes entrenched within the identity of the 
farmer, as “farmers are not simply representing their own identities, but also the identities of 
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their families stretching from the past to the future”. Thus, exiting the family farm can not 
only result in the severing of these connections to the land, to family history and the loss of 
income, it can also substantially impact farmers’ sense of identity, sense of belonging and, 
subsequently, mental health and well-being. As Kuehne (2012, p.5) describes, beyond the 
financial transaction of selling the farm and the subsequent loss of livelihood: 
[…] there were even deeper and more profound changes than these. It changed who I 
associated with, my sense of importance, my place in the community and my relationship 
with that particular piece of land. The sale of my farm invoked deep feelings of loss. This was 
caused by more than the loss of the farm; it was loss of certainty, loss of purpose and loss of 
identity. 
 
Furthermore, some farmers internalise the decision to sell their farm as a sign of personal 
failure (Kuehne 2012). This is particularly significant, as I argue later in this thesis, because 
policy discourses have portrayed farmer exits as the result of the poor farm management 
practices of the farmers who are leaving the land. This framing constructs farmer exits as a 
result of individual inadequacies and, as Kuehne (2012) discusses, farmers in turn have 
accepted individual responsibility for this failure to succeed in the occupation which is 
intricately connected to their sense of identity. In contrast to this individualist construction, I 
argue below that farmer exits are best understood in structural terms, as a direct consequence 
of how policy makers have sought to engineer conditions for greater consolidation within 
Australian farm businesses, and to re-allocate farm resources towards the largest, most 
efficient farms.  
As a result of this complex relationship between farmers, their land, family history and 
identity, the considerable number of farmer exits in Australia throughout recent decades has 
resulted in significantly higher rates of anxiety, depression and suicide among farmers, than 
is evident in the broader Australian population (Bryant and Garnham 2014; Alston 2012, 
2004; Dean and Stain 2010; Wiseman and Whiteford 2009; Alston and Kent 2008; Wythes 
and Lyons 2006; Caldwell, Dear and Jorm 2004). Such health impacts are exacerbated by the 
unwillingness of many male farmers to recognise and seek help for mental health problems.  
Beyond the considerable consequences of farmer exits upon farming families, the decline in 
farming populations has contributed to a significant decline in rural communities. Rather than 
remaining in their communities, farming families exiting their properties typically migrate to 
coastal regions, regional centres or cities (Smith and Pritchard 2012; Alston 2004; Tonts 
1999). As a consequence, the increased rates of farmer exits have undermined rural 
populations and, in some cases, threatened the viability of rural communities (Talbot and 
Walker 2007; Tonts and Jones 1997; McKenzie 1994). As McManus et al. (2012, p.27) and 
Pritchard et al. (2012) have noted, farmers perform a key role in contributing to the resilience 
of rural communities, by maintaining local economies through employment, either directly in 
farming or ancillary businesses and community life, and through the maintenance of social 
spaces such as halls, as well as sporting clubs. Thus, declining farming populations 
potentially weaken the social capital and resilience of rural communities (Tonts, Plummer 
and Argent 2014; McManus et al. 2012; Talbot and Walker 2007; McKenzie 1994). As 
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McKenzie (1994, p.253) has argued, “this trend creates a vicious cycle of population loss, 
service decline and further out-migration”. As farmers exit rural, agricultural communities, 
the local population falls. Subsequently, the local economy weakens due to reduced spending 
on goods and services. In particular, agricultural businesses servicing farming populations are 
affected. In turn, employment opportunities become scarcer, which leads to further out-
migration as people leave in search of work in cities and regional centres. In turn, services 
such as health, education, transport and communications have been withdrawn by 
Governments which have become increasingly focused on rationalising service provision, in 
part via consolidating services in areas of higher population density (Tonts and Jones 1997; 
McKenzie 1994; Stilwell 1992). This retraction of services causes further population decline, 
as people move in search of employment, health-care and schools. As McKenzie (1994, 
p.256) states, “There are also significant psychological impacts, with many seeing the closure 
of such central communities’ services as signalling the ‘death’ of a town”. The consequences 
of farmer exits upon the well-being of farming families and their communities are clear, and 
illustrate the limitations of policy making that has attempted to construct agriculture 
principally in economic terms. 
The decline of Australian farming populations and subsequent effects of this outmigration 
from rural towns are closely associated with the retraction of State assistance for farming. As 
Dibden, Potter and Cocklin (2009, p.302) observe, Australian farmers experience the second 
lowest level of support among all OECD countries. According to Dibden, Potter and Cocklin 
(2009, p.302), farmers are:  
[…] encouraged to adapt to liberalised trade through development of more productive 
farming systems, i.e., through intensive farming practices, farm consolidation, displacement 
of smaller, less ‘efficient’ farmers and developing better business management capacities.  
 
This process is described by Dibden and Cocklin (2005), and Dibden, Potter and Cocklin 
(2009) as a form of competitive productivism that has driven Australian agricultural policy. 
By contrast, European agricultural policy is underpinned by a multifunctional approach, 
which assumes that “without State assistance, large numbers of family farmers are vulnerable 
to economic pressure”, potentially resulting in farmers abandoning their land (Dibden, Potter 
and Cocklin 2009, p.303). This pressure is constructed as having potentially severe social and 
environmental consequences. Thus, policies maintaining trade barriers and assistance to 
farmers are constructed as an essential measure to protect the European countryside from 
global markets (Dibden, Potter and Cocklin 2009; Potter and Tilzey 2007, 2005). As Dibden 
Potter and Cocklin (2009, p.302) argue, “the public good role of farming is key to this 
understanding, the argument being that farming (particularly in marginal areas) needs to 
continue if farmlinked biodiversity and the appearance and amenity of rural landscapes are to 
be maintained”.  
Potter and Tilzey (2007, 2005) and Dibden, Potter and Cocklin (2009) have noted that this 
approach to agricultural policy contrasts with the increasingly neoliberal policies of the EU in 
other areas, such as financial and labour market deregulation. However, this ongoing support 
for agricultural assistance for farmers is attributed to the support for multifunctionality in 
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agriculture, which is grounded in a “social welfare justification for state assistance” (Potter 
and Tilzey 2005, p.590). This approach has influenced policy makers, who Potter and Tilzey 
(2005, p.590) argue have “gradually acknowledged the need to diversify the income base of 
family farms by capitalising on agriculture’s ancillary functions such as biodiversity, 
landscape and cultural heritage”. The multifunctional approach to agriculture, though weak in 
Australia (Bjørkhaug and Richards 2008; Argent 2002), is used in countries such as France, 
Germany and Norway, with the latter using government subsidies to employ the “language 
and action of a multifunctional agriculture into its agricultural mode of operation” (Bjørkhaug 
and Richards 2008, p.108). Bjørkhaug and Richards (2008) and Dibden, Potter and Cocklin 
(2009) highlight the role of farming organisations in supporting multifuncitonality and 
maintaining State assistance for farmers. This support contrasts sharply with the activities of 
farming organisations in Australia, such as the National Farmers Federation, and Grains 
Council of Australia, who have consistently argued for greater competition in farming and the 
dismantling of government regulation, while using neoliberal concepts of choice, freedom 
and individualism to further these arguments (O’Keeffe 2016c).  
The competitive productivism that characterises agriculture in Australia has also been 
connected to damaging environmental consequences that result from intensive farming 
methods and the use of fertilisers, herbicides and pesticides (Lawrence, Richards and Lyons 
2013; Pritchard, Burch and Lawrence 2007). The pressure to maximise productivity to cope 
in an economic environment with few avenues for financial assistance, compels farmers to 
use potentially damaging farming methods (O’Keeffe 2016b; Lawrence, Richards and Lyons 
2013). This is not to say that Australian farmers are not interested in minimising their 
environmental impact, or that all farmers are responsible for implementing damaging 
environmental practices. Far from it. The success of volunteer-based farm programs such as 
Landcare is evidence of farmer engagement with environmental practices, as is the growing 
proportion of farmers employing organic farming methods (Tennent and Lockie 2013). 
However, Australian agricultural policy discourses have, for a number of decades, prioritised 
and rewarded productivity. As I argue in chapters 8 and 9, productivity has been constructed 
as a policy truth, and productivist farming methods, such as the application of fertilisers, 
herbicides and pesticides, concentration of farm properties and increased specialisation, have 
come to represent smart farming (Argent 2002). Furthermore, environmental protections, 
such as policies which aim to prevent land clearing and mature tree removal, have been 
constructed as burdensome regulation, or “green tape” (Productivity Commission 2017) 
By contrast, in Europe, farmers are provided with state support to modify their farming 
practices, in the interests of meeting environmental goals (Kleijn and Sutherland 2003). As 
described by Kliejn and Sutherland (2003, p.947), agri-environment schemes are used for 
“reducing nutrient and pesticide emissions, protecting biodiversity, restoring landscapes and 
preventing rural de-population”. As such, many of the programs delivered for farmers are tied 
to specific social and environmental aims, which, in contrast with Australian agricultural 
policy, are considered by policy makers to have value.  
Within Australia, the Australian State and Federal Governments have responded to the social 
and environmental problems experienced throughout rural and regional Australia, by 
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developing regional policy which has encouraged communities to become more self-reliant 
(O’Keeffe 2014a; Beer et al. 2005; Cheshire and Lawrence 2005; Tonts and Haslam-
McKenzie 2005; Gray and Lawrence 2001b; Herbert Cheshire 2000). Essentially, 
responsibility - though, crucially, not power - has been devolved from governments to local 
communities, as communities have been encouraged to find solutions to their own problems 
(Cheshire and Lawrence 2005; Lockie 1999). As Cheshire and Lawrence (2005) argue, this 
encourages people and communities to view their problems as resulting from their own 
failings, rather than acknowledging the structural causes of rural community decline. 
Furthermore, regional development programs, such as the Victorian Government’s ‘Putting 
Locals First Program’, have been developed according to carefully constructed funding 
criteria, which closely align with the Government’s economic goals (O’Keeffe 2014a). Even 
as this approach might restrict the capacity of communities to respond to the challenges they 
encounter, it operates to absolve Governments of responsibility for the ongoing resilience of 
rural communities, while ensuring that community responses to their challenges are tightly 
controlled and politically acceptable.  
Similar to regional development policy, Australian agricultural policy in recent decades has 
focused on promoting individualism, competition, self-help and self-reliance (Herbert-
Cheshire and Lawrence 2005; Cheshire and Lawrence 2005; Gray and Lawrence 2001b; 
Higgins 2001a). In this thesis, I extend this analysis by exploring the conceptualisation of 
farmers as business-minded individuals who are centred exclusively in maximising their 
returns. This construction differs substantially from research which analyses the importance 
of farmers’ connection to their land, their family histories in farming, and the relationship 
between farming, identity and well-being (McManus et al. 2012; Kuehne 2012; Sartore et al. 
2008; Fraser et al. 2005; Webb, Carey and Geldens 2002; Smailes 2000; Gray and Lawrence 
1996; Cook and Ronan 1991). Policy discourses have constructed farming in economic terms, 
which has largely externalised these important social aspects of farming, rendering them 
insignificant in policy. As I will argue, this is an essential discursive shift that has helped to 
make deregulation possible.  
 
Changing wheat industry policy 
Australian wheat industry policy has changed markedly throughout the past hundred years. 
Popular perceptions of the State’s role in regulating farming, the trustworthiness of grain 
traders, and the role of the farmer in relation to the broader Australian society have changed 
on numerous occasions throughout this time, shaping wheat industry policy. In addition, 
global crises such as war and economic depression have often been the catalyst for policy 
change. For example, the compulsory acquisition of wheat was first enacted during the First 
World War (Connors 1971). Victorian Minister for Agriculture, the Honourable F.W. 
Hagelthorn (1916, pp.3-4), explained these measures:  
These are no ordinary times. The greatest war the world has ever seen is raging…The Federal 
and State Governments have interfered—not to prevent the farmer getting the benefit of high 
prices, but to save him from ruin and the country from chaos and disaster. 
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This justification suggests that Governments implementing this scheme are concerned that 
they may be encroaching on the individual freedoms of wheat growers, even as they argue 
that such encroachment might be necessary. Haglethorn excuses these measures, by 
articulating the graveness of the situation, and noting the extraordinary events which have 
compelled this decision. This shows a concern that growers may have been disgruntled at 
having to sell their wheat to the State, rather than to an open market. However, these 
statements also help to articulate the power of farmers at the time. This power is further 
illustrated in the call for growers to save “the country from chaos and disaster”, and in 
appeals to the agrarian sentiment that farming is the foundation upon which Australian 
society has been built.  
Similarly, in 1930 the Australian State and Federal Governments appealed to wheat growers 
to sow an additional one million acres of wheat, in an attempt to rectify Australia’s trade 
deficit and help buttress the economy prior to the onset of the great depression (Victorian 
Department of Agriculture 1930). As stated in a document produced for Victorian growers to 
further this appeal, “He [the wheat grower] believes the situation is not of his making, but the 
more it is the fault of the foolish or selfish sections of the community the more it is the duty 
of the sounder sections to save the country from past folly” (Victorian Department of 
Agriculture 1930, pp.4-5). This rhetoric positions farmers as being reliable pillars of 
Australian society, while calling on growers to summon their sense of responsibility as a 
collective, to meet a challenge that is facing the nation. Wheat growers responded with a 
record wheat crop (Connors 1971).  
The success of the compulsory acquisition of wheat throughout the War, and the perceived 
skulduggery and collusive activity of unregulated grain traders, led to growing support 
among farmers for a collective approach to wheat marketing. This support contributed to the 
formation of the Australian Wheat Board in 1939, which was tasked with managing the 
compulsory acquisition of wheat that was again enacted during World War II (Botterill 2012; 
Whitwell and Sydenham 1991). From 1948, with the Federal Government’s introduction of 
the first Wheat Stabilisation Plan, the Australian Wheat Board (AWB) became the sole 
exporter of Australian wheat. For growers, this process was relatively simple (Pritchard 
1998). Wheat marketing was conducted entirely by the AWB, which pooled the wheat it 
received from growers, according to classification. This allowed the AWB to amass large 
quantities of wheat to sell to overseas buyers. The scale of these transactions was held up as a 
key advantage of statutory marketing, which was argued to provide growers with collective 
bargaining power in world markets. Growers were essentially provided with average prices 
through this pooling system, as net returns to growers were calculated based on the value of 
wheat sales and the costs associated with these transactions, including freight charges and 
marketing costs. Until 1989 this process was supported by government guarantees on wheat 
prices, articulated in the Wheat Stabilisation Plans. According to Ryan (1984, p.117), the first 
five Plans set price guarantees according to the cost of production, whereas the 6th Plan 
(1974/75) shifted this approach to reflect export prices. The removal of guaranteed wheat 
prices exposed growers to global wheat markets, shifting the policy focus from stability to 
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market efficiency (Pritchard 1998; Ryan 1984). In this climate the AWB was increasingly 
scrutinised, with attention focused on its capacity to deliver premium prices for growers.   
Furthermore, throughout the early-to-mid 1980s, global wheat prices declined substantially in 
the midst of a “trade war” involving the United States and European Commission (Coleman 
and Skogstad 1995, p.244). This price decline threatened the viability of farmers, and also 
caused the Canadian and Australian Governments to analyse their own approaches to wheat 
industry assistance and marketing. At the time, the wheat industries in these countries were 
dominated by statutory marketing authorities, the Australian Wheat Board and the Canadian 
Wheat Board respectively, which were substantial participants in the global wheat trade 
(Boaitey 2013). Whereas the Canadian and Australian Governments each sought to motivate 
trade liberalisation, the Canadian government also sought to provide a level of protection for 
growers (Martin and Clapp 2015; Magnan 2015; Coleman and Skogstad 1995). As 
highlighted by Coleman and Skogstad (1995, p.257), the Canadian Government responded to 
the pressure upon Canadian farmers by providing “ad hoc payouts to western farmers to 
shield them from the trade war”. Coleman and Skogstad (1995, p.257) go on to argue that the 
Government’s “longer-term solution was to engage in a consultative exercise with the grains 
and oilseeds policy community with the objective of designing new programs to achieve 
income security and stability”.  
By contrast, the Australian Government used this crisis as a catalyst to break from policies 
which provided direct, general assistance for farmers. This shift in approach was motivated 
by the IAC, in particular, and the Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAE), who were among 
the most vocal critics of Statutory Marketing Arrangements, the Wheat Stabilisation Plans, 
and other means of Government intervention and assistance. These authorities argued that 
such measures created inefficiencies by distancing growers from markets, and preventing 
them from responding to market signals (IAC 1983, 1988; BAE 1987). Furthermore, the IAC 
portrayed the AWB as an inefficient monopolist, which was not subjected to competitive 
forces, and thus had no incentive to reduce costs or seek out the best prices for its wheat. The 
IAC claimed that the AWB had no capacity to accurately determine the costs of the services 
which they performed for growers, due to their protection from markets. As a result, the IAC 
argued that Statutory Marketing restricted growers’ returns, by reducing wheat prices and 
attributing supply chain and marketing services with arbitrary costs which were not the result 
of the price discovery process which would occur in a competitive market. In addition, as the 
AWB collectivised wheat prices and costs, providing an average return, the IAC claimed that 
this approach failed to reward the most efficient growers and deprived them of incentives, 
instead rewarding mediocrity. This argument in particular represented a clear shift away from 
the collectivism of the post-World War II years, and sought to motivate policy change based 
on the interests of individual wheat farmers.  
The rhetoric of the individual resonated with the policy ambitions of the Hawke Government, 
expressed with particular clarity by Minister for Primary Industry John Kerin. In the 1988 
policy statement ‘Australian Wheat Industry: Marketing in the Future’, Kerin claimed that 
“There is a need to shape the direction of the nation’s grains industry towards a future where 
commercial independence, maximum efficiency and marketing flexibility will be key 
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criteria” (Commonwealth of Australia 1988a, p.2). This statement argued for reduced 
government assistance for the wheat industry, suggesting that “The wheat industry now has 
the opportunity to reduce its reliance on Government and take control of its own affairs” 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1988a, p.5). Competition, it was claimed, would reduce 
growers’ costs and increase the potential for higher wheat prices, which, the Department of 
Primary Industry (Commonwealth of Australia 1988a, p.5) argued, would benefit growers 
who “should be concerned with maximising their net return”. The statement portrayed choice 
as a key mechanism for achieving this aim. Through the influence of the IAC, BAE and the 
Hawke Government, concepts such as competition, efficiency, choice and freedom of the 
individual were portrayed in policy discourses as guidelines which good policy must follow. 
Although the AWB’s control of wheat exports remained intact throughout this period, the 
Hawke Government did deregulate the domestic wheat market in 1989. Given the relatively 
small scale of this market compared to Australia’s wheat exports, domestic deregulation was 
not a monumental shift; however, it did signify the growing support among policy makers for 
market-based approaches to agricultural organisation.  
 
Wheat export market deregulation 
In 1999 the Australian Wheat Board was privatised (McCorriston and MacLaren 2007, p.638) 
despite significant opposition from wheat growers, who felt that a private organisation would 
be more concerned with returning benefits to shareholders rather than to wheat growers 
(Cockfield and Botterill 2007, p.48). In spite of these concerns, the privatised AWB Limited 
was floated on the Australian Stock Exchange in 2001 (McCorriston and MacLaren 2007, 
p.638).  The United Nations Oil-for-Food inquiry, which began in 2004, raised allegations 
that AWB Limited had been making payments to the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein for the 
purpose of securing wheat contracts. As a consequence, in 2005 the Australian Government 
established a Royal Commission to investigate these claims under the oversight of Terence 
Cole (Cockfield and Botterill 2007, p.44). This scandal also provided the catalyst for full 
deregulation of the export wheat market, with the then Chairman of the Australian Consumer 
and Competition Commission Allan Fels stating that it showed “what a monopoly thinks it 
can get away with” and suggested that “the time [had] come to close down the Australian 
Wheat Board as an export monopoly” (Cockfield and Botterill 2007, p.44; Australian 
Broadcasting Commission 2006). The Howard Government responded to this crisis by 
implementing the 2007 Wheat Export Marketing Act, in which AWB Limited retained its 
statutory marketing of wheat exports from Australia.  
The following year, the recently elected Labor Government implemented the Wheat Export 
Marketing Act (2008), which deregulated the wheat export market by abolishing statutory 
wheat marketing and permitting private grain traders to export Australian wheat. Then 
Federal Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Tony Burke argued in support of 
deregulation, stating that “The industry needs significant reform to increase the level of 
competition…Only then will returns to growers be maximised”. This claim repeated 
arguments presented over a number of decades, which portray competition as the solution to 
the problems of farm viability arising from declining commodity prices and the increasing 
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costs of inputs (Commonwealth of Australia 2008a, 2008b; Higgins 2001b; Commonwealth 
of Australia 1988a; Kerin 1986; Mauldon and Schapper 1974). Competition, it is argued, 
would benefit wheat farmers through increased flexibility of their wheat marketing and 
increased choice, while also ensuring that wheat farmers would have a number of private 
grain traders competing for their grain (Chang, Martel and Berry 2003; Irving et al. 2000; 
Watson 1999). Policy makers claimed that the increased choice and freedom would enable 
farmers to exercise their self-interest, marketing skills and knowledge, to obtain premium 
wheat prices. In this sense, wheat export market deregulation was portrayed as being 
primarily for the benefit of wheat farmers (Commonwealth of Australia 2008a, 2000b; 
Productivity Commission 2005a, 2000a, 2000b; Allen Consulting 2000a; Irving et al. 2000).  
Australian wheat farmers repeatedly opposed this policy shift. When the potential 
deregulation of the export market was raised in 1992, the New South Wales Farmers’ 
Association conducted a series of six meetings, attended by 1,000 growers, where ‘straw 
polls’ showed less than 10 of the people in attendance, “…wanted to see the international 
grain traders muscle in on the Australian Wheat Board’s (AWB) single desk selling role” 
(The Sun-Herald 1992). Furthermore, the New South Wales Farmers’ Association reported 
that “distrust of international grain traders is widespread” (The Sun-Herald 1992). Support 
for the statutory marketing power of the AWB is echoed by Harold Flett, President of the 
Donald District of the Victorian Farmers Federation (VFF), who stated that “retention of the 
‘single desk’ seller status is critical” (The Donald-Birchip Times 1992), whereas Pat 
Trethowan, VFF Goulbourn Valley District President, claimed that the ‘single desk’ “is 
something growers want and will fight to the back teeth to protect it” (Riverine Herald 1992). 
Comments such as this reflect growers’ strong support for the AWB, particularly through the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, when the liberalisation of the wheat export market was raised as a 
possibility. Concern from growers about the potential deregulation of the domestic and also 
export wheat markets was highlighted in a survey published in July 1988 by National Farmer 
(1988), in which grain growers were asked the following question, among others: 
Do you favour more deregulation of the export marketing of Australian wheat? Yes – 12.8%; 
No – 81.2%; Undecided – 6.0% 
 
Although there is no information as to how many growers completed the survey, the 
indication from readers of the National Farmer is that opposition to deregulation remained 
steadfast. As grain grower Ross Flannery (The Land 1988) stated, few grain growers “want 
private traders to get a leg in the door”. According to Flannery “At present we have 15 buyers 
in the world and one seller in Australia. If the market was freed up we potentially have 
40,000 sellers but still only 15 buyers” (The Land 1988). However, rather than address the 
economic argument against deregulation of the wheat industry, groups representing grain 
growers focused on “inefficiencies” within the grain supply chain, or maintained an emphasis 
on “control” (O’Keeffe 2016c). Furthermore, farm organisations and the Federal Government 
directed their focus towards the subsidies provided to farmers in the EU and US, which they 
claimed undermined global markets and harmed Australian growers. For example, Clinton 
Condon, speaking to The Australian (1989), stated that “The opportunity exists at the 
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international level for governments to remove distortions which have plagued the 
international wheat trade…We all lose by interfering in free trade”. Ultimately, farm lobby 
groups (as distinct from farmers) legitimised the arguments around agricultural liberalisation, 
which were then used by policy makers to argue for wheat export market deregulation.  
The Canadian Government followed a similar, though much more rapid trajectory of wheat 
industry deregulation (Magnan 2015; Martin and Clapp 2015; Boaitey 2013; Coleman and 
Skogstad 1995). As mentioned by Magnan (2015, p.3), “Since 2006, the federal Conservative 
Government has pursued further neoliberalisation of the grains sector by stripping the 
Canadian Wheat Board of its marketing monopoly”. This shift is in addition to the 
termination of financial supports, programs and subsidies (Magnan 2015, p.3). As in 
Australia, the majority of Canadian growers supported their Wheat Board. In an attempt to 
show support for its existence, the Canadian Wheat Board polled growers, finding that 62% 
supported maintenance of statutory marketing (Waldie 2011). Despite this support, the 
government proceeded with deregulation of the wheat export market, and was subsequently 
met with a $17bn lawsuit from the group ‘Friends of the Canadian Wheat Board’. While there 
is limited research exploring the perspectives and experiences of Canadian wheat growers 
following this policy shift, Ian Robson, who is a Canadian farmer and also member of the 
Friends of the Canadian Wheat Board, has claimed that “[Deregulation] has never been about 
giving farmers more freedom […] It’s about making them compete against each other. With 
the Wheat Board, the price of wheat was as high as $9 a bushel. Now it’s almost half. And 
it’s difficult for smaller farmers to do their own marketing and financing. It’s not more 
freedom for farmers. It’s freedom for the people higher up in the system” (McDonald 2014). 
Similar concerns have been identified in Australian-based research exploring growers’ 
responses to the end of statutory wheat marketing. This research has found that farmers feel 
burdened with the additional workload associated with marketing (Head et al. 2011), while 
deregulation has undermined growers’ returns, increased the risks associated with marketing 
and led to farmers’ experiences of disempowerment and disenfranchisement (O’Keeffe and 
Neave 2017; Baker 2016; O’Keeffe 2014b). This is articulated by Martin and Clapp (2015, 
p.553), who state that the deregulation of the Australian and Canadian wheat markets “has 
meant that farmers who previously counted on the marketing board to help market grain are 
now expected to turn to commodity exchanges and large grain traders for marketing 
assistance and risk management”. O’Keeffe and Neave (2017) analyse how this is creating 
unequal power relations between traders and growers, many of whom feel disempowered and 
vulnerable. As discussed by O’Keeffe and Neave (2017), Martin and Clapp (2015) and 
Magnan (2011), the negative impacts on growers in Australia and Canada are particularly 
great for the small-to-medium sized producers.  
 
Wheat industry supply chains in Australia 
A key rationale for wheat export market deregulation was that competition in the export 
market would enhance competition in the wheat supply chain. This competition was claimed 
to result in cost savings, which would ultimately improve growers’ returns (Commonwealth 
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of Australia 2008a; Productivity Commission 2000a, 2000b; Allen Consulting 2000a; Irving 
et al. 2000). As I demonstrate below, this scenario has not eventuated. The figures, tables and 
writing included in pages 30-31 have been adapted from my article ‘Contestability in the 
Australian Wheat Industry’, which is included as Chapter 5 of this thesis.  I present this 
background information here to explain the wheat industry structure and evolution of this 
structure following deregulation.  
 
Figure 1: Australian wheat export supply chain 
 
 
 
                Grain Trader 
 
 
Figure 1 presents a basic outline of Australian wheat supply chains. In Australia, 
infrastructure servicing the wheat industry, including off-farm storage and handling, and port 
facilities, are controlled by three regionally-based bulk handling companies (BHCs) - CBH 
(Western Australia), Viterra (South Australia), and GrainCorp (eastern Australia, including 
Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland). Farmers producing wheat for export sell to 
grain traders which, in most cases, access this infrastructure to export this wheat to overseas 
markets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Farm Storage Port Customer 
Bulk 
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Figure 2: Privatisation and consolidation of Eastern Australia grain handling authorities.  
 
Grain Elevators Board Victoria   Vicgrain (1995) 
                                      GrainCorp (1999) 
Grain Handling Authority NSW  GrainCorp (1992) 
 
NSW Barley Board    
NSW Oats Marketing Board                 NSW GB (1991)      GrainCorp (2004) 
NSW Sorghum Board 
NSW Oilseeds Board 
                   Grainco (2000) 
Cent QLD Sorghum Board 
State Wheat Board (QLD)  Grainco (1991) 
Queensland Barley Board 
Bulk Grain Queensland 
 
Adapted from Essential Services Commission (2006, p.17). 
 
The BHCs’ ownership of storage, handling and ports stems from the privatisation of State-
based grain authorities in the 1990s and early 2000s. The grain authorities controlled State-
wide infrastructure networks, including grain handling, storage and port facilities. The 
privatised firms merged, causing further consolidation. As Figure 2 shows, GrainCorp 
emerged from the privatisation of 10 different boards and authorities across Victoria, New 
South Wales and Queensland. Thus, GrainCorp control infrastructure established and 
managed by these authorities. Similarly, Viterra (SA) and CBH (WA) control these segments 
of the wheat supply chain in their regions.  
 
Table 1: Bulk handling companies regional control of storage and handling, ports, and export 
markets.  
Supply chain segment 
CBH 
(WA) 
GrainCorp 
(eastern Australia) 
Viterra 
(SA) 
Market Share: up-
country 
Receives and stores 
approximately 90% of 
WA’s grain 
Handles approximately 
75% of east coast grain 
80% market share of SA 
up-country grain storage 
Market Share: port 
throughput (%) 100 80-90 100 
Market Share: export 
tonnage 
48% WA bulk exports 
(2012/13) 
28% eastern Australian 
exports (2012/13) 
46% SA exports 
(2012/13) 
Adapted from Stretch, Carter and Kingwell (2014, p.11). 
32 
 
Table 1 demonstrates how these BHCs have used this ownership of grain handling, storage 
and ports, either directly or indirectly, to develop market share. This table reflects a key 
problem of privatising vertically integrated, public authorities. The private companies 
emerging from privatisation, in many cases, control supply chains, including non-contestable 
facilities and infrastructure (ports and storage networks), and use this control to establish 
market share in the contestable segments of the supply chain (grain marketing). The potential 
for this scenario occurring was known when the wheat export market was deregulated, and 
was foreshadowed by Nationals Senator Barnaby Joyce, who argued against this policy shift 
in parliament (Commonwealth of Australia 2008b). Yet, as I suggest in Chapter 5, policy-
makers chose to rely instead upon a general interpretation of contestability theory, concluding 
that deregulation and privatisation would not restrict the competitiveness of the wheat 
market.  
 
 
Figure 3: Australian wheat export market concentration, 2009 to 2013. Data extrapolated 
from Australian Grain Growers (2014, p.3). Reproduced from O’Keeffe (2017b).  
 
However, as Figure 3 indicates, wheat export markets have become less competitive as the 
market has matured. The five most prominent wheat exporters have increased their market 
share, whereas the ‘other’ companies, which accounted for nearly 50% of Australian wheat 
exports in 2009, have seen this figure drop to 25% in 2013. At the State and regional level, 
market concentration is particularly high, as firms such as CBH, Glencore and GrainCorp 
focus their exporting activity in the regions where they control infrastructure. Wheat farmers 
who anticipated a greater level of competition following deregulation have argued that, as a 
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result of these regional monopolies developing, the number of wheat exporters operating at 
the local level is limited, giving firms considerable power over growers, who often have 
limited marketing skills and knowledge by comparison (O’Keeffe and Neave 2017).   
 
Recent investment in the Australian wheat export industry  
In recent years, there have been considerable investments in the Australian wheat industry. 
Table 2 includes the major investments occurring in this time, and explains which supply 
chain segments are central to these investments. These details are significant, as firms 
recognise that, if they are to develop a share of the export market, then it is essential to own 
supply chain infrastructure (O’Keeffe 2017c, 2016a). These investments are driven by firms’ 
desire to develop power through developing resources, and reduce dependencies upon the 
incumbent bulk handling companies. Firms such as GrainCorp and Viterra control bottleneck 
infrastructure such as ports, which are accessed by whole wheat growing regions. Competing 
grain traders are in the position where they must access these facilities, thereby contributing 
to the financial resources of their export competitors, or develop their own infrastructure.   
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Company 
 
Investment State Storage Ports Trading 
Bunge Limited Developing new ports at Bunbury and Geelong 
(Sprague 2014). 
WA, VIC  X  
Asciano Formed JV with Itochu, Albany Bulk Handling 
(Thompson 2012). 
WA  X  
Mitsui Acquired 25% of Plum Grove (Tasker 2012). 
 
WA   X 
Louis Dreyfus Acquired fertiliser company Ravensdown 
 
WA X X  
Louis Dreyfus  Formed JV with Mountain Industries (parent Asicano)  
 
NSW X   
Glencore Acquired Viterra in 2012 
 
SA X X X 
Glencore 32.5% interest in Newcastle Agri Terminal JV with 
CBH and Olam Grains Australia (Thompson 2015). 
NSW  X  
Olam Intl. Has a 32.5% interest in Newcastle Agri Terminal with 
Glencore (Thompson 2015) 
NSW  X  
Mitsubishi Acquired 80% equity in Olam Grains Australia (World 
Grain 2014a) and 20% ownership of Olam International 
(Terazono 2016). 
NSW  X  
Nidera Acquired controlling share in PentAG Commodities  
 
QLD   X 
Noble Group Quattro Ports JV with Qube Holdings  
 
NSW  X  
COFCO Acquired Noble Group and Nidera (World Grain 2016, 
2014b) 
 
Intl.  X X 
Sumitomo Acquired Emerald Grain in 2014 and owns Melbourne 
Port facilities, through 2005 acquisition of ABA 
(Binsted 2014). 
VIC X X X 
CHS Acquired 50% share in Broadbent Grain, which has 
since been renamed CHS Broadbent (Broadbent Grain 
2014). 
NSW X   
CHS  50:50 owner of Agfarm with Ruralco 
 
Aus.   X 
ADM Acquired Toepfer international (ADM 2014a) 
 
Intl.   X 
ADM Attempted to acquire GrainCorp.  NSW, VIC, 
QLD 
X X X 
Cargill Acquired AWB GrainFlow NSW, VIC, 
QLD 
X  X 
Wilmar Intl. Developed 50:50 JV with Gavilon, Wilmar Gavilon 
(Queensland Bulk Terminals 2017). 
QLD  X X 
Marubeni Parent company of Gavilon (Iwata 2015). 
 
QLD  X X 
Table 2: Recent company investments in Australian wheat storage, ports and marketing  
 
As Table 2 shows, this investment has come from transnational agri-food firms, which in 
many cases have sought to acquire or merge with firms controlling existing wheat industry 
infrastructure such as ports and storage facilities. For example, Glencore acquired Viterra, 
which itself had acquired the privatised bulk handler ABB in 2009 (Sydney Morning Herald 
2012; Australian Taxation Office 2010). This acquisition provided Glencore with ownership 
of the entire wheat supply chain in South Australia, one of Australia’s largest wheat 
producing states (Stretch, Carter and Kingwell 2013). In addition, a number of investments in 
smaller firms have been completed. Mitsui and Co, Salim Group and Seaboard have each 
acquired 25% of West Australian trading company Plum Grove (Tasker 2012; Brindal 2010). 
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Louis Dreyfus Commodities (Louis Dreyfus) acquired fertiliser company Ravensdown, 
giving the firms access to storage and a port berth in Western Australia (Cattle and Bettles 
2013). United States co-operative CHS acquired a 50% stake in NSW wheat storage and 
handling company Broadbent Grain (Heard and Marshall 2014). Dutch firm Nidera acquired 
a controlling stake in PentAG Commodities, then was subsequently acquired by Chinese firm 
COFCO (Marshall 2015). These investments increase the control of the large, transnational 
firms within the Australian wheat industry, while reducing the number of smaller market 
participants.  
Whereas this investment could be portrayed as evidence of increasing industry competition, 
the effect could be the opposite. The competition that is occurring is between oligopolistic 
transnational firms, which are acquiring smaller upstream firms to develop their power within 
the industry. Potentially, this kind of competition could lead to consolidation of ownership 
and capital within the industry, to the disadvantage of other industry participants, such as 
farmers.  
 
Geographic Expansion  
Companies investing in the Australian wheat industry are invariably large and well-
capitalised global firms, as shown in Table 3. As such, their investments into the Australian 
wheat industry should be viewed in the context of their function as global value chain 
managers (Clapp 2015a). 
 
Company Country Revenue  Net Income Market Cap Countries Active Employees 
ADM  United States 62.95bn 1.39bn 23.88bn 160 31,800 
Bunge  United States 44.88bn 532.00m 11.10bn 40 32,000 
Glencore  Switzerland 152.06bn -739.70m 54.68bn 50 110,380 
CHS Inc  United States 31.35bn 412.42m 379.82m 25 12,160 
Olam  Singapore 15.63bn 244.92m 4.15bn 70 18,040 
Wilmar  Singapore 42.84bn 1.09bn 16.01bn 50 93,000 
Mitsubishi  Japan 58.51bn 4.01bn 32.85bn 90 68,250 
Marubeni  Japan 64.88tn 1.41bn 10.83bn 67 39,910 
Sumitomo  Japan 36.40tn 1.56bn 16.39bn 67 66,860 
Mitsui  Japan 37.69tn 2.81bn 24.66bn 65 43,610 
Table 3: Profiles of publicly-listed firms investing in Australia’s wheat export industry. All 
financial figures converted to USD. Data sourced from company websites and the Financial 
Times (www.ft.com). Company information correct as of June 13 2017. Currency 
conversions conducted on June 13 2017, using www.xe.com. As information on Cargill, 
Louis Dreyfus and COFCO is not publicly available, these firms are not included in this 
table.  
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Firms portray their geographic expansion into new regions and, subsequently, new markets, 
as central to the development of their global value chains. As described by ADM (2016a, 
p.4), “The Company’s strategy involves expanding the volume and diversity of crops that it 
merchandises and processes, expanding the global reach of its core model, and expanding its 
value-added product portfolio”. In that regard, the recently deregulated Australian wheat 
industry is viewed as a site for geographic expansion, to be subsumed into their global value 
chains. Similarly, Bunge CEO Soren Schroder describes his company’s recent Australian 
investments as the final “piece” in the puzzle of Bunge’s global footprint (Singh 2015a). In 
that regard, the development of global value chains is outlined as an operating strategy, and 
geographic expansion enables the firm to extend this strategy. Potentially, firms may use this 
type of global expansion to reduce supply risks, and to ensure ongoing access to 
commodities. Furthermore, this development enables firms to connect exporting regions to 
new consumer markets, through their value chains. This interpretation implies that the value 
created through global value chains is derived solely from the trade in physical commodities. 
The puzzle, in this regard, involves sourcing wheat from all possible wheat producing 
regions.  
Firms describe their investments in relation to Australia’s proximity to lucrative consumer 
markets in Asia (Reuters 2015, Singh 2015a, 2015b; ADM 2014b, 2013). Thus, the 
Australian wheat industry, by virtue of its closeness to growing consumer markets, becomes a 
significant site of contestation. Global value chain managers compete for the Australian 
market to feed upstream segments of their global value chains and develop their position 
within Asian markets. Despite their considerable scope and scale, firms such as Bunge and 
Louis Dreyfus have a relatively small presence in Asia (Bunge 2017; Louis Dreyfus 2017). 
Thus, developing a strong presence in Australia is an important aspect of developing the 
capacity to fully capitalise upon consumer growth in Asia.  
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Production 
 
Exports 
 
Imports 
 Country Value (1000 
tonnes 
Country Value (1000 
tonnes) 
Country Value (1000 
tonnes) 
China 126,215 United States 33,198 Egypt 10,331 
India 95,850 Canada 19,808 Brazil 7,630 
Russia 59,711 France 19,639 China 7,572 
United States 55,147 Australia 18,002 Indonesia 7,074 
France 38,950 Russia 13,746 Japan 6,520 
Canada 29,281 Germany 8,224 Algeria 6,343 
Germany 27,785 Ukraine 7,762 Italy 6,324 
Pakistan 25,979 India 6,504 United States 5,491 
Australia 25,503 Kazakhstan 5,023 Germany 5,421 
Ukraine 24,114 Romania 4,773 South Korea 4,906 
Table 4: World’s 10 largest wheat producers, exporters and importers: 2013/2014. Data 
sourced from the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations Database 
(http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#home). 
 
Wheat production has an important geographical dimension. As Table 4 shows, China and 
India are the largest two wheat producing countries by a substantial margin, yet produce 
wheat primarily for highly populated domestic markets. In contrast, Australia is the ninth 
largest wheat producer, yet is the fourth largest exporter. The geographical significance of 
Australian wheat production is further highlighted in Table 3, which shows that three of the 
largest five wheat importers - China, Indonesia and Japan - are located in Asia. Australia is 
the only major exporting nation in close proximity. Thus, the deregulation of the Australian 
wheat export market in 2008 provided firms with a new territory, close to key Asian markets. 
For the ABCD companies (ADM, Bunge, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus) in particular, Australian 
deregulation represents new opportunities, both in terms of wheat sourcing and capturing a 
share of high value retail markets. This process extends the global reach of these firms, as 
well as the value that they are able to appropriate through moving wheat through value chains 
towards the final product. In addition to the value created through physical commodities, 
many of the largest transnational agri-food corporations, such as Cargill, ADM, Bunge and 
Louis Dreyfus, derive a significant percentage of their revenue from their participation in 
financial markets (Murphy, Burch and Clapp 2012; Salerno 2017). These firms actively 
speculate in commodities markets and farmland through subsidiaries which leverage their 
parent companies’ knowledge of commodity stocks and markets (Isakson 2014; Salerno 
2017; Murphy et al. 2012). Thus, an integral part of value creation for agri-food corporations 
is the development of information, through their geographic expansion into new regions and 
markets, and their integration throughout entire value chains (Isakson 2014; Salerno 2017; 
Murphy et al. 2012). In this regard, the deregulation of markets such as the wheat export 
market in Australia provides firms with multiple new avenues for growth and value creation.  
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Summary 
In this thesis I examine the deregulation of the wheat export market as an example of the 
broader neoliberalisation of Australian society. This approach is necessary, as the 
mechanisms which have driven wheat export market deregulation are not specific to the 
wheat industry, or agriculture. I argue that this shift has occurred as the role of the State has 
been re-constructed to facilitate the extension of private firms into aspects of Australian 
society previously thought of as the domain of the public. As I show in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 in 
particular, policy makers have justified this shift, by appealing to the belief that firms, 
moderated by markets, are best equipped to raise the performance of Australian industries 
and, therefore, improve the nation’s economic performance. Connected to this shift, is the 
role of the citizen as consumer, as a powerful actor in the process of establishing the most 
successful, most efficient firms. In this role, the citizen as consumer values that which firms 
can provide in liberalised markets. In addition, the consumer and their welfare are prioritised 
over producers, such as wheat farmers.  
Thus, the deregulation of the wheat market is framed as a necessary shift, by policy makers 
arguing that encouraging the participation of firms in this market will enhance efficiency and 
the wheat industry’s contribution to the national economy. This policy change was made 
possible through a very specific construction of markets, firms and consumers, one in which 
knowledge, values and identities were reshaped to bring them into accord with the 
construction. The kinds of knowledge that could be counted as legitimate, I argue throughout 
this thesis, were constructed narrowly, as specifically quantitative information (such as wheat 
prices and costs), produced in markets. Specific policy values, such as efficiency, competition 
and individualism, were privileged over potentially competing values, such as equity, 
stability and security. Particular constructions of the identities of firms, consumers and 
farmers are also integral to this policy change. For example, large, transnational firms were 
portrayed as integral to maximising the performance of the wheat industry, through their 
superior efficiencies, scale and responsiveness to consumer needs. In this reality, wheat 
export market deregulation was portrayed by policy makers as common sense.   
However, as I argue in chapters 9, 10 and 11, this construction needed to be made 
operational. To cast light on the process by which the construction was operationalised, I 
draw particularly on the concept of governmentality as a theory of neoliberalism, to highlight 
how technologies of agency and performance were used by policy makers to make 
deregulation of the wheat export market possible. Audit, cost-benefit analysis, performance 
objectives and econometric modelling were introduced from the 1980s onwards, ostensibly to 
make the AWB more accountable. However, these technologies of government were used to 
govern the industry by establishing the maximisation of wheat growers’ returns as the only 
legitimate purpose of statutory wheat marketing policy. In addition, technologies of agency 
were employed through instruments such as the structural adjustment policies, the Howard 
Governments’ Agriculture-Advancing Australian policy and latterly, the Agricultural 
Competitiveness White Paper, to construct ‘good’ farming behaviour in terms of actions 
associated with entrepreneurial, self-reliant individuals, who were primarily concerned with 
maximising their returns. Thus, consistent with this construction, policy makers claimed that 
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wheat export market deregulation was in farmers’ interests. In addition, firms were framed as 
the actors which were best equipped to maximise farmers’ returns.  
As I argue in Chapter 12, this portrayal did not adequately consider firms’ capacity to exert 
power in markets. Underpinned by policy makers’ conception of competition in terms of 
contestability, which is concerned with potential, rather than actual, competition, wheat 
export market deregulation has resulted in consolidated markets featuring transnational firms 
such as Cargill, ADM and Glencore. These firms have sought to develop their position in the 
Australian wheat export market through influencing policy making and engaging in supply 
chain management strategies such as mergers and acquisitions, to build and protect market 
share. In this regard, the deregulation of the wheat export market has enabled firms to expand 
their global value chains, whereas the monopoly of the AWB has essentially been replaced by 
regional monopolies and oligopolies controlled by private firms.  
In Chapter 13, I draw the articles I have completed for this research together, and examine the 
key themes emerging in this work. I draw parallels between the deregulation of the wheat 
export market, and other areas of Australian policy, such as employment, to critically reflect 
on the rationality which has underpinned the neoliberalisation of Australian society. I 
challenge the notion of the ‘business-friendly environment’ as a necessary precursor to a 
prosperous and happy society, and instead argue that this construction has been used to 
transfer power from the public sphere, to the private sphere.  
 
Reflecting on the thesis format 
This research examines the changing agricultural policy within Australia in the context of 
such large-scale trends. I use this research to shed light on why this shift towards deregulation 
occurred, how it was made possible, and whose interests are served by this shift. The 
multifaceted character of this research has required me to draw upon a number of different 
schools of thought, including economic geography, political economy and organisational 
theory. To enable appropriate consideration of the insights from these different approaches, 
and to address the different research questions arising from this work, I have structured the 
PhD research into a series of discrete research projects, each designed to produce one or more 
individual articles.  These individual articles, taken together, contribute to the broader 
argument of this thesis, which explores how agricultural policy change in Australia has been 
engineered in the interests of global agribusiness. This reflects Dowling, Gorman-Murrary, 
Power and Luzia’s (2012, p.295) suggestion that a PhD by Publication is best suited to 
doctoral research which “consisted of discrete schemes each of which spoke to a broader 
theme”. 
I use the PhD by Publication format as a means of conducting the multidisciplinary research 
necessary to develop a comprehensive, coherent response to the research questions posed at 
the outset of this work. This method has also enabled me to respond to new ideas and 
theoretical approaches as these have emerged throughout the course of this research. For 
example, I did not envisage that I would be drawing upon sociology of quantification 
literature until my research revealed that quantification was potentially being used by policy 
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makers to narrow debate around the wheat industry. Furthermore, I had not anticipated that I 
would be citing constructions of the ‘good farmer’, and analysing these discursive formations 
as a key shifting in enabling wheat industry deregulation. The PhD by Publication format 
made it possible to adapt the research programme to take better advantage of these kinds of 
emergent insights that always form a key dimension of doctoral research. 
My use of this format then caused me to consider how to best write a discussion and 
conclusion which did not simply repeat the points raised in the discussion and conclusion 
sections of the individual articles. I approached these chapters as an opportunity, not only to 
draw the points raised in each of the articles together, but to conduct a deeper analysis of 
what can be extrapolated from these articles as a connected and coherent body of work. Thus, 
I approached the discussion and conclusion sections by treating my articles as ‘data’. This 
approach enabled me to identify themes emerging in the articles which are not necessarily 
apparent when interpreting the articles as individual pieces. This cross-article analysis allows 
me to reach beyond the findings of the individual articles, to develop new findings that only 
become visible when surveying the entire body of work as an integrated whole. This process 
is similar in some ways to that used when analysing interview data, for example. 
Individually, interview data might reveal important insights, as articulated by different 
participants. However, drawing this interview data together then allows a researcher to 
develop a richer picture of this data and what it might reveal. My approach to the PhD by 
Publication is methodologically innovative in approaching its knowledge synthesis in a 
manner that is not currently reflected in the emerging literature on the PhD by Publication 
model.   
As other student reflections on the PhD by Publication format have shown, this approach to 
doctoral research can be used as a learning tool (Robins and Kanowski 2008; Jackson 2013; 
Grant 2011). The process of submitting articles to journals in diverse fields such as economic 
and cultural geography, political economy, business and organisational theory, has enabled 
me to engage with journal referees in each of these fields. Regular editor and referee 
feedback has helped improve my understanding of these research areas, as well as respond to 
the suggestions of disciplinarily diverse reviewers and practice tailoring my writing to 
different audiences.  
Finally, the PhD by Publication emphasises the need to publish. Robins and Kanowski (2008) 
and Jackson (2013) in particular, writing as Australian postgraduate students, cite the value of 
this format in improving publication outputs and therefore employability in a competitive job 
market. This publication focus is a motivation for publishing throughout my candidature. 
However, reflecting on my attempts to create a competitive publishing record during my 
candidature, it is hard to escape the sense that my conduct, as with the farmers that I study in 
this research, has been governed by quantitative performance measures such as publication 
statistics. As much as there is a genuine use of the PhD by Publication as a scholarly tool to 
improve my PhD research, the need to publish, for PhD candidates hoping to find 
employment in academia, is inescapable.   
Ball (2012, p.17), talks about his shift from being “produced and formed as a welfare state 
academic subject” to a “neoliberal academic subject”, stating that: 
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We are burdened with the responsibility to perform and if we do not we are in danger of being 
seen as irresponsible. Performativity is a moral system that subverts and re-orients us to its 
ends. It makes us responsible for our performance and for the performance of others. There 
are two technologies at play here turning us into governable subjects – a technology of agency 
and a technology of performance. 
 
In this regard, for Australian PhD candidates competing for increasingly scarce employment 
in academia, it can be irresponsible not to perform, and the performance of PhD students is 
most visible through publications (Jackson 2013; Dowling 2008; Park 2005; Boud and Lee 
2005). As Sutton (2017, p.626) states, the culture of measurement and performance 
assessment is shaping how academic labour can be understood. A PhD candidature can be 
considered as part of that labour (Park 2005, pp.190-191), with the PhD by Publication a 
means through which research students can improve their contribution to the “research 
productivity of the performative university” (Boud and Lee 2009, p.7). As described by 
Dowling et al. (2012, pp.293-294), “the PhD by publication offers insight into the production 
of researchers in the contemporary academy”. In this regard, while a PhD by Publication may 
be unusual in comparison with the traditional thesis as one singular document, it is an 
approach which is entirely consistent with the performative university.  
However, this context then creates challenges for the student researcher, particularly if their 
work is critical of the neoliberalisation of one or more aspects of their society, as my work is. 
According to Dowling (2008, p.814), “Corporatism and neoliberalism are not simply 
parachuted into contexts like universities; they are enacted, performed and contested”. I am 
proud of my publishing record throughout my candidature. At the same time, it is also hard to 
escape the sense that, to an extent, my approach to this work has been governed by what is 
constructed as valuable, or countable, in the neoliberalised higher education context in 
Australia. This governance framework causes me to reflect on my identity as a researcher and 
my adaptation to this environment and, ultimately, whether my decision to complete a PhD 
by Publication is governed by the technologies of performance, such as benchmarking, 
performance measurement and audit, which I analyse critically throughout my work. In other 
words, am I engaging in some kind of performative contradiction, enacting and performing 
neoliberalism? Ball (2016, p.1050) highlights this dilemma of the performative university, 
stating: 
These technologies and the reform process […] are not simply changes in the way we do 
things or get things done. They change what it means to be educated, what it means to teach 
and learn, what it means to be a teacher. They do not just change what we do; they also 
change who we are, how we think about what we do, how we relate to one another, how we 
decide what is important and what is acceptable, what is tolerable. As I have said already – 
these changes are both out there, in the system, the institution; and ‘in here’, in our heads and 
in our souls. 
 
At its core, my PhD research is focused on critically analysing the neoliberalisation of 
Australian agriculture, by specifically focusing on the deregulation of the Australian wheat 
industry. I challenge constructions of competition, efficiency and productivity, and analyse 
42 
 
the State’s use of technologies of agency and performance in particular, to govern individuals 
‘at a distance’, and to shape what matters in this policy context.  
Yet in adapting to my position as a precariously employed sessional tutor and PhD candidate, 
my own decisions and sense of value in myself as a researcher have been governed to 
emphasise my own productive outputs. The presents a challenge to my ‘soul’, as Ball (2003) 
might say. My research is intrinsically tied to my sense of who I am and the values I 
represent. My publications retain my sense of justice. Yet my individualistic, neoliberalised 
self exploits these values through publication that enhances my quantifiable value as a 
researcher, and my contribution to my university. It is striking to note that, in many of the 
student accounts of their own experiences of the PhD by Publication, the authors highlight 
their achievements by measuring their outputs in statistical terms, particularly through 
numbers of publications completed throughout their candidature (Jackson 2013; Grant 2011; 
Robins and Kanowski 2008). My concern is that the PhD by Publication, however beneficial 
and appropriate for my approach to this research, could lead to a re-shaping of what it is to be 
a PhD Candidate, and may reflect an addition area of expansion for the performative 
university.  
Further research is needed to understand how the PhD by Publication is used and experienced 
by PhD candidates choosing this approach in the social sciences. For the purposes of this 
research, I am using this approach to address economic restructuring in Australia and the case 
study of wheat export market deregulation, through a range of different lenses, each 
employed in a series of discreet articles. These articles comprise Chapters 5 to 12 of this 
thesis. The discussion, Chapter 13, draws upon these articles as a form of ‘data’, which I 
draw together to understand and analyse the broader implications of what these articles, as a 
body of work, can reveal.  
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
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Introduction 
This thesis addresses the case study of wheat export market deregulation in Australia, by 
analysing how this shift was made possible, what the purpose of this shift may have been, and 
what this reveals about the broader restructuring of Australian society. This chapter examines 
existing literature on wheat export market deregulation which has focused upon evaluating 
the efficiency gains and returns to growers resulting from this shift. This literature is 
underpinned by the logic that, if growers’ returns are shown to be increased by liberalisation 
of the wheat market, then this policy change is justified. However, I suggest that this issue is 
more complex. Therefore, in this chapter I develop a theoretical framework for analysing 
how this policy shift was implemented, how the focus of this policy has been narrowed and 
why. 
This chapter commences by drawing upon scholarly and governmental literature on wheat 
export market deregulation, to analyse the conceptualisation of this issue in academic and 
policy discourses. Following this, I analyse the concept of governmentality as offering a 
helpful lens for examining this policy change. I draw upon postructuralist discourse analyses 
for developing a theoretical approach to understanding the construction of policy truths such 
as competition, efficiency, the individual and the consumer. I then use literature examining 
technologies of performance and agency, and quantification, which I suggest have been 
applied by policy makers to make society governable, particularly in the case of the 
Australian wheat industry. Finally, I examine resource dependency theory as an approach for 
analysing firms’ use of corporate political action and supply chain management strategies to 
develop power over policy makers and markets.  
I conclude this chapter by analysing what research is needed to better understand the issue of 
wheat export market deregulation, and how the articles contributing to this thesis aim to 
address these gaps in the literature on this topic. It should be noted that this Chapter draws 
upon the more detailed analyses included within each of the articles presented from Chapters 
5 to 12. 
 
How wheat export market deregulation has been analysed  
Research analysing the Australian wheat industry deregulation is dominated by agricultural 
economists focusing either upon wheat price changes, or supply chain costs, including costs 
incurred by statutory marketing to growers and the broader community (Mugera et al. 2016; 
Williams 2012; McCorriston and MacLaren 2007; Chang et al. 2003; Watson 1999; Wait and 
Ahmadi-Esfahani 1996). This research addresses the AWB’s claim that it used countervailing 
power to deliver premium wheat prices to growers (McCorriston and MacLaren 2007; Chang 
et al. 2003; Watson 1999). This claim is portrayed by Watson (1999, p.429) as the only 
legitimate justification for statutory wheat marketing.  
My research examines the strength of this argument. Studies such as Mugera et al. (2016); 
McCorriston and MacLaren (2007) and Chang et al. (2003) are underpinned by the 
assumption that statutory marketing deprives growers of choice and freedom, and therefore 
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prevents individual growers from using their self-interest to seek the best prices from the 
market. Williams (2012) and Mugera et al. (2016) have measured wheat price changes 
subsequent to deregulation in 2008, concluding that there is minimal evidence that any 
negative observations, such as reduced wheat prices and market volatility, can be attributed to 
deregulation. Whereas Mugera et al.’s (2016) research is an interesting analysis of shifting 
wheat prices in a West Australian context, work such as this assumes that all growers will 
have an equal opportunity to analyse and respond to market signals. Furthermore, in 
measuring changes in average prices, this literature may provide a distorted picture, as some 
growers with the resources to employ marketing expertise may have achieved above average 
prices, while other, less-resourced farmers may have struggled to cope with the demands of 
wheat marketing.   
Associated with this literature are government-initiated inquiries analysing the effect of 
regulation upon supply chain costs. This literature estimates the financial costs of regulation 
upon industry (Centre for International Economics 2005; Allen Consulting 2000a; 
Productivity Commission 2000a; Industries Assistance Commission 1989; Royal 
Commission into Grain Storage, Handling and Transport 1988). Regulation is constructed by 
these studies as a barrier which imposes a clearly definable cost upon industry participants, 
such as farmers. At the core of such work is the presumption that removing these regulatory 
barriers will encourage the organic development of competition. In turn, it is assumed that 
competition will reduce supply chain costs. Deregulation is therefore portrayed as a policy 
shift offering immediate financial gains for growers. The 1988 Royal Commission into Grain 
Storage Handling and Transport (1988) first addressed this issue, claiming that deregulation 
of the state-based wheat supply chains would save growers $10 for every tonne of wheat they 
sold.  
In more recent years, similar research has been conducted by Allen Consulting (2000a) and 
the Centre for International Economics (2005), each as part of government initiated inquiries 
into wheat export marketing. Using econometric modelling, Allen Consulting (2000a) 
predicted that deregulation of the wheat export market would lead to industry gains of up to 
$223 million per year. This research effectively serves two key purposes. First, it portrays 
regulation as imposing a cost upon growers and the Australian community. This argument 
implies that this regulation necessarily must be measured by the standard of whether it 
provides a financial benefit exceeding such a cost. However, the benefits that growers 
attribute to statutory wheat marketing are less easily quantified, and cannot be ascribed solely 
to monetary values. In placing a monetary value on regulation and identifying the potential 
savings that individual growers can expect, this work aims to persuade growers of the 
benefits of deregulation, as much as it aims to convey to policy makers what this policy shift 
could achieve. Despite the assumptions and value judgments inherent within this kind of 
research, these projections are presented as incontrovertible, factual information and used as 
such by policy makers to strengthen their claims that statutory marketing served little 
purpose, and deregulation would deliver substantial costs savings and financial benefits.   
As I show in this section, wheat export market deregulation has been examined in scholarly 
and government literature primarily through the lens of changes to wheat prices and supply 
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chain costs. However, I suggest that this research presents a narrowed conception of the 
wheat industry and of what matters in relation to this industry. Thus, I suggest that a different 
approach is needed to understand this shift in all its complexity.  
 
Is there a better approach?  
The deregulation of Australian wheat marketing is relatively unexplored by geographers or 
rural sociologists, who are otherwise well positioned to analyse these policy changes. While 
there has been a wealth of literature from Australian rural sociologists and geographers 
exploring the effects of deregulation upon rural communities and farmers in the past few 
decades (Argent 2005; Vanclay 2003; Gray and Lawrence 2001a; Tonts and Jones 1997; 
McKenzie 1994; Lawrence 1987), wheat export market deregulation is yet to be addressed on 
its own merits. Sociologists provide glimpses of the effect of wheat export market 
deregulation, often in the context of broader studies that explore social capital (Talbot and 
Walker 2007), or farmers’ experience of climate change (Head, Atchison, Gates and Muir 
2011). These studies point to issues arising from deregulation without, however, fully 
allowing deregulation to take centre stage, and thereby open a problem space that demands 
further attention.  
The concept of governmentality offers a lens through which questions around Australian 
economic restructuring can be understood in relation to rural, regional and agricultural policy 
change (Dufty-Jones 2015; Argent 2011; Gibson, Dufty, Phillips and Smith 2008; Cheshire 
and Lawrence 2005; Larner 2005; Higgins and Lockie 2002). The deregulation of the wheat 
export market could be interpreted as a simple transition from government regulation of 
markets to market liberalisation. This depiction of wheat market deregulation, which is 
reflected in the agricultural economics literature on this topic, implies that the 
neoliberalisation of agriculture is understood as the withdrawal of State intervention in 
markets and the reduction of State assistance for farmers. This process is characterised by 
Peck and Tickell (2002) as “roll-back” neoliberalism, most notably employed in the 1980s by 
the British and United States Governments of Thatcher and Reagan, though also by the 
Hawke and Keating Governments of the late-1980s and early-1990s in Australia. However, 
as Peck and Tickell (2002, p.384) have argued, in the time since: 
[…] the agenda has gradually moved from one preoccupied with the active destruction and 
discreditation of Keynesian-welfarist and social-collectivist institutions (broadly defined) to 
one focused on the purposeful construction and consolidation of neoliberalised state forms, 
modes of governance, and regulatory relations. 
 
According to Peck and Tickell (2002), this second-wave of neoliberalism resembles a 
program of re-regulation, or “roll-out neoliberalism”. Whereas “roll-back” neoliberalism 
suggests the withdrawal of government control of social and economic life, “roll-out” 
neoliberalism has come to resemble “a range of rationalities and techniques that seek to 
govern without governing society, to govern through regulated choices made by discrete and 
autonomous actors” (Rose 1996, p.328). These techniques, operationalised by neoliberalism, 
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are described by Rose (1993, pp.294-295) as including “monetarisation, marketisation, 
enhancement of the powers of the consumer, financial accountability and audit”. These 
technologies derive their power from their apparent disinterest and harmlessness (Miller and 
Rose 1991). Although they imply a level of distance from the State, governmentality theorists 
argue these technologies are instead used by the State to shape the conduct, the behaviour, the 
attitudes and values of its citizens.  
In using this approach, I consider wheat export market deregulation as a project which was 
implemented by policy makers over three decades. To make deregulation possible, policy 
makers needed to construct a reality in which this shift appeared to be common-sense. The 
role of discourse is shaping values, identities and knowledge which accorded with the 
rationality of markets and which understood markets as the producers and communicators of 
value. In drawing on the work of Miller and Rose (2008, 1991, 1990), Rose (1996, 1993), 
Dean (1999), Higgins (2002a, 2002b) and others, I aim to build upon previous research which 
critically analyses the development of regional policy, through exploring the development of 
discourse (Lockie and Higgins 2007; Cheshire and Lawrence 2005; Liepins and Bradshaw 
2003; Liepins 1996; Sharp and Richardson 2001). 
 
Creating a governable reality  
The case of Australian wheat marketing policy, across the past 30 years, is a particularly 
interesting one. The industry has ostensibly been deregulated, implying the withdrawal of the 
State. It could be argued that the deregulation of the wheat export market is made possible 
through the simple retraction of State support. However, as I will argue particularly in 
chapters 9, 10 and 11, deregulation is not so easily explained. Rather than conceptualising 
deregulation in terms of a simple absence of regulation, I draw on governmentality research 
and its associated analysis of how governmental technologies of agency and performance 
have been employed to make society amenable to governing. In particular, I explore the 
construction of individuals - in particular, farmers – as well as policy values and 
organisations, as part of this changing environment.  
 
Technologies of Agency 
The collectivism which underpinned Australian agricultural policy following the Second 
World War was increasingly rejected in the 1980s. In turn, the agrarianism which reflected 
the identity of the Australian farmers also changed significantly (Cheshire and Lawrence 
2005). Rather than upholding values of cooperation and mateship, farmers were encouraged – 
particularly through emerging policy discourses – to view themselves as individuals (Botterill 
2009; Lockie 2009; Cheshire and Lawrence 2005; Herbert-Cheshire and Lawrence 2005; 
Gray and Lawrence 2001b). Individualism and self-reliance were portrayed as long-held 
farming traits, though these were re-shaped to reflect independence from government support 
(Cockfield and Botterill 2012a; 2012b; Botterill 2009). Associated with this change is the 
individualisation of risk, and the development of the concept of individual responsibility 
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(Cheshire and Lawrence 2005; Herbert-Cheshire and Lawrence 2005; Gray and Lawrence 
2001b; Herbert-Cheshire 2000). This individualism of risk and responsibility operated to 
ensure that farmers understood their successes and failures as being due to their own 
individual capacities as a farmer (Cheshire and Lawrence 2005). Such a shift in farming 
identity should be viewed in conjunction with a broader policy shift from an emphasis on co-
operation, towards a focus on the priorities of competition and efficiency.  
Dean (1999, p. 167-169) argues that this construction of the self-governing individual is 
made possible through the implementation of political technologies, such as technologies of 
agency. Similar to technologies of empowerment, which aim to shape attitudes and 
behaviours under the guise of empowerment, technologies of agency encourage people to 
accept responsibility and become self-reliant through building and exercising agency 
(Herbert-Cheshire 2000; Larner 2000). This discursive construction re-shapes the role of 
government to be a facilitator of skill development, encouraging people to become active 
citizens (Herbert-Cheshire and Higgins 2004; Larner 2000; Rose 1996). Pritchard and Tonts 
(2011) outline how technologies of agency encourage the practicing of freedoms, yet 
carefully construct the freedoms that can be practiced, and how they are practiced. McKee 
(2008) posits that, although this shift is purported to transfer power from the State to the 
individual, the State in fact positions itself as an enabler, shaping the conduct of the 
individual. This approach has been applied in an agricultural context, most fruitfully by 
Higgins (2005, 2002a, 2002b, 2001b). In analysing the Agriculture – Advancing Australia 
package implemented by the Howard Government in the late-1990s, Higgins argued that, 
rather than withdrawing assistance from agriculture, as is commonly believed, this package 
instead re-shaped assistance to encourage farmers to adopt an economically rational approach 
to their farm practice (2001, p.324). This work develops the conceptualisation of farmers as 
self-reliant and individualistic. Higgins (2005, 2002a, 2002b, 2001b) shows that, while the 
individualisation of farmers represents a shift away State responsibility for farmers, this 
should be seen as a step towards the operationalisation of farmers, through the use of 
technologies of agency. In Chapters 9 and 10, I build upon this analysis by extending it to 
understand more recent policy shifts, including the deregulation of the wheat export market.  
 
Technologies of Performance 
From exploring the shaping of individual conduct in Chapters 9 and 10, in Chapter 11 I turn 
to the shaping of organisations’ conduct - in particular, the AWB and farm lobby groups. 
Throughout the 1980s, policy makers sought to measure and assess the AWB’s performance 
as a statutory marketer of wheat. The AWB’s lack of objectives was framed as a problem, as 
this prevented governments from measuring its success in meeting these objectives. Thus, 
technologies of government, such as performance objectives (the maximisation of growers’ 
returns), evaluation, audit, cost-benefit analysis and econometric modelling were introduced 
by policy makers to govern the AWB. Policy makers’ attempts to construct performance 
objectives to reflect emerging policy truths of efficiency and cost-effectiveness is an 
important development in the deregulation process, which is under-developed in literature on 
agricultural deregulation in Australia. I suggest that the concept of governmentality provides 
49 
 
an important framework for understanding this shift, particularly drawing upon Dean’s 
(1999) conception of technologies of performance. As described by Dean (1999, p.169), 
“technologies of performance, then, are utilised from above, as an indirect means of 
regulating agencies, of transforming professionals into ‘calculating individuals’ within 
‘calculable spaces’, subject to particular ‘calculative regimes’”. Therefore, whereas 
technologies such as auditing and benchmarking are ostensibly used to increase transparency 
and accountability, Dean (1999) and others such as Power (1996), Higgins et al. (2015) and 
Miller and Rose (1990) have suggested that these instruments are designed to coerce and 
control. 
In this regard, governmentality theorists argue that technologies of performance enable 
society to be governed ‘at a distance’, through monitoring and controlling the minute actions 
of individuals and organisations (Penny 2016; Higgins et al. 2015; Russell and Frame 2013; 
Miller and Rose 2008; Swyngedouw 2005; Higgins and Lockie 2002; Dean 1999). These 
simple and apparently neutral technologies are used to govern behaviour, through 
establishing norms or expectations which legitimise certain behaviours, and then monitor and 
assess the capacity of actors to perform according to these norms (Larner 2006; O’Malley et 
al. 1997; Rose 1993; Miller and Rose 1990). For example, this could include the norms of the 
market, to which individuals, as moral, risk-averse and economically rational actors, must 
conform (Larner 2006). In the case of wheat export marketing, this could include the 
construction of legitimate behaviour as the maximising of returns, and in relation to farm 
practice, the maximisation of productivity. Throughout this thesis, though particularly in 
Chapters 9 and 10, I explore the use of these technologies in shaping farmers as individuals. 
However, in Chapter 11, I draw on governmentality research into the use of technologies of 
performance to coerce the AWB into a focus on maximising growers’ returns. In particular, 
audit is a key technology used by Government in this process.  
Audit is used by governments as a technology of performance, designed to facilitate 
legitimate behaviours (Miller and Rose 2008; Dean 1999). In ‘The Audit Society’, Power 
(1996) illustrates audit as a mechanism for governing the conduct of organisations. Power 
(1996, p.289) describes audit as a process of “making things auditable”. According to Power, 
this process first involves the construction of a legitimised knowledge base, which is 
amenable to audit, and the development of environments which recognise and accept this 
knowledge base. Regarding public authorities, policy objectives, audit and benchmarking 
become central to the governance of conduct (Rochford 2008; Power 2000, 1996). For 
example, in the case of wheat export marketing, this might include the use of audit to 
measure the AWB’s ability to provide growers with premium prices, while reducing the cost 
of this activity to domestic consumers. Thus, if audit is being used to measure the AWB’s 
performance against this objective, then the AWB is compelled to focus on improving its 
performance according to these measures.  
As Power (1996, 1997) discusses, auditing assumes the existence of auditable ‘facts’. 
Quantification of social phenomena creates these facts, through definition, measurement and 
analysis. This is an important step in constructing what ‘matters’ in policy terms. This 
construction entails creating objectives and benchmarks, and instruments for interpreting and 
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assessing performance according to these standards (Diaz-Bone and Didier 2016; Desrosieres 
2014, 2011; Rochford 2008; Swyngedouw 2005). Quantification, and its reductionist, 
depersonalising approach, is central to this. As analysed by Rose (1991, p.676), “To exercise 
power over events and processes distant from oneself it is necessary to turn them into traces 
that can be mobilised and accumulated”. According to Rose (1991, p.676), “Events must be 
inscribed in standardised forms, the inscriptions transported from far and wide and 
accumulated in a central locale, where they can be aggregated, compared, compiled and 
calculated”. This simplifies the phenomena in question, creating distance between the 
governed and the governing, while enabling the State to monitor the performance and 
individuals and organisations, whose actions are guided by the performance measures which 
they are subject to.  
As quantification has developed in prominence, quantification of the social world has become 
established in many instances as a process for creating acceptable knowledge (Russell & 
Frame 2013; Russell and Thompson 2009; Scott 1998; Power 1996). This knowledge is 
constructed as acceptable, as it is presented as being free of subjective judgment (Le Gales 
2016). It is rational, depersonalised, objective and neutral (Pritchard 2005a). In that sense, the 
numbers created through quantification are held as having power unto themselves - they 
create a reality which is taken to be self-evident (Espeland and Stevens 2008). Governments 
are then able to use these numbers as a simplified, yet disinterested, unequivocal 
representation of reality, and act upon this knowledge to create policy which governs society 
(Friedberg 2013; Espeland and Stevens 2008; Scott 1998). The construction of quantitative 
data as neutral and objective is challenged by Le Gales (2016, pp.516-517), for example, who 
argues that how the objects of measurement are defined guides how they are measured. 
Numbers, in that sense, are used to convey a dispassionate interpretation of reality, yet in 
essence the process of determining how numbers are produced is itself dependent upon 
opinion, judgement and subjective interpretation. In that sense, numbers are not neutral, and 
the reality that they are often used to portray is not self-evident (Espeland and Stevens 2008).  
Yet, in the debate around wheat export marketing, supply chain costs and wheat prices, for 
example, are portrayed by policy makers in precisely such ostensibly neutral numeric terms. 
In recent decades, policy discourses have emphasised the value of quantification as a basis 
for determining policy (Espeland and Stevens 2008). Numerical information and econometric 
modelling are often portrayed as objective representations of knowledge, free of political bias 
and simply reflective of the truth. Such representations are referred to as “concrete evidence” 
on occasion (Chang et al. 2003), or simply as “evidence” – no further qualification required 
(National Competition Council 2004). For example, grower perspectives aired in public 
debates are described as limited in value, as they are not backed with “evidence” (National 
Competition Council 2004). In Chapter 11 in particular, I explore how these constructions 
have shaped wheat industry policy in Australia, and helped to facilitate the deregulation of 
the Australian wheat export market.  
This literature provides significant resources for understanding how the wheat export market 
came to be deregulated. By analysing the use of technologies of performance to shape the 
AWB’s purpose, policy makers were then able to measure the AWB’s performance using 
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data which could be easily quantified. Integral to this, is the shaping of knowledge, and the 
legitimisation of certain forms of knowledge, and knowledge-creating processes. In Chapters 
10 and 11 in particular, I explore how quantification and technologies of performance have 
been applied to shape and legitimise knowledge.  
 
Emerging corporate power in Australian agriculture  
In addition to this flawed construction of competition, I interrogate the notion that firms lack 
the power and incentive to exert control over markets, supply chain participants and policy 
makers. To do so, I draw upon resource dependency theory to analyse firms’ use of power to 
develop and protect their control of markets.   
 
Resource Dependency Theory 
Numerous organisational theories aim to understand firm strategies, including transaction 
cost economics and population ecology; however, resource dependency theory is most suited 
to the aims of this research because it provides an important framework for understanding the 
power of organisations, and how these organisations interact with their environment (Wry, 
Cobb and Aldrich 2013; Davis and Cobb 2010). According to resource dependency theory, 
the survival of firms is directly related to their capacity to reduce uncertainty of resource 
supply, particularly through reducing their dependencies upon other firms (Drees and 
Huegens 2013; Hessels and Terjessen 2010; Cascario and Piskorksi 2005; Bretherton and 
Chaston 2005). Resources could be defined as physical, financial, political or informational 
(Wry, Cobb and Aldrich 2013). With regard to agribusiness, resources could include: the raw 
commodity; physical assets such as grain elevators, ports or transport; financial resources 
necessary to make acquisitions; or the political resources that may assist the firm in 
influencing policy development. Studies employing resource dependency theory therefore 
seek to understand how firms use existing resources, what motivates firms to develop new 
resources, and how resource dependent relationships with other firms are managed (Hofer 
2012; Mottner and Smith 2009; Paulraj and Chen 2007; Bretherton and Chaston 2005; Elg 
2000). In developing their resource base, resource dependency theory claims that firms will 
proactively seek to influence their environment (Drees and Huegens 2013; Gulbrandsen et al. 
2009). This insight underscores the differences in approach to other organisational theories 
such as population ecology, which maintains that firms adapt to, rather than change, their 
environments (Davis and Cobb 2010; Nienhuser 2008).  
However, resource dependency theory remains underutilised. In particular, very few studies 
leverage the concepts of resource dependency to understand strategies employed by firms in 
an agricultural context, despite this theory being eminently suited for this purpose. At the 
same time, resource dependency theorists have tended to draw upon quantitative data, such as 
broad surveys of firm executives or other large scale datasets. As such, there is very limited 
qualitative research using this theoretical framework. Yet, with annual reports, media 
announcements, speeches delivered by company executives, interviews and presentations to 
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shareholders, there is a considerable amount of data in which firms explain their strategies, 
which is amenable to qualitative analysis, but yet to be explored by resource dependency 
theorists. In Chapter 12, I analyse this kind of data, through the lens of resource dependency 
theory, which helps to extend and clarify the analytic potential of this theory. This research 
offers new insights, in particular by showing that agricultural firms aim to mitigate risk and 
uncertainty by developing supply chain control, and also through shaping government policy 
to enable their continued expansion into new regions and markets.  
 
What needs to be researched?  
This thesis aims to contribute to a number of fields of research. As this chapter highlights, I 
am drawing upon a number of different theoretical approaches to address the topic of 
Australian wheat industry deregulation and, more broadly, the neoliberalisation of Australian 
agriculture. However, these different approaches each enable me to understand an important 
aspect of this topic. For example, governmentality provides a valuable lens in understanding 
the discursive constructions of farmers, policy values and organisations to accord with the 
State’s ambitions to maximise the productive use of the nation’s resources. However, this 
same approach is less suited to understanding firms’ strategies of mergers and acquisitions as 
a means of developing market power than resource dependency theory, which is specifically 
developed for this purpose.   
Whereas much of the literature examining wheat export market deregulation analyses the 
impact of different market structures upon wheat prices and supply chain costs, my research 
instead focuses on how this policy shift was made possible. How questions of wheat industry 
organisation shifted from a focus on the security and stability of farmers, towards efficiency, 
maximisation of incomes and how to best facilitate the re-allocation of farm resources. In 
doing so, this research offers a novel approach to this specific topic. However, I also draw 
upon the work of Higgins, Lockie, Pritchard, Lawrence, Cheshire and Haslam-McKenzie, 
among others, who have each sought to analyse neoliberalism and its impacts upon regional 
Australia and, most particularly, Australian agriculture.  
In examining how wheat industry deregulation has been made possible, I cover a number of 
areas which are yet to be fully explored in relation to the Australian wheat industry. For 
example, contestability theory is relatively underutilised in Australia, particularly outside of 
the Journal of Australian Political Economy. My work adds to this analysis by questioning 
policy makers’ use of contestability theory in relation to the Australian wheat export market. 
Furthermore, I draw upon governmentality literature to examine the continuing evolution of 
the ‘good farmer’ in Australian policy discourses, and to highlight how this construction has 
helped facilitate wheat export market deregulation. I extend this analysis to examine how the 
Australian Government’s recent Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper uses this 
construction, in association with technologies of agency, to facilitate a shift towards farmers’ 
reliance upon private sector investment, rather than State expenditure. In building upon 
Pritchard’s (2005a) critique of econometric modelling, I use this research to understanding 
how quantification has shaped how knowledge is developed and interpreted in Australian 
53 
 
wheat industry policy development, and how this has externalised many of the social 
consequences of wheat market deregulation. In drawing together governmentality and 
sociology of quantification approaches, I offer a different theoretical lens through which to 
understand how quantification and technologies of performance, such as audit and 
benchmarking, can be used to shape policy.  
In addressing the question of whose interests are served by this policy shift, I am also 
providing a departure from the existing literature on this matter. For example, if it is assumed 
that wheat prices are the primary ambition of wheat market policy (as is currently the case), 
then, if wheat prices were to be raised as a result of deregulation of the market, it could be 
assumed that farmers are those who benefit. However, this conclusion assumes that all 
farmers are equally well equipped to extract this higher price. This is not the case, as I will 
argue in Chapters 9 and 10. Which leads me to analyse how the deregulated wheat market has 
developed. Specifically, I focus my attention on the strategies employed by firms within this 
market, such as Cargill, ADM and Glencore. In doing so, I utilise resource dependency 
theory, which is rarely used in an agricultural context, despite being eminently suited to this 
field. Furthermore, I use this theory to examine firms’ market influence and influence over 
policy makers, and by analysing qualitative data such as Annual Reports, media releases and 
speeches, my empirical data and analysis offers a new approach to resource dependency 
theory research. In the next section, I describe the research methods which I have used to 
apply the different theoretical approaches outlined in this chapter.   
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Chapter 3: Method 
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Discourse Analysis 
This research explores the discursive relations between power, knowledge and truth. I am 
particularly interested in the capacity of discourse to produce and re-produce what it is that 
matters, to set boundaries around how problems can be identified, understood and addressed. 
As such, this research uses a post-structuralist approach to discourse analysis, which I employ 
in the context of Australian agricultural policy, focusing specifically on the deregulation of 
the Australian wheat industry. There may be some diversity in the empirical data used 
throughout this thesis, and the theoretical approaches used to address each particular topic 
may differ. Nevertheless, in each paper I am examining discourse as a means through which 
power relations are shaped. 
Throughout my thesis, particularly in Chapters 5, 7, 9, 10 and 11, I analyse discursive 
constructions which produce and re-produce truths such as competition, efficiency, 
productivity, freedom, choice and individualism. Similar approaches have been applied to 
policy studies in the United States (Dixon and Hapke 2003; Brasier 2002), New Zealand 
(Liepins and Bradshaw 1999; Liepins 1996), the United Kingdom (Potter and Tilzey 2005; 
Stenson and Watt 1999) and Australia (Lockie and Higgins 2007; Pritchard 2005a, 2005b; 
Tonts and Haslam-McKenzie 2005; Herbert-Cheshire 2000). These studies explore policy 
discourses to understand how meaning and knowledge is created, and how this is exercised as 
a form of power through discourse. In particular, Dibden, Potter and Cocklin (2009), Higgins 
(2005, 2002a, 2002b, 2001a, 2001b,) and Lockie and Higgins (2007) employ a 
poststructuralist approach to discourse analysis, to understand particular policies and policy 
shifts. These authors draw upon governmentality literature, citing Dean (1999), Rose (1996), 
Miller and Rose (1990), in exploring the State’s attempts to shape conduct of individuals, 
through establishing truths and norms. Exploring how discourse exercises power through the 
production of knowledge is central to addressing the questions I am posing in this thesis 
(Peck and Tickell 2002). Discourse can be considered as “more than ideology or rhetoric”, 
and more significant than a conversation, for example (Rose 1993, p.289). Discourse includes 
the use of language, but also ideology, strategy, and the relationship between knowledge and 
power (Graham 2005; Lees 2004; Sharp and Richardson 2001; Hall 1997). Discourse does 
not simply reflect power relations; discourse determines the structure of debate by developing 
‘regimes of truth’, which act to impose boundaries around how a problem can be defined, 
while also limiting the potential solutions to this problem (Jacobs 2006; Lees 2004; Hall 
1997). In this sense, discourses concern not only the context within which knowledge is 
produced, but also actively structure what can be considered as truth, and what cannot, while 
also directing how people should and should not act (Anderson 2010; Stenson and Watt 1999; 
Atkinson 1999). In shaping this knowledge, neoliberal discourse portrays itself as common 
sense, in which the market is normalised and depoliticised (Springer 2012; Pritchard 2005a; 
Peck and Tickell 2002). 
According to Rose (1993, p.289), language should therefore be considered as the means 
through which the world can be understood, and operationalised, in ways that can be acted 
upon by those who might seek to govern, such as politicians or experts, and also by those 
who occupy those domains which are re-cast in this light, such as the market and the family. 
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Related to the use of discourse as a technology of governance, is the conceptualisation of the 
‘authority of truth’, which Rose describes as being enabled by the role of the expert (Rose 
1993, p.297). This conceptualisation is integral to the relationship between power and 
knowledge, whereby the truth is systematically produced by “expert, authoritative or 
scientific discourse” (Anderson 2010, p.50). Significantly, neoliberalism seeks to define itself 
as being apolitical, which implies that the ‘truth’, as constructed by neoliberal discourses, is 
beyond reproach due to its substantiation by disinterested experts (Peck and Tickell 2002, 
p.400). Significantly, through establishing what can be considered as truth, discourses also 
“create a series of absent agendas, agents, objects of concern and counter-narratives, which 
are mobilised out of the discursive picture” (Stenson and Watt 1999, p.192). Discourse, from 
this perspective, holds considerable power. The dominant discourse – for example, 
neoliberalism - directs “thought and action” to align with thoughts and actions which can be 
considered legitimate within that neoliberal discourse (Hall 1997, p.44). This approach to 
discourse analysis guides the development of the methodology for this particular thesis, 
which aims to understand how ideas and constructs which accorded with the neoliberal 
discourse came to be understood in general debate as ‘truths’, while alternate discourses were 
essentially rendered as insignificant or without basis. 
 
Genealogy  
In explaining the poststructuralist approach to discourse analysis as a method for 
understanding policy development, Hewitt (2009, p.7) states that “through debunking the 
rationality of policy making, researchers become aware of the contingent nature of the policy 
process”. This emphasis on the policy making process also accords with the emphasis of 
genealogical research as a study of process. According to Hewitt (2009, p.7), this focus 
enables the researcher to understand the creation of knowledge and rationalisation of policy 
instruments within the context of the dominant discourse. 
When first studying present Australian agricultural policy, I was struck by how ideas like 
competition and efficiency were presented by policy makers, grain traders, farm 
organisations and farmers as essential to the ongoing welfare of agricultural industries and 
farmers. The unqualified acceptance of these ideas is even more noticeable, given that 
Australian agricultural policy was characterised by very different values, such as co-
operation, farmer security and stability, and collectivism, only three to four decades prior. My 
immediate thought was: How did this complete change in attitudes and values occur, and 
what discursive shifts were required for this change to be made possible?  
Thus, to address this question, my research is necessarily genealogical. A genealogy of wheat 
industry deregulation is essential to understand the process by which this policy shift came to 
be viewed as a logical policy shift that would benefit farmers, their communities and the 
Australian society. Concepts such as competition, efficiency, individualism, technologies of 
audit and performance management, the passivity of firms in relation to the market and the 
concept of the consumer as King (Jones 2012), are often presented in Australian policy 
discourses as self-evident truths, which therefore must be used to guide policy. Genealogical 
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research using a poststructuralist approach to discourse analysis has enabled me to identify 
the subtle, yet important, discursive shifts which have enabled these truths to become so 
ingrained in Australian policy making. In this research, I am seeking to understand the 
present policy environment by analysing previous discursive formations that have allowed 
this environment to develop as it has. As described by Kuchler and Linner (2012, p.582), the 
purpose of genealogical research enables the researcher to “present a history of the present 
designed to outline the conflicts and strategies of control that condition discursive 
formations”. 
Though not explicitly stated in each article, all chapters drawing on empirical material, with 
the exception of chapter 12, are underpinned by this genealogical approach to research to 
some degree. Chapter 5 explores the use of contestability theory in policy, Chapters 6 and 7 
analyse the uncritical and vague use of efficiency as a precursor to enhanced living standards, 
Chapter 8 seeks to understand how productivism has emerged as an essential approach to 
farming in Australia. Chapters 9, 10 and 11 analyse the construction of farming, farming 
organisations and farming identity to accord with approaches to agricultural organisation that 
aim to maximise productivity and efficiency. Thus, whereas these articles may draw upon a 
range of theoretical approaches, such as sociology of quantification, governmentality, 
economic geography and political economy, they are each underpinned by a genealogical 
approach to research, which aims to understand how Australian agricultural policy has 
developed to focus on economic indicators, while externalising social and environmental 
concerns. The next section of this work uses this analysis to then understand the strategies of 
corporations which have been encouraged to participate in this ‘business-friendly 
environment’, and what the potential implications of this shift may be.  
This thesis therefore draws upon genealogical research that has analysed discourse, and its 
capacity to create knowledge through establishing rules governing what can be known, and 
how this knowledge can be understood (Van Herzele 2015; McMichael 2009; Jacobs 2006; 
Dixon and Hapke 2003; Higgins 2001b; Liepins and Bradshaw 1999). Building upon this 
work, I understand discourse as shaping policy debates through framing what legitimate 
knowledge is, and significantly, what legitimate knowledge is not. As mentioned by Higgins 
(2002b, p.5), “genealogy provides a conceptually coherent means for challenging the search 
in historical investigations for the origins or foundations of knowledge”, through exposing 
the “struggles for truth that underpin the claimed neutrality of these knowledges”. In this 
regard, genealogy is ideally suited to this research, which traces the construction of 
competition, efficiency and markets as politically neutral truths, and analyses how these 
truths have facilitated policy change.  
Genealogical research examines processes of knowledge creation and power through 
discourse, while seeking to understand the silencing of alternate discourses (Van Herzele 
2015; Kuchler and Linner 2012). This emphasis on the process of knowledge creation focuses 
genealogical research on understanding how truths are considered in the present, by analysing 
how truths have been constructed, and therefore, how they can be challenged (Hayter and 
Hegarty 2015). My genealogical research is inspired by Higgins’ (2001b) article on the 
construction of the ‘low income farm problem’. Higgins constructed a ‘genealogy of 
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government’, by exploring the problematisation of low-income farmers in the developing 
agricultural economics literature in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Whereas Higgins’ work 
analysed the problematisations of ‘unviable’ farmers, and of government assistance, I extend 
this analysis by exploring the problematisation of statutory wheat marketing, and the 
construction of competition and efficiency as solutions to declining grower returns. By 
tracing developing policy discourses, I analyse how these ideas have become accepted as 
truths within wheat industry policy, and how this facilitated wheat export market 
deregulation.  
I have used this research to examine, not only policy itself, but also the process whereby 
policy is created and the discursive shifts which have influenced this process (Kuchler and 
Linner 2012). While my research considers key policy documents, such as Acts of Parliament 
or reports of government-initiated inquiries into the wheat industry, I also focus my research 
upon the ‘minor texts’ such as newspaper articles or letters to the editor, which I consider as 
forming part of this discourse. These documents help provide context, though also help 
illustrate smaller shifts, which may not otherwise have been detected.  
 
Documents 
I focused my document searches at the State Library of Victoria, the National Library of 
Australia (online collections) and the Public Record Office of Victoria. I also searched the 
online databases of authorities such as the Productivity Commission and ABARES, as well as 
the politicians’ websites to locate speeches and media releases. I used the Australian 
Parliament House website to find Hansard transcripts, as well as information on government 
inquiries, including committee reports, submissions and transcripts of public hearings. The 
newspaper articles published prior to 1994 were found in the Public Record Office of 
Victoria. Articles published between 1994 and 2004 were found in the State Library of 
Victoria microfilm collection, and articles published after 2005 were found using Google 
searches. I have included a comprehensive list of documents used by my research in 
Appendix 2.  
 
Data Collection and Analysis 
The published articles included in this thesis individually describe my approaches to data 
analysis for each discrete component of my overarching research project. As each of these 
studies was slightly different, it is not possible to recount here an overarching detailed 
‘method’ of data collection and analysis.  However, a few general statements are possible 
here. 
In Sections 2 and 3 of this thesis, I use a similar approach to discourse analysis. In section 2, I 
interrogate key documents to analyse how key ideas such as efficiency, competition and 
productivity are represented, explained and justified in industry and competition policy 
discourses. For example, in analysing policy discourses’ use of contestability theory, I drew 
upon the documents which mentioned competition, constestability, or potential competition. I 
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noted where these ideas were mentioned, how they were represented and the context. Using 
this approach, I compared the use of contestability across a range of policy documents. I 
identified similarities and trends, and to develop a clear idea of how discourses construct and 
re-produce this idea. In Section 3, which explores the operationalisation of key ideas such as 
efficiency and contestability, for example, I aim to construct a genealogy of how the shift 
from collectivism to market-based approaches to organisation was made possible. In this 
work, I explore wheat industry deregulation as a process which occurred across four decades, 
from the 1970s to the present. In that sense, I aim to understand deregulation in the present, 
by exploring the discursive shifts which made this policy change possible. In analysing 
documentation representing farmers, farming, government organisations including the AWB 
and also firms, I aim to identify important, yet subtle shifts in discourse which contributed to 
this policy change.  
Chapter 12 analyses merger, acquisition and joint venture activity in the Australian wheat 
industry. I located this information on company websites, newspapers and online news sites. I 
use this information to develop a picture of which companies owned which aspects of the 
wheat supply chain. Chapter 12 includes a textual analysis of annual reports, speeches and 
media releases, to understand why companies used particular strategies of investment. In that 
regard, I pieced together different pieces of information from these documents, presented in 
different contexts and to different audiences, to gain a greater depth of understanding about 
why these strategies were being employed. In particular, this aspect of my work explored 
strategies such as mergers and acquisitions as an expression of power.  I use resource 
dependency theory in Chapter 12, to interpret this information by exploring the use of 
acquisitions, mergers and joint ventures as a strategy which enabled firms to develop 
resources and influence their external environment. In addition, I explore firms’ use of these 
strategies in relation to their global ambitions.  
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Article Summaries  
In this chapter, I provide summaries of the articles in the coming sections, to survey briefly 
what each contributes to the overarching project of understanding how the Australian wheat 
industry came to be deregulated, and whose interests have been served by this policy shift. 
These articles are organised into the three key thesis sections:  
• Section 2: Creating a reality of markets, firms and consumers 
• Section 3: Making society governable: The case of Australian wheat export 
market deregulation 
• Section 4: Emerging corporate power in Australian agriculture  
 
Section 2: Creating a reality of markets, firms and consumers 
 
Chapter 5: O’Keeffe, P., (2017c), Contestability in the Australian wheat export 
industry, Journal of Australian Political Economy, 79, pp.65-86.  
This article analyses policy makers’ conceptualisations of competition in terms of 
contestability. I argue that support for contestability theory is misplaced. As I show in this 
article, contestability theory is based on limited theoretical and empirical foundations, yet 
policy makers have uncritically applied this theory. Policy makers draw loosely upon this 
theory to claim that the absence of regulatory barriers to market entry is sufficient for a 
market to be competitive. This neglects the key conditions of contestability theory, such as 
the stipulation that a market is competitive, provided there are no entry costs.  
As I argue in this chapter, this theory is misapplied to the Australian wheat export market. 
Firms realise that, unless they own infrastructure - ports, storage facilities, for example - they 
will have a very limited ability to develop a substantial market share. This constraint 
effectively imposes an entry cost upon firms wanting to enter the deregulated wheat market. 
Firms have the option of either investing in new facilities, or acquiring existing firms that 
control infrastructure. These actions incur substantial costs. For example, Bunge have 
invested $60m in two new ports, in Bunbury and Geelong. ADM attempted to acquire 
Graincorp for $3.4bn. Few firms have the capacity to make these investments. As such, 
market entry is only genuinely accessible to those firms with this capability. 
 
Chapter 6: O’Keeffe, P., (2015), Efficiency, productivity and…fairness: An analysis 
of the Harper Review into Australia’s competition policy, in Theresa Petray and Anne 
Stephenson (ed.), Proceedings of the 2015 TASA Conference, Hawthorn, Australia, 
23-26 November 2015, pp.169-176.   
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In this article, I show how efficiency is portrayed as a principal policy ambition, which is 
claimed to deliver benefits to consumers. Conversely, equity is marginalised and replaced 
with fairness. Fairness is conceptualised as achievable through markets, which reward effort 
and innovation. Furthermore, I argue that prioritising the consumer focuses policy upon the 
end result – the price, quality and choice of good or services. In turn, this undermines the 
importance of key actors and structures involved in the process of delivering products to 
consumers – the producers of the raw materials, the employees and market concentration. As 
with the previous article, I use this analysis to show how policy discourses shift attention 
away from the significance of market concentration and the power of large firms.   
As I show in Chapter 5, competition is portrayed as a process of establishing which firms are 
best able to maximise efficiency and productivity and meet consumers’ needs. Subsequently, 
policy makers tolerate consolidated markets as an outcome of this process, believing this 
market structure is the most efficient, and best equipped to enhance consumers’ living 
standards. For example, a market featuring a small number of dominant firms is accepted on 
the presumption that these firms have reached this position as they are the best, most efficient 
firms, which are best able to meet the needs of consumers. Tampering with this, through 
government intervention, will undermine the efficiencies created through this competitive 
process and harm consumers.  
 
Chapter 7: O’Keeffe, P., (2018b), Who wouldn’t want more efficiency? Analysing 
the construction of efficiency as a ‘truth’ within policy discourses, Journal of 
Sociology, https://doi.org/10.1177/1440783318759087 
This article draws together ideas developed in Chapter 5 and 6, to examine discursive 
constructions of the relationships between markets, firms, competition and efficiency. This 
article serves two important functions for this thesis. First, I analyse competition policy 
discourses in particular, to understand what competition and efficiency mean in the context of 
Australian industry and competition policy, and what benefits are claimed to result from these 
policy values. Second, I draw on the disaggregation of work to show that firms are best 
placed to benefit through this reconfigured policy environment. As I also show in Chapters 5 
and 6, these policy shifts have been implemented on the apparent assumption that firms lack 
power in markets, and return efficiency gains back to consumers.  
As this article shows, policy discourses portray competition and efficiency as essential 
ambitions of good policy. Competition compels firms and producers to be efficient. In turn, 
this raises living standards for us as consumers, as competition between firms lowers the cost 
of goods and services, leading to better product quality and diversity as firms aim to appeal to 
the needs of consumers.  
There are a number of discursive constructions at work here. Efficiency is constructed as 
representing common sense. Any person of sound mind will believe that efficiency is a good 
thing. Conversely, this marginalises alternate discourses, as policy discourses portray those 
questioning efficiency as lacking common sense. Competition is normalised as part of 
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everyday life. In everyday life, there are winners and losers. Some firms will win, some will 
lose. This is a normal process. Restructuring is inevitable. Globalising processes, outside the 
control of the Australian government, will eventually cause these reforms to occur, so policy 
makers argue that proactive reform is essential.  
Through focusing on the consumer and their material living standards, I argue Australian 
policy discourses marginalise those involved in the process of producing – such as workers 
and farmers. In this article, I draw on the increasingly precarious nature of work to highlight 
how this discourse has treated the negative effects of restructuring on the vulnerable 
populations in the workforce as externalities in the more important process of maximising the 
nation’s economic efficiency.  
 
Chapter 8: O’Keeffe, P., (2016b), Responding to the productivist paradigm: 
Experiences of farmers in Victoria’s western Wimmera, in M. Chou (ed.) Proceedings 
of the Australian Sociological Association (TASA) 2016 Conference, Melbourne, 
Australia, 28 November - 1 December 2016, pp. 263-269. 
This article contributes to this thesis by addressing the concept of productivity in the context 
of structural adjustment policies implemented by the Australian Government in recent 
decades. As I suggest, this focus reduces the value of farming, and of farmers, to the capacity 
to be productive. As in the normalisation of competition as a process of creating winners and 
losers, I show that structural adjustment normalises farmer exits as an essential step in 
maximising industry efficiency and productivity. I then develop this idea further in chapters 9 
and 10, to argue that these reductionist policy constructions externalise the social and 
environmental consequences of the neoliberalisation of Australian agricultural and rural 
industries.  
 
Section 3: Making society governable: The case of Australian wheat export market 
deregulation 
 
Chapter 9: O’Keeffe, P., (2017a), Creating resilience or private sector dependence? 
Shifting constructions of the farmer in Australian policy discourses, Space and Polity, 
21(3), pp.318-334.  
This article develops upon the previous chapter, by analysing how policy discourses have 
constructed farming as a reducible, calculable function which the State is able to act upon to 
meet its objective of maximising productive resource use. Policy makers’ focus on allocative 
efficiency underpins this shift. Whereas in Chapter 7 I explore this concept in relation to 
employment and competition policy, here I show its influence within agriculture. This aspect 
of economic efficiency is applied to rural and agricultural policy to re-allocate resources to 
the most efficient resource managers, whether they be firms or farmers. Policy makers claim 
this is necessary to facilitate the exits of the least efficient farmers from the industry, thus 
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liberating resources controlled by these farmers, such as farm land and machinery. 
Consequently, it is argued the most efficient farmers will acquire these resources, expand 
their farming operation and put these resources to more productive use. This is portrayed as 
beneficial for Australian society, as it improves industry efficiency and productivity.  
This shift is made possible, in part, by the re-construction of farming and farmer identity. 
Policy discourses portray farming in reductionist terms. The value of farming is reduced to its 
capacity to convert resources into commodities. Questions around agricultural organisation 
become focused on enhancing the efficiency of this process. Similarly, farmer identity is 
reduced to the role of resource managers. Farmers have value, because of their role in 
converting resources to commodities. By maximising the efficiency of this process, farmers 
enhance their contribution to Australian society.  
This construction makes structural adjustment possible. Farmers that are least able to 
maximise resource efficiency and productivity are constructed as not only poorly skilled 
farmers, but as an impairment on societal welfare. The exit of these farmers from the industry 
is therefore rationalised as a positive shift. This construction overlooks the valuable role of 
farmers in supporting rural communities and caring for the land, and also the relationship 
between farmers, their land and their histories in farming. 
 
Chapter 10: O’Keeffe, P., (2017b), Maximising efficiency, marginalising equity: A 
genealogy of Australian wheat export market deregulation and 'the good farmer’, 
Australian Geographer, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00049182.2017.1353585   
This article adds to the ideas I develop in chapters 8 and 9, by exploring the marginalisation 
of equity as a policy objective, and the subsequent externalisation of the negative social 
consequences of deregulation throughout rural Australia. The first part of my analysis 
explores the framework employed in Australia to prioritise efficiency in rural and agricultural 
policy. Here, I show how efficiency is constructed as the central goal of industry policy. 
Conversely, equity is portrayed as being antagonistic to this goal, and is separated from 
efficiency. Policy discourses claim industry policy should focus on maximising efficiency, 
whereas equity is best addressed through other government mechanisms such as welfare. 
This creates problems for the AWB and statutory wheat marketing, which was essentially 
established as an equalising force for Australian wheat farmers. The key functions of the 
AWB were to provide farmers with security, to protect them from markets, to distribute 
returns evenly among farmers. However, these functions are now cast as being antithetical to 
the broader goal of maximising efficiency. As I suggest in this article, the AWB is 
constructed as incompatible with this policy framework. Numerous inquiries and reviews into 
wheat marketing structure throughout the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s were initiated by 
government to quantify the value of statutory marketing. However, this article shows how 
these inquiries were developed to focus on a narrow conception of economic efficiency, 
which prioritised wheat prices and supply chain costs, and to diminish the significance of the 
AWB’s equalising functions. Furthermore, growers’ participation into these inquiries was 
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devalued, derided as subjective and as lacking substantive evidence. Thus, despite the 
overwhelming support for the AWB which farmers articulate in these inquiries, statutory 
marketing is framed as a hindrance to the ‘good farmer’, and a barrier to greater industry 
efficiency.  
 
Chapter 11: O’Keeffe, P., (2018a), Creating a governable reality: Analysing the use 
of quantification in shaping Australian wheat marketing policy, Agriculture and 
Human Values, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10460-018-9848-6  
In accordance with the developing policy emphasis on efficiency analysed in chapters 8, 9 
and 10, here I show how the AWB’s role was re-constructed to focus on its capacity to 
maximise growers’ returns. Specifically, technologies of performance, such as audit and 
performance objectives, were used by policy makers to shape and control the AWB’s 
function. Furthermore, this article draws upon sociology of quantification research, to 
examine how quantitative data, particularly real and projected wheat prices and supply chain 
costs, was prioritised by policy discourses as the only truly legitimate source of information 
which could be used in measuring the AWB’s performance and assessing wheat export 
market regulation. As in chapter 10, here I show how subjective data, particularly associated 
with growers’ claims on the basis of equity, was undermined as offering a credible basis for 
policy decisions. Rather, this article highlights the use of econometric modelling, particularly 
by Allen Consulting (2000), in predicting and legitimating the cost savings of deregulation. 
As such, I argue that the social world has been actively erased and policy narrowed to focus 
on quantifiable phenomena and quantitative data.  
 
Section 4: Emerging corporate power in Australian agriculture 
 
Chapter 12: O’Keeffe, P., (2016a), Supply chain management strategies of 
agricultural corporations: A resource dependency approach, Competition and Change, 
20(4), pp.255-274. 
In arguing for wheat export market deregulation in 2008, Government Members of 
Parliament sketched out a post-deregulation scenario involving a market with many grain 
traders who would be competing amongst each other for Australian growers' wheat. This has 
not eventuated. The Australian wheat market is dominated by four firms, controlling 70 per 
cent of exports. This level of concentration is more pronounced at the State level, and even 
greater at the regional level. This result is due to the relationship between ownership of 
supply chain infrastructure and firms' capacity to develop market share. Firms focus their 
export activity in areas where they own infrastructure. As such, local markets, state markets, 
are highly concentrated. Furthermore, this policy shift was underpinned by the assumption 
that firms lack power to influence markets or policy development.  
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This article challenges the assumption that firms have little ability or desire to influence their 
external environment. In this article, I use resource dependency theory, developed as a theory 
of organisational power by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), to explore how agricultural 
corporations protect and develop their power, with regard to interventions in markets and 
policy. This article suggests that firms do have power and the desire to use this power to their 
advantage. By implementing deregulation on the flawed assumption that it is the market and 
not firms which hold power, policy makers have erred substantially. As with the use of 
contestability theory I highlighted in chapter 5, this oversight has created an environment 
which allows corporations to develop their power within the Australian wheat industry, 
relatively unchecked.  
 
Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: O’Keeffe, P., and Neave, M., (2017), Experiences of wheat growers in 
Victoria’s western Wimmera following deregulation of the Australian wheat export 
market, Rural Society, 26(1), pp.1-18.  
This article highlights the experiences of a small sample of wheat growers regarding wheat 
export market deregulation. These growers cite political disenfranchisement, the perceived 
loss of industry control, the emergence of concentrated markets featuring powerful firms and 
difficulties associated with wheat marketing as the key impacts of deregulation. The work 
articulated in this PhD thesis explores the process of wheat export market deregulation, which 
has shifted power from smaller family farmers to larger, consolidated farms and firms. This 
article refers to the outcomes of this process, as experienced by wheat farmers.  
 
Summary 
Together, these articles address the key research questions underpinning this thesis, which 
ask how the Australian wheat export market came to be deregulated, and in whose interests. 
Across these articles, I assemble the resources to argue that this shift was made possible 
through the discursive construction of competition, efficiency and productivity as truths 
which must be pursued by the State through policy. Furthermore, I show how the farming 
industry, particularly farmers and organisations such as the AWB, were re-constructed to 
accord with these truths, and instrumentalised to achieve the State’s objective of efficiency 
maximisation and enhancing productive resource use. This shift, I suggest, has been 
implemented to achieve these aims, through self-interested, business-minded farmers, and 
through large, transnational firms. This has caused power to shift towards firms such as 
Cargill, ADM, Bunge and Louis Dreyfus, which use the recently deregulated wheat export 
market to grow their control of global grain markets. 
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Chapter 5: Contestability in the Australian Wheat Industry 
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Contribution of article to thesis 
In this article, I explore theoretical ideas of firms, markets and competition, which I suggest 
have shaped policy making in Australia. This helps ground the arguments that I make in this 
thesis, by showing how policy makers conceptualise competition, and competitive markets, 
and the perceived role of large firms in increasing economic efficiency of markets and 
industries.  
In particular, I analyse policy markers’ use of contestability theory. I argue this theory is 
limited and is incorrectly applied in the case of the Australian wheat export market. I suggest 
contestability theory is used to legitimise the development of consolidated markets featuring 
dominant firms, under the guise that this market structure is the most efficient.   
I show that the wheat export market has become concentrated, featuring oligopolies and 
regional monopolies. First, deregulation of the wheat export market has created concentrated 
markets, only accessible to well-capitalised, transnational firms. Thus, it is not contestable or 
competitive. Second, the choice and freedom promised to growers through deregulation has 
not eventuated.  
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Contestability in the Australian Wheat Industry 
Introduction 
In the past 30 years, policy makers have argued that privatisation and deregulation of State-
administered businesses, services and infrastructure leads to enhanced choice, competition 
and greater efficiency. Less clear is the question of how contestability theory has been used 
as a policy lens to understand and predict competition and firm behaviour in deregulated 
markets. To address this issue, I analyse the application of contestability theory to the 
Australian wheat export market by examining policy documents such as reviews and 
inquiries into competition policy and wheat industry policy (particularly wheat marketing), 
initiated by government and government authorities between 1988 and 2008. 
The Federal Government, under Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, deregulated the Australian 
wheat export market in 2008, ending 60 years of statutory marketing by the Australian Wheat 
Board. At the time, Minister for Agriculture, Tony Burke, said that deregulation would 
enable growers to maximise their returns on production (Grattan 2008). Many wheat growers, 
on the other hand, were sceptical of such claims. Members of Parliament and Senators from 
both major political parties argued that deregulation would create a market place featuring 
numerous grain traders competing for farmers’ wheat. For example, Liberal Senator Chris 
Ellison stated that “[i]t is imperative that as many participants enter the market as possible” 
(Commonwealth Government 2008b, p.2308). This, it was claimed, would give growers 
choice, while the competition would drive up wheat prices. However, this description of a 
competitive market differs from how competition has been conceived in policy documents. 
Contestability theory, emphasising potential, rather than actual competition, informed policy 
from 1988, when the Industries Assistance Commission (1988) argued for deregulation of 
wheat exports, to 2008, when the Rudd government’s policy shift was implemented. 
The National Competition Policy Review, initiated by the Keating Government to investigate 
how a national policy could “develop an open, integrated domestic market for goods and 
services by removing unnecessary barriers to trade and competition”, provides a different 
interpretation of competition (Hilmer et al., 1993, p.361). Hilmer et al. (1993, p.3), dismiss 
the conception of market competition as necessarily involving large numbers of small firms, 
instead claiming that “competition between a few large firms may provide more economic 
benefit…due to economies of scale and scope”. Hilmer et al. (1993, p.2), draw upon Dennis 
(1977) to define competition as the “striving or potential striving of two or more persons or 
against one another for the same or related objects”. Referring to Baumol (1982), Hilmer et 
al. (1993, p.2) explain that: 
Recent work suggests that the real likelihood of competition occurring (potential striving) can 
have a similar effect on the performance of a firm as actual striving. Thus, a market which is 
highly open to potential rivals – known as a highly ‘contestable’ market – may be of similar 
efficiency as a market with actual head-to-head competition. 
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Policy documents informing Australian wheat industry policy share this interpretation, 
viewing competition in terms of the contestability of the market, rather than the number of 
firms in that market. Yet, these policy documents do not refer in detail to the three conditions 
of a contestable market: that entry of new firms is costless, the market is susceptible to hit-
and-run entry and entry is reversible (Shepherd 1984, 1995). This raises the question of how 
contestability theory is used in policy, and whether contestability theory can be applied to the 
Australian wheat export market. 
To analyse the use of contestability of the Australian wheat export market, we first need to 
understand the broad structure of the wheat supply chain, outlined in Figure 1. In Australia, 
infrastructure servicing the wheat industry, including off-farm storage and handling, and port 
facilities is controlled by three regionally-based bulk handling companies (BHCs) – CBH 
(Western Australia), Viterra (South Australia), and GrainCorp (eastern Australia, including 
Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland). Farmers producing wheat for export sell to 
grain traders which, in most cases, access this infrastructure to export this wheat to overseas 
markets. 
Figure 1: Australian wheat export supply chain 
 
 
 
                Grain Trader 
 
 
The BHCs’ ownership of storage, handling and ports stems from the privatisation of State-
based grain authorities in the 1990s and early 2000s. The grain authorities controlled State-
wide infrastructure networks, including grain handling, storage and port facilities. The 
privatised firms merged, causing further consolidation. As Figure 2 shows, GrainCorp 
emerged from the privatisation of 10 different boards and authorities across Victoria, New 
South Wales and Queensland. GrainCorp controls the infrastructure established and 
previously managed by these authorities. Similarly, Viterra (SA) and CBH (WA) control 
these segments of the wheat supply chain in their region. 
 
 
 
 
 
Farm Storage Port Customer 
Bulk 
Packer 
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Figure 2: Privatisation and Consolidation of Eastern Australia Grain Handling Authorities 
 
Grain Elevators Board Victoria   Vicgrain (1995) 
                                      GrainCorp (1999) 
Grain Handling Authority NSW  GrainCorp (1992) 
 
NSW Barley Board    
NSW Oats Marketing Board                 NSW GB (1991)      GrainCorp (2004) 
NSW Sorghum Board 
NSW Oilseeds Board 
                   Grainco (2000) 
Cent QLD Sorghum Board 
State Wheat Board (QLD)  Grainco (1991) 
Queensland Barley Board 
Bulk Grain Queensland 
 
Adapted from Essential Services Commission (2006, p.17). 
 
Table 1 demonstrates these BHCs have used this ownership of grain handling, storage and 
ports, either directly or indirectly, to develop market share. This reflects a key problem of 
privatising vertically integrated public authorities. The private companies emerging from 
privatisation, in many cases, control supply chains, including non-contestable facilities and 
infrastructure (ports and storage networks), and use this control to establish market share in 
the contestable segments of the supply chain (grain marketing). Thus, the problem of 
uncompetitive markets, at the retail segment, can result from the initial privatisation. This 
scenario was known to policy makers when the wheat export market was deregulated; but 
policy-makers chose to rely instead upon a general interpretation of contestability theory to 
conclude that this deregulation and privatisation would not restrict the competitiveness of the 
wheat market. 
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Table 1: Bulk handling companies regional control of storage and handling, ports, and export 
markets.  
Supply chain segment CBH 
(WA) 
GrainCorp 
(eastern Australia) 
Viterra 
(SA) 
Market Share: up-
country 
Receives and stores 
approximately 90% of 
WA’s grain 
Handles approximately 
75% of east coast grain 
80% market share of SA 
up-country grain storage 
Market Share: port 
throughput (%) 
100 80-90 100 
Market Share: export 
tonnage 
48% WA bulk exports 
(2012/13) 
28% eastern Australian 
exports (2012/13) 
46% SA exports (2012/13) 
Adapted from Stretch, Carter and Kingwell (2014, p.11). 
 
I argue here that contestability theory is flawed and is applied uncritically in policy affecting 
the wheat industry, producing outcomes that do not reflect the promises made by politicians 
to wheat growers. The result has been that oligopsonistic regional wheat export markets are 
not contestable. Key conditions of contestability theory, notably that entry is costless, are not 
met. I outline contestability theory and the broader ideological context resulting in the 
growing support for this idea, before analysing policy documents to understand how 
contestability theory is applied in Australian policy-making. Finally, I examine the 
contestability of the deregulated wheat export market. As contestability theory has 
underpinned Australian policy, including wheat market policy, it is important to consider the 
robustness of this theory, its use in Australia, and whether this application leads to desirable 
policy outcomes. 
 
Market consolidation and efficiency 
Policy documents, including Hilmer et al. (1993), IAC (1988) and Harper, Anderson, 
McLuskey and O’Bryan (2015), argue that maximising efficiency should be the focus of 
competition and industry policy. Efficiency, it is claimed, is enhanced through competition 
between firms striving to meet the demands of the market. This claim needs to be considered 
in relation to the theoretical basis for these ideas, showing the context in which contestability 
theory was developed. 
In his influential paper, ‘Industry structure, market rivalry, and public policy’, Demsetz 
(1973) contends that firm efficiency determines profitability. According to Demsetz (1973), 
the most efficient, and therefore most profitable, firms expand market share. Thus, Demsetz 
(1973, p.5), claims that if concentration emerges due to the “superior efficiency of those 
firms that have become large, then a deconcentration policy, although it may reduce the ease 
of colluding, courts the danger of reducing efficiency either by the penalties that it places on 
innovative success or by the shift in output to smaller, higher cost firms that it brings about”. 
This perspective influenced the relaxation of policy aimed at restricting market concentration 
(Kari et al., 2002). 
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The claimed relationship between market concentration and efficiencies grew in prominence, 
as did criticisms of antitrust policy within the United States. Critics such as Bork (1967; 
1978), and Baumol and Ordover (1985, p.247) argued the Federal Trade Commission, in 
restricting market concentration, punished firms that were successful due to their superior 
efficiency and economies of scale and scope. Rather, activities such as mergers would 
substantially improve industries and markets, by introducing “efficiencies that make it 
necessary for other firms in the industry to try harder” (Baumol and Ordover 1985, p.247). 
These criticisms give rise to the prioritisation of market structures that are claimed to 
maximise efficiency (Bork 1967; Baumol and Ordover, 1985; Summers, 2001). This focus is 
underpinned by the assumption that larger companies will be the most efficient, and that ‘the 
market’ compels firms to return efficiency and profitability gains to consumers. These 
assumptions thus lead to the argument for the tolerance of concentrated markets. In turn, the 
development of large corporations is excused, on the assumptions that the presence of these 
firms increases efficiency, and firms, regardless of size, do not possess the power to influence 
markets. These assumptions are evident in the definition of competition used by Hilmer et al. 
(1993). 
 
Contestability theory 
Contestability theory was developed by Baumol (1982) as a revolutionary idea in economics 
and industrial organisation. Baumol outlined contestability in his 1982 address to the 
American Economic Association, entitled ‘An uprising in the theory of industry structure’, as 
a theory which intended to provide a flexible and applicable “benchmark for desirable 
industrial organisation” (Baumol 1982, p.2). Contestability theory enabled policy makers to 
operationalise the concepts developed by Bork and Demsetz, and apply these ideas to 
competition policy. According to contestability theory, oligopolies and regional monopolies 
that typically characterise agricultural markets are not necessarily reflections of market 
failure (Baumol, 1982; Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1983a). Provided there are no barriers 
preventing market entry, such as prohibitive entry costs or regulatory barriers, these market 
structures are efficient and competitive – in principle and demonstrably so (Baumol, 1982; 
Baumol, et al. 1983a; Davies, 1986). Market efficiency, on the other hand, is weakened by 
government regulation restricting entry to these markets (Baumol, 1982; Baumol, et al. 
1983a; Davies, 1986).  
As already noted, contestability theorists posit that a market is contestable when three key 
conditions are met: market entry is costless, the market is susceptible to hit-and-run entry, 
and exit is costless (Baumol, 1982; Baumol, et al. 1983a). Regarding the first of these, Davies 
(1986, p.299) contends that a market for which entry is costless compels firms to act as if 
they would in a “perfectly competitive situation”, as the threat of competition forces 
incumbent firms to maximise efficiency. Yet Shepherd (1984, p.577) claims “virtually all 
production requires specific assets which cannot be transferred or sold costlessly”. For 
example, the employment of experts to facilitate this entry creates costs that may not be 
recovered, as may expenditure on necessary research and development (Shepherd, 1984). 
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Despite the absence of regulatory barriers and costs, the investment required by a firm to 
enter a market may still be substantial. Even if entry to the market were free, Dasgupta and 
Stiglitz (1988, pp.570-571) contend that “by the mid-70s, it was clear that free entry…was 
not sufficient to ensure economic efficiency”. Furthermore, Shepherd (1984) and Dasgupta 
and Stigltiz (1988) argue that contestability theory does not consider the potential for 
incumbent firms to deter potential competitors, directly or indirectly, from entering that 
market. 
The second condition is the supposed vulnerability of that market to “hit-and-run entry”, 
otherwise described as “absolute entry” (Baumol, 1982, p.4; Shepherd, 1984). As Baumol 
(1982, p.4) explains, “[e]ven a very transient profit opportunity need not be neglected by a 
potential entrant, for he can go in, and, before prices change, collect his gains and then depart 
without cost, should the climate grow hostile”. Yet as Brock (1983, p.1065) claims, this 
depends on the incumbent firms’ inability to respond quickly to change, such as price 
changes, despite the success of their business being directly related to their capacity to do so. 
Schwartz and Reynolds (1983, pp.489-90), question the plausibility of the concept of hit-and-
run entry, arguing that “hit-and-run entry may be impossible in markets that are almost 
perfectly contestable”. Schwartz and Reynolds (1983, p.489) contend that the strength of 
contestability theory is therefore limited as, once there is minimal deviation “from the strict 
assumptions of perfect contestability, pricing and entry decisions depend upon the nature of 
firm interactions”. Baumol (1982) explains that hit-and-run entry is fundamental to 
contestability theory and premised on the idea that this threat will compel firms to act 
efficiently (Schwartz and Reynolds, 1983). The implausibility of this concept, lacking robust 
support, undermines the strength of this theory. 
Similar concerns apply to the third condition required for contestability theory to hold - that 
market entry is reversible. In other words, firms exiting a market will not incur sunk costs 
(Baumol et al., 1983b). Baumol et al. (1983b, p.496) ask, “[c]an markets in which there are 
‘almost’ no sunk costs behave ‘almost’ perfectly contestably? We have shown that they can, 
and we believe empirical evidence will confirm that they generally do”. The use of the term 
‘almost’ is disputed by Shepherd (1984) and Stiglitz et al. (1987), who contend that absolute 
freedom and costlessness of entry and exit is required for contestability theory to hold. 
According to Stiglitz et al. (1987, p.932), even “the presence of arbitrarily small sunk costs 
can serve as an absolute barrier to entry and make potential competition completely 
ineffective as a discipline device”. These criticisms highlight the rigidity of the conditions 
required for contestability theory to be applicable (Stiglitz, et al. 1987; Schwartz and 
Reynolds, 1983; Shepherd, 1984), yet Baumol et al. (1983b) claim otherwise, despite limited 
empirical support for these contentions. 
Given that contestability theory has been applied to justify the deregulation of markets and 
industries, that it has limited empirical support, and is based on numerous questionable 
assumptions, the implications are concerning. In particular, contestability theory excuses 
concentrated markets and dominant firms within these markets (Blaug 2001). For example, 
Baumol and Willig (1986, p.10) argue: 
76 
 
We reject with equal conviction the position of those who hold that mere large size of a firm 
means that it must serve the economy badly, that high concentration ratios are sufficient to 
justify governmental restrictions upon the structure or conduct of an industry. 
 
According to Baumol and Willig (1986, p.10), the undesirable consequences potentially 
resulting from concentrated markets would be mitigated by market contestability. They argue 
that incumbent firms will experience potential competition, as they would actual competition, 
and that the three key conditions of contestability (discussed above) can be met. Baumol and 
Willig’s argument presumes that firms will both act to maximise their efficiency and deliver 
gains from efficiency improvements to their consumers. Furthermore, this implies consumers 
have substantially more power than firms in this scenario. Each of these assumptions is 
questionable, yet is central to contestability theory. 
Contestability theory fits with the emerging neoliberalism of the 1970s and 1980s, offering an 
excuse for neoclassical economists as to why real-world markets may not reflect perfect 
competition and not warrant state intervention. Contestability redefines the notion of 
competition to contend that oligopolistic or monopolistic markets can be competitive and 
efficient market structures. However, contestability theory is flawed and based upon 
questionable assumptions of firm behaviour. Despite these limitations, policy makers have 
applied this theory to a myriad of policy areas in Australia. The uncritical application of 
contestability theory to wheat market policy, resulting in concentrated wheat export markets 
that are not contestable, is particularly problematic. 
 
Applying contestability theory to policy 
Australian policy discourses around competition and economic policy extolling the virtues of 
contestability do not explain contestability theory, nor clearly define competition. Rather, 
arguments supporting the dismantling of regulatory barriers are prosecuted on the basis that 
this leads to ‘more competition’, or ‘greater contestability’. Policy documents do not 
critically reflect upon the viability and applicability of contestability theory. Articles by 
Baumol (Baumol, 1982; Baumol, et al. 1983; Baumol and Willig, 1981) are given 
ceremonious citations, accompanied by a brief description of the idea of contestability theory. 
However, these policy documents do not refer to the conditions required for contestability 
theory to hold. This implies that contestability has been used as an idea, without condition. 
Thus, policy makers have simplified contestability, portraying the removal of barriers to entry 
as sufficient to create a contestable market. 
Through applying contestability theory in this manner, policy makers rely upon the 
robustness of a small group of studies (Baumol, 1982; Baumol et al., 1983; Baumol and 
Willig, 1981) that do not clearly support the applicability of contestability theory to real 
world markets. The limitations and weaknesses of this theory are not addressed by policy 
makers, despite the criticism that contestability theory has attracted. Policy makers thus avoid 
engaging with criticisms presented by Shepherd (1984, 1985), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988), 
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among others. Contestability theory is represented as fitting the overarching hope for 
deregulation in policy documents, which is to maximise market and industry efficiency. 
Policy documents presume the presence of large firms in markets will maximise efficiency, 
as larger firms are believed to be inherently more efficient, due to their size and scope. For 
example, the Productivity Commission (2005a, p.286) argues that: 
…increasing concentration in the local economy has been a desirable outcome of trade 
liberalisation, rather than a new problem which competition policy must address. That is, 
increased international competition has served to drive out much inefficient small scale and 
fragmented production. 
 
Thus, the oligopsonistic market structure fits policy makers’ ambition to maximise efficiency, 
and such a market is claimed to be competitive as it is contestable. Yet, policy documents 
apply a shallow, uncritical interpretation of contestability, with the sole condition being that 
external firms are not prevented from entering the market by regulatory barriers. 
 
Wheat export market contestability 
Can contestability theory be reliably applied to the Australian wheat industry? The theory 
requires that market entry is costless. However, instead of directly addressing this condition, 
policy documents indicate that removing regulatory barriers to market entry is sufficient to 
create contestable markets. This idea is used clumsily in the example of the Australian wheat 
industry. The Bulk Handling Companies (BHCs) control storage, handling and port facilities, 
the non-contestable segments of the wheat supply chain, and operate grain trading arms, the 
contestable segment of the supply chain (Allen Consulting, 2008; National Competition 
Council, 2009). In its submission to the Productivity Commission Inquiry into the Wheat 
Export Marketing Amendment Act, the National Competition Council (2009) contends that 
unless the contestable and non-contestable segments of these firms are separated, competition 
will not develop. The National Competition Council (NCC), Allen Consulting (2008) and ITS 
Global (2006) argue that firms use their control of the non-contestable segments of the supply 
chain to prevent competing firms from entering the market. To address this problem, the 
Commonwealth Government introduced an ‘Access Test’ to ensure that grain traders entering 
the market would have clear access to storage and port facilities operated by CBH, ABB 
Grain (since acquired by Viterra) and GrainCorp. With regard to contestability theory, this 
regulation intends to ensure that grain traders can enter the export wheat market without 
incurring costs. 
Despite these assurances, firms focus their export activity in areas where they control 
infrastructure. For example, between 2010 and 2012, CBH exports comprised 46.5% of all 
exports from its Albany port, 50.5% of total exports from its Esperance Port and 39.9% of 
total exports from its Geraldton port (Wheat Exports Australia, 2012). However, CBH has 
reduced its activities in the Eastern states, to consolidate its exports from Western Australia 
and South Australia. This focus indicates that although there may be no regulatory barriers 
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preventing CBH from establishing a presence in the Eastern states of Australia, the company, 
despite 12 years of investment and being a major Australian wheat exporter is still unable to 
develop a substantial and sustainable share of this market. Similarly, Emerald has withdrawn 
from Western Australia to focus on Victoria, where it owns facilities within the Port of 
Melbourne. 
Bulk handlers Viterra and GrainCorp also focus their business in regions where they control 
storage, handling and ports. Conversely, firms that do not own infrastructure realise that, 
unless they address this shortcoming, they will not develop their share of the Australian 
market. As Yasushi Takahashi, Mitsui Australia Managing Director, states “for us to be a 
competitive and attractive supplier of wheat and grain…we will have to make some 
meaningful investments in ports, rails and silos’’ (The Australian, 2014a). Similarly, Olam 
Australia Chief Executive, Bob Dall'Alba, says “unless you're one of the large quasi-
monopoly holders of assets, you're marginalised in the business, and therefore you need to 
keep investing in port and other infrastructure” (Jasper, 2014). 
 
Table 2: Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) figures for the Australian Export Wheat 
Industry (2011-2013).  
Year Australia QLD NSW VIC SA WA 
2011/2012 1278 1238.06 3271.96 1595.83 1578.41 2122.34 
2012/2013 1403 2135.35 3811.07 1546.61 2717.49 1944.39 
Data compiled from NSW Farmers (2014) and Grain Producers Australia (2013). 
 
Table 2 uses the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) as a measure of concentration in the 
Australian wheat export market and regional markets. The regional market figure presented 
in this table is most relevant, as the distance between markets prevents a wheat grower in 
Western Australia from transporting and selling wheat to a marketer operating in Victoria. I 
calculate HHI figures by adding the squares of the market share of each company in that 
market (Murphy 2006, p.13). Thus, a market with one company will have a HHI figure of 
10,000, whereas a market with 100 companies each with a 1 per cent market share will have a 
HHI figure of 100. HHI figures between 1000 and 1800 indicate moderate concentration, 
whereas figures exceeding 1800 reflect a highly concentrated market (Murphy, 2006, p.13). 
As shown in Table 2, in 2012/2013 every regional market except Victoria exceeded this 
figure. 
Policy makers will argue that, despite the market concentration evident in Table 2, markets 
are still competitive as there are minimal regulatory barriers preventing firms from entering 
these markets. However, without control of infrastructure, firms appear reluctant to make a 
meaningful entry into the Australian market. 
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Investment in new infrastructure 
In the past three years, firms have developed port and storage facilities to rival the BHCs. 
Policy makers will suggest that this is evidence of contestable markets, pointing out that 
firms are entering the market and investing in facilities to support this entry. However, this 
development does not necessarily indicate contestability. As previously noted, for 
contestability theory to hold in real world markets, entry must be costless. As shown in Table 
3, investing in ports is a long term, expensive endeavour. For example, Bunge Limited is 
investing A$60 million in developing port facilities in Bunbury (Western Australia) and 
Geelong (Victoria) (Financial Review 2014). 
 
Table 3: Investment in new port facilities by grain traders 
Port  Investment  
Port Kembla 
(NSW) 
A$75m investment by Quattro Group, a 50/50 joint venture established by Noble and Qube 
(Locke 2014; Wiggins and Toevai 2014). 
Newcastle 
(NSW) 
Investment by Asciano in partnership with Louis Dreyfus  
Newcastle Agri 
Terminal (NSW) 
A$70m investment by Glencore, 32.5% stake; Agrex Australia, 32.5% stake; and CBH, 
18.9% stake, which CBH is trying to sell (The West Australian 2015). Agrex Australia is a 
joint venture between Olam Australia and Mitsubishi  
Bunbury  
(WA) 
A$40m investment by Bunge Australia (Sprague 2014)  
Geelong  
(VIC) 
A$20m investment by Bunge Australia (Sprague 2014) 
 
Acquisitions 
Acquisitions are also used by firms to gain control of storage, handling and port facilities. 
Two firms that emerged from the privatisation of state-based bulk handling authorities, ABB 
Grain (South Australia) and GrainCorp, have been acquisition targets. Viterra acquired ABB 
Grain in 2009. Glencore then acquired Viterra in 2012. Similarly, Archer Daniels Midland 
attempted to acquire GrainCorp in 2013 (Packham and Neales, 2013). The then Federal 
Treasurer Joe Hockey rejected this acquisition in November 2013, claiming that it was not in 
the national interest (Packham and Neales 2013). 
Table 4 below demonstrates that significant merger and acquisition activity has been 
occurring in the Australian wheat industry. Policy makers may argue that this suggests 
deregulation is having the desired effect, through attracting investment in the wheat industry. 
To an extent, this is true. Table 3 and Table 4 show substantial investments by firms in new 
infrastructure and in firms owning storage, handling and ports. However, only well-
capitalised global firms are making these investments. While a contest is occurring, it is 
exclusively between very large firms with the capacity to make major investments. As firms 
need to control storage, handling and port facilities to be competitive, and control is achieved 
through investments that only the very large well-capitalised global firms appear capable of 
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making, the contestability of the wheat export market may actually be very limited. Thus, the 
market is formally open but, in reality, is only open to these major firms, as meaningful entry 
is dependent upon firms’ capacity to invest, to incur costs that are sunk. 
 
Table 4: Acquisitions in the Australian wheat industry 
2016 Qube currently attempting a $9bn acquisition of Asciano 
 
COFCO completed its acquisition of Nidera, purchasing the 49% of the company that it did 
not own, for US$750m (Ballard 2016; Financial Times 2016).  
2015 Nidera completed its acquisition of PentAG (Nidera 2016).  
 
COFCO acquired Noble Agri for AU$2.25bn (Cofco Agri 2015; Grain Central 2016).  
2014 Mitsubishi acquired 80 per cent of Olam Australia for US$64m in 2014, and 20% of parent 
company, Olam International, for SGD1.53bn in 2015. (Blas and Koh 2015; The 
Australian 2014b).  
 
CHS acquired a 50% stake in NSW firm Broadbent, Agfarm (Heard and Marshall 2014).  
2013 ADM attempted to acquire GrainCorp for A$3.4bn. 
2012 Emerald, through parent company Sumitomo, acquired Australian Bulk Alliance for 
A$120m (Emerald Grain 2013). 
 
Glencore acquired Viterra for C$6.1bn (Hasselback 2013). In 2009, Viterra acquired ABB 
grain (Australian Taxation Office 2010). 
2011 Cargill (Private Company) acquired AWB GrainFlow, giving Cargill ownership of 22 grain 
receival sites in Australia’s Eastern States (GrainFlow 2011). 
2007 Queensland Cotton acquired by Olam Australia for AUD166m (Olam Group 2016; 
Chappell 2007).  
 
The Australian infrastructure investments and acquisitions are substantial. However, they 
must be seen in the context that Australian wheat comprised only 3.75% of global wheat 
production in 2013, and in the light of how small are the Australian percentages of the total 
investments made globally by international merchants. Whether the Australian investments 
are financially sound in and of themselves (a concern expressed by the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation of the United Nations, 2015, p.12) may be beside the point. For example, 
Bunge’s $40m investment in its Bunbury port lost A$3.4m in its first two operating years 
(The West Australian, 2016), but Bunge Chief Executive Officer, Soren Schroder, also 
hastened to point out that “Australia is a very important piece for the global supply chain for 
a company like Bunge” (Garrett and Fitzgerald, 2014). According to Schroder, Bunge is 
“very close to having completed the global footprint…Canada and Australia were the last two 
pieces” (Singh, 2015a). If large corporations making investments and acquisitions are 
focused on developing their global supply and marketing strategies, is it at all sensible to 
ponder contestability within a national market, let alone sub-national markets? At the very 
least, it is difficult to think of production and price in a fragment of the global market 
reflecting the degree of contestation between firms participating in such a fragment. 
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Conclusion 
This article has analysed contestability theory and its application to policies affecting the 
Australian wheat industry. I have argued that contestability theory is flawed, yet policy 
makers have used this theory uncritically to inform policy decisions such as the deregulation 
of the wheat export market. Policy makers have not adequately considered the limitations of 
contestability theory, nor cited the conditions required for the theory to hold (i.e. that market 
entry is costless, absolute and reversible). Policy decisions have been based on a broad 
interpretation of contestability, simplified to infer that the removal of regulatory barriers to 
market entry is sufficient to create a contestable market. 
In the case of the Australian wheat export market, this logic is transparently misplaced. Firms 
may seek to enter this market without incurring cost but, to truly compete, ownership of 
infrastructure (grain storage and handling facilities, ports) is essential. To enter this market, 
firms must invest in new infrastructure, or through acquisitions of firms already owning 
infrastructure. This expenditure represents a barrier to market entry. Further, the magnitude 
of the necessary spending restricts market entry to highly capitalised, global firms that are 
capable of making these investments, incurring debt and potentially incurring losses as they 
develop market share. 
In fact, the Australian wheat export market is concentrated, particularly in the oligopsonistic 
regional markets. It is possible that this scenario was actually desired by policy makers. 
Policy documents refer to the supposed efficiency gains that can be achieved by allowing 
large companies to develop market share. This claim hinges on the assumptions that large 
firms will be the most efficient, that efficiency is a good policy ambition, and that markets 
will compel firms to be efficient and prevent large firms from exerting market power. 
However, the policy-makers may well have played into the hands of large multinational firms 
for whom profitability depends more on the exercise of market power than on the efficiency 
of grain handling, storage, international shipment and selling. 
What about the farmers? Wheat growers, for whom deregulation was supposedly 
implemented, are lost in this debate. Federal Members of Parliament and Senators claimed 
that wheat export market deregulation would create a market with numerous buyers 
competing for growers’ wheat. This scenario has not eventuated. This is unsurprising, given 
that this vision is inconsistent with the concept of competition that has informed Australian 
policy, which centres on potential, rather than actual, competition. According to Rod Sims, 
Chairman of the Australian Consumer and Competition Commission, the 2015 Harper 
Review of National Competition Policy was intended to support farmers. However, the 
Harper Review is focused on ‘making markets work for consumers’ and doesn’t mention 
farmers, or attempt to articulate how producers would benefit from oligopsonistic markets 
(Harper, 2015, p.7). Rather than benefitting wheat growers, this article contends that 
deregulation of the wheat export market is primarily intended to liberalise the participation of 
large, frequently multinational firms as buyers in Australian markets. Contestability theory 
conveys the idea that a market comprised of a small number of large firms is still 
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competitive, but its application to policy has resulted in a consolidated market which in 
reality is not open to new entrants and therefore, is not contestable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
83 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6: Efficiency, productivity and…fairness: An analysis of the Harper Review 
into Australia’s competition policy 
 
This article was published in the refereed proceedings of the 2015 conference of The 
Australian Sociological Association, ‘Neoliberalism and Contemporary Challenges for the 
Asia Pacific’.  This article was developed specifically for the conference, and is among the 
first published analyses of the the National Competition Policy Review (Harper et al. 2015).  
 
 
Citation: 
O’Keeffe, P., (2015), Efficiency, productivity and…fairness: An analysis of the Harper 
Review into Australia’s competition policy, in Theresa Petray and Anne Stephenson (ed.), 
Proceedings of the 2015 TASA Conference, Hawthorn, Australia, 23-26 November 2015, 
pp.169-176.  
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Contribution of article to thesis 
 
This article analyses the Harper Review into Australia’s competition policy and its emphasis 
on maximising efficiency in the interests of the consumer. As in the previous chapter, I show 
that in prioritising allocative efficiency, policy makers have legitimised the development of 
large firms and concentrated markets, in the assumption that ultimately, the consumer will 
benefit. This article shows Bork’s influence, among others, in providing a theoretical basis 
for this policy construction. I argue that this presents a narrowed conception of the citizen as 
a consumer, which is an argument I develop further in Chapter 7. As in Chapter 5, this article 
is important to the overall thesis argument as it shows the constructions of firms, markets and 
consumers which have been used to justify policy makers’ emphasis on efficiency, at the 
expense of the social. This creates a policy ‘reality’, which I argue in chapters 9, 10 and 11, 
has been used to facilitate the deregulation of Australian agriculture, particularly, the wheat 
export market.   
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Efficiency, productivity and…fairness: An analysis of the Harper Review into 
Australia’s competition policy 
 
Abstract 
In December 2013 the recently elected Australian Government commissioned a review into 
Australia’s national competition policy. The review panel, chaired by Professor Ian Harper, 
published their final report in March 2015. This paper provides an analysis of the 2015 
Australian Competition Policy Review (referred to henceforth as the Harper Review), which 
has the overarching objective of ensuring that markets work in the interests of consumers 
(Harper, Anderson, McCluskey and O’Bryan 2015, p.7). The key assumptions which 
underpin the Harper Review are that competition is the most effective means of achieving 
efficiency, while a more efficient and productive economy will deliver a range of outcomes 
including equity, fairness and increased living standards for all. Furthermore, this emphasis 
on efficiency, while placing less importance on market concentration, does not adequately 
consider the power that can be exercised by corporations with a high market share. This 
analysis hinges on the belief that “the disciplines of a competitive market” will be sufficient 
to ensure that corporations do act in such a way that the assumed benefits of competition 
filter through society (Harper et al. 2015, p.15). This focus crowds out alternate values, while 
providing constructions of power, equity, and social welfare, which fit within the rationality 
of competition and efficiency.  
 
Introduction 
Politicians from mainstream political parties frequently espouse the virtues of a competitive 
economy. Rather than being envisaged as an end point, competition is viewed as being a key 
means through which broader objectives of increased efficiency and productivity are 
achieved (Bowen 2014; Abbott 2015; Keating 1994). Through these aims, competition is 
considered as an important mechanism for achieving a broad range of outcomes, including 
economic growth (Keating 1994), higher incomes and  increased living standards (Howard 
1996), more opportunity and employment (Bowen 2014), fairness and equity (Harper et al. 
2015).  
In addition, Harper et al. (2015) view competition as a key means through which consumer 
choice, and subsequently, consumer empowerment, is reached. The fundamental belief that 
ties these objectives together, is that competition within markets compels businesses and 
service providers to increase efficiencies and pass these efficiency gains on to consumers. In 
announcing the Harper Review, then Prime Minister Tony Abbott (2013, p.1) stated that “The 
competition review will examine not only the current laws but the broader competition 
framework, to increase productivity and efficiency in markets…and raise living standards for 
all Australians”. This statement implies that redistribution can be achieved through increased 
competition within the Australian economy.  
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What is efficiency?  
While efficiency is often mentioned by Australian politicians in relation to competition 
policy, a description of what efficiency represents is rarely forthcoming. Similarly, the 
Harper Review refers to efficiency on numerous occasions, though does not specify what this 
means (Harper et al. 2015). Inaugural Australian Consumer and Competition Council 
Commissioner, Rhonda Smith, stated that “The aim of micro-economic reform (and of 
competition policy as part of it) is to improve the efficiency with which resources are used, 
thus contributing to improved living standards” (Smith 1996, p.1). Smith describes efficiency 
as including technical and production efficiency, dynamic efficiency and allocative 
efficiency, with the latter explained as ensuring “resources go to where consumers value them 
most” (Smith 1996, p.1). Orbach (2011, p.141) contends that allocative efficiency is achieved 
“when the cost of resources used in production is equal to the consumer’s willingness to 
pay”. Orbach (2011, p.141) equates allocative efficiency with Pareto optimality, in which an 
allocation of resources benefits one or more people, without leaving another person worse off 
(Orbach 2011, p.141; Posner 1979, p.488). The Kaldor-Hicks criterion develops upon Pareto 
optimality, though contends that efficient distribution of resources can benefit a person and 
leave another worse off, yet the individual that has benefitted through this allocation will 
have the capacity to compensate those who may have been negatively impacted (Posner 
1979, p.491; Coleman 1979, p.514). Using the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, some have contended 
that legal rules – such as competition policy – should not be designed to necessarily benefit 
all through redistribution, rather, any redistribution should occur through taxation or welfare 
(Weisbach 2003, p.439; Kaplow and Shavell 1994, pp.667-668). This contention suggests 
that issues of equity and efficiency can be separated, yet critics suggest that this is incorrect 
due to the “pervasiveness” of market failure (Stiglitz 1991, pp.40-41; Jolls 1998). As stated 
by Stiglitz (1991, pp.4-5), from this perspective, “Economists need not concern themselves 
with value judgments; whatever the government’s distributive objectives, it implements these 
through initial lump sum taxes and subsidies, and then leaves the market to work for itself”. 
Additionally, the potential to compensate those that are worse off through competition policy 
which primarily focuses on efficiency, will not necessarily result in the development of 
taxation and welfare policies which do ensure adequate compensation.  
While efficiency is mentioned extensively throughout the Harper Review, the issue of 
whether competition policy should aim to deliver equitable outcomes receives relatively little 
attention. Furthermore, while the Harper Review aims to “make markets work in the long-
term interests of consumers” (Harper et al. 2015, p.23), this ambition appears to differ from 
Tony Abbott’s desire to see competition policy deliver “raised living standards for all”. 
However, Abbott himself is inconsistent on this issue; having previously admitted in 2002 
that increases in inequality might inevitably result from increased competition (Conley 2004, 
p.1). 
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The Chicago School and antitrust 
Economists from the Chicago School criticised the static view of markets adopted by the 
neoclassical model of perfect competition (Sidak and Teece 2009). Additionally, from this 
perspective, government intervention is perceived as being an impediment to efficient 
markets. According to Shughart and McChesney (2010, p.390), antitrust enforcement was 
based on rhetoric opposing the development of big companies and prioritised the prevention 
of market concentration above all else. Subsequently, antitrust policy had developed to focus 
less “on the interest of consumers in free markets than to the interest of inefficient producers 
in safe markets” (Bork 1967, p.242, cited in Signorino 2013, p.7). From the perspective of the 
Chicago School, the promotion of efficiency is viewed as being more important than reducing 
market concentration (Bork 1967; Baumol and Ordover 1985, p.247). Though conceding that 
mergers may undermine competition in some instances, Baumol and Ordover (1985, p.247) 
argue that on the other hand, mergers which may result in increased efficiencies “make it 
necessary for other firms in the industry to try harder”. This is a key assumption which 
underpins the Harper Review.  
 
Efficiency through ‘consumer welfare’ 
The emphasis of competition policy, within countries such as the United States and Australia 
has focused on delivering favourable outcomes for consumers (Kirkwood 2012; James Jr et 
al. 2013, pp.100-101; Murphy 2006, p.32). This focus implies that citizens effectively are 
consumers, yet this does not disclose the contention that consumer welfare is most effectively 
enhanced through an emphasis on efficiency (Bork 1967; Baumol and Ordover 1985, p.247). 
Robert Bork, of the Chicago School, is a key figure in shifting the focus of antitrust towards 
consumer welfare (Crane 2014; Elzinga 2014; Orbach 2011). This influence is such that 
consumer welfare, as developed by Bork, is the only goal of US antitrust policy (Orbach 
2011, p.133; Crane 2014, p.835). As mentioned by Crane (2014, p.835), Bork’s consumer 
welfare effectively disguises the underlying, and predominant, emphasis of economic 
efficiency. According to Bork (1967, 1978), antitrust should be exclusively focused on 
promoting consumer welfare, which can be achieved through pursuing economic efficiency. 
This focus is underpinned by the assumption that an efficient company, regardless of their 
market power, will supply the market with better products at better prices for consumers 
(Bork 1967). As stated by Crane (2014, p.835), Bork repositioned antitrust law from being “a 
constraint on large-scale business power and toward a conception of antitrust law as a mild 
constraint on a relatively small set of practices that pose a threat to allocative efficiency”. In 
many ways, this idea of consumer welfare, and the championing of efficiency, excused the 
development of large corporations within concentrated markets. This approach fundamentally 
ignores the capacity of corporations with significant market share and political influence to 
exert market power. Furthermore, this also relies heavily upon the assumption that a large 
company will allocate resources efficiently and deliver outcomes that benefit consumers. The 
influence of these ideas is particularly pertinent with regard to the approach towards 
competition policy in Australia.  
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Harper Review into Competition Policy 
Announced in 2013 by the newly elected Australian Government under Prime Minister Tony 
Abbott, the Harper Review follows Hilmer, Rayner and Taperell’s (1993) review of 
competition policy, which has underpinned Australian policy makers’ approach to 
competition in the past two decades, particularly through the 1995 National Competition 
Policy. Harper et al. (2015, p.15) explain their understanding of competition policy: 
Competition policy, like other arms of government policy, is aimed at securing the welfare of 
Australians…Properly applied, it can improve the quality and range of goods and services, 
including social services, available to Australians…the disciplines of a competitive market 
compel efficiencies in business conduct, which in turn contributes to the productivity and 
competitiveness of enterprises. 
 
This definition suggests that competition leads to efficiency increases which enhance 
productivity, ensuring that businesses are more competitive and will deliver better products 
for consumers. This analysis hinges on the assumption that “the disciplines of a competitive 
market” will be sufficient to ensure that corporations do act in such a way that the assumed 
benefits of competition filter through society.  
 
Consumers 
The emphasis of the Harper Review is clearly focused on consumers, lending considerably 
from Bork’s notion of consumer welfare as being the fundamental aim of competition policy. 
According to Harper et al. (2015, p.23), “Our competition policy, laws and institutions serve 
the national interest best when focused on the long-term interests of consumers”. Importantly, 
Harper et al. (2015, p.15) extend the understanding of what a “consumer” is, to include those 
people who are reliant upon social services. To emphasise this point, Harper et al. (2015, 
p.23) contend that “Consumers in this context are not just retail consumers or households…In 
the realm of government services, consumers can be patients, welfare recipients, parents of 
school-age children or users of the national road network”. Furthermore, Harper et al. (2015, 
p.23) contend that ‘consumers’ can also include businesses. This appears to redefine the role 
of a citizen within their society. Reducing people to consumers, particularly with regard to 
government services, fundamentally alters the relationship between the government and the 
citizenry. Furthermore, Harper et al. (2015, p.20) emphasise that the power of the individual 
citizen can be enacted through their role as a consumer, and their capacity to exercise choice. 
I suggest this is a very limited conception of power, or empowerment, as Harper et al. (2015) 
frequently refer to. In addition, with regard to government services, it could be argued that a 
citizen does – or in the case of privatised public services, did - effectively retain some level of 
ownership over these services. The power that is exercised through the choices made as a 
consumer, as opposed to the power that is exercised as an owner, is relatively hollow.  
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While associating competition and choice, with empowerment Harper et al. (2015, p.20), also 
equate with the increased freedom of consumers. This is very much in the Chicago School 
tradition of associating freedom with free markets (Bork 1966; Friedman 1962). Furthermore, 
Harper et al. (2015, p.27) contend that the lives of those on lower incomes, can be enhanced 
through increased consumer choice. The application of this terminology, coupled with the 
narrow conception of what it is to be a citizen, considerably limits the scope for alternate 
values to be aspired to. Furthermore, the shallow conceptions of equity, empowerment and 
freedom of Harper et al. (2015) ensure that more rounded considerations of these values may 
be compromised through this emphasis on efficiency and productivity.  
 
The consumer of Human Services 
The broad definition of a ‘consumer’, by Harper et al. (2015), is of considerable significance. 
The positioning of a citizen as a consumer of human services for example, implies that 
neoliberal tenets such as efficiency and competition can be applied successfully throughout 
society. Furthermore, the assertion is that these ideas, which have arguably not been 
particularly successful in safeguarding the global economy with significant crisis, will deliver 
beneficial outcomes regardless of the context in which they are applied. With regard to social 
services, this is evident in Harper et al.’s (2015, p.24) assertion that consumer choice 
“encourages governments to adapt their services to better serve our needs”. Harper et al 
(2015) consider that competition will force government services to become more efficient 
and more productive, to remain attractive to consumers of these services. Consumers, in turn, 
can exercise their power by choosing a different service provider. Whether this approach is 
appropriate to social services delivery is also highly questionable, with the risk being that this 
approach significantly undermines the principles upon which social welfare might be based. 
Nevertheless, Harper et al (2015) demonstrate a strong conviction that competition delivers 
equitable outcomes in society, and would argue that the development of more efficient and 
productive government services will ultimately result in improved social welfare outcomes. 
This argument is exemplified in the following statement (Harper et al. 2015, p.34):  
[D]eepening and extending competition policy in human services is a priority reform. 
Lowering barriers to entry can stimulate a diversity of providers, which expands user choice.  
 
While Harper et al. (2015, p.34) acknowledge that in some remote location, competition 
between services providers may not be possible due to the size of the “market”. In this case, 
the “well-designed benchmarking of services” is essential in maintaining the quality of 
services, in cases when competition from the market is not able to have the effect of 
providing incentives for efficiency and productivity improvements. This suggests that in 
cases where markets are not competitive, service providers will be required to meet standards 
that assume the presence of competition. In this sense, even when markets aren’t competitive, 
mechanisms can be developed to resemble the influence of competition. While Harper et al. 
(2015) contend that government may have to intervene to ensure that competition is 
maintained, there is a sense throughout this paper that government should remove itself from 
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being a provider of services, to become a manager of competitive markets for those services, 
with the use of a “light touch” (Harper et al. 2015, p.24). In some ways, this reflects a 
neoclassical approach which does emphasise the role of government as intervening to ensure 
that markets more closely resemble perfect competition (Tsoulfidis and Tsaliki 2015), rather 
than the more overtly libertarian approach  adopted by the Chicago School.  
 
Public interest 
Within the terms of reference of the National Competition Policy Review, then Federal 
Treasurer Joe Hockey (2013a) called on the review panel to determine how productivity and 
efficiency can be attained through “identifying and removing impediments to competition 
that are not in the long-term interest of consumers or the public interest”. The idea of exactly 
what the ‘public interest’ represents, is not explored in any significant detail throughout the 
Harper Review. It could be assumed that since the Harper Review (2015, p.32) advocates 
maintaining the current public interest test outlined in the National Competition Policy, that 
this reflects the idea of the ‘public interest’, as developed within Hilmer et al. (1993). 
According to Hilmer et al. (1993), determining whether or not anti-competitive regulations 
are in the public interest should be based on two grounds – whether market failures are 
present (considered as being a rare occurrence), or if community values – which are 
described in vague terms as immutable and constantly changing – are compromised by 
increased efficiencies. The implicit assumption here is that markets are not likely to fail. The 
reliance upon free markets is reflected in the contention throughout the Harper Review that 
competition does deliver choice, which can then provide consumers with beneficial 
outcomes. However as Harper et al (2015, p.27) contend, “For choice to deliver real benefits, 
consumers not only need proper access to information, but it must also be in the right form 
for them to assess it, and they must have the capacity to access it”. Should these conditions 
for information not be met, then presumably the capacity for consumers to benefit through 
choice offered by that competitive market would be fundamentally reduced. Yet as Stiglitz 
(1991, p.17) states, “imperfect information is pervasive throughout the economy”. Criticisms 
of the neoclassical model of perfect competition, and perfect information, are not exactly 
new, with Schumpeter and even Hayek among the critics of this model. However the Hilmer 
Review, and subsequently, the Harper Review, appear less likely to acknowledge the 
potential for market failure.  
Referring to ‘community values’, Hilmer et al (1993, pp.88-89) describe that “there are some 
situations where competitive market conduct may achieve economic efficiency, but at the 
cost of other valued social objectives…In both categories, it is also important to recognise 
that there will usually be a host of policy instruments by which governments can pursue their 
particular economic or social objectives”. Presumably, these policy instruments are likely to 
include taxation and welfare, which suggests that Hilmer et al. (2013) were of the view that 
distribution was best achieved through these means, rather than through legal rules. As 
Harper et al. (2015) advocate the conception of the ‘public interest’ as outlined by Hilmer et 
al. (2013), it can be seen that these reviews appear to share a belief in the Kaldor-Hicks 
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criterion for efficiency, and therefore are of the view that the issues of efficiency and equity 
can be separated (Stiglitz 1991, pp.40-41).  
 
Conclusion 
This paper provides an analysis of the Harper Review, published in 2015 as a review into 
Australia’s competition policy. The overarching assumption of the Harper Review is that 
competition results in increased efficiencies, which delivers increased productivity. Bork’s 
conception of consumer welfare is particularly influential with regard to the Harper Review, 
which effectively equates efficiency or markets as having a direct relationship to the welfare 
of consumers. Importantly, the broad definition of what a consumer is, which Harper et al. 
(2015) extend to include those who rely upon human services, implies that the principles of 
competition can be extended to all areas of society. This claim that competition should be 
introduced into human services in particular is highly contentious. Positioning people as 
consumers of government services, and choice as an expression of power, neglects the power 
that people exert over publicly owned government services, that were (and in some cases, 
are) effectively controlled by the citizens that Harper et al (2015) refer to as consumers. 
Furthermore, the shallow depictions of what equity, fairness or ‘the public interest’, actually 
represent, effectively crowd out broader definitions of these values.  
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Chapter 7: ‘Who wouldn’t want more efficiency?’ Analysing the construction of 
efficiency as a ‘truth’ within policy discourse 
 
This article was developed for the ECR/HDR workshop organised by the Sociology of 
Economic Life thematic group of The Australian Sociological Association (TASA), after my 
initial abstract submission was selected for inclusion. This workshop, ‘From economic 
rationalism to global neoliberalism’ was organised to celebrate 25 years since publication of 
‘Economic Rationalism in Canberra’ by Michael Pusey. Michael Pusey was the discussant 
for this article, and I thank him for his support and suggestions. A revised version of my 
workshop paper was submitted for inclusion in a special edition of the Journal of Sociology, 
to reflect on the significance of ‘Economic Rationalism in Canberra’.  
 
 
Citation: 
O’Keeffe, P., (2018b), Who wouldn’t want more efficiency? Analysing the construction of 
efficiency as a ‘truth’ within policy discourse, Journal of Sociology, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1440783318759087 
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Contribution of article to thesis 
This article continues my critique of policy makers’ rhetoric around competition, markets and 
efficiency. In relation to the overall thesis, this article shows the weaknesses of the claimed 
benefits of these constructs, which have been used to justify the incursion of corporate power 
into previously restricted areas of society, such as wheat marketing.  
This article develops my analysis of discourses around firms, competition, markets and 
consumers, and the relationships between these constructs. I analyse consumers’ living 
standards as policy makers’ claimed motivation for creating a ‘business friendly 
environment’. This notion is underpinned by the erroneous assumption that firms lack power 
in markets and policy making, which I address in this article and throughout this thesis.  
As in Chapters 5 and 6, I show how policy makers seek to create a favourable environment 
which will encourage firms’ participation in Australian markets. As I argue in this paper, this 
has undermined the quality of life of many Australians, particularly those in the workforce 
who are precariously employed, unemployed or underemployed.  
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‘Who wouldn’t want more efficiency?’ Analysing the construction of efficiency as a 
‘truth’ within policy discourses. 
 
Abstract 
The discourse of Australian public policy refers regularly to the concept of efficiency as 
though the meaning of this term is self-evident and shared by all stakeholders in the policy 
process. Efficiency is constructed as a primary objective of policy, as an ambition which is 
unequivocally ‘good’. This focuses discussion on what policy change is needed to maximise 
efficiency, rather than the more pertinent question, of ‘Why efficiency?’ This paper examines 
how efficiency is described and justified, in a collection of Australian policy documents 
produced in the past 25 years by government departments, agencies and inquiries, and by 
mainstream lobby groups and consulting firms. These policy documents portray efficiency as 
essential in raising consumers’ living standards. In turn, living standards are narrowed, 
centring on satisfaction of consumers’ wants through markets, by firms. I build on Pusey’s 
argument that efficiency injures, rather than improves, quality of life for many people. 
Measures in the interests of maximising efficiency, such as casualization, outsourcing and 
disaggregation of jobs, have contributed to an increasingly insecure existence for many, 
particularly those on society’s margins. As a result, I argue that rather than seeking to 
maximise efficiency for the betterment of society, efficiency is pursued in spite of society.  
 
 
Introduction  
Efficiency is a term that is used widely, in many different contexts, and often, with different 
meanings. Within policy discourses, policy proposals are often justified through appeals to 
how efficiency can be maximised. On occasions, the term ‘efficiency’ is used to conjure an 
association with its formal meanings in economic theory, without however specifying the 
precise economic meaning of the term; at other times ‘efficiency’ is used more vaguely, 
essentially as a synonym for ‘good’. Efficiency is often constructed as an ambition, which if 
achieved, might result in the betterment of some aspect of Australian society. At other times, 
efficiency is framed as a solution to a problem - in particular, the problems caused by 
government regulation. Yet there is very little elaboration of how efficiency is concretely 
understood. The question of why efficiency should be prioritised over other, competing, 
social goals, also receives scant attention. Significantly, while efficiency is often portrayed as 
providing benefits to ‘Australians’, there is little critical attention given to understanding 
which Australians might be better placed to benefit from efficiency gains.  
 
This article was developed for the workshop ‘From Economic Rationalism to Global 
Neoliberalism', organised by the Sociology of Economic Life thematic group of The 
Australian Sociological Association (TASA) to mark 25 years since publication of Michael 
Pusey’s Economic Rationalism in Canberra. In this article, I draw upon Pusey’s work, to 
understand how efficiency is constructed as a truth, and how this influences the relationship 
between the state and society. At the Roundtable, ‘25 Years since Michael Pusey’s Economic 
Rationalism in Canberra’ at the 2016 TASA conference, Michael Pusey (2016) defined 
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economic rationalism as “the doctrine that economies, markets and money can always, at 
least in principle, deliver better outcomes than states bureaucracies and the law”. According 
to Head (1988, p.466) this concept is founded on the assumptions that “market forces 
typically unleash growth, innovation and efficiency, whereas governmental regulations and 
expenditures typically impede growth, stifle productivity and entrepreneurship, and generate 
inefficiencies in both the private and public sectors”. As Pusey (1998a, p.133) contends, 
throughout the 1990s, the application of economic rationalism by government shifted from 
reducing government intervention and removing market barriers, towards “institutional 
transformation that will ‘make Australia competitive’”. Through examining policy 
discourses, I analyse the framing of efficiency as a key priority in achieving this goal, which 
is argued to lead to enhanced living standards for consumers. Perhaps most pertinently, I 
explore the potential implications for the people and values that do not fit this focus upon 
efficiency and consumers’ living standards.  
 
This article critically analyses key policy documents produced in the 25 years since the 
publication of Economic Rationalism in Canberra. I analyse documents produced by Federal 
Government departments and politicians (Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 
[DPMC] 2014; Howard 1995a, 1995b; Turnbull 2015; Morrison 2015; Australian 
Government 2013); Committees of Inquiry established by Government (Hilmer, Rayner and 
Taperell 1993; Harper, Anderson, McLuskey and O’Bryan 2015); Government authorities 
(Jobs for New South Wales [Jobs for NSW] 2016; Productivity Commission 2016, 2013, 
2005a, 2005b, 2001; National Commission of Audit [NCOA] 2014; National Competition 
Council [NCC] 2009); lobby groups (Business Council of Australia 2014) and consultancy 
firms (McKinsey Australia 2014; McKinsey Global Institute 2012, 2011). I selected these 
documents for analysis as they share a common aim of seeking to develop or influence 
policy, emphasising the role of efficiency in “making Australia competitive” (Pusey 1998a, 
p.133). Furthermore, these documents have either been developed to directly influence 
policy, such as the case with the Harper et al. (2015) and Hilmer et al. (1993) reviews into 
Australian competition policy, to shape policy debates (McKinsey Australia 2014; Business 
Council of Australia 2014) or to shape the direction of Government (Howard 1995a, 1995b; 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 2014). I examine these documents to determine 
how efficiency is described and justified within the context of policy discourses, which I 
contend frame efficiency as a truth, through the production and reproduction of these 
arguments as knowledge. In exploring these constructions, and drawing upon Pusey’s work, I 
suggest that efficiency is pursued by the state, through firms, despite the needs and values of 
society.  
 
Creating a business friendly environment 
In the 25 years since Economic Rationalism in Canberra was published, Australian 
Governments have continued to privatise government owned assets and authorities, such as 
Telecom (Telstra), Trans Australia Airlines (Qantas), and the Australian Wheat Board (AWB 
International). More recently, the Harper Review, initiated by the Abbott Government in 
2013, advocated for the privatisation and marketisation of human services (Harper et al. 
2015). Throughout this period, agricultural export markets such as wheat have been 
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deregulated, whereas government assistance for industries such as car manufacturing has 
shifted from supporting job protection, towards enabling workers to transition to new 
employment. Labour market deregulation has been implemented alongside these changes, 
such as the Howard Government’s Work Choices legislation, which sought to undermine 
workers’ capacity to organise collectively (Peetz and Pocock 2009). Policy makers have 
argued these changes are necessary to enhance Australia’s competitiveness, by promoting 
competition and efficiency, to stimulate productivity growth and economic growth. 
 
However, multifactor productivity growth has remained low in Australia for over a decade 
(DPMC 2014; Productivity Commission 2016, 2013; NCOA 2014). Policy discourses cite 
inefficient resource use as the cause; specifically, high production costs such as wages and 
employee benefits (DPMC 2014; Productivity Commission 2016, 2013; NCOA 2014). To 
address stagnating productivity and economic growth, policy discourses claim the Australian 
Government must work to create a “business friendly environment” characterised by 
deregulated markets and lower corporate taxes (DPMC 2014, p.iii; Jobs for New South Wales 
2016; NCOA 2014). Central to this logic, is the assumption that firms will respond to 
competition by increasing resource efficiency, and will return the gains of these efficiencies 
to consumers.  
 
Measures which aim to attract firms to the Australian economy, such as the reduction in 
corporate taxes, are portrayed as essential mechanisms in boosting wages and job growth 
(DPMC 2014, p.xi). These changes are therefore argued to be in the interests of Australian 
society. Firms, with their greater capacity to maximise efficiency and responsiveness to 
markets, are framed as the actors which will raise Australia’s prosperity. Thus, policy 
discourses frame governments’ central purpose as creating a business friendly environment.  
 
What is efficiency, and why is it pursued?  
In this process of improving prosperity, efficiency is used as a central idea. However, what 
efficiency represents is often left unexplained. Policy discourses frequently cite efficiency as 
a primary policy ambition, though use this term vaguely, as if this were a general ambition to 
portray a sense of what policy should be achieving. The National Competition Policy 
Review, initiated by the Keating Government to investigate how a national policy could 
“develop an open, integrated domestic market for goods and services by removing 
unnecessary barriers to trade and competition”, provides a rare, and brief, outline of what 
efficiency represents (Hilmer et al. 1993, p.361).  
 
Hilmer et al. (1993, p.4) outline three components of economic efficiency: technical or 
productive efficiency, allocative efficiency and dynamic efficiency. This article is particularly 
interested in the concept of allocative efficiency, which Hilmer et al. (1993, p.4) explain “is 
achieved where resources used to produce a set of goods or services are allocated to their 
highest valued uses”. Hilmer et al. (1993, p.4) claim that competition enhances allocative 
efficiency “because firms that can use particular resources more productively can afford to 
bid those resources away from firms that cannot achieve the same level of returns”. Hilmer et 
al. (1993) and Harper et al. (2015) draw a connection between firm size and efficiency, 
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favouring a regulatory environment that doesn’t unduly restrict firm size, in the interests of 
maximising efficiency.  
 
Thus, allocative efficiency is achieved when the most efficient firms, presumed to be the 
largest in a market, are able to procure resources from inefficient firms, presumed to be the 
smallest, and use these resources to their productive potential (Harper et al. 2015; Hilmer et 
al. 1993). Policy discourses construct firms as being the key actors in raising efficiency. 
Regulation which impedes firms and their capacity to be efficient is therefore portrayed as a 
barrier to efficiency. These two constructions are important, as the State and firms are 
portrayed as sharing similar needs and goals, whereas regulation which may protect society’s 
interests, are constructed as an impediment to these ambitions. The aim of the state, being the 
maximisation of efficiency to enhance productivity growth and economic growth, is framed 
as being achievable through the actions of firms.  
 
Efficiency as a truth 
This article now explores how policy discourses foster efficiency as a truth by developing 
these ideas as common sense thinking, which is apolitical and normal. The construction of 
competition and efficiency as common sense is evident in the 2014 report of the National 
Commission of Audit (NCOA), ‘Towards Responsible Government’. The NCOA was 
convened by the Federal Government under the Prime Ministership of Tony Abbott, to assess 
and report on “efficiencies and savings to improve the effectiveness of, and value-for-money 
from, all Commonwealth expenditure” (NCOA 2014, p.252). In response, the NCOA (2014, 
p.5) “developed a set of common sense principles to guide its deliberations”. Included in this 
list, is Principle 9, which states that government should: 
 
Act in the public interest and recognise the benefits of markets. In competitive markets, 
customers, not producers, take precedence. Competition and contestability drive lower costs, 
improve quality and give people what they want (NCOA 2014, p.9). 
 
The inference is that this is not necessarily an argument, but simply reality, and should be 
considered as such by governments when developing policy. The NCOA imply that alternate 
approaches to policy lack sound thinking, and do not share the public’s best interests.  
Policy discourses frame markets as normal, boring and apolitical (NCC 2009; Howard 
1995b). As opposed to politically motivated State intervention, markets are portrayed as 
apolitical mechanisms which simply facilitate price discovery and help organise transactions 
efficiently. For example, in his speech to The Menzies Research Centre, titled ‘The Role of 
Government’, then Federal Opposition leader John Howard (1995b) stated that “Sound 
money, responsible budgets and efficient markets are nothing more than mechanisms to 
deliver rising living standards”. Similarly, the NCC (2009, p.33) portrays markets as 
mechanisms for communicating information, allocating resources efficiently, and rewarding 
merit. According to policy discourses, markets exist outside the sphere of government, as 
opaque mechanisms which cannot be easily understood. Therefore, governments should not 
undermine their efficiency by intervening.  
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Efficiency is framed as a politically neutral concept, of little interest to society. Federal 
opposition leader, John Howard (1995b) argued that while “it might be boring to many…any 
government interested in its country’s economic future and jobs for its people must get on 
with the task of improving its efficiency”. Howard intentionally frames this task as 
uninteresting, and yet implies that this what good government should aim for. Howard 
suggests there is no question that Australia’s economic future is directly related to the 
governments’ capacity to increase efficiency, nor is there need for public debate on validity 
of this relationship. This needs to be accepted, as the NCOA claim (2014, p.11).  
 
The creation of winners and losers by competition is also normalised as being simply part of 
economic life (DPMC 2014; Turnbull 2015). Thus, individual firms and industries should not 
be protected. Rather, the competitive process deserves protection. As Malcolm Turnbull said 
in a radio interview with commentator Neil Mitchell following his accession to the role of 
Australian Prime Minister in 2015 (Turnbull 2015):  
 
Business is tough. Competition is tough. Once you start providing protections for one 
business after another you start putting up the price of products in Australia.  
 
Policy discourses normalise this process as an integral aspect of efficiency maximisation. 
Firms (and industries) that fail are portrayed as inefficient, incapable of meeting the needs of 
consumers, and undermine aggregate efficiency and productivity. Interference in this normal 
process, it is claimed, substantially undermines the efficiency of markets (DPMC 2014; 
NCOA 2014).  
 
Through these techniques, I suggest, the maximisation of efficiency becomes an inevitable 
response to conditions which are beyond the control of individual governments (Hilmer et al. 
1993; Howard 1995b; NCOA 2014). The urgent need to remove regulation is stressed by 
numerous papers (McKinsey Australia 2014; DPMC 2014; Hilmer et al. 1993). Regulation is 
portrayed as burdensome ‘red-tape’. Policy documents claims that unless corporate tax cuts 
and reduced government expenditure are implemented, Australian society will inexorably 
decline (DPMC 2014, p.iii). As such, it is claimed that policy supporting firms also supports 
Australia’s prosperity and Australians’ well-being.   
 
Raising living standards  
Policy discourses contend efficiency gains resulting from competition between firms, will 
lead to increased living standards. This is not presented as an argument, but as a statement of 
fact (Hilmer et al. 1993; Harper et al. 2015; Productivity Commission 2016, 2005a; 
McKinsey Australia 2014; DPMC 2014, NCOA 2014). As then Prime Minister Tony Abbott 
(Australian Government 2013) stated when announcing the Review of Australia’s 
Competition Policy, increased “productivity and efficiency in markets” would “raise living 
standards for all Australians”. Statements such as this, common throughout policy discourses, 
suggest the relationship is so obvious, that explanation or grounding in evidence is 
unnecessary. Yet, Abbott and others do not acknowledge that focusing on efficiency of 
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markets and firms may undermine people who lose in the competition for increasingly scarce 
and insecure employment.  
 
Competitive markets, policy discourses claim, maximise efficiency (Hilmer et al. 1993; 
Industries Assistance Commission 1988). Competition policy, therefore, aims to increase 
efficiency (Hilmer et al. 1993; Keating 1992). These arguments are premised on the 
assumption that firms will respond to competition by maximising efficiency, which is framed 
as the primary ambition of business (Hilmer et al. 1993; IAC 1988; Productivity Commission 
2005a; Sims 2015). Moreover, it is assumed that firms respond to competition by seeking to 
maximise efficiencies, will then pass on subsequent cost savings to consumers (Hilmer et al. 
1993; Harper et al. 2015; IAC 1988; Productivity Commission 2005a). Therefore, creating a 
business friendly environment is assumed to raise the productivity and efficiency of 
Australian markets and industries, but also to improve the experience of Australian 
consumers.  
 
While firms are portrayed as being the vehicles through which efficiency is maximised, 
policy discourses downplay the potential for firms to exert power over markets, policy 
makers and citizens. Instead, it is claimed that consumers possess all the power in this 
relationship, which they exercise through market choices (Harper 2015). The benefits 
accruing to consumers from competition, efficiency and productivity, in turn, supposedly lead 
to increased living standards, which are conceptualised in terms of access to cheaper, more 
diverse and higher quality goods and services (Hilmer et al. 1993; Harper et al. 2015; 
Productivity Commission 2005a). Thus, expanding firms’ participation in Australian life, 
through privatisation and marketisation for example, is framed in policy discourses as 
essential in enhancing consumers’ living standards (Jobs for NSW 2016; Harper et al. 2015; 
NCOA 2014; DPMC 2014). However, as Pusey has argued, this instead necessitates a limited 
construction of living standards and of citizenry, and by focusing on improving efficiency to 
enhance consumers’ living standards, quality of life is undermined. As I suggest, this ignores 
firms’ power in markets and creates asymmetrical power relationships between firms and 
citizens, which can be witnessed in markets for goods and services, though also in labour 
markets.  
 
Portraying citizens as consumers enables living standards to be constructed as materialistic, 
and measurable through knowledge produced and communicated by markets. Pusey critiqued 
this focus on markets as a means of enhancing consumers’ living standards, by citing the 
welfare economics concept of living standards as reflecting aggregate utility “measured in 
dollars by the market” (Pusey 1996, p.72). In this sense, markets create and measure living 
standards according to the knowledge which markets understand, such as consumer choices 
and prices (Pusey 1996, p.74). Thus, the notion of living standards, and the knowledge with 
which it is constructed and assessed, is not interchangeable with other concepts such as 
quality of life and well-being, as some policy documents suggest (NCOA 2014). Pusey 
(1996, p.72) highlights the dissimilarities between ‘living standards’ and ‘quality of life’, 
citing Robert Lane, who stated that: 
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The issue is that commodities themselves, and the income to purchase them, are only weakly 
related to the things that make people happy: autonomy, self-esteem, family felicity, tension-
free leisure, friendships. This is the major defect of a want satisfying mechanism. 
 
Pusey argues that this is also the case in Australia, where life priorities of people are only 
indirectly related to income or money, or consumables (Pusey 2003a, 2003b, 1996). This 
illustrates the disconnection between policy conceptualising living standards in terms of 
utility and what it is that people actually desire as part of a meaningful, fulfilling life. Yet 
policy discourses do not highlight the problems associated with this disjuncture. Policy 
makers construct living standards as a vague, yet desirable goal which can be achieved 
through greater efficiencies, as firms compete to satisfy consumer needs. This turns attention 
away from questions about what efficiency is, or what conception of ‘living standards’ should 
be enhanced, towards the narrowed question of what policy change is required to maximise 
efficiency. This focus on efficiency is pursued by Governments, which do not address the 
question of whether efficiency improves peoples’ capacity to enjoy fulfilling, meaningful 
lives.  
 
Creating employment?   
Associated with the concept of living standards, are the claims that increases in efficiency 
result in more jobs, higher wages and more income per capita (McKinsey Australia 2014; 
Productivity Commission 2005a; Hilmer 1993; BCA 2014). These contentions rest upon the 
assumption that aggregate increases in productivity, arising from efficiency gains, will 
benefit the general population (Productivity Commission 2016). According to this argument, 
successful firms will re-invest in their productive capacity, resulting in more employment. 
The Abbott and Turnbull Governments corporate tax cuts are underpinned by these tenuous 
assumptions (DPMC 2014; NCOA 2014). This contradicts research suggesting human labour 
is typically the easiest resource for firms to shed in an effort to reduce costs and increase 
efficiency (Wilson and Ebert 2013; Buchanan 2004). As stated by McKinsey Australia (2014: 
23): 
Now, the faraway labourer – or intelligent machine – is available for hire and may be better 
endowed than the local labourer in skill or price or speed of work, or with the efficiency of 
organisation, or whatever is required to win the customer. 
 
McKinsey Australia’s (2014, p.iv) research paper ‘Compete to prosper’ aims to provide a 
“clear sense of purpose and decisive action by policy makers, business leaders [and] research 
institutions” to develop Australia’s skills and resources. This paper is developed in 
conjunction with the BCA, which McKinsey Australia describes as its “thought partner”. 
McKinsey Australia (2014, p.23) explains the outsourcing of labour to international labour 
markets or automation as inevitable, claiming that employment growth must centre on 
‘interaction jobs’: 
 
Interaction jobs are characterised by higher levels of reasoning, judgement and the ability to 
manage non-routine tasks…People in these jobs must be collaborative, creative, and have 
strong problem solving skills. 
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McKinsey Australia (2014, p.24) contrast interaction jobs with production and transaction 
jobs. According to McKinsey Australia (2014, p.24), 34% of full-time employees are 
engaged in “movement intensive” production jobs, whereas transaction jobs, which are 
“rules-based, and can be scripted, routinised or automated”, comprise 19% of the economy. 
These categories of employment, McKinsey Australia argue, will inevitably decline as firms 
seek greater efficiencies to appeal to domestic consumers. Supporting industries which house 
transaction and production jobs is framed as an inefficient allocation of resources. McKinsey 
Australia (2014) claim that the inevitable fall in these employment fields should not be 
arrested. This is reflected in policy documents arguing governments should not ‘pick 
winners’ by supporting ‘inefficient’ industries (DPMC 2014; NCOA 2014).  
 
Despite their estimations that production and transaction jobs comprise 53% of full time 
employees, McKinsey Australia argue that aggregate employment will not be seriously 
affected by the phasing out of these jobs (McKinsey Australia 2014, pp.23-24). This claim is 
highly contestable and also masks the question of whether employees in these categories will 
be able to transition to employment in ‘interaction jobs’, which may require a substantially 
different skillset, education and training (McKinsey Australia 2014, pp.23-24). Prioritising 
efficiency at the expense of transaction and production jobs, risks a scenario where large 
sections of the workforce compete for increasingly scarce employment, for which many may 
lack necessary attributes, skills and qualification. The opportunities for many people with 
limited education, in low-skilled employment, will become increasingly scarce in this 
scenario. However, policy discourses do not address the potential ramifications of efficiency, 
which may undermine the well-being of significant sections of the working population, who 
may become excluded from formal employment as competition for fewer jobs increases.  
 
Parent company of McKinsey Australia, McKinsey Global Institute (2012, 2011), also 
highlight that highly skilled interaction jobs can be disaggregated. This involves identifying 
which parts of complex interactive jobs can be performed by lower cost workers, and 
outsourcing these tasks. As mentioned by McKinsey Global Institute (2011, p.47), “What can 
be disaggregated will be. And, often, what can be disaggregated can be outsourced and 
offshored”. This foreshadows a re-allocation of resources, as jobs are separated into tasks 
requiring varying levesl of skills and employment. High skilled workers retain the tasks that 
require a high level of skill and knowledge. Tasks requiring lower skills are outsourced, 
either to offshore locations where labour costs are lower, or to lower-cost workers. As 
McKinsey Global Institute claim (2011, p.51), this process creates “An employment 
landscape of virtual workers and disaggregated jobs – with resources always available across 
an Internet connection – gives employers unprecedented flexibility to deploy labour more 
precisely. Often this means more use of part-time schedules or hiring only on a temporary or 
contingent basis”.  
 
This picture reflects a work force with increasingly tenuous employment, yet is presented as a 
positive environment which is conducive to efficiency maximisation. The Productivity 
Commission (2016) and Jobs for NSW (2016) each draw upon McKinsey Australia to 
endorse this approach. According to Jobs for NSW, a government-backed agency that is 
102 
 
partnered with McKinsey, “previously [firms] may have relied on one person to do a series of 
consecutive tasks, now they can unbundle those tasks and get them done from discrete 
suppliers, wherever they are” (2016, p.53). Consequently, as Jobs for NSW argue, it is up to 
people to build capabilities that firms require in modern economies, and integrate into a 
“flexible and dynamic labour market” (Jobs for NSW 2016, p.53). The responsibility for 
adapting to these changes is outsourced to people, as workers, whereas firms’ interests are 
supported by Governments, on the false premise that this will raise consumers’ living 
standards.  
 
The unbundling, or disaggregation, of jobs reflects policy makers’ emphasis on allocative 
efficiency. Splintering individual jobs by outsourcing lower-skilled tasks from highly skilled 
jobs is intended to focus the resources of these employees on tasks which most contribute to 
maximising productivity. This may potentially create a hollowing out of these jobs, 
undermining employment in fields such as law, medical science and accounting. While this 
shift is claimed to result in increased employment, there is little evidence to support this 
claim. Rather, the loss of transaction and production jobs, coupled with the dismantling of 
higher skilled jobs, may create further unemployment and underemployment, enhancing the 
corrosive social consequences of these trends.  
 
Casualisation and underemployment: the side effects of efficiency  
The unbundling and disaggregation of jobs is an extension of the ongoing fragmentation of 
work, which has involved the “destruction of core workforces and their replacement with 
more contingent ones” (Wilson and Ebert 2013, p.266). As Buchanan (2004, p.20) argues, 
this creates “a regime which fits many workers into the needs of production and service 
provision by offering only very limited choices to workers”. Thus, rather than creating 
freedom and choice for workers, the experience is the opposite.  
 
Economically rationalist policies have created a work force in which a growing number 
experience a precarious existence, characterised by unemployment, casualization and 
underemployment (Watts 2016; Healy 2016; Beer et al. 2016; Benach et al. 2014; Campbell 
2008; Western 2007). Full time work has declined and increasingly, people are employed in 
part-time and casual work. (Healy 2016; Beer et al. 2013; Wilson and Ebert 2013; Western et 
al. 2007; Buchanan 2004). Lower skill, low income employment fields and areas previously 
characterised by a strong union presence have been most affected (Buchanan 2004; Beer et 
al. 2016; Healy 2016). Disaggregating jobs in the interests of increasing allocative efficiency 
is likely to exacerbate this process. 
 
The increasingly precarious nature of work is directly related to housing and family 
instability (Beer et al. 2016; Healy 2016; Wilson and Ebert 2013; Campbell et al. 2013), and 
contributes to mental health problems such as stress, reduced self-esteem and social 
recognition, dissatisfaction, anxiety and depression (Blustein et al. 2016; Wilson and Ebert 
2013; Benach et al. 2014). Disconnection from ongoing employment and stable working 
environments also contributes to social exclusion, as people lose social connections 
developed in the work place (Blustein et al. 2016; Benach et al. 2014; Wilson and Ebert 
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2013). In addition to policies curbing workers’ rights, fragmentation and casualisation of the 
work force has diminished workers’ voice, and undermined conditions and access to 
entitlements (Wilson and Ebert 2013; Campbell 2008). Subsequently, managerial control 
over work has increased (Wilson and Ebert 2013).  
 
Whereas Governments claim to focus on enabling people to develop their capabilities and 
employability, the increasingly precarious nature of work has most affected already marginal 
groups, such as single parents, young people, and people with limited skills and education 
(Beer et al. 2016; Healy 2016). As mentioned by Healy (2016, p.318), some low-skilled 
groups face “entrenched problems of workforce exclusion”. Policy discourses frame the 
disaggregation and fragmentation of work as essential in increasing the flexibility and 
dynamism of the work force, thereby increasing multifactor productivity and allocative 
efficiency. However, the increasingly precarious nature of work is causing significant societal 
problems, particularly for marginal communities. Furthermore, the welfare provisions to 
support people who have become disenfranchised through this process have been 
continuously eroded by Australian Governments since the 1980s (Watts 2016).  
 
Welfare as a cost to efficiency 
In the years following the Second World War, welfare had been developed as a safety net to 
support people in such a situation, emphasising respect and dignity as basic human rights to 
be protected (Watts 2016). In recent decades, this approach has shifted, as policies have 
increasingly sought to stigmatise, control and blame welfare recipients, whose rights as 
citizens have been eroded (Watts 2016). Welfare has been constructed as a cost to the 
taxpayer, which Governments must seek to minimise (Department of Social Services 2015; 
NCOA 2014; Porter 2016). For example, Minister for Social Services, Christian Porter 
(Porter 2016) cited a study by PriceWaterhouseCoopers which projected the lifetime welfare 
costs of Australia’s present generation to be A$4.8 trillion. This is framed as a significant 
source of inefficiency, in terms of the costs imposed on government, and also in terms of 
labour resources which are not being put to productive use (Porter 2016). As a result, Porter 
(2016) argued that the reliance of young carers, students and young parents on welfare 
needed to be addressed, by placing “fair and firm obligations on capable individuals to 
assume greater responsibility for their own lives”.  
 
Policy makers have taken an increasingly punitive approach to welfare recipients. In 
announcing policies to reduce the perceived manipulation of the welfare system by people 
“who have little desire to work”, government Ministers Michaelia Cash, Christian Porter and 
Alan Tudge announced drug testing of job seekers and welfare quarantining, substantially 
increased activity requirements (from 30 hours per fortnight to 50 hours per fortnight) and 
cancellation of payments for not complying with these requirements (Cash, Tudge and Porter 
2017; Department of Social Services 2017). I suggest the stigmatisation of welfare recipients 
is intended to construct welfare as burden on society, measurable in terms of budget costs, 
rather than a societal obligation to support those in difficulty. This deflects attention from the 
structural causes of unemployment and underemployment, which I argue in this article are 
created by the continued emphasis on maximising Australia’s overall productivity through a 
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focus on efficiency. While work is increasingly tenuous and insecure, the safety net for those 
who lose decent employment is continually being reduced. In the context of diminishing 
workers’ representation, this creates a substantially weakened work force, which experiences 
increasingly asymmetrical power relations with employers.  
 
Externalising Society  
Michael Pusey argued in his 2003 presentation to the Australian Senate entitled ‘An 
Australian Story: the troubling experience of economic reform’, policy development 
according to the neoliberal tenets of competition, efficiency and productivity has undermined 
the well-being of middle Australians (Pusey 2003a). According to Pusey, middle Australians 
experienced increasingly scarce employment, felt that corporations held too much power, 
income distribution was unfair and that families experienced a reduced quality of life (Pusey 
2003a; Pusey 2003b). And yet, as this article suggests, governments have continuously 
claimed that creating and a business friendly environment through corporate tax cuts, a 
deregulated labour market will lead to the betterment of peoples’ lives through increased jobs 
and economic growth, which is claimed to benefit all of Australian society.  
As Pusey (2016) suggested in the Roundtable ‘25 Years since Michael Pusey’s Economic 
Rationalism in Canberra’ at the 2016 conference of The Australian Sociological Association: 
 
The whole society slowly comes to be seen as a break on the market, or worse a generic 
externality and a stubbornly resisting sludge through which we must drive the economy. All 
policy reduces to economic policy. 
 
This process externalises society, as Pusey has argued. Policy discourses construct efficiency 
as being in society’s interests. Yet this construction is founded on a series of tenuous claims 
and assumptions. In borrowing Pusey’s idea of society as an externality of the market, I 
suggest it is worth thinking about this concept with regard to the notion of efficiency and its 
construction as a key policy objective. Efficiency is claimed to enhance the productive use of 
resources. This logic, I suggest, is applied to people and society. Policy makers rationalise 
society as a collection of resources. Policy is developed to maximise the productive use of 
these resources. Policy makers use the concept of allocative efficiency to facilitate the 
transfer of resources to their highest valued use, with value narrowly defined in terms of 
productivity. If employees are resources, then application of this idea could result in a shift 
from the supposedly least productive, to the most productive employees. Furthermore, the 
roles performed by the most productive employees are stripped back to focus just on their 
most productive uses. Therefore, the most productive employees perform only those tasks 
which allow them to maximise their own productivity.  
 
This creates a number of externalities. First, not all employees and people seeking 
employment will have the capacity to develop skills and knowledge required by jobs 
requiring a high level of skill and education. This potentially excludes large section of the 
work force from formal employment. Second, the disaggregation of interaction jobs may also 
undermine this group of employees, through reducing their tasks and responsibilities, and 
potentially, their claim to ongoing, full time employment. Secure, ongoing employment, 
which suits people with a range of skills, competencies, education and experience, and 
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provides employees with a supportive workplace is treated as anachronistic and as having 
little value. The loss of secure employment is constructed as an unfortunate, though 
necessary, consequence of markets and efficiency.  
 
Whereas efficiency is framed as being the central policy ambition which improves living 
standards, equity is constructed as a cost which undermines efficiency. Equity becomes a 
problem to be addressed, rather than a goal to be achieved. Equity-enhancing mechanisms of 
government intervention to create or protect jobs, and welfare, are constructed as antithetical 
to the efficiency of the nation as a whole (NCOA 2014). Labour is reconstructed as 
necessarily flexible, tenuous and easily re-allocated to meet firms’ changing needs. Problems 
of unemployment and underemployment are framed as individual problems, rather than 
societal problems. Coupled with policies designed to curb the power of unions, this has 
contributing to an increasingly insecure, fragmented and disempowered workforce, which 
lacks an adequate safety net in the instance of unemployment.  
 
Thus, in the interests of creating a business friendly environment, secure and stable 
employment has been replaced with flexibility and tenuousness, contributing to a precarious 
society characterised by increasing housing instability, mental illness and social exclusion. 
Policy makers overlook the inefficiencies created through these problems. The quality of life, 
rights and dignity of people who are externalised in this process are clearly undermined.  
 
Conclusion  
This article has highlighted the discursive construction of efficiency as a truth. Corporations 
are central to this truth. It is presumed that they are efficiency maximising organisations, 
which do not exert power and return the gains from their efficiencies to citizens, who are cast 
consumers. This process is claimed to increase living standards. Framing efficiency as a truth 
– either as a means through which the ideal of enhanced living standards can be achieved, or 
as a necessary policy response to stagnating economic growth and job losses - has led to a 
narrowing of the policy debate within Australia. Central policy questions become focused on 
how to increase efficiency, without pausing to consider if this is a sensible approach.  
 
Efficiency is justified on the basis that this raises living standards. However, in this paper, I 
draw upon Pusey’s work to contend that this focus instead externalises society and 
diminishes quality of life for many. Despite this, efficiency is constructed as the main policy 
ambition. Equity is marginalised. Thus, other objectives and values which society and its 
citizens hold, such as meaningful, secure employment, are constructed as secondary and even 
antagonistic, towards this goal. It could be argued that rather than seeking to maximise 
efficiency for the betterment of society, that efficiency is pursued in spite of society.  
 
This then raises the question of who this approach is intended to benefit. This is difficult to 
address with certainty. However, I draw upon the rationalisation of work, and employees, 
inherent within policy discourses, to construct a picture of employment that allows 
corporations to “deploy labour more precisely” (McKinsey Global Institute 2011, p.51). It is 
argued that this is to help assist the workforce to
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However, this places corporate needs above the needs of society. In that sense, society and its 
citizens are reconstructed to best meet corporate needs, which are of a workforce that is 
remote and flexible, and where jobs are rationalised as tasks, which can be distributed to the 
lowest cost employees. This is claimed to be a picture of efficiency, yet it is one where 
employees’ rights, security, stability and social ties are fundamentally undermined. Thus, I 
suggest that the state aims to create an efficient environment, to support corporations as 
central actors in the process of enhancing efficiency, despite the needs and values of its 
citizens. 
  
Acknowledgements 
Thank you to Michael Pusey, Gabrielle Meagher and Jack Barbalet for the enthusiasm shown 
towards the work of all participants in the workshop ‘From Economic Rationalism to Global 
Neoliberalism’. I would also like to acknowledge workshop organisers, Tom Barnes and 
Elizabeth Humphrys. Thank you to two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments, 
to Nicole Pepperell for feedback on an earlier draft of this paper, and to Michael Pusey and 
Fabian Cannizzo for their comments and suggestions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
107 
 
 
 
Chapter 8: Responding to the productivist paradigm: Experiences of farmers in 
Victoria’s western Wimmera 
 
 
This article is published in the refereed proceedings of the 2016 conference of The Australian 
Sociological Association.  
 
 
 
 
Citation: 
 O’Keeffe, P., (2016b), Responding to the productivist paradigm: Experiences of farmers in 
Victoria’s western Wimmera, in M. Chou (ed.) Proceedings of the Australian Sociological 
Association (TASA) 2016 Conference, Melbourne, Australia, 28 November - 1 December 
2016, pp. 263-269. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 
 
Contribution of article to thesis 
This article begins to explore concepts such as allocative efficiency and resource re-allocation 
(analysed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7) in relation to agricultural policy. As in Chapters 5 and 6 in 
particular, I show how policy makers’ construct the ideal industry structure as that which 
maximises allocative efficiency. This leads to the concept of productivism and its relation to 
structural adjustment. Structural adjustment, through the re-allocation of farm resources (i.e. 
farmer exits), is portrayed as a positive and necessary means for increasing productive 
resource use.  
Farming is conceptualised in mechanistic terms, as comprised of movable and replaceable 
parts. I develop this analysis in Chapters 9, 10 and 11 to show how this reductionist approach 
has been used to narrow farming value to economic performance, by decontextualizing 
farmers from their relationship to land, families and communities.  
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Responding to the Productivist Paradigm: Experiences of farmers in Victoria’s western 
Wimmera 
Productivity growth is framed as essential for the success of Australian farmers (Australian 
Government 2015; Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation [RIRDC] 2007). 
I contend that this idea is presented within policy discourses as a statement of fact, yet is one 
that has been carefully constructed since the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1971, the 
Committee for Economic Development in Australia (CEDA) published ‘Productivity’. This 
collection of works by prominent Australian agricultural economists argued that agricultural 
policy must aim to increase the productivity of Australian industries. As stated in the 
foreword by CEDA chairman AC Gray (Gray 1971, p.ii), “the plight of our rural industries is 
such that attempts to boost productivity are vital to the sectors long term survival”. Critically, 
in his essay ‘The Government, the economy, and productivity’, Nevile (1971, p.3) claimed 
that “government policies must be such as will lead to productive resources being used in 
those ways which are the most efficient from the point of view of the economy as a whole”. 
This is an important statement. In focusing upon the efficient use of resources, Nevile (1971) 
adopts a mechanistic view of agriculture. If farmers enter this picture, it is as managers of 
these resources. This approach contends that agricultural policy should view farms as a 
collection of resources, from which the challenge is to extract maximum productivity. 
Farmers are then defined by their capacity to be efficient, and to contribute to this broader 
ambition. This re-construction of the farmer is critically important to the overall picture of 
agricultural deregulation.  
In more recent times, productivity, and productivism, has become so entrenched within 
policy discourses that it is simply referred to as ‘smart’ farming. According to the 2015 
Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper, published by the Australian Government, “the 
future success of Australian agriculture depends on smarter farming practices” (2015, p.95). 
Smarter farming practices, in this context, are portrayed as those which seek to enhance 
productivity (Commonwealth of Australia 2015). This emphasis on the continued increase in 
productivity has been the focus of Australian policy for close to five decades, with policy 
developed to support the ‘smarter’, most productive farmers, and encourage the exit of 
‘unviable’ farmers from the industry (Commonwealth of Australia 2015; Malcolm, Davidson 
& Vandenberg 2000; Productivity Commission 1996; Burdon 1993; Gray, Oss-Emer & 
Sheng 2014; Productivity Commission 2005b; Higgins 2001b).  
The shift towards an emphasis on productivity, and away from governmental support for 
farmers, has contributed to a decline in farming populations and an increase in the average 
size of farm properties within Australia (RIRDC 2007; Sheng, Zhao & Nossal 2011; Knopke, 
Strappazzon & Mullen 1995; Argent 2002; Hooper, Martin, Love & Fisher 2002). The 
concentration of farming businesses, into fewer, though larger properties, is clear. This 
process of “adjustment” is framed by Malcolm, Makeham and Wright (2005, p.61) as an 
inevitability, which is “actively” assisted by “governments of all persuasions”.  
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Productivitism 
Agricultural productivity is described by Nossal and Gooday (2009, p.4) as reflecting 
“changes in the efficiency of converting inputs into outputs”, and is pursued as a policy 
objective under the assumption that this will lead to increased living standards (Nossal & 
Gooday 2009). Productivism, as an approach to farming which aims to maximise productivity 
growth, is argued to result from the expanded use of technology, increases in farm size and 
scale and through the re-allocation of resources to more efficient farm managers (Nossal et al. 
2009; Knopke, O’Donnell & Shepherd 2000; RIRDC 2007; Gray et al. 2014; Productivity 
Commission 2005b; Lawrence et al. 2013; Dibden, Potter & Cocklin 2009). The increased 
use of technology is cited by many as being a key driver of increases in productivity growth 
(Nossal et al. 2009; Knopke et al. 2000; RIRDC 2007; Nossal & Gooday 2009). This includes 
the development and application of new herbicides, use of fertilisers, improvements in plant 
breeding, pest and weed control and enhancements in machinery size and capability (Knopke 
et al. 2000). Maximising the capacity of these technological advancements is related to scale 
of farming operations (RIRDC 2007; Nossal & Gooday 2009). According to the RIRDC 
(2007, p.4), this could lead to increased consolidation of farm businesses, as “small farmers 
that are unable to employ the new technology cost effectively may lose their ability to 
compete”. Furthermore, economies of scale, achieved through increases in size, are also cited 
as an important driver of productivity growth (Nossal & Gooday 2009; Knopke et al. 2000; 
Malcolm et al. 2000). The relationship between productivism and expansion was established 
by LeCounteur (1971, p.10), who claimed that “A fundamental problem is that the pure 
subsistence farmer has limited resources with which he can produce alternative commodities 
with a direct consumer demand, and lacks the financial capacity to expand his area of grazing 
or farming activity”. This portrays expansion of farming size as essential, while claiming that 
this is achievable through intensive farm practices.  
Structural adjustment, as a means of increasing agricultural productivity (Nossal & Gooday 
2009; Gray et al. 2014), is associated with the concept of allocative efficiency, outlined by 
Hilmer, Rayner & Tapparell (1993, p.4) as being maximised when “resources used to 
produce a set of goods or services are allocated to their highest valued uses”. In relation to 
agriculture, allocative efficiency is increased when resources are managed by the most 
efficient, most productive farm managers (Gray et al. 2014). Resultantly, it is argued that 
productivity increases with the exit of least efficient, least productive farmers from the 
industry (Nossal & Gooday 2009; Gray et al. 2014). Fundamentally, this approach to policy 
is made possible by constructing farmers as resource managers, by viewing farms as ‘the 
community’s resources’, and by focusing policy upon the maximisation of the productive use 
of farm resources.  
This emphasis compels farmers to try to maximise their productivity through technology use 
and increases in size, or face an uncertain future in farming. As stated by Gray & Lawrence 
(2001, p.42) this can lead to farmers becoming “trapped in cycles of increasing productivity 
for diminishing returns”. Furthermore, this is associated with increased specialisation, with 
farmers focusing on the most productive land uses available, and environment damage 
(McKenzie 2014; Lawrence et al. 2013; Dibden, Potter & Cocklin 2009; Pritchard, Burch & 
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Lawrence 2007; Gray & Lawrence 2001). In a policy context which has “encouraged the 
growth of productivist farming” (Lawrence et al. 2013, p.31), it is unclear whether farmers 
themselves feel capable of adopting alternative approaches to agriculture.  
 
Conclusion 
Through developing policy which aims to maximise industry efficiency and productivity and, 
through encouraging intensive farming methods, farm expansion and structural adjustment, 
policy discourses apply a reductionist, mechanistic approach to agriculture. I contend that this 
is an essential aspect of agricultural deregulation. Further research is required to understand 
how the re-construction of the farmer, and of farming, has made deregulation of agricultural 
industries possible.  
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Contribution of article to thesis 
This article is the first of three which analyses how the reality of markets (which I highlight 
in the previous section) is made governable. Thus, I argue that through constructing a reality 
of markets, firms and consumers, and then governing this reality through technologies and 
agency and performance, policy makers have made deregulation of the wheat export market 
appear as a logical, common sense governance decision.   
In this article, I analyse reconstructions of farming identity, through technologies of agency, 
to coerce farmers into meeting governing regimes’ policy objectives. I draw upon the 
examples of Structural Adjustment Policy (1988 and 1992), the Agriculture – Advancing 
Australia policy package and the Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper. The White 
Paper outlines the Commonwealth Governments’ plan to attract private investment to 
agriculture. Farmers, it contends, must reconstruct their farms to attract investment. This is 
framed as a critical aspect of modern farming.  However, I suggest that this (in the context of 
agricultural policy change in the past three decades), completes a transition from State 
responsibility for farming, towards the individual, and then towards private sector 
dependence. Through the genealogical approach used in this article, I am able to trace this 
shift and highlight the subtle constructions of farming identity as a means of facilitating the 
emergence of corporate power in agriculture.  
In Chapter 10, I develop this analysis, which I use to show how wheat export market 
deregulation was made possible.  
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Creating resilience or private sector dependence? Shifting constructions of the farmer 
in Australian policy discourses 
Abstract 
The Australian Government’s Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper aims to create a 
profitable and resilient Australian agriculture sector. In doing so, the White Paper emphasises 
farmers’ individual responses to the structural problems which have undermined farmers’ 
profitability, such as consolidated commodities markets. In particular, the White Paper 
recommends that farmers shape their farming practice to make their farms more attractive to 
private investors. This is presented as a normal response to farm profitability concerns. Farms 
are portrayed as investment targets and securing investment is framed as an essential skill of 
the modern farmer. To understand how this discursive construction has been made possible, 
this article develops a genealogical analysis of changing constructions of farmers, farming 
and of the role of the State. This research reveals the subtle discursive shifts which have 
helped shift responsibility for farming, from the State, to the self-reliant individual, and most 
recently, towards the private sector. Whereas the construct of the self-reliant, independent 
farmer has been used to facilitate deregulation of agricultural industries, this recent shift in 
power towards the private sector may potentially undermine farmers’ autonomy and increase 
dependence on private sector investment.  
 
Introduction 
The Australian Government released its Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper (White 
Paper) in 2015, intending to provide a blueprint for the long-term profitability, resilience and 
sustainability of Australian farming. The Australian Government describe this plan as a “$4 
billion investment in farmers” (Commonwealth of Australia 2015, p.ii). This document 
emphasises the need for an “open and competitive business environment”, which is claimed 
to support farmers by maximising their returns (Commonwealth of Australia 2015, p.1).  This 
document emphasises the individual actions required by farmers to improve their financial 
prospects. Among the stated government initiatives, mostly focused on reducing regulation, 
or red and green tape, which the Government argues will “reduce unnecessary barriers to 
productivity and profitability”, is the recommendation that farmers construct their farms as 
investable targets for private capital (Commonwealth of Australia 2015, p.2). Attracting 
investment is portrayed as an essential aspect of modern farming and according to this 
document, will help to stimulate growth in the agricultural sector following the end of the 
mining construction boom, which had underpinned Australia’s prosperity throughout the past 
decade. This need for farmers to attract private investment is normalised by this document, 
though as I suggest in this article, this potentially undermines the autonomy of farmers, and 
further reconceptualises the role of farming within Australian society, and farmers’ 
relationship to their land.  
The Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper continues the emphasis of Australian policy 
discourses on individualism, competition and efficiency, through its emphasis on private 
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investment and farms as investment targets is a recent and, relatively unexplored discursive 
shift. Thus, the presentation of this idea as a central part of farming, and as a normal and 
logical response to farm profitability concerns, requires some attention. This article is 
therefore concerned with analysing how this idea came to be normalised in this manner, and 
in exploring the potential ramifications of this shift. In doing so, I conduct a genealogical 
analysis, which explores this present construction and how it was made possible, by 
examining discursive constructions of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, which facilitated the 
neoliberalisation of Australian agriculture, particularly, the construction of farmers as 
rational, calculating individuals, and of farming as reducible, calculable and administerable. 
This article makes visible the small discursive shifts which have occurred, and how this has 
shaped constructions of farmers and farming which are driving Australian agricultural policy. 
Through conducting this analysis, this article identifies the subtle shift in responsibility for 
farming, away from the State-centred policies of the early 1980s, towards the 
responsibilisation of farmers and the individualisation of risk, and finally, the shift in 
responsibility towards private sector investors which, ironically, could undermine the 
individual autonomy of farmers.  
 
Governmentality 
This article draws upon the Foucauldian notion of governmentality to understand the 
neoliberalisation of Australian agriculture and the changing roles for the State, farmers and 
farming within this context. Since the early 1970s, Australian agricultural policy has shifted 
from an emphasis on collectivist values, towards market based approaches which exposed 
individual farmers to global markets. The economic rationalism of the 1980s, defined by 
Head (1988, p.466) as premised on the belief that “market forces typically unleash growth, 
innovation and efficiency”, was embraced by Australian policy makers (Pusey 1991). 
Successive Australian Governments dismantled statutory marketing arrangements, privatised 
government assets and authorities and abolished Government assistance for farmers. These 
changes had significant ramifications for farmers and rural communities (O’Keeffe and 
Neave 2017; Kuehne 2012; Smith and Pritchard 2012; Lockie and Bourke 2001; Pritchard 
2000; Tonts and Jones 1997). Farmer exits increased, causing a steep decline in rural 
populations. This undermined social capital and the viability of many rural communities 
(Baker 2016; Alston 2012; Talbot and Walker 2007; McKenzie 1994). Escalating mental 
illness within farming populations is a further consequence of this restructuring, with rates of 
depression, anxiety and suicide rising as many farmers struggled to cope with the rapidly 
changing policy environment (Bryant and Garnham 2014; Caldwell, Dear and Jorm 2004).  
Throughout the 1990s, the policy direction shifted from rolling back Government support, 
towards the development of policy which claimed to give control back to regional 
communities (Tonts and Haslam-McKenzie 2005; Higgins 2002a). In this instance, policy is 
presented under the guise of empowering communities and individuals, though within tightly 
controlled frameworks which govern action by creating acceptable behaviours, norms and 
expectations (Herbert-Cheshire and Higgins 2004; Higgins and Lockie 2002). For some, this 
represents a second wave of neoliberalism, resembling a program of re-regulation, or “roll-
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out neoliberalism” (Dibden, Potter and Cocklin 2009; Lockie and Higgins 2007; Higgins 
2002b; Peck and Tickell 2002). In building upon the governmentality critique of 
neoliberalism developed by Foucault, Rose (1996, p.328) contends that neoliberalism has 
come to resemble “a range of rationalities and techniques that seek to govern without 
governing society, to govern through regulated choices made by discrete and autonomous 
actors”. These techniques, operationalised by neoliberalism, are referred to by Rose (1993, 
pp.294-295) as including “monetarisation, marketisation, enhancement of the powers of the 
consumer, financial accountability and audit”. The relative subtlety of roll-out neoliberalism 
contrasts with the shock of economic rationalism. Whereas the focus of economic rationalism 
is on the State’s rapidly retreat from its previously social-welfarist approach, advanced liberal 
rationalities are centred on governing the minute actions of individuals ‘at a distance’, 
shaping their behaviours in discreet, almost unrecognisable ways (Miller and Rose 2008; 
Rose, O’Malley and Valverde 2006; Argent 2005).  
The individual is integral to advanced liberal rationalities of governing, which focus on 
achieving economic growth through prioritising the capacity of individual actors to make 
choices (Higgins and Lockie 2002; Jessop 2002; Rose 1993). Jessop (2002, p.2) contends that 
from this perspective, the apparent freedom of “rational actors” to make decisions is 
governed by established norms and expectations which delimit the scope of acceptable 
choices. Thus, the freedom to choose is restricted to those choices which are deemed to be 
acceptable according to these norms and expectations. In exchange for the freedom to choose, 
the individual accepts full responsibility, and full penalty, for these decisions (Cheshire and 
Lawrence 2005). In this instance, a responsible, moral individual is one that assesses the 
risks, costs and benefits of their choices, prosecutes entrepreneurial decisions and minimises 
risks to themselves and others (Lemke 2000). In this sense, the moral choice is also the 
economically-rational choice. If individuals bear the risks that are associated with their own 
personal decisions, and citizenship is reflected in the ability of those individuals to act “in an 
entrepreneurial manner’, then “it is possible to govern without governing society” (Rose 
1993, p.298). Governing, in this sense, could be understood as the “conduct of conduct”, 
where it is the “regulated and accountable choices of autonomous agents” that are governed 
(Rose 1993, p. 298). Furthermore, authority is transferred from the political domain to the 
market. Thus, it is the authority of the market –which itself is governed by neoliberal 
constructs of competition, efficiency and the consumer – that individuals respond to and 
understand. 
 
Technologies of agency  
Advanced liberalism requires individuals have the capacity to make rational, moral and 
entrepreneurial choices. This leads to the construction of self-governing individuals, who 
accept responsibility, and act rationally (Gill 2011; Pritchard and Tonts 2011; Cheshire and 
Lawrence 2005; Halpin and Guilfoyle 2004; Herbert-Cheshire 2000; Larner 2000). Dean 
(1999, p. 167-169) argues this is made possible through the implementation of political 
technologies, such as technologies of agency and performance. These technologies shape 
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conduct by encouraging people to accept responsibility and become self-reliant through 
building and exercising agency (Herbert-Cheshire 2000; Larner 2000). Such techniques 
include training and skill development, providing individuals opportunities to become active 
citizens (Herbert-Cheshire and Higgins 2004; Larner 2000; Rose 1996). While this shift 
towards active citizenry is promoted through discourse under the veil of self-reliance and 
individual freedom, technologies of agency aim to encourage behaviours and attitudes 
according with policy ambitions (Pritchard and Tonts 2011). At the surface, this approach 
may claim to divest power from the state to the individual, yet the state retains power as an 
enabler (McKee 2008). The free, individual action of individuals is encouraged, yet this is a 
heavily structured freedom. In Australian agriculture, where it is commonly believed that 
government assistance was withdrawn in the deregulation of the sector, Higgins contends that 
rather, assistance “was targeted in new ways to foster an ‘active’ and economically ‘rational’ 
approach by farmers to their practice” (2001a, p.324). Farmers, in turn, were encouraged to 
reflect upon their attitudes and practice to change their conduct to accord with this approach 
to farming, and to develop their capabilities as active, responsible and entrepreneurial agents 
(Higgins 2001a; 2002a; 2005).  
The discursive construction of farmers, farming and agriculture as “knowable, calculable and 
administerable”, is integral to this shift (Miller and Rose 1990, p. 5). Discourse is important 
in producing knowledge, and in changing and defining what can be constituted as knowledge 
(Jacobs 2006; Higgins 2001b; Liepins and Bradshaw 1999). This leads to the development of 
truths, or ‘regimes of truth’, which define how problems can be identified, interpreted and 
responded to (Dittmer 2010; Atkinson 1999; Rose 1993). Within agriculture, truths - such as 
the need to increase productivity and efficiency - are constructed and normalised, though 
have different meanings for different actors (Herbert-Cheshire and Higgins 2004, pp.294-
295). For farmers, this reflects the need to increase productivity, through means that are 
prescribed and supported by the state, such as increasing technology use and economies of 
scale. For the State, this includes facilitation of structural adjustment. This renders agriculture 
as something that can be reduced to the question of calculation, or, the question of what 
industry structure can maximise productivity. In turn, farmers are judged as viable or 
unviable, based on their capacity to achieve productivity gains (Higgins 2001b). 
Responsibility, in this instance, is framed in terms of farmers’ ability to develop skills and 
capacity to implement productivity enhancing measures. Since the 1970s, the State has 
carefully shifted the focus of its responsibility, from supporting farmers to remain on the land 
through policies providing various means of assistance, towards creating a policy 
environment which prioritises values such as productivity and efficiency, and facilitates and 
encourages farmers’ entrepreneurialism and self-reliance. This article uses a genealogical 
analysis to make this shift visible. However, beyond this devolution of individual 
responsibility and risk towards individual farmers, I suggest that a further process is 
underway in Australia, which is shifting responsibility for farming towards private sector 
interests. As I argue, this has the potential to substantially undermine farmers’ autonomy, and 
transfer industry ownership and power towards financial investors. By drawing upon the 
discursive formations of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, this article analyses the process by 
which this transference of power to the private sector was made possible.  
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Genealogy 
This article examines the discursive constructions which made the shift towards private 
ownership of farming appear normal, desirable, and in farmers’ best interests. To understand 
this change, we need to analyse the minute discursive shifts which shaped individual actors, 
policy values and perceived responsibilities of the State towards farming. Thus, to answer the 
question of how deregulation was made possible, I have sought to construct a genealogy of 
farming which captures these subtle shifts. In doing so, this research traces the discursive 
construction of truths, such as the good farmer, and the notion of farming as reducible to 
measures of efficiency and productivity, and therefore calculable and administerable. These 
truths are presented by discourses as neutral and normal. As with Higgins (2002a, p.5), my 
use of genealogy is intended to investigate how these truths came to be established and, to 
challenge the basis of these truths.  
Furthermore, through this analysis I want to understand how the discursive shifts that 
occurred throughout the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, have contributed to the apparently normal 
and logical suggestion within the Australian Governments’ Agricultural Competitiveness 
White Paper, that farmers must construct their farms as targets for private investors. Thus, my 
genealogical research is intended to “present a history of the present”, by analysing how this 
recent policy direction can be understood in relation to previous discursive constructions of 
the individual and the role of the State (Kuchler and Linner 2012, p.582). 
This article therefore traces how constructions of farmers and farming have been developed 
over the past 30 years, and how these changing constructions have influenced the present 
shift towards private investment in farming. Furthermore, tracing the changing conceptions of 
the States’ responsibility towards farming is essential in understanding this shift. At the 
surface, it appears that the policy changes over the last 30 years have shifted responsibility 
for farming from the State towards the private sector. This article therefore constructs a 
genealogy of farming to analyse how this was made to appear as a logical, normal and 
sensible solution to farm profitability.  
 
Method 
This paper draws upon a wide range of policy documents, published between 1986 and 2016. 
These documents contribute to, and are shaped by, policy discourses around farming and 
farmer identity. I sourced these documents from the State Library of Victoria collections, the 
Public Record Office (PROV) and Victoria, and online. Policy Documents sourced from the 
State Library of Victoria were located through the online catalogue, using combinations of 
basic search terms such as “agriculture”, “rural”, “policy”, and through identifying 
collections from authors such as the Rural Industries Research Development Corporation and 
Government of Victoria. I included policy documents from the PROV within the Grain 
Elevators Board Agency VA 1057 record ‘Historical Information and Reference Collection’.  
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Source Document 
Australian 
Government 
(Commonwealth of 
Australia) 
Inquiry into agricultural innovation: Smart Farming (2016); Agricultural 
Competitiveness White Paper (2015); National Food Plan (2013a); 
Parliamentary Debates: Official Hansard (2008; 2012a, 2012b); Review of 
Agriculture – Advancing Australia package (2004); Economic and Rural 
Policy: A government policy statement (1986). 
Acts of Federal 
Parliament Rural Adjustment Scheme (Commonwealth of Australia 1988b; 1992). 
Government 
departments and 
authorities  
Department of Primary Industries and Energy: Australian Wheat Industry 
(1988); Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation (2007; 
2011); Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and 
Sciences (Knopke, O’Donnell and Shepherd 2000); Productivity 
Commission (2000a; 2000b); Industry Commission (1996). 
Policy statements Truss (2000); Anderson and MacDonald (1999); Howard (1997). 
Interest groups National Farmers Federation (1986; 1993; 2013); Joint Industry Submission Group (2000). 
Newspapers 
The Australian (1989; 1994; 1997); The Age (1992; 1993; 1994); Sydney 
Morning Herald (1992; 1996a; 1996b); The Financial Review (1986; 
1992a; 1992b); The Land (1986a, 1986b; 1989; 1992). 
Table 1: Documents used in developing genealogy of wheat industry policy 
 
These documents, listed in Table 1, each aim to contribute to agricultural and rural policy 
debates and policy development. In examining this collection, I analysed how farmers are 
represented in policy discourses, and how these representations have shifted between 1986 
and 2016.  
Specifically, I analysed these changing representations by looking at how the documents 
characterise farmers – their needs, values, ambitions and expectations of agricultural and 
rural policy. In particular, I drew upon publications by the Australian Government and 
Government authorities in piecing together these representations, by investigating how these 
documents understood farmers and their interests and, how this changed over time. 
Furthermore, in analysing Acts of Federal Parliament and policy statements in conjunction 
with these documents, I identified the behaviours, values and attitudes that Federal 
Government encouraged and rewarded. This helped me to develop a picture of the ‘good 
farmer’ and its representation in policy. Mainstream newspapers were important sources in 
this regard, as these documents contained both public comments from politicians adding to 
these representations and editorial statements articulating what the publication considered 
growers should want, or how they should respond to events.  
In addition, I studied these documents to establish Government priorities and its perceived 
role in relation to farming. This is often unclear at first glance. For example, documents such 
as the Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper claim to be developed to support farmers’ 
interests. Through analysing this claim in greater detail, against the discursive constructions 
of farmers and farming over the past 30 years, this article is able to examine what this means, 
and how this claim relates to broader government priorities such as increasing the efficient 
use of the nations’ resources, for example. Through examining discursive representations of 
farmers, and Governments’ perceptions of its own role in relation to farming, this article 
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analyses this changing relationship. Specifically, this article uses this approach to examine 
how responsibility for Australian agriculture has shifted from the State, towards farmers, and 
potentially, towards private investment.  
My analysis explores how policy shifts are facilitated by differing constructions of farming 
identity, and how policy discourses seek to govern the behaviour, attitudes and practice of 
farmers. The presentation of this analysis is chronological, to the extent that I track shifts in 
farmer identity and the role of government over a period of time, though to understand these 
shifts, my analysis first required me to view these documents as an entire collection. In 
presenting this analysis, I have not cited individual documents for every claim. Rather, I 
make claims on behalf of this collection of documents. When quoting sources to illustrate a 
point that I draw from my analysis of this discourse, I refer directly to a single source.  
 
Rationalising farmers’ value 
In recent decades, Australian agricultural policy has shifted from protecting farmers, towards 
protecting markets. This change re-imagines governments’ role in agriculture, frequently 
explained through policy discourses as creating the environment for markets to function. 
This, it is claimed, enhances efficiency, by connecting farmers with markets. As Larner 
(2000, p.245) explains, this conceptualisation of the role of the state is based upon the 
assumption that governments can create an environment “where active citizens will exercise 
responsibility for themselves and their families”. Accordingly, policy discourses construct the 
capacity of the individual to make responsible, informed choices as a freedom, which the 
state should not impede (Lockie and Higgins 2007). This is central to arguments which have 
contributed to the deregulation of wheat export marketing and other marketing arrangements 
underpinning dairy, wool, barley and egg industries (O’Keeffe 2017b; Gill 2011). Policies 
such as statutory wheat marketing emphasised the collective interests of farmers. In these 
arrangements, statutory marketing authorities marketed commodities on behalf of farmers 
and distributed averaged returns back to growers. These policies were supported by farmers, 
though policy makers argued that this prevented farmers from maximising their returns, while 
restricting freedom and choice. As such, it was claimed that state intervention in agricultural 
marketing restricted market and industry efficiency. Discursive shifts which constructed 
farmers as individuals, rather than as a collective, were therefore essential in re-shaping the 
State’s responsibility as creating an environment which enabled self-interested farmers to 
maximise their returns, through exercising freedom and choice.   
The Rural Adjustment Schemes of 1988 and 1992 further distance the State from its previous 
responsibility of assisting farmers. The primary objective of the 1992 Rural Adjustment 
Scheme was to “foster the development of a more profitable farm sector that is able to 
operate competitively in a deregulated financial and market environment” (Rural Adjustment 
Act 3.1a). The Rural Adjustment Scheme operationalizes this aim by supporting profitable 
farmers to enhance the “productivity of their farm units” (Rural Adjustment Act 3.2b), while 
encouraging farmers without “prospects of sustainable long term profitability to leave the 
sector” (Rural Adjustment Act 3.2e). Policy makers pursue structural adjustment, believing 
122 
 
this enhances productivity, competitiveness, resilience, and self-reliance of the farm sector. 
As explained by Gray, Oss-Emer and Sheng (2014, p.5):  
At an industry level, ongoing resource reallocation is an important source of productivity 
gains…In particular, exits of less efficient farm businesses release scarce resources for use by 
more efficient farms, which are able to expand and increase productivity, increasing the 
efficiency of resource use as a whole. 
 
This distant terminology renders agriculture as eminently calculable (Miller and Rose 1990, 
p.5). Farms are described as farm units, or as scarce resources, from which policy must 
extract maximum productivity. The policy question becomes centred on how to achieve 
greatest productivity from the national resource base, with farmers operationalized as 
resource managers. This mechanistic approach necessarily views farmers as atomistic 
individuals whose value to society is considered in terms of their capacity to contribute to the 
productive management of the resources they control. This decontextualises farmers from 
their communities and land. Thus, policy discourses frame the exits of the least efficient 
resource managers from the industry as having no perceptible negative impact. Whereas 
policy discourses claim this process strengthens communities and builds resilience, I argue 
these reductionist conceptions of community, strength and resilience are narrow, and fail to 
capture the contribution of farmers to their communities. Subjectivity is rendered 
incalculable, and therefore unknowable. The more subjective farming values, such as family 
history in farm properties and the community, for example, are portrayed as being of lesser 
significance.  
In this process, farmers are re-constituted as tools assisting the productive use of the nation’s 
resources. However, for this construction to hold, the value of farming first needed to be 
narrowed to questions that could be answered by quantitatively measuring efficiency and 
productivity. This externalises the social impacts of farmer exits. In this policy context, the 
value ascribed to the productivity of resource use significantly overshadows the broader 
impact of this shift upon farmers and their communities. Policy discourses construct farmers’ 
role in the industry as replaceable, while according minimal significance to their community 
function, beyond the transactions associated with their business. This is framed as a rational 
response to the realities of compressed terms of trade, and over-supply of commodities. 
Values such as co-operation are marginalised as “agrarian socialism”, belonging to a previous 
era.  In that regard, while the individualisation of farmers facilitates structural adjustment, 
this is made possible by the rationalist re-construction of farmers and farming as calculable 
and administerable. Thus, the role of government shifts to focus on maximising productive 
use of farm resources, through individualised, self-reliant farmers.   
The reallocation of resources articulated in the structural adjustment policies of the 1980s is 
made possible through measuring farmers against their capacity to manage resources 
efficiently. Policy discourses suggest that the more farmers are able to maximise the 
efficiency of this process, the more value they add to Australian society. The farmers who are 
least able to meet this aim are constructed as inefficient, poorly skilled and, as barriers to 
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industry efficiency and consumer well-being. Thus, the exits of these farmers is rationalised 
as a positive shift. According to the Financial Review (1992a): 
Australian farmers have long cast themselves as among the most efficient in the world. By 
many definitions, this is true...But it is also true that the generalisation hides many sloppy 
operators - those who have survived on inheritances, the availability of relatively cheap land, 
unsustainable management practices and highly regulated marketing schemes.   
 
In turn, government intervention is framed as unjustifiably supporting substandard farmers. 
Smart farmers are cast as those which adopt technology, avoid government support and 
favour market deregulation. This reflects the construction of good farmers as active agents, 
who adopt the language of self-reliance and responsibility, and develop their capacity to 
enhance productivity and stay viable. Conversely, the notion of the “grossly inefficient family 
farm” contributes to the perception that deregulation as necessary and overdue (Financial 
Review 1992a). Policy discourses construct farm unprofitability as an individual issue, 
stemming from poor farm management, outdated practices, lack of adaptability and 
incapacity or unwillingness to learn. The structural causes of this problem are not addressed.  
Rather, policy makers view the exit of unprofitable farmers from farming as an essential, and 
inevitable, process of resource re-allocation. The construct of the unprofitable farmer is 
therefore necessary to make the process of structural adjustment appear as a common sense 
solution to problems of industry inefficiency. Their inefficiency is portrayed as a personal 
failing. Their continued existence in farming is cast as an impediment to the Governments’ 
aim of maximising productive resource use. The role of Government is repositioned to focus 
on transitioning these farmers out of the industry, causing their resources to be re-allocated to 
more productive and efficient actors.  
 
Producing business-minded, efficient farmers  
Policy discourses construct independent, business-focused farmers as the actors which are 
best positioned to increase resource productivity and efficiency. Thus, problems of farm 
viability are portrayed as being solvable through independence, improved business skills and 
a business-minded attitude. Good farmers are constructed as hard edged, economically 
rational business people, who are not concerned with their relationship with the land, and 
their role in supporting rural communities, they are only concerned with maximising their 
returns. This reflects a set of behaviours, values and attitudes, such as self-reliance, freedom, 
choice and individualism, which comply with policy values that have emerged from the 
1980s onwards. This construction seeks to govern farm practice, moulding farmers into 
efficient actors which can be operationalised to meet broader policy ambitions.  
Policy discourses portray the role of government as providing opportunities for self-reliant 
farmers to develop their skills in areas such as financial management, marketing and business 
management. These skills are framed as essential in the evolving farm sector, enabling 
farmers to enhance their self-reliance. For example, the Howard Governments’ ‘Agriculture - 
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Advancing Australia’ (AAA) package sought to make the farm sector more productive and 
competitive, facilitating “changes to producers’ skills, attitudes and practices, and by 
providing risk management tools, information and improved market opportunities” 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2004, p.2). The Commonwealth Government (2004, p.4) 
reviewed the AAA package, referring to a Solutions Research study commissioned by the 
Department of Primary Industries and Energy, to “develop a set of key indicators for 
producer behaviour, skills and attitudes”, which: 
a) are necessary pre-requisites for the package’s long-term goals of increased profitability, 
competitiveness and sustainability in agricultural industries; and 
b) could reasonably be attributed to the successful operation of AAA programs [Emphasis 
added] 
 
Thus, the Solutions Research study was commissioned to identify the skills, behaviours and 
attitudes supporting the successful implementation of the AAA policy. According to the 
Commonwealth Government (2004, p.4), this study was based on a series of workshops with 
farm consultants and industry representatives, who “agreed that to achieve stronger 
agricultural industries”, policy should aim to enhance farmers “strategic management for the 
future; capacity for change and adoption of innovation; financial self-reliance; [and] market 
competitiveness”. This document frames these indicators as attributes of good farmers. Yet, 
they are developed specifically to support the AAA policy aims. Rather than developing 
policy to fit the needs of farmers, in this instance, farmers are shaped to support the 
Government’s policy.  
This shift towards the business-minded farmer is critically important in facilitating 
agricultural deregulation. For example, with regard to the deregulation of the export wheat 
market in 2008, the Federal Government implemented this shift, by arguing that this was in 
farmer's interests. The Government drew upon this construction of the business-minded 
farmer, as one that was principally interested in maximising their returns. The government 
framed these farmers as good farmers. This policy was argued to support their ability to 
maximise their returns and reward their entrepreneurialism. Conversely, farmers arguing 
against deregulation were framed as being anachronistic and resistant to change. It is implied, 
that if wheat export market deregulation helps facilitate the exits of these farmers from the 
industry, this will be positive for society. The Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper 
continues this emphasis on creating the policy environment which enables the efficient, 
business-minded farmer to maximise their returns.  
 
Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper – creating dependent farmers? 
The Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper (White Paper) was announced by the 
Australian Government as a “a clear strategy to improve the competitiveness and profitability 
of the agriculture sector, boosting its contribution to trade and economic growth, and building 
capacity to drive greater productivity through innovation” (Commonwealth of Australia, 
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2013b, p.1). As the White Paper argues, increasing the competitiveness of the sector is 
essential, as “stronger farmers mean a stronger Australian economy” (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2015, p.1). This notion of strength is narrow, suggesting that strength is reducible to 
farm profitability. Thus, it is implied that farmers which are either experiencing financial 
difficulty, or structured out of the industry, lack strength and resilience. This emphasises the 
White Paper’s focus on the individual and its lack of reflection on the structural causes of 
farm profitability. For example, the White Paper acknowledges the consolidation of 
commodities markets, which is particularly evident in the deregulated wheat export market 
(O’Keeffe 2017c). However, rather than providing a structural critique of this outcome of 
deregulation, or a structural solution to this, the White Paper instead focuses on enabling 
farmers to succeed in this environment, principally, through attracting investment from the 
private sector. 
The White Paper constructs farms as investment targets. Attracting private investment is 
framed as an essential part of “modern” farming, with farmers’ ability to do this central to 
their role as farmers (Commonwealth of Australia, 2015, p.7). In turn, the Government 
considers its role to be centred on providing farmers with the skills to attract investment. 
Farmers, it is argued, need to attract “external non-bank capital”, through enhancing their 
capacity to “demonstrate value and provide investable products that allow external 
investment” (Commonwealth of Australia 2015, p.47). The White Paper explains that 
domestic superannuation funds’ reluctance to invest in farming is due to the long term nature 
of farm investments, raising the question of whether the White Paper is suggesting that 
farmers should revise their farming models to deliver shorter-term gains for external 
investors.  
This focus on private investment and construction of farms as investment targets 
fundamentally changes the relationship between farmers and their farms. Farms are portrayed 
as investments, and the farmers’ role is portrayed as shifting from maximising the productive 
use of their farm resources, towards attracting capital investment from external sources. In 
this sense, the Governments’ aim is to encourage greater private sector investment into 
agriculture and, in the wake of the end of Australia’s mining boom, stimulate investment into 
the Australian economy. However, this appears to be endorsing the financialisation of farm 
land, without sufficiently considering the implications of this shift. 
In encouraging farmers to attract private investment, the White Paper proposes that farmers 
consider business models which cede full ownership of the farm to external investors, such as 
joint ventures, leasing arrangements and share-farming (Commonwealth of Australia 2015). 
The latter approach could potentially allow smaller farmers to develop greater scale by 
pooling resources, while still retaining a share in the decision making, with fellow farmers. 
This could potentially allow farming collectives to develop and for farmers to remain in the 
industry, without ceding control to private investors. However, in other scenarios described 
by the White Paper, such as joint ventures featuring multiple investors, or farmers selling 
land to external or offshore investors, to remain on their property as farm managers, it is 
conceivable that farmers will lose their autonomy and independence. Self-reliance, in this 
sense, is constructed in terms of the farmers’ capacity to attract external funding. An 
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independent farmer is framed as one who makes good business decisions and, in addition, can 
secure private sector funding. Yet through this act, a farmer could risk becoming dependent 
on private capital and losing their sense of individuality and self-reliance, which has been 
constructed as an essential characteristic of the good farmer.  
The consequences of this are unclear. There is a growing body of literature exploring the 
negative consequences of farm financialisation for small holders in the South (Salerno 2017, 
McMichael 2013). While Magnan (2015) has illustrated the growing financialisation of farm 
land in Australia and the proliferation of corporate mega-farms, the implications for small-to-
medium sized farmers are less well known. Research exploring the increased use of contracts, 
particularly by supermarket chains, has substantially undermined farmer autonomy over 
decision making (Burch and Lawrence 2013, 2009). This could suggest that the adoption of 
farming models featuring external investors may undermine farmers’ autonomy, however the 
pronounced shift towards financialisation in Australian farming evident in the White Paper, is 
relatively recent and the impacts of this may not reveal themselves for some time. Potentially, 
farmers may lose autonomy and independence through this shift, undermining previous 
constructions of farmers as independent and self-reliant. How this influences farmers’ 
conceptions of themselves, and their land, will be an important development to follow. 
Furthermore, if investors such as private equity firms are intent on short-term returns, and the 
involvement of these types of investors in Australian farm land increases, how will this alter 
land use and farming methods, and what will be the environmental implications of these 
changes? These are important questions, which the White Paper has not sufficiently 
considered in calling for greater private sector investment in Australian farming. What my 
analysis of the White Paper does reveal, is that this shift reflects a subtle, yet substantial, shift 
in the responsibility for the farm sector from government, towards corporate interests. 
 
Conclusion  
This article analyses the discursive constructions of farmers and of farming throughout the 
1980s, 1990s and 2000s, culminating with the Australian Government’s Agricultural 
Competitiveness White Paper, published in 2015. The White Paper argues that farmers must 
make their farms attractive to private investors, claiming the ability of farmers to secure 
investment is an essential aspect of farming. The White Paper implies that Government’s role 
is to provide farmers with the opportunities to develop skills and knowledge in this area. The 
shift towards private investment in farming, and the governments’ role as an enabler of this 
shift, is portrayed as a normal, logical and self-evident response to the external pressures 
threatening the ongoing financial viability of Australian farmers. Through conducting a 
genealogical analysis of the changing constructions of farmers, farming and the role of the 
State, this article analyses the subtle discursive shifts which have enabled these present 
constructions to develop. In particular, this work emphasises the shifting responsibility for 
farming, from the State, towards individual farmers and then towards the private sector.  
Throughout the 1980s, policy makers sought to reduce the State’s responsibility for farming 
and the protection of farmers, by deregulating markets and industries, withdrawing financial 
127 
 
assistance and exposing farmers to global markets. This shift was made possible by the 
individualisation of farmers, and the conceptualisation of farming value as being reducible to 
its capacity to convert resources into commodities. This decontextualised farmers from their 
communities and land, and rendered them as measurable, calculable, administerable and 
replaceable. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s in particular, farmers were encouraged to view 
themselves as business people who were concerned only with maximising their returns. The 
role of government became focused on enabling farmers to increase their independence and 
self-reliance, through developing business skills and knowledge, which were constructed as 
essential aspects of modern farming. This enables the Agricultural Competitiveness White 
Paper’s emphasis on private investment in farming to appear as a normal response to issues 
of farm profitability. Attracting private investment is portrayed as an essential skill that all 
modern, successful, business-minded farmers are able to perform.  
However, as I suggests in this article, this has potentially significant ramifications for 
farmers’ autonomy. The business models identified in the White Paper, such as joint ventures 
featuring numerous private investors, all involve farmers’ ceding some level of control over 
decision making on their farm. The White Paper does not consider the consequences of this 
shift, and how this might be experienced by farmers and their communities. As I suggest in 
this article, this potentially leads to the farmers’ dependence on private capital, and control of 
the private sector over farming. In developing this construction of farming, the Australian 
Government has not considered how this might change land use decisions, and the 
environmental, social and economic consequences of these decisions.  
Previous constructions of farmers have been used by successive Australian Governments to 
increase farm efficiency and productivity. Farmers’ identities and conduct has been shaped to 
meet these policy aims. In the example of the Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper, the 
Australian Government is aiming to further re-construct farming as an investment target. 
Farmers are considered as facilitators of this investment. Primarily, this shift is to stimulate 
private sector investment in Australian agriculture, in response to the end of the mining 
construction boom which had underpinned Australian economic success through the early 
part of this century. This article uses genealogical analysis to highlight how this shift was 
made possible, and to draw attention to subtle shift in responsibility for Australian farming, 
from the State towards the private sector.  
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Contribution of article to thesis 
This article analyses competition and agricultural policy discourses and the construction of 
efficiency as the legitimate goal of industry policy. I show how the policy discourses 
facilitated the separation of efficiency and equity policy and how this was used to de-
legitimise the AWB’s key function of equalising returns among growers.  
Policy discourses construct efficiency as encapsulating all that matters, while equity is cast as 
vague and value-laden.  Thus, the ‘good farmer’ is framed as one who prioritises efficiency. 
Building upon my analysis of the State’s operationalisation of the modern farmer from the 
previous Chapter, I explore this construction in relation to the deregulation of the wheat 
export market.  
Good farmers are portrayed as those who are business-focused, who desire the freedom and 
choice to market their wheat to who they want. Thus, farmers are shaped to desire wheat 
deregulation.  
As such, policy makers claim that wheat export market deregulation, which is claimed to 
offer growers’ freedom and choice, is proposed by policy makers in good farmers’ interests. 
Good farmers are economically rational actors, and therefore are primarily interested in 
maximising the returns on their wheat. Deregulation is claimed to be necessary for growers to 
maximise their returns. Therefore if this is what matters and is what growers want, then this is 
the policy change which must be implemented.  
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Maximising efficiency, marginalising equity: A genealogy of Australian wheat export 
market deregulation and 'the good farmer’ 
Abstract 
The Australian Government deregulated the wheat export market in 2008, ending 60 years of 
statutory wheat marketing by the Australian Wheat Board (AWB). In this article, I explore 
the discursive shifts which contributed to this change. I adopt a genealogical approach to this 
research, by collecting and analysing policy documents produced between 1983 and 2012, to 
understand how truths – such as efficiency, competition and the ‘good farmer’ – were 
constructed and reproduced to facilitate wheat export market deregulation in Australia. 
Through analysing the case of wheat export market deregulation, and the process by which 
this shift was made possible, this article contributes more broadly to research examining the 
neoliberalisation of Australian rural industries, and the discursive construction of norms, 
values and identities to facilitate these changes.  
 
Introduction 
From 1948 to 2008, the Australian Wheat Board (AWB) was the sole exporter of Australian 
wheat. This changed in 2008, when the Australian Government ended statutory wheat 
marketing, permitting accredited commercial grain traders to export wheat from Australia. 
Then Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Tony Burke, claimed this move was 
essential to create competition and ultimately, provide growers with better returns for their 
wheat (Commonwealth of Australia 2008a). This shift followed the 2006 Inquiry into Certain 
Australian Companies in Relation to the UN Oil-For-Food Inquiry, headed by Terence Cole 
QC, which found the AWB (operating as the privatised AWB International) paid $220 
million in ‘kickbacks’ to the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein (Botterill 2007; Overington 
2007). The scandal damaged the AWB’s reputation and provided ammunition for critics of 
statutory marketing, creating the impetus for change (Cockfield and Botterill 2007). 
However, this article contends that for two decades prior to this scandal being uncovered, 
policy makers had sought to problematise the AWB and statutory wheat marketing, as a 
source of industry inefficiency which could be addressed through market liberalisation. Key 
inquiries into the Australian wheat industry (Irving et al. 2000; Industries Assistance 
Commission 1988, 1983; Royal Commission into Grain Storage, Handling and Transport 
1988) argued that the AWB, through its redistribution of costs and returns, undermined 
growers’ incomes, distorted market signals and hindered the productivity and efficiency of 
the Australian wheat industry.  
Australian competition and industry policy discourses emerging throughout this period 
portray competition and efficiency as truths. Good policy, as claimed by policy makers, 
should maximise competition and efficiency by removing barriers to markets. Furthermore, 
as I suggest in this article, policy discourses systematically marginalised equity as a credible 
ambition of industry policy. Finally, growers were reconstructed as individual actors, which 
shared values of competition, efficiency, self-reliance, freedom and choice over security and 
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stability. This article aims to understand policy makers’ construction and use of these truths 
to facilitate wheat export market deregulation. To meet these aims, I use a genealogical 
analysis to trace the development of these ideas in relation to wheat industry policy. I collect 
and analyse Australian Government policy statements, Acts of parliament, parliamentary 
debates, reports into the wheat industry by government authorities, consultancy firms, 
independent inquiries and wheat industry groups, and newspaper articles, to understand how 
these key ideas have been constructed and used to shape policy. This article focuses 
specifically upon the Australian wheat industry, yet has broader relevance for agricultural and 
rural industries and communities which have experienced similar changes since the 1980s.  
In examining the case study of Australian wheat export marketing deregulation, this article 
contributes to work by geography scholars, particularly in an Australian rural and regional 
context, which have analysed neoliberalism by making visible the discursive construction of 
norms and values such as competition and efficiency, and the instrumentalisation of 
individual, entrepreneurial subjects (Pritchard 2005a, 2005b; Argent 2005; Larner 2005; 
Gibson and Klocker 2005; Cheshire and Lawrence 2005).  
 
Experience of agricultural deregulation in Australia 
Following the Second World War, policy makers aimed to provide Australian producers with 
a stable environment to reduce risk and uncertainty and encourage greater production. 
Farmers were protected from global markets, and supported through mechanisms such as 
tariffs, statutory marketing authorities and government underwriting of price floors, which 
ensured that producers always had a buyer for their commodities at a minimum, pre-
determined price. Declining terms of trade for agricultural commodities in the 1970s caused 
national governments respond by either maintaining or increasing forms of protection, or 
dismantling interventionist policies (Vanclay 2003). Australian Governments have 
wholeheartedly adopted the latter approach. Initially, the Whitlam Government implemented 
a general 25% cut to tariffs in 1973 (Anderson, Lloyd and MacLaren 2007), and in 1974 
ended subsidies for superphosphate, substantially affecting producers (Gifford 1984). The 
Hawke Government’s election in 1983 accelerated privatisation and deregulation of 
industries, through its emphasis on increasing efficiency and productivity by promoting 
competition within markets and industries (Pritchard 2005a, 2000; Vanclay 2003). In 
particular, this resulted in a substantial retraction of government assistance for agricultural 
industries in Australia.  
Globally, wheat production outpaced demand throughout the 1980s, causing a steep decline 
in prices. In the context of reduced State support for agriculture and farmers, this undermined 
the financial security of many growers who directed numerous, often militant protests 
towards the Australian Government. Minister for Primary Industries and Energy, Rob Kerin, 
and Prime Minister Bob Hawke both responded to this situation by distancing Government 
from this crisis, blaming depressed world markets on the “protectionist policies” of the 
United States and European Union, claiming this encouraged farmers to artificially increase 
wheat production. Rather than protecting farmers, the Government argued its role was to 
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create a competitive environment, to promote greater efficiencies and productivity which 
would enable Australian growers to compete internationally (Hawke 1986; Kerin 1986). In 
1988, Kerin developed this argument, forecasting a future where “commercial independence, 
maximum efficiency and marketing flexibility will be key criteria” (Commonwealth of 
Australia 1988a). However, the social and environmental consequences of this direction have 
often been overlooked by policy makers.  
For many farmers and their communities, the experience of deregulation has been difficult 
(Vanclay 2003; Tonts and Jones 1997; Alston 2004). While successive Australian 
Governments have withdrawn financial assistance for farmers, at the same time, governments 
have sought to facilitate the exits of the least efficient farmers from the industry, through 
policies such as the Rural Reconstruction Schemes of the 1970s, and Rural Adjustment 
Schemes of the 1980s and 1990s (Vanclay 2003; Alston 2004). This was framed as an 
essential step in “[fostering] the development of a more profitable farm sector that is able to 
operate competitively in a deregulated financial and market environment” (Rural Adjustment 
Act 3.1a, 1992). For farmers, the experience of losing the family farm is immense. This is 
documented by Kuehne (2012), whose auto-ethnography articulates the loss of identity, 
community, culture and livelihood resulting from his decision to sell the family farm. The 
attachment of farmers to their land, to the occupation and lifestyle is integral to farmers’ 
identity and sense of self (Wiseman and Whiteford 2009). The fracturing of this relationship 
is among the key causes of the very high levels of mental illness and suicide within 
Australian farming populations (Bryant and Garnham 2014; Alston 2012; Alston 2004; 
Wiseman and Whiteford 2009; Caldwell, Dear and Jorm 2004; Vanclay and Lawrence 1993).  
The reduced numbers of farmers in Australia has substantially impacted rural farming 
communities (Vanclay 2003; Alston 2004; Alston 2012). The effect is cyclical, as declining 
numbers of farm families substantially undermines the viability of many rural towns 
(McKenzie 1994). This shift precipitates a retraction in rural service provision, as 
Governments rationalise services such as education and health care (Alston 2004; McKenzie 
1994; Tonts and Jones 1997). Populations decline, as people move in search of services and 
employment. The rationalisation of services was driven by a developing emphasis upon self-
help and self-reliance within regional policy (Tonts and Haslam-McKenzie 2005; Tonts and 
Jones 1997). In adopting this approach, Governments fundamentally re-shaped its 
relationship with rural communities, whose decline has been viewed by policy makers as an 
inevitable outcome of market-based policies designed to increase efficiency of resource use 
(Dibden, Potter and Cocklin 2009; Alston 2004). It should also be noted that at a time where 
agricultural restructuring facilitated farmer exits and resulted in widespread mental health 
challenges among farming populations, service provision was rationalised (Tonts and Jones 
1997). In that sense, agricultural deregulation in the name of economic efficiency 
externalised the social implications of this policy shift, while the rationalisation of 
government services limited the State’s capacity to respond to this crisis.  
In response to the increasingly tenuous nature of farming, farmers remaining in the industry 
have increasingly adopted productivist farming methods (Lawrence, Richards and Lyons 
2013; Lawrence 1999). As described by Lawrence et al. (2013), specialisation, intensification 
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and economic concentration are the three key characteristics of productivist farming. 
However, productivist farming has also resulted in numerous environmental problems which 
could potentially undermine Australia’s capacity to respond to climate change and food 
security challenges (Pritchard, Burch and Lawrence 2007; Lawrence et al. 2012; Lawrence 
1999; Vanclay and Lawrence 1993). To increase “the productivity of their farm units” (Rural 
Adjustment Act 1992), farmers become trapped in a situation where they feel compelled to 
employ environmentally damaging practices, to increase their productivity and avoid being 
cast as among the least viable, least efficient operators (Vanclay and Lawrence 1993; 
O’Keeffe 2016b). Thus, deregulation of Australian agriculture and rural industries, in an 
attempt to create greater efficiencies, has resulted in substantial externalities which have been 
extensively researched, and are potentially significant sources of inefficiency. Wheat export 
market deregulation is a further example of a policy shift which centres on achieving 
narrowing defined gains in economic efficiency, without due consideration for the broader 
social and environmental implications of this change.  
 
Dismantling the Australian Wheat Board 
Prior to deregulation in 2008, the Australian Wheat Board was the sole exporter of Australian 
wheat. For growers, this process was relatively simple (Pritchard 1998). Wheat marketing 
was conducted entirely by the AWB, which pooled the wheat it received from growers, 
according to classification. This allowed the AWB to amass large quantities of wheat to sell 
to overseas buyers. The scale of these transactions was held as a key advantage of statutory 
marketing, as this was argued to provide growers with collective bargaining power in world 
markets. Growers were essentially provided with average prices through this pooling system, 
as net returns to growers were calculated based on the value of wheat sales and the costs 
associated with these transactions, including freight charges and marketing costs. Until 1989 
this process was supported by government guarantees on wheat prices, articulated in the 
Wheat Stabilisation Plans first implemented in 1948. According to Ryan (1984, p.117), the 
first five Plans set price guarantees according to the cost of production, whereas the 6th Plan 
(1974/75) shifted this approach to reflect export prices. The removal of guaranteed wheat 
prices exposed growers to global wheat markets, shifting the policy focus from stability to 
market efficiency (Pritchard 1998; Ryan 1984). In this climate the AWB was increasingly 
scrutinised, with attention focused on its capacity to deliver premium prices for growers.    
The social and environmental impacts of agricultural restructuring received little attention in 
the mainstream debate on wheat export marketing deregulation. This policy shift was framed 
as being primarily introduced in growers’ interests, and focused on the issue of wheat prices 
and supply chain costs. Australian Government members, as well as members of the 
opposition Liberal Party, argued that deregulation would empower growers through enhanced 
freedom and choice, which growers could use to achieve the best prices for their wheat 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2012, 2008a, 2008b). Further, Government Members outlined 
their expectation that growers would be able to choose between multiple grain traders, who 
would compete for their wheat (Commonwealth of Australia 2012). This perspective ignored 
the highly concentrated nature of the global wheat trade, which is dominated by four 
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transnational firms (Murphy, Burch and Clapp 2012). As such, the deregulated Australian 
wheat market has subsequently developed to be characterised by regional monopolies and 
oligopolies (O’Keeffe and Neave 2017; Australian Grain Growers Co-operative 2014).  
 
 
Figure 1: Australian wheat export market concentration, 2009 to 2013. Data extrapolated 
from Australian Grain Growers (2014, p.3).  
 
As Figure 1 shows, in the five years following deregulation, the 5 largest exporters of 
Australian wheat nearly tripled their share of the export market. Conversely, the ‘other’ 
exporting firms’ market shares have declined markedly. In addition, market concentration is 
even greater at the regional level. Firms controlling regional wheat supply chains – 
previously owned by State-based bulk handling authorities – have used this control to 
establish a dominant share of the wheat export market in these regions (O’Keeffe 2017c). 
Industry concentration has been further accelerated by global mergers and acquisitions such 
as Glencore’s acquisition of Viterra. Recently, firms have invested in the Australian wheat 
industry, through mergers and acquisitions with incumbent firms owning infrastructure, or 
through new infrastructure projects. The effect of these investments is yet to be fully 
understood, though it should be noted that it is predominantly large, transnational agri-food 
firms that are investing in the industry. Whether this provides growers with greater choice, or 
reinforces the sense of disempowerment as growers are subsumed into the global value 
chains of these major firms (Lawrence 1999), is yet to be explored in relation to the wheat 
industry. 
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Wheat export market deregulation 
There is surprisingly little research focusing upon wheat export market deregulation in 
Australia. Literature addressing this topic is dominated by agricultural economists. Prior to 
deregulation, research from within this discipline sought to measure the costs imposed by 
regulation, and also attempted to estimate the projected outcomes of wheat export market 
deregulation, including changes in price and supply chain costs (McCorriston and MacLaren 
2007; Chang, Martel and Berry 2003; Watson 1999; Wait and Ahmadi-Esfahani 1996). 
Following the initial dismantling of the single desk for wheat exports in 2008, research has 
measured the outcomes of deregulation through analysing changing wheat prices following 
this policy shift (Williams 2012; Mugera et al. 2016). This body of literature portrays wheat 
export market policy as measurable through quantifiable measures of wheat prices, and 
supply chain costs such as grain marketing, handling and transport fees. There is certainly 
some merit to these assessments, yet this research only captures one aspect of what is a very 
complex issue. This research sits alongside inquiries initiated by the Federal Government 
(Irving et al. 2000; Productivity Commission 2010; Royal Commission into Grain Handling 
and Storage 1988), which have reduced questions around wheat industry policy to 
quantitative analyses of predicted and real costs and benefits of industry structure, 
particularly centring on financial returns to growers.   
Farmers are portrayed as individual actors concerned only with achieving maximum returns 
for their wheat.  This is an important discursive shift that helped facilitate wheat export 
market deregulation. Individualisation of farmers has been extensively researched in an 
Australian context (Gill 2011; Cheshire and Lawrence 2005; Higgins and Lockie 2002; 
Lockie and Higgins 2007; Higgins 2002a). This research articulates how farmers were 
encouraged – particularly through emerging policy discourses – to view themselves as 
individuals (Cheshire and Lawrence 2005). The individualisation of risk and creation of 
‘responsible agents’ is associated with this change, with citizenship reconstituted to reflect 
the capacity of entrepreneurial individuals to accept responsibility, manage risk and bear the 
consequences of their actions (Higgins and Lockie 2002, p.421). The individualisation of 
farmers is important in the context of wheat export market deregulation, though is yet to be 
explored in relation to this policy shift. This is significant, as research which has exploring 
wheat export market deregulation has viewed farmers as individualistic, rational actors, 
primarily concerned with maximising their incomes. Thus, analysing these constructions is 
important in understanding how these shifts contributed to wheat export market deregulation.  
 
Genealogy 
This article draws upon research that has analysed discourse, and its capacity to create 
knowledge through establishing rules governing what can be known, and how this knowledge 
can be understood (Liepins and Bradshaw 1999; Jacobs 2006; Higgins 2001b). Building upon 
this research, I understand discourse as shaping policy debates through framing what 
legitimate knowledge is, and significantly, what legitimate knowledge isn’t. Thus, discourse 
creates ways of knowing, creating acceptable interpretations of problems, and acceptable 
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solutions to these problems. This process creates truths, or ‘regimes of truth’, on the one 
hand, while marginalising alternate knowledge and thought. Discourses frame how reality 
can be understood by shaping what is thinkable, instrumentalising ‘legitimate’ thought and 
knowledge to influence policy.  
Numerous studies employ genealogical research to understand policy through analysing 
discursive change (Higgins 2002a, 2001b; Dixon and Hapke 2003; Van Herzele 2015; 
Liepins and Bradshaw 1999; McMichael 2009). As mentioned by Higgins (2002a, p.5), 
“genealogy provides a conceptually coherent means for challenging the search in historical 
investigations for the origins or foundations of knowledge”, through exposing the “struggles 
for truth that underpin the claimed neutrality of these knowledges”. Genealogy is ideally 
suited to this research, which traces the construction of competition, efficiency and markets 
as politically neutral truths, and analyses how these truths have facilitated policy change.  
Genealogical research examines processes of knowledge creation and power through 
discourse, while seeking to understand the silencing of alternate discourses (Van Herzele 
2015). This focuses genealogical research on understanding how truths are considered in the 
present, by analysing how truths have been constructed, and therefore, how they can be 
challenged (Hayter and Hegarty 2015). My genealogical research is inspired by Higgins 
(2001b) article on the construction of the ‘low income farm problem’. Higgins constructed a 
‘genealogy of government’, by exploring the problematisation of low-income farmers by the 
developing agricultural economics literature in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Whereas 
Higgins’ work analysed the problematisations of ‘unviable’ farmers, and of government 
assistance, I extend this analysis by exploring the problematisation of statutory wheat 
marketing, and the construction of competition and efficiency as solutions to declining 
grower returns. By tracing developing policy discourses, I analyse how these ideas have 
become accepted as truths within wheat industry policy, and how this facilitated wheat export 
market deregulation. 
 
Policy documents 
To provide a detailed analysis of discursive shifts within wheat industry policy discourses, I 
draw upon a wide range of sources, detailed in Table 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
137 
 
Source Document 
Australian Government Commonwealth of Australia (1986, 1988a, 2004, 2008a, 2008b, 2012). 
Acts of Federal 
Parliament 
Industries Assistance Act 1973, Wheat Marketing Amendment Act 2008, Wheat 
Marketing Amendment Act 2012 
Government authorities 
and independent 
inquiries 
Productivity Commission (2010, 2001, 2000a, 2000b); Rural Industries Research 
and Development Corporation (2004); Industries Assistance Commission (1988, 
1983), National Competition Council (2004); National Competition Policy 
Review of the Wheat Marketing Act 1989 (Irving et al. 2000), Royal Commission 
into Grain Storage, Handling and Transport (1988). 
Consultancy firms 
engaged to inform 
inquiries into the wheat 
industry 
ACIL Tasman (2004); Allen Consulting (2000a, 200b); Centre for International 
Economics (2005). 
Wheat industry groups 
Joint Industry Submission Group, (2000), National Farmers Federation – (1993, 
1986); Australian Grain Exporters Association (2004); Australian Wheat Board 
(1987) 
Newspapers 
The Australian (1984); The Age (1992, 1993); Daily Commercial News (1992a, 
1992b, 1992c); The Land (1986a, 1986b, 1989); Financial Review (1984, 1992a, 
1992b); Stock and Land (1992); Stock Journal (1992); The Weekend Australian 
(1989, 1992); Sydney Morning Herald 1992); Canberra Times (1992); Business 
Review Weekly (1992); Telegraph-Mirror 1993). 
Table 1: Documents used in developing genealogy of wheat industry policy 
These documents were published between 1983, marked by the Industry Assistance 
Commission’s (IAC) (1983) inquiry into the wheat industry and 2012, when the Australian 
Government abolished the accreditation scheme run by Wheat Exports Australia, allowing 
grain traders to export Australian wheat without State approval. I analyse these documents to 
explore how policy values and farmer identity have been constructed, in relation to the 
Australian wheat industry. In writing this analysis I consider these policy documents as a 
collection, and make claims based on my analysis of this collection as a whole. I refer to 
individual documents to illustrate certain points.   
 
Prioritising efficiency 
In this section, I explore how policy discourses created a policy framework which prioritised 
efficiency, and sought to marginalise equity as a credible industry policy objective. Policy 
makers used this framework to portray statutory wheat marketing as fundamentally 
incompatible with the State’s aim of improving industry efficiency.  
In 1974, the Commonwealth Government established the Industries Assistance Commission 
(IAC) to “improve the efficiency with which the community’s productive resources are used” 
(Industries Assistance Commission Act 1973, section 22.1.a). This re-positioned agricultural 
policy to focus on enhancing the productive and efficient management of the “community’s 
productive resources”. This cast farmers as resource managers and their farms as resources. 
The “community” is presumed to desire efficient and productive management of these 
resources. Rather than protecting farmers, the Industries Assistance Commission re-framed 
agricultural policy to protect the community’s right for its productive resources to be 
managed with maximum efficiency, contributing to national economic performance. Intended 
or otherwise, this diminishes the position of farmers. Farmers’ claims for security and 
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stability, central to the collectivism which marked agricultural policy following the Second 
World War, are substantially weakened, as their role is re-cast in terms of their capacity to 
manage the community’s resources productively and efficiently.  
The IAC (1983, p.6) reiterated this emphasis on efficiency in its 1983 review of the 
Australian wheat industry, stating:  
Policy should have regard primarily for the efficiency with which the community’s resources 
are used…this view is not based on a belief that other community objectives are any less 
important but rather on the belief that other objectives can be achieved more directly, and at 
less cost, through instruments which are not part of industry assistance policy.  
 
This statement separates efficiency and equity as policy objectives, reflecting the perspective 
of mainstream policy documents addressing wheat industry regulation from the 1980s 
onwards. This portrays efficiency maximisation as a credible objective of good industry 
policy, whereas equity is framed as antagonistic towards this ambition. Within this policy 
framework, the security, stability and equalising measures afforded to farmers by statutory 
wheat marketing are cast as policy objectives which lack credibility and undermine 
efficiency.  
This is evident in the report of the Royal Commission into Grain Handling, Storage and 
Transport, initiated by the Hawke Government in 1986. The Royal Commission urged state 
governments to restructure grain handling organisations, “to ensure that the agencies are 
freed of social obligations”, and act as commercial entities (1988, p.46). As stated in the 
Royal Commission report, social obligations “can impose costs that would not usually be 
incurred in a purely commercial environment and these costs are ultimately borne by 
growers” (Royal Commission into GHST 1988, p.46). Importantly, social objectives in 
industry policy are constructed as a cost imposed by the state, with limited perceptible 
benefits to growers. AWB Operations Manager, Tom Pile, reproduces this argument (Daily 
Commercial News 1992):  
The stakeholders must be convinced that the system will run as a commercial business and 
not be used as an instrument of government social policy. Yet, at a recent conference, a senior 
representative of the Department of Transport and Communications made the following 
statement: ‘When the government sat down to consider its options in framing the One Nation 
statement, it sought to meet a number of objectives. A key objective was to create jobs’…The 
objective is commendable, but it hardly forms the basis for a sound rail transport policy which 
is commercially and competitively oriented. 
 
Policy discourses frequently emphasise the need to create a “purely commercial” wheat 
industry structure. Markets are portrayed as pure, apolitical mechanisms which are an arbiter 
of fairness, while government intervention in industry is constructed as politically motivated. 
Credible industry policy is framed as that which enhances efficiency, through facilitating 
development of a “purely commercial environment”. Equity is portrayed as an unnecessary 
impediment to this aim. Separating equity and efficiency allows policy makers to argue that 
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industry policy should prioritise efficiency, while claiming equity can be most effectively met 
through alternate policy instruments.  
Thus, efficiency is constructed as the central objective of wheat industry policy. Firms are 
repeatedly portrayed as key actors in improving efficiency, and therefore, growers’ 
prosperity. Efficiency, it is claimed, is maximised when markets are competitive. 
Competition, rather than security and stability, is framed as being in the growers’ best 
interests, as competition maximises farmers’ returns, whereas the re-distribution of returns 
through statutory marketing dampens prices and incentives, encourages free-riding and is 
fundamentally unfair on the most efficient farmers. Policy makers argue the development of 
competition will benefit growers, as the market will encourage firms’ to pursue purely 
commercial objectives. In doing so, it is claimed that firms will increase industry efficiency, 
reduce supply chain costs incurred by growers, and use self-interest and greater marketing 
skills and efficiencies to deliver better wheat prices. Firms are constructed as lacking power 
to influence markets, and as answerable to growers, who are cast as the powerful actors in 
this relationship. Good farmers are framed as those which will be able to succeed in this 
environment. In this context, policy discourses introduce the concept of fairness, in place of 
equity.  
Whereas firms are endorsed as central to improving the Australian wheat industry’s 
efficiency and productivity, government intervention is problematised as fundamentally 
inefficient. Among others, the Industries Assistance Commission (1988) and Royal 
Commission into Grain Storage Handling and Transport (1988) argue that as government 
authorities such as the AWB are not subject to competition, they lack the necessary 
incentives to minimise its expenditure, and are unable to accurately determine the costs of 
their services. While some credence is afforded to the AWB’s capacity to market large 
parcels of wheat, policy discourses argue that the market structure featuring one participant is 
incapable of maximising efficiency and productivity, and should be dismantled to facilitate 
greater participation from commercial firms. Crucially, policy discourses portray government 
intervention into wheat marketing, through the statutory marketing of the AWB, as resulting 
not from sound economic and social policy, but politically-motivated decisions influenced by 
agrarian socialists (Pritchard 2005a; 2005b). Conversely, as Pritchard (2005a; 2005b) argues, 
policy discourses present market liberalisation as politically neutral. Markets are portrayed 
simply as apolitical mechanisms, existing outside of the sphere of governments and 
impenetrable by political interests.   
The success of these arguments fundamentally shaped the debate over wheat industry 
regulation. Industry policy was guided by the question of how to maximise efficiency, with 
the solution presumed to be through the development of competition. From within this policy 
framework, the redistribution of costs and returns among growers by the AWB is constructed 
as antithetical to this aim.  
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Externalising social and environmental costs  
Yet in this conception, efficiency is considered narrowly as economic efficiency. Key policy 
documents such as Hilmer et al. (1993, p.4), define efficiency by describing three dimensions 
of economic efficiency – productive efficiency, allocative efficiency and dynamic efficiency. 
By focusing upon maximising the economic efficiency of individual industries, policy makers 
failed to account for the externalities created by these policy shifts. As an example, farming 
has been conceived of as a means through which productive use of natural resources can be 
maximised. The policy focus then shifts to meet this central aim, with all other concerns 
considered to be the responsibility of other arms of government. However, the focus on 
economic efficiency has created significant social and environmental problems, including the 
decline of rural communities following population out-migration and service retraction, the 
mental health challenges experienced by farmers and the environmental consequences caused 
by the proliferation of productivist farming. These issues require substantial government 
intervention and expenditure to address. This creates new sources of inefficiency, which 
become the problem of the broader society. These social and environmental costs are 
obscured in competition and industry policy discourses, which instead seek to construct 
efficiency as a strictly economic idea, and as the key value to guide competition and industry 
policy.  
 
Marginalising social objectives  
In prioritising efficiency and marginalising equity, policy discourses reduced the AWB’s 
value to focus on its capacity to increase wheat prices and minimise supply chain costs for 
growers. Significantly, this shift enabled policy makers to audit the AWB’s performance and 
quantify the value of statutory wheat marketing.  
Numerous studies were initiated by government and industry groups to assess the costs and 
benefits of wheat industry regulation (Royal Commission into Grain Handling, Storage and 
Transport 1988; Joint Industry Submission Group 2000; Irving et al. 2000; National 
Competition Council 2004; Productivity Commission 2010). For example, Irving et al. (2000, 
p.5) were tasked with analysing and quantifying “the benefits, costs and overall effects on 
businesses involved in the Australian wheat industry and/or the community generally”. 
Similarly, the Commonwealth Government asked the Productivity Commission (2010, p.iv) 
to “assess the operation of the current wheat export marketing arrangements, including the 
costs and benefits”. Within these frameworks, quantifiable costs and benefits hold greatest 
weight, as they are claimed to be neutral, tangible and reliable. For example, Allen 
Consulting’s (2000, p.67) finding, based on econometric data, that deregulation of the wheat 
export market would lead to savings of between AUD$223 million and -AUD$71 million, 
was cited as incontrovertible evidence of the need for deregulation. Significantly, those 
quoting this data invariably failed to mention the negative projections of this modelling 
(Productivity Commission 2005a; Australian Grains Export Association 2004).  
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On the other hand, equity is treated with scepticism. Policy discourses frame equity as value 
laden, subjective, and difficult to measure and understand. For example, the Productivity 
Commission (2001, p.45) claim that policy arguments based on equity are controversial and 
contentious. The subjectiveness of equity is viewed as creating “inconclusive, drawn-out 
political debates about equity or regional impacts, most of which are unknowable and 
unprovable” (Productivity Commission 2001, p.3). Significantly, this questions the validity of 
information based upon subjective interpretation. Conversely, the Productivity Commission 
(2001, p.xix) claim that the arguments for efficiency are simpler and clearer, and which can 
be made knowable through an assessment of the costs and benefits of regulation, in relation 
to the projected benefits and costs of deregulation. This perception substantially affected the 
capacity of Irving et al. (2000), the National Competition Council (2004) and the Productivity 
Commission (2010), in particular, to fully appreciate the social benefits of wheat export 
market regulation, as experienced by farmers and their communities. Growers’ claims that 
statutory marketing performed an important social function are largely dismissed on the basis 
that these claims are unsupported by evidence, or simply immeasurable. This marginalises 
growers’ observations and experiences. Furthermore, the Productivity Commission (2010) 
report on growers’ dissent following the first phase of wheat export market deregulation. 
Rather than using these opinions to contribute to its overall assessment of the success of 
wheat export market deregulation, the Productivity Commission counters these growers’ 
opinions, downplaying their significance and disputing the basis for their concerns.  
These assessments are conducted in a context where equity itself is framed as an objective 
which is best addressed by means other than wheat industry policy. Further to this, 
assessments of the wheat industry deride equity as value-laden, and largely dismiss subjective 
data supporting statutory wheat marketing as lacking credibility. On the other hand, 
quantifiable information such as costs and prices are constructed as indisputable, unbiased 
and knowable information. This creates a significant bias in these assessments and re-
constructs what can be considered as credible evidence in relation to this policy area. Irving 
et al.’s (2000, p.5), key finding, that “the Committee was not presented with, nor could it 
find, clear, credible, and unambiguous evidence that the current arrangements for the 
marketing of export wheat are of net benefit to the Australian community”, was referred to 
repeatedly throughout parliamentary debates on wheat export market deregulation. Yet this 
finding effectively silences the voices of the “overwhelming” number of growers who 
contributed to this inquiry by expressing support for statutory marketing (Irving et al. 2000, 
p.82). As Pritchard (2005b, pp.107-108) has argued, “This approach to understanding 
efficiency rests on an important methodological foundation: the costs from cross-subsidising 
individuals tend to be open to expression in monetary terms, whereas citizenship entitlements 
often are not”. Thus, as Pritchard (2005b; 2000) suggests, such assessments are poorly 
equipped to capture the benefits of particular policies of redistribution.  
This approach is driven by a narrow focus on economic efficiency, which does not 
adequately consider the social and environmental externalities created through this process. 
In focusing upon the efficiency of the wheat industry through narrow indicators such as 
142 
 
wheat prices, the social and environmental costs arising from deregulation which do not fit 
within this reductionist, quantitative framework are rendered insignificant.  
 
Shaping Growers  
The shift in values underpinning wheat industry policy has contributed to wheat industry 
deregulation. Equally important, policy discourses have re-shaped farmer identity to accord 
with these values (Cheshire and Lawrence 2005; Lockie and Higgins 2002). The construction 
of the ‘good farmer’ is central to this. Research has explored the notion of the good farmer in 
relation to farming practice and associated environmental impacts (Silvasti 2003; Vanclay, 
Silvasti and Howden 2007; Lockie 1998). However, I draw upon research exploring 
individualisation of farmers, contending that the ‘good farmer’, has been operationalised to 
help facilitate wheat export market deregulation. The good farmer is considered less in terms 
of farm practice, farm appearance, community contributions or morality, and more in terms 
of their self-conceptualisation as a rational economic actor. The good farmer views 
themselves as a business person, who assesses the costs and benefits associated with their 
business, and sensibly makes decisions on this basis. This farmer employs common sense 
and, according to this discourse, common sense farming is that which maximises returns. 
Assessments of the wheat industry, and value of regulation in particular, aim to communicate 
to growers how much they could benefit financially from a policy shift which reduces 
regulation (Irving et al. 2000; Allen Consulting 2000; Royal Commission into Grain 
Transport, Handling and Storage 1988). These inquiries appeal to this farmer, who is 
constructed as being principally concerned with maximising their returns. Policy discourses 
rationalise and calculate the costs and benefits of regulation. This approach portrays 
quantifiable information as concrete, credible and value-free evidence. Good farmers are 
constructed as rational and calculating. Policy discourses frame good policy, and good 
business decisions, as based upon assessment of this evidence. As this evidence is 
constructed to show that deregulation will deliver higher returns to growers, and growers are 
framed as rationally concerned with maximising their returns, good farmers are constructed 
as those which want to ‘get on with business’ and support deregulation.  
In conjunction with this shift, policy discourses portray a good farmer as independent, self-
reliant and competitive. Rick Farley, as Executive Director of the National Farmers 
Federation argued that ‘As individuals, farmers are fiercely competitive and independence is 
built into the whole farming psyche’ (Canberra Times 1992). This comment is reflective of 
discourses throughout the 1980s and 1990s in particular, which highlight the stoicism of 
farmers as a long-held character trait, though re-frame this form of independence in terms of 
independence from government support. In Farley’s view, the farmer is an individual, 
independent of other farmers. Farmers are portrayed as competitive, in the sense that they 
relish competition with other farmers. Yet statutory wheat marketing considers growers as a 
collective, precluding competition between farmers and essentially delivering equal returns to 
growers.   
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Policy discourses frequently lament the injustice of this arrangement. Good farmers, it is 
claimed, are unjustly required to support the less efficient, less skilled farmers through 
statutory marketing, as costs and returns are redistributed among growers, regardless of how 
efficient or how skilled they may be. This is argued to reduce incentives, and moreover, to 
place an unfair burden on the most efficient farmers. However, this also prevents growers 
from utilising their skills and knowledge to maximise their wheat prices. Thus, a good wheat 
farmer is framed as one that wants to develop these skills and, will be prepared to accept their 
loss should they fail to build these skills and use them effectively. This is portrayed as a fair 
situation, with the market determining, without prejudice, which farmers succeed or fail 
based on their skills, knowledge, organisation and judgment. This construction does not 
consider the varying capacities of farmers to acquire these skills, and assumes that all will 
have equal ability and resources to develop the knowledge to market their wheat successfully.  
Public debates frame wheat export market deregulation in terms of its impact upon growers. 
Yet, this policy is not directed towards the interests of all growers, but instead is designed for 
the ‘good farmer’. Deregulation of the wheat export market, is argued to provide growers 
with choice, freedom, and control. This is reflected by Senator Nick Sherry’s comments in 
Federal Parliament (Commonwealth of Australia 2008b, p.2131), claiming this policy shift 
was focused on providing growers control through prioritising freedom and choice. As Sherry 
stated, “After all, it is their wheat” (Commonwealth of Australia 2008b, p.2131). 
Sherry equates choice with grower empowerment, though I argue that in this instance, choice 
is prioritised as a mechanism for enhancing grower self-reliance. Not all growers will have 
the capacity or the desire to exercise choice and freedom, and may experience this as a 
burden. However, this is not necessarily a concern for policy makers, who want to encourage 
growers who are prepared to accept responsibility for their wheat marketing. Those farmers 
who are incapable of developing the necessary skills and attitudes to market their own wheat 
successfully, are constructed as poor farm managers, who do not deserve ongoing 
government assistance to remain in farming. Rather, their exits from farming are constructed 
as an essential step in maximising productive resource use. The good farmers remaining in 
the industry subsume the resources that are made available through these exits, and put them 
to more productive use. Thus, the good farmers, for whom wheat export market deregulation 
was intended, operationalise the State’s central aim of increasing efficient use of the 
community’s productive resources.  
Importantly, this creation of the good farmer, as a rational, self-reliant actor intent on 
maximising their returns, decontextualises farmers from their connections to their land and 
communities. This creates an “abstracted and aspatialised” conception of farming (Pritchard 
2005b, p.110), which externalises the social implications of wheat export market deregulation 
in particular and centres policy restructuring on the impact upon individual farmers, and their 
capacity to maximise their returns by exercising choices in liberalised markets. 
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Conclusion 
This article has analysed how neoliberalisation has occurred within an Australian rural 
context, by developing a genealogy of wheat export market deregulation. In examining this 
policy shift as a process which has occurred across three decades, this article has revealed 
how this change was facilitated by the discursive construction of norms and values such as 
competition, efficiency and individualism and, pertinently, the shaping of farming identity to 
accord with these values. More broadly, this article contributes to research by geography 
scholars which has analysed the shaping of the lives of rural Australians through neoliberal 
discourses and policies. The discursive formations which have facilitated this policy shift 
have decontextualised farmers from their land and communities. This has ultimately 
contributed to policy that is designed to support one interpretation of farming, while 
externalising the social and environmental consequences of this shift.   
Fundamentally, I suggest that policy discourses sought to problematize statutory wheat 
marketing as an inefficient system, which deprived growers of freedom, control and choice, 
while inhibiting industry efficiency and innovation. Industry and competition policy 
discourses constructed efficiency as a central aim of industry policy, which was achievable 
through market liberalisation and competition between firms. Equity, or social obligations, 
was portrayed as oppositional to efficiency. Thus, policy discourses separated efficiency and 
equity in policy. Good industry policy, it was claimed, aimed to maximise efficiency. 
Statutory wheat marketing was constructed as being incompatible with this policy 
framework. As statutory wheat marketing redistributed returns evenly among growers, 
protected growers from what were perceived as volatile global markets and provided a 
measure of security and stability for growers, the marketing arrangements of the AWB 
essentially provided important equity-enhancing functions. However, assessments of the 
AWB’s performance framed these functions as contrary to the overarching aim of 
maximising efficiency. 
The AWB and its single desk retained significant support among growers, particularly 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, for deregulation to occur, policy makers had to 
portray the AWB as serving no identifiable purpose, which could not otherwise be addressed 
through markets. This gives rise to the assessment of the AWB in terms of costs and benefits 
it provided. The AWB’s value was narrowed to reflect the price premiums it delivered for 
growers, and its capacity to reduce supply chain costs. This is an essential aspect of wheat 
export market deregulation. The overarching policy framework which guided these 
assessments presumed that as the AWB redistributed returns among growers, it prevented 
growers for seeking out the best prices in an open market. Furthermore, due to the lack of 
supply chain competition, it was presumed that the AWB had no capacity to lower costs, as it 
was unable to accurately determine fair prices for their services. Therefore, assessing the 
AWB’s performance concerning these measures against projections of what would occur in a 
deregulated market, was destined to find that the AWB provided growers with limited value, 
while impairing the national economy.  
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Farmers were constructed as wanting the choice and freedom deregulation offered. Good 
farmers were portrayed as business-minded professionals. They understood the virtues of 
competition and trusted the capacity of firms to deliver improved returns, which, above all 
else, is what these farmers wanted. This implied that growers who did not share these values 
and attitudes were anachronistic, and held on to an outdated ideology. Thus, while it is 
claimed that wheat export market deregulation was introduced for growers, I suggest that this 
policy was for the ‘good’ farmers, who were able to operationalise the State’s objective to 
maximise efficiency. This marginalises farmers who do not fit within this framework. 
Understanding the effect of wheat export market deregulation upon growers and their 
communities is an important area for further research. This is essential to develop a more 
complete understanding of the effect of this policy shift.  
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Contribution of article to thesis 
This chapter analyses the use of quantification to make the wheat industry amenable to 
governing and, policy makers’ use of technologies of performance to govern wheat industry. 
Specifically, these technologies are focused on assessing and coercing the AWB, to narrow 
its value and focus towards maximising growers returns. Cost-benefit analysis and 
econometric modelling is then used to demonstrate the superiority of markets in meeting this 
aim. This analysis builds upon my argument in Chapter 9, which showed how growers had 
been constructed as principally interested in maximising their returns.  
The power of these technologies is in their perceived normalcy. They are neutral. They 
simply convey the reality of a situation and enable policy makers to act this reality.  
Thus, deregulation of the wheat export market is made possible through the reconstruction of 
policy values to focus on maximising efficiency through liberalised markets (argued in 
Chapter 10), the reconstruction and governing of farmers using technologies of agency 
(Chapters 9 and 10), and the coercion of the AWB through technologies of performance, such 
as audit, cost-benefit analysis and performance objectives (Chapter 11).  
As in Chapter 10, I show how policy discourses marginalise social concepts such as equity 
and dismiss objections to deregulation on social grounds, due to the subjectivity of the data 
informing these objections. Thus, policy discourses effectively erase the social world, by 
discrediting the social, on the one hand and, portraying markets and information produced in 
markets as a reality.   
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Creating a governable reality: Analysing the use of quantification in shaping Australian 
wheat marketing policy  
Abstract 
This article analyses Australian policy makers’ use of quantification and technologies of 
government to implement the project of Australian wheat export market liberalisation. This 
article draws upon policy documents to analyse how quantification has been used to construct 
a simplified, governable conception of the wheat industry. Policy makers acted upon this 
constructed reality, through technologies of performance, such as performance objectives, 
audit, cost-benefit analysis and econometric modelling to facilitate wheat export market 
deregulation. In addition, this article shows how quantification was used to delegitimise the 
social consequences of deregulation, and marginalise farmers’ opposition to this shift.  
 
Introduction 
This article analyses Australian policy makers’ use of quantification and technologies of 
performance to make agricultural deregulation in Australia possible. Specifically, I examine 
the deregulation of Australia’s wheat export market, as a project which policy makers 
commenced in the early 1980s and pursued until the deregulation of wheat export marketing 
in 2008. There are two discursive constructions important to this shift. First, quantification 
was used to narrow the focus of statutory wheat marketing, administered by the Australian 
Wheat Board (AWB), towards maximising wheat prices. As I show in this article, this 
simplified the role of statutory marketing, making it amenable to governing. Second, 
governmental technologies such as performance objectives, audit, cost-benefit analysis and 
econometric modelling were used to measure and coerce the AWB and to demonstrate that 
liberalised markets would provide greater benefits to the Australian community. Importantly, 
throughout this project policy discourses sought to counter growers’ opposition to 
deregulation, by subtly marginalising the significance of their concerns and the importance of 
social and environmental consequences of industry policy. While wheat prices and costs are 
undoubtedly important, it is essential to examine how these quantifiable indicators were 
constructed as the sole, credible measure of statutory marketing policy. Furthermore, this 
article analyses how the emphasis on wheat prices was used as a key mechanism in the 
deregulation of this industry.  
I commence this article by explaining the Australian wheat industry and its history of 
marketing regulation. Next, I draw upon sociology of quantification literature (Le Gales 
2016; Espeland and Stevens 2008, 1998) and governmentality research analysing 
technologies of performance (Rochford 2008; Dean 1999; Power 1996; Rose 1991) to 
develop a conceptual framework for analysing this issue. Following this, I analyse how the 
AWB’s performance objectives were shaped to focus on maximising growers’ returns and 
policy makers’ use of audit to govern the AWB’s performance accordingly. I then examine 
policy makers’ use of cost-benefit analysis to demonstrate the claimed superiority of 
liberalised markets in enhancing industry efficiency and maximising growers’ returns. This 
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article explores how these reviews marginalise subjective forms of evidence, such as 
growers’ experiences and observations, instead focusing on quantitative methods for 
producing acceptable knowledge. I suggest policy makers used quantification to reduce and 
simplify the Australian wheat industry, coerce and control the AWB and wheat growers and, 
to legitimise wheat export market deregulation.  
I analyse the Australian wheat export market liberalisation as a long-term project of 
government, rather than the result of responsible cost-benefits analyses of regulation and its 
benefits, as portrayed by agricultural economists and government authorities (Commonwealth 
of Australia 2008a; McCorriston and MacLaren 2007; Irving et al. 2000). This article makes 
visible the processes of quantification and use of governmental technologies such as audit, 
cost-benefit analysis and econometric modelling. In analysing the example of Australian 
wheat export marketing policy, I suggest policy makers have used an assemblage of these 
technologies to transfer thought, the rationality of markets, competition and efficiency into 
the domain of reality, to make the deregulation of the wheat export market possible (Miller 
and Rose 1990). In this sense, policy discourses construct the social world as a barrier to 
optimising allocative efficiency and productivity, thereby reducing the contribution of the 
wheat industry to the national economy. Quantification, in conjunction with assemblages of 
technologies including audit, benchmarking and cost-benefit analysis are used to reduce this 
barrier by delegitimising and erasing the social world. In justifying policy change such as 
wheat export market deregulation as being ‘in the national interest’, policy makers obscure 
the effect of market liberalisation upon people and communities. Whereas the deregulation of 
the wheat industry was framed as being in the interests of wheat farmers, this policy shift has 
created an environment where wheat farmers and their communities are disenfranchised and 
undermined. By tracing changing policy discourses around wheat marketing over three 
decades, this article draws attention to the subtle discursive shifts which made liberalisation 
of the wheat export market possible.  
 
Background 
The Australian wheat industry 
Australia accounted for 3.28% of global wheat production and 9.62% of world exports in 
2015/2016 (ABARES 2017a, p.37). In 2015/2016, 24,168 tonnes of wheat produced in 
Australia, of which 28.3% was used by domestic markets (ABARES 2017b) and 66.7% was 
exported predominantly to Asian and Middle Eastern countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam, 
China and South Korea (AEGIC 2017). Thus, while Australia is not a major wheat producer, 
it is a significant wheat exporter. Australia’s major wheat producing states in 2015/16 were 
Western Australia (8,800kt), New South Wales (7,500kt), South Australia (4,376kt) and 
Victoria (2,085kt)(ABARES 2017b). The location of wheat production determines how 
wheat is marketed. A higher percentage of wheat produced in regions close to large consumer 
markets (Victoria, New South Wales) is sold domestically, whereas West Australian and 
South Australian farmers export approximately 90 per cent of production (Stretch, Carter and 
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Kingwell 2014). As an example of the wheat prices received by Australian farmers, 
GrainCorp’s cash prices at the Cootamundra Site fluctuated between AUD$201.86 and 
AUD$260.86 per tonne for ASW1 (Australian Standard White) wheat in the three months 
from July 14 2017 to September 13 2017 (CropConnect 2017).    
 
Wheat export market deregulation 
The Commonwealth Governments’ approach to wheat marketing, and agricultural policy 
more generally, has changed substantially in recent decades. The Industries Assistance 
Commission (IAC) was instrumental in this process. The Commonwealth Government 
developed the IAC in 1973 to “improve the efficiency with which the community’s 
productive resources are used” (Industries Assistance Commission Act 1973, section 22.1.a). 
The IAC focused upon regulatory arrangements it perceived as undermining efficiency, 
particularly the statutory marketing of agricultural commodities (Botterill 2012). In response 
to weakening global commodities markets and declining terms of trade, successive Australia 
governments restructured agriculture by deregulating markets and privatising government 
owned assets and authorities, thus exposing agricultural industries to global competition 
(Dibden, Potter & Cocklin 2009; Vanclay 2003; Higgins 2001). Agricultural restructuring 
accelerated under the Hawke Government (1983-1991), which substantially reduced 
protections and assistance for farmers. This enduring shift created significant social 
ramifications for rural communities (Baker 2015; Smith & Pritchard 2012; Vanclay 2003; 
Tonts & Jones 1997). Increased numbers of farmers exited the industry, leading to rising 
depression, anxiety and suicide throughout rural Australia as farmers lost their livelihoods, as 
well as their connections with the land and farming communities (Alston 2012, 2004; Kuehne 
2012; Wythes and Lyons 2006; Fraser et al. 2005; Caldwell, Jorm & Dear 2004). The loss of 
farmers and their families from rural Australia lead to declining populations in many rural 
communities, affecting local economies dependent upon farming populations (Baker 2015; 
McManus et al. 2012; Pritchard et al. 2012; Smith & Pritchard 2012; Vanclay 2003).  
It is in this context that I turn to the issue of Australian wheat export marketing. From 1948 
onwards, the AWB compulsorily acquired wheat produced in Australia. The AWB 
accumulated the wheat it received from growers, sold this wheat to domestic and export 
markets and distributed the proceeds from these sales evenly among growers (Pritchard 
1998). The IAC (1988, 1983) argued that this distorted markets, preventing farmers from 
responding to market signals and adjusting production decisions accordingly. Furthermore, 
the IAC claimed the AWB undermined industry efficiency as it lacked incentives to reduce 
costs or capture premium prices for growers (IAC 1988). Critically, questions around wheat 
export marketing became focused around the AWB’s perceived inefficiencies and its capacity 
to use its market power to deliver premium prices to growers.  
Despite ongoing opposition from growers and farm organisations, these arguments 
contributed to the eventual deregulation of the wheat export market in 2008. At the time, 
Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Tony Burke and Labor Senator Nick Sherry, 
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among others, cited research by Irving et al. (2000) and consultancy firm ACIL Tasman 
(2006) to support their claim that statutory wheat marketing restricted growers’ choices and 
freedom without delivering price premiums (Commonwealth of Australia 2008a, 2008b). 
Similarly, much of the scholarly research into statutory wheat marketing in Australia assumes 
that the central purpose of the AWB was to maximise growers’ returns, and that measurement 
of supply chain costs and wheat price changes can determine whether this policy shift has 
succeeded (Mugera et al. 2016; McCorriston & MacLaren 2007; Chang, Martel & Berry 
2003; Watson 1999). Conversely, Baker (2016), O’Keeffe & Neave (2017) and Head, 
Atchison, Gates & Muir (2011) have sought to understand growers’ experiences of wheat 
export market deregulation. This research found that small-to-medium sized growers have 
struggled to adapt to this policy shift, resulting in many farmers feeling disenfranchised and 
vulnerable, while the new responsibilities of wheat marketing have created additional 
workloads and loss of leisure time. At the very least, this suggests that the narrowing of this 
policy question to a matter of wheat prices and supply chain costs has externalised a range of 
pertinent issues related to this policy shift. Thus, rather than address the impacts arising from 
this policy, this research seeks to understand how this shift was made possible.  
 
Making society governable 
Australian policy makers’ attempts to increase efficiency and productivity through 
quantifiable indicators such as prices and costs are not confined to the Australian wheat 
industry. Similar processes have been applied to restructure labour markets and diverse 
sectors such as health care, social security and higher education, in Australia and globally 
(Watts 2016; Connell 2013; Marginson 2013; Cooper & Allem 2008, Alston 2007). Central 
to these policy shifts, is the construction of markets as “object[s] of power and knowledge” 
(Mitchell 2008, p.1117). According to this construction, evident in mainstream Australian 
policy discourses, markets and economies exist naturally and in reality as apolitical 
mechanisms for the efficient ordering of the economy through transactions, “in the name of 
national and individual prosperity” (Rose 1993, p.286). This rationality has been applied by 
policy makers in the economic restructuring of Australian society (Watts 2016; Alston 2007, 
2004; Pritchard 2005). However, the rationality of liberalised markets and economies alone is 
not sufficient to make this shift possible. Society must be made governable, and amenable to 
this reality of markets and the economy (Gibson, Dufty, Phillips & Smith 2008; Oels 2005; 
O’Malley, Weir & Shearing 1997).  
Thus, in this article I draw upon governmentality research and its analysis of advanced liberal 
governing. As mentioned by Rose (1993, p.286), whereas the object of the economy, 
featuring markets comprised of competing firms, may not be dissimilar to other modes of 
governing such as liberalism, advanced liberal governing employs technical, practical 
technologies to make society amenable to that rationality. According to Miller and Rose 
(1990, p.3), governmentality research entails: 
[…] an investigation not merely of grand political schema, or economic ambitions, nor even 
of general slogans such as 'state control', nationalization, the free market and the like, but of 
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apparently humble and mundane mechanisms which appear to make it possible to govern: 
techniques of notation, computation and calculation. 
 
In particular, governmentality research has focused on the creation and governance of self-
governing individuals and the subtle coercion of these individuals through technologies of 
agency and performance (O’Keeffe 2017a, 2017b; Penny 2016; Higgins et al. 2015; Lockie 
2009; Higgins and Lockie 2002). However, the use of technologies is also particularly 
evident in the governing of organisations, which is the focus of this article. The technologies 
central to advanced liberal governing include audit, financial accountability, benchmarking, 
calculation and cost-benefit analysis (Rose 1993, p.294). These technologies share three 
important aspects. First, they are seemingly innocuous, almost boring. Second, their power as 
governmental technologies is drawn from the power of numbers. Third, the construction of 
numbers through such technologies, particularly those numbers produced by markets, is 
portrayed as a representative of truth, knowledge and reality. This is essential to the project of 
advanced liberal governing. This leads to the importance of quantification to this project, and 
the relationship between quantification and governmentality.  
 
Quantification 
Quantification, described by Espeland and Stevens as “the production and communication of 
numbers”, has become increasingly prominent in attempts to understand and act upon social 
phenomena (2008, p.402). According to Espeland and Stevens (2008, p.402), quantification 
can have numerous purposes and meanings and “Only by analysing particular instances of 
quantification in context can these purposes and meanings be revealed”. In this article, I draw 
upon this interpretation to analyse how the Australian wheat industry, with all its 
complexities, has been narrowed to focus on quantitative measures such as wheat prices.  
As mentioned by Espeland and Stevens (1998, p.321), the “efficiency of bureaucracies and 
economic transactions depends on their growing depersonalization and objectification”. 
Quantification is an important part of this process. Quantification reduces complexity and 
removes the importance of context, making the objects of quantification more amenable to 
governing (Espeland and Stevens 1998). Numbers simplify society by reducing complex 
relations and situations to that which can be amenable to calculation (Friedberg 2013; Scott 
1998; Espeland and Stevens 1998). Espeland and Stevens (2008, 1998) refer to this process 
as commensuration, where qualities are transformed into quantities. Scott (1998, p.11) 
suggests this helps reduce phenomena to something which is “more legible and hence more 
susceptible to careful measurement and calculation”. The reduction of complex phenomena to 
that which can be analysed, understood and communicated in quantitative form helps to 
shape how problems can be identified, understood and addressed (Espeland and Stevens 
2008). In that sense, complex problems are reduced to solvable equations. Governing, in this 
instance, becomes a technical operation focused on the quantifiable performance of the 
economy.   
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Numbers are constructed as the product of disinterested, mundane technologies. Therefore, 
numbers are portrayed as pure representations of knowledge and of reality (Miller and Rose 
1990). Furthermore, whereas numbers can be used to create distance between governance 
regimes and the objects of governing, policy makers are able to distance themselves from the 
technologies used to generate numbers, and the numbers that are used to legitimise political 
power (Porter 1995; Rose 1991, 1993). Thus, numbers are portrayed as objective, neutral and 
apolitical; as the product of humble, simple technologies and not the political judgment of 
policy makers (Le Gales 2016; Pritchard 2005; Porter 1995; Miller and Rose 1990). Diaz-
Bone and Didier (2016) Diaz-Bone (2016) and Le Gales (2016) challenge this claimed 
neutrality of numbers, arguing that the norms and conventions which are established to define 
the objects of measurement and how they are measured, subtly influences how these numbers 
are produced. In that sense, numbers are not neutral, as is frequently implied by policy 
makers in Australia. Furthermore, the reality that they are often used to portray is not self-
evident (Espeland and Stevens 2008). Despite this, advanced liberal governance regimes use 
numbers produced by quantification to represent a simplified, yet disinterested and 
unequivocal representation of reality, and act upon this knowledge to create policy which 
governs society (Espeland and Stevens 2008; Scott 1998). 
 
Technologies of Performance 
Quantification can be used to construct a narrow and simplified interpretation of reality, 
grounded in the perception of numbers as disinterested and trustworthy (Desrosieres 2011; 
Rose 1993). The knowledge created through quantification is operationalised through 
assemblages of technologies such as auditing, benchmarking, calculation, econometric 
modelling, data storage and analysis, making this reality amenable to governing (Le Gales 
2016; Rochford 2008; Kurunmäki and Miller 2006; Swyngedouw 2005; Pritchard 2005a, 
2005b; Larner 2000; Power 2000).  
As defined by Kurunmäki and Miller (2006, p.89), technologies “refer to the routine and 
often humble mechanisms and devices through which the activity of government is 
conducted”. Policy makers legitimise such technologies, claiming that they are essential in 
enhancing accountability, transparency and credibility (Russell and Thomson 2009; Leander 
and Munster 2007). In this regard, technologies are constructed simply as examples of good 
governance practices. Governmentality theorists, on the other hand, argue that technologies 
of government are employed to define how phenomena can be understood, and legitimise 
acceptable thought and action within this context (Rose 1991). Rather than enabling greater 
public scrutiny of Government or corporate power, for example, the use of these technologies 
of performance enable the State to govern through society by monitoring and controlling the 
actions of individuals and organisations ‘at a distance’ (Higgins et al. 2015; Penny 2016; 
Russell and Frame 2013; Miller and Rose 2008; Swyngedouw 2005; Higgins and Lockie 
2002; Dean 1999). Thus, technologies are used to govern the actions of ostensibly 
autonomous actors, who are compelled to operate within strict boundaries of acceptable 
thought and behaviour (Le Gales 2016).  
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Governmentality scholars have analysed individual policies and policy collections through 
identifying assemblages of technologies such as calculation, audit, cost-benefit analysis, 
benchmarking and performance objectives, to shape knowledge and actors and to act upon 
individuals and communities (Dufty 2015; McKee 2009; Rochford 2008; Lockie and Higgins 
2007; Leander and Munster 2007; Kurunmäki and Miller 2006; Stratford 2006; Stenson and 
Watt 1999). For example, benchmarking and performance objectives act as a force for 
disciplining individuals, organisations and nations and directing resources towards 
legitimised activities and behaviours  (Sum and Jessop 2013; Connell 2013; Sum 2009; 
Rochford 2008; Leander and Munster 2007). As Sum and Jessop (2013, p.37) state in relation 
to the Global Competitiveness Report and Global Competitiveness Index, which rank the 
economic performance of nations: 
These numerical scores and relative rank orders operate as a disciplinary tool (or paper 
panopticon) that draws more and more countries into its number order, comparing their 
economic performance scores over time and their ranking in relation to each other. […] They 
deploy numbers and tables to rank countries. Annual revisions create a cyclical disciplinary 
art of country surveillance that institutionalises a continuous gaze through numbers that 
depicts countries’ performance via changing rank and score orders.  
 
Such disciplinary mechanisms govern behaviours, values and attitudes by compelling actors 
to view their own purpose and performance in relation to the objectives which are established 
by the governing regime. In addition, benchmarking delineates between good and bad 
performance. Thus, the knowledge captured and communicated through this mechanism 
becomes central to interpreting what good performance is, how it can be measured and, 
perhaps most pertinently, marginalising and delegitimising the activities, behaviours and 
values which are not included within this knowledge.   
Similarly, audit, used by governments in conjunction with related technologies such as cost-
benefit analysis and performance objectives, helps make society amenable to governing 
(Miller and Rose 2008; Dean 1999; Porter 1995). Power describes audit as “an active process 
of making things auditable” (1996, p.289). According to Power (1996, p.289), audit involves 
first developing a “legitimate and institutionally acceptable knowledge base”, and second, 
“the creation of environments which are receptive to this knowledge base”. With regard to 
the latter, audit requires “individuals and organisations to be made visible in a manner which 
conforms to the audit process” (Power 1997). As Power (1997, 1996) mentions, auditing 
assumes the existence of auditable facts. Quantification of social phenomena creates these 
facts, through convention, measurement and analysis (Diaz-Bone and Didier 2016). This is an 
important step in constructing what ‘matters’ in policy terms, entailing the creation of 
standards, performance objectives and audit processes for interpreting and assessing 
performance according to these standards (Desrosieres 2014; Rochford 2008; Swyngedouw 
2005).  
Audit presumes that individuals and organisations understand and measure their own 
purposes and values accordingly. Individuals’ actions are therefore not only guided by the 
performance objectives which are being audited, they are required to assess their own 
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performance against these objectives (Penny 2016; Higgins et al. 2015; Russell and Frame 
2013; Miller and Rose 2008; Rochford 2008). In this sense, individuals and organisations are 
made calculable, and also calculating (Dean 1999; Rose 1991). Their values and actions 
necessarily shift according to the audit’s focus. Thus, while audit is portrayed as a policy 
instrument which enhances accountability and transparency, Power argues that the ‘act’ of 
auditing assumes more symbolic importance in lending legitimacy to the organisation (Power 
2003, 2000, 1996). According to Power (2000, p.117), audit is instead used more 
substantively as a “private discipline of information gathering and control”. In that sense, 
audit shapes society by defining what actions, thoughts and behaviours have value, and 
compelling individuals and organisations to assess their own performance according to these 
values.  
Muniesa, Millo and Callon (2007, p.4) describe mechanisms such as accounting methods and 
benchmarking procedures, economic modelling and pricing techniques as abstractors. For 
Muniesa et al. (2007, p.4), “‘to abstract’ is to transport into a formal, calculative space”. This 
involves decontextualizing objects, as part of the process of making goods calculable (Callon 
and Muniesa 2005). This concept of abstraction is particularly pertinent in relation to the 
deregulation of the wheat export market. On the one hand, I suggest that policy discourses 
have sought to marginalise the social function performed by the AWB, using benchmarking, 
performance objectives and auditing to construct this organisation as having an exclusively 
economic role. Thus, the economic performance of the AWB is separated from its social 
function. In conjunction with this shift, is the detachment of farming from its inherently 
social dimensions, including the attachment of farmers to their occupation, land and identities 
as farmers and, their role in supporting rural communities, economically and socially. 
Whereas quantification and technologies of performance prioritise the economic dimension 
of farming while excluding the social, technologies such as performance objectives, 
benchmarking, auditing and economic modelling enable policy makers to verify the 
superiority of markets. These technologies not only render the wheat export industry as 
calculable, but also enable the construction of markets (Muniesa et al. 2007).   
Thus, I suggest that in the case of the Australian wheat industry, policy makers have 
deployed assemblages of governmental technologies to facilitate the liberalisation of the 
Australian wheat export market. Studies examining policy through the governmentality lens 
have previously argued that the social has been reconfigured, with policy makers devolving 
risk and responsibility to individuals and their communities (Cheshire and Lawrence 2005; 
Tonts and Haslam-McKenzie 2005; Higgins 2002; Stenson and Watt 1999). In the case of 
wheat export marketing policy in Australia, I suggest that rather, the social has been erased 
through technologies of performance which have sought to construct economic performance, 
as measured through wheat prices and supply chain costs, as being the only legitimate 
purpose of this policy area.  
In drawing together sociology of quantification and governmentality research, this article 
helps to make the processes outlined in these theories visible in relation to the restructuring of 
an Australian agricultural industry. Furthermore, this article shows how quantification is used 
in a policy setting to marginalise opposition to neoliberalisation, thus lending greater 
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legitimacy to the technologies of government employed in the process of wheat export 
market deregulation.  
 
Method 
This study examines wheat marketing policy change from 1983 to 2012. This period 
encompasses the publication of the Industry Assistance Commission’s report ‘The Wheat 
Industry’, which is among the first major publications to argue for liberalised wheat markets 
in Australia, through until the second phase of wheat export market deregulation in 2012, 
when the accreditation scheme for wheat exports was abolished by the Commonwealth 
Government. Table 1 captures the significant events occurring in this period. 
 
Year Key event 
1983 Industries Assistance Commission published its inquiry, ‘The Wheat Industry’, advocating 
reduced government assistance for the wheat industry. 
1989 Wheat Marketing Act 1989: Ended the wheat stabilisation plans and the underwriting of wheat 
prices by the Hawke Labour Government. Domestic wheat market is deregulated, allowing 
private companies to trade wheat within Australia.  
1995 National Competition Policy implemented by the Commonwealth Government 
1999 Australian Wheat Board privatised, known henceforth as AWB International (AWBI). 
2000 National Competition Policy Review of the Wheat Export Market published, concluding that 
statutory wheat marketing provided no perceptible benefits to the Australian community.  
2005 ‘Kickbacks scandal’ emerges, implicating AWBI and its senior officials, who are alleged to 
have paid bribes to the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein, contravening the United Nations’ oil-
for-food program. This creates further impetus for wheat export market deregulation.  
2007 Wheat Marketing Amendment Act 2007 introduced by the Howard Liberal/National Coalition 
Government, maintaining the AWB’s single desk for wheat exports.  
2008 The recently elected Rudd Labour Government deregulates wheat export marketing, permitting 
Australian wheat to be traded internationally by private companies, provided they are 
accredited by the newly-created Wheat Export Authority.  
2012 The Wheat Export Authority and wheat export accreditation scheme is abolished by the Gillard 
Labour Government.  
Table 1: Important events and changes to wheat industry policy from 1983 to 2012.  
 
To examine policy change occurring within this period, I analyse policy documents published 
within this time, which share the common purpose of contributing to wheat industry policy. I 
sourced these documents from the State Library of Victoria archive collections and the 
National Library of Australia online collection. The documents are published by government 
authorities (for example, Industries Assistance Commission, Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics), State Governments, the Commonwealth Government, the Australian National 
Audit Office, private consulting firms (ACIL Tasman, Centre for International Economics, 
Allen Consulting) and the Australian Wheat Board. Table 2 contains a full list of documents 
analysed in this research.  
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Stages of 
Deregulation Author Title (Date) 
 
Industries Assistance 
Commission  
The Wheat Industry (1983, 1988), Measuring the cost of 
government regulations (1989)  
Stage 1: Creating 
objectives and 
auditing the AWB 
Australian National Audit 
Office 
Reports on the audit of the Australian Wheat Board 
(1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994) 
 Australian Wheat Board  Response to Industries Assistance Commission draft 
report of the wheat industry (1987) 
 Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics 
Wheat Marketing Assistance (1987) 
 
 
Hilmer, Rayner and 
Taperell  
National Competition Policy Review (1993) 
 Irving, Arney and Linder  National Competition Policy review of the Wheat 
Marketing Act 1989 (2000) 
Stage 2: Cost-benefit 
analyses, erasing the 
social, econometric 
modelling 
Allen Consulting The Wheat Marketing Act 1989: The economic impact of 
competitive restrictions (2000a); The Wheat Marketing 
Act 1989: The social impact of competitive restrictions 
(2000b) 
 Productivity Commission  Submission to the National Competition Policy Review 
of the Wheat Marketing Act 1989 (2000a); Single desk 
marketing: Assessing the economic arguments (2000b); 
Wheat export marketing arrangements (2010), Review of 
the National Competition Policy Reforms (2005) 
 Senate Select Committee  Riding the waves of change: A report of the Senate 
Select Committee on the socio-economic consequences 
of the National Competition Policy (2000) 
 ACIL Tasman A review of the NCP grain market reforms: NCC 
occasional series (2004) 
Table 2: Policy documents analysed in this research.  
 
I have separated these documents into two stages of deregulation, as each of these collections 
perform a different purpose in facilitating wheat export market policy change. The documents 
included in Stage 1 are published in a context where concepts such as competition, efficiency 
and liberalised markets are emerging in Australian policy discourses. I analyse how these 
documents establish a framework for quantifying and governing the AWB’s performance. In 
particular, these documents are important in constructing wheat prices and supply chain costs 
as the only legitimate indicators of the AWB’s performance, while discrediting alternate 
policy objectives which had underpinned the AWB’s existence since 1939, such as the re-
distribution of returns among growers. In Stage 2, commencing with the National 
Competition Policy Review (Hilmer et al. 1993), I analyse how these documents use the 
framework established in Stage 1, to develop the argument for deregulation of the wheat 
export market. Cost-benefit analyses is central to this, with Irving et al. (2000), Allen 
Consulting (2000a), Productivity Commission (2000a), Centre for International Economics 
(Joint Industry Submission Group 2000) and ACIL Tasman (2004) each attempting to 
quantify the value of regulation, in terms of its costs and benefits, through generating 
quantifiable data pertaining to wheat prices and supply chain and marketing costs.  
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Stage 1: Performance objectives and Audit 
Creating Performance Objectives 
In the early 1980s, policy makers’ problematisations of government intervention into markets 
and industries gained mainstream appeal. This shift was underpinned by the rationality of 
markets as efficient, powerful mechanisms for improving economic performance. The 
AWB’s existence prevented this rationality from being extended to the Australian wheat 
industry. Thus, I suggest, policy makers commenced a project of wheat market deregulation 
by making the wheat industry amenable to this rationality. First, policy makers identified the 
need to measure the AWB and its performance. This entailed creating objectives which could 
be measurable through quantitative data. This had the effect of narrowing the AWB’s focus 
towards these objectives. Technologies of audit then provided a supposedly impartial 
technology for measuring the AWB’s performance according to this data. 
Policy makers’ suspicions regarding the inefficiencies of organisations such as the Australian 
Wheat Board led to increased use of technologies designed to monitor and govern 
performance. The challenge for organisations such as the IAC, was that although their clear 
preference was for the liberalisation of markets, there were no mechanisms for creating a 
compelling case for the removal of statutory marketing. This is evident in the IAC’s 1983 
inquiry into the wheat industry, which laments policy makers’ inability to measure and 
interpret the AWB’s performance. The IAC (1983, p.ii) argued that as the AWB was a 
statutory marketing authority and not subject to competition in either the domestic or export 
wheat markets, the AWB’s performance was difficult to measure. According to the IAC 
(1983, p.ii), “it is difficult to assess whether unnecessary costs are created by its involvement 
in activities which are not essential for it to market wheat efficiently” (IAC 1983, p.ii). 
Immediately, this narrows the AWB’s value to its capacity to “market wheat efficiently”. 
From this point, the IAC then raise the need to assess the performance of the AWB, stating 
(IAC 1983, p.59): 
The nature of the environment in which such authorities operate also provides few 
benchmarks for either the authority or those outside the authority to determine whether 
unnecessary costs are incurred.  
 
For policy makers (Bureau of Agricultural Economics 1987; IAC 1983; Victorian 
Government 1983), this problem is compounded by the absence of any performance 
objectives for the AWB. Subsequently, the IAC recommend that the AWB’s primary 
objective should be to “maximise returns to growers from the sale of wheat without taxing 
domestic consumers” (IAC 1983, p.59). This objective draws the AWB’s focus towards 
maximising returns and incorporates the interests of consumers, as though consumers are as 
invested in wheat marketing as farmers. In addition, the AWB is compelled to understand and 
measure its value in these terms. This is significant in shaping ‘what matters’ in relation to 
wheat marketing policy. In subsequent debates around wheat marketing policy, the AWB 
argued that its capacity to maximise returns was what justified its ongoing monopoly over 
wheat exports (AWB 1987). This legitimised policy makers’ narrowing of the AWB’s role, 
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and the reduction of this issue to the question of which market structure is best able to 
maximise growers’ returns. In a context where mainstream policy discourses presupposed 
that liberalised markets were best able to achieve this aim, the longevity of the AWB as a 
statutory marketer was already imperilled.  
 
Auditing the AWB 
The IAC (1983) recommended auditing to measure the AWB’s performance against the 
objective of maximising growers’ returns. This was portrayed as necessary in assisting proper 
assessment and accountability of the AWB. As mentioned by the IAC (1983, p.60): 
Growers and the community are not given much opportunity to examine the affairs of the 
AWB. The Annual Reports and newsletters of the AWB provide little information for 
growers or others to assess the commercial performance of AWB. Statements were made at 
the public hearings propounding benefits to growers…yet there were no data presented to 
substantiate these assertions.  
 
This statement is interesting for a number of reasons. First, auditing is portrayed as being in 
the growers’ interests. Yet, there is no indication that growers were concerned with the 
apparent lack of transparency, or felt that auditing should be used to monitor the AWB. To 
address this shortcoming in relation to accountability and data, the IAC (1983, p.60) 
recommend that the AWB “publish separate accounts for sales on the domestic and export 
markets, including separation of identifiable and joint costs”, thereby allowing Members of 
Parliament to audit its performance. Using the technology of audit in this manner is intended 
to create a quantitative knowledge base, which can be used to assess the AWB’s performance 
measures such as price premiums and supply chain costs. Second, there is no indication of 
what constitutes good performance, or why performance against these indicators is preferable 
to measuring the value that growers’ ascribe to the AWB, for example. The “commercial 
performance of AWB” is assumed to be the measure of ‘what matters’, which all parties can 
agree upon, yet this subtly marginalises the AWB’s worth to growers. Wheat marketing and 
its broader role in Australian agriculture is simplified, reducing the significance of other 
factors previously central to wheat marketing policy, such as equity and the security of 
farmers and farming communities.  
The subsequent auditing of the AWB was framed in terms of enhanced transparency and 
accountability. Yet, reports of these audits contain no significant information that would 
allow farmers to interpret the AWB’s performance. These documents state only that audits 
were completed, without providing details on the findings of these audits (Australian 
National Audit Office 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994). This suggests that rather than 
genuinely enhancing transparency and accountability, auditing the AWB provided the State 
with a technology to guide its performance to focus on maximising efficiency. Therefore, 
while quantification makes the AWB and its performance calculable, the construction of 
objectives and the use of audits make the AWB governable.  
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Stage 2: Determining the costs and benefits of regulation 
National Competition Policy: Quantifying costs and benefits  
In 1993, the Keating Government initiated the National Competition Policy Review to create 
a national framework for developing “an open, integrated domestic market for goods and 
services by removing unnecessary barriers to trade and competition” (Hilmer et al. 1993, 
p.361). As argued by Hilmer et al. (1993, p.1): 
If Australia is to prosper as a nation, and maintain and improve living standards and 
opportunities for its people, it has no choice but to improve the productivity and international 
competitiveness of its firms and institutions. Australian organisations, irrespective of their 
size, location or ownership, must become more efficient, more innovative and more flexible. 
 
Hilmer et al. (1993) identified market regulation as a key barrier to competition and 
efficiency. Using Hilmer et al.’s framework, the Keating Government subsequently 
implemented the National Competition Policy (NCP) in 1995. As explained by the 
Productivity Commission (2005, p.iv), “A key principle of NCP is that arrangements 
detracting from competition should be retained only if they can be shown to be in the public 
interest”. This compelled government to rescind policy such as statutory wheat marketing, 
which restricted market access, unless proponents of these policies could demonstrate that 
such regulation was in the public interest and, provided benefits which could not be derived 
from liberalised markets. Analyses of policy within this framework therefore assumed that 
competition would confer benefits to society, and that in most cases, regulation restricting 
competition was detrimental to the broader interests of society (Productivity Commission 
2005, 2000a; Irving et al. 2000). Subsequently, assessments of the value of regulation were 
reduced primarily to the economic costs and benefits that it generated (Productivity 
Commission 2005, 2000a, 2000b; Irving et al. 2000; Allen Consulting 2000a).  
This leads to the National Competition Policy review of the Wheat Marketing Act. 
Announcing this review, Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Warren Truss, 
asked the Independent Committee, chaired by Malcolm Irving, to “analyse and quantify the 
benefits, costs and overall effects on businesses involved in the Australian wheat industry 
and/or the community generally” (Irving et al. 2000, p.viii). According to Irving et al. (2000, 
p.118):  
In the Committee’s view, the question of the size of the single desk price premium is pivotal, 
since much of the argument for the single seller system providing a benefit appears to depend 
on the idea that the system provides significant additional export returns to growers over and 
above what would be provided by a multiple seller system [emphasis added]. 
 
Yet, as this paper demonstrates, the AWB’s objective to maximise grower returns was 
implemented at the IAC’s recommendation.  
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This emphasis on wheat price premiums and supply chain costs is pivotal. Yet it is also made 
possible through the subtle use of apparently humble and mundane technologies such as 
policy objectives, audit and cost-benefit analysis. This policy shift towards focusing on 
growers returns is made to appear self-evident, as common sense. Policy makers imply that it 
makes sense for a wheat marketing authority to focus wholly on maximising wheat prices. 
Auditing the AWB’s performance against this objective is portrayed as the obvious actions of 
a responsible government, as is using cost-benefit analysis to determine if regulation 
outperforms market liberalisation. Yet, each of these technologies are dependent upon the 
construction of value as being that which can be produced and communicated through 
markets, liberalised or otherwise. This is a subtle shift in power away from the AWB, 
statutory marketing and farmers, to the extent that the eventual deregulation of the wheat 
board is constructed as a common-sense decision.  
 
Econometric modelling: Creating acceptable knowledge  
Policy discourses portray quantitative information as an unambiguous and undistorted 
representation of reality. Furthermore, policy discourses claim that quantifying a policy’s 
consequences, or predicted consequences, is to exercise responsible policy making. This 
emphasises the claimed impartiality of numbers, minimising the scope for political judgment 
to unduly influence decision making. Thus, quantification helps depoliticise policy making 
and legitimises the engineering of society to meet general economic goals such as economic 
growth and the retraction of government expenditure.  
Numerous studies, completed by consulting firms Booz, Allen and Hamilton (1995), Allen 
Consulting (2000a) and the Centre for International Economics (Joint Industry Submission 
Group 2000), have each used economic modelling to quantify the impact of regulation upon 
the wheat industry and the broader Australian society. These studies produce clear, 
communicable estimations of the costs (or benefits, depending on who commissioned the 
research) of wheat export market deregulation. In their assessment of statutory wheat 
marketing, Irving et al. (2000) commissioned Allen Consulting to quantify the projected costs 
and benefits of wheat export market deregulation. In ‘The Economic Impact of Competitive 
Restrictions’, Allen Consulting used econometric modelling to project the economic 
outcomes of deregulation, which it predicted would result in savings of between AUD$223 
million and minus AUD$71 million. These findings were used frequently in Australian policy 
discourses to claim deregulation of the wheat export market would benefit the Australian 
wheat industry (Commonwealth of Australia 2008a, 2008b; Productivity Commission 2005, 
Australian Grain Exporters Association 2004). However, these findings are reported 
selectively, with only the positive deregulation scenarios mentioned in these documents.  
In this instance, econometric modelling is portrayed as a neutral, unbiased mechanism for 
generating the evidence needed to understand wheat export market regulation costs. This 
information is inserted into the political discourse around this issue as a factual representation 
of reality, despite the limitations and assumptions of this modelling. Thus, in this instance, 
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econometric modelling conducted by a consultancy firm has found wheat export market 
deregulation could cost as much as $223 million. Policy makers have selectively used this 
finding to argue that abolishing this regulation will reap up to $223 million in savings for the 
Australian community. First, this argument marginalises the importance and value of that 
regulation for wheat growers. Second, this helps reduce this policy issue to a simple, 
unbiased policy making decision, based on costs and benefits to the Australian economy. 
This construction is used to demonstrate the superiority of markets, thus making the 
construction of a market for Australian wheat exports appear logical, rational and necessary.  
 
Erasing the social  
As I argue in this paper, quantification enables policy makers to construct acceptable 
knowledge, to shape a simplified conception of reality. The legitimacy of this reality is 
dependent upon the erasure of the social world, in policy terms.  
The complexity of the social world interferes with policy makers’ reductionist approach to 
agriculture in particular, where key policy questions are focused on how to best maximise the 
productive use of resources. The answer to this question, as constructed by policy discourses, 
is that this is best achieved through liberalised markets which promote allocative efficiency. 
This approach requires a distancing of policy makers from society. Quantification is central 
to creating distance, allowing the State to view society as an economy, comprising of distant 
and distorted, movable and replaceable parts. In turn, quantification enables policy questions 
to be reduced to equations which can be solved through the manipulation of numbers which 
are distant of the world they are claimed to represent. Dismissing competing discourses, and 
marginalising the value of qualitative reflections on lived experiences and observations, is 
central to this task. This article now analyses the discursive techniques used by wheat 
marketing policy reviews (Productivity Commission 2010; Irving et al. 2000) to erase the 
value of the social world. 
 
“Evidence” and evidence 
Studies such as the Irving et al. (2000) inquiry into wheat export marketing policy sought 
submissions from industry participants, including growers. Irving et al. (2000) treat these 
submissions differently, depending on the participants’ attitudes towards wheat export market 
deregulation. Despite it being “obvious that AWB Limited has very strong support from a 
majority of Australian wheat growers”, Irving et al. afford greater import to growers’ 
arguments criticising statutory wheat marketing (Irving et al. 2000, pp.64-67). Irving et al. 
(2000, p.64) summarise the perceived “benefits” of regulation using plain and passive 
language, presented as unsubstantiated, abstract claims: 
Price premiums are obtained from ‘single desk’ selling, which add to average export returns.  
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Following this, the perceived “disadvantages” of statutory marketing, according to growers, 
are written as arguments supported by critical appraisal of available evidence (Irving et al. 
2000, p.65): 
At best there is weak evidence the existence of significant price premiums over and above 
those attributable to quality and freight, [and] 
The evidence that the ‘single desk’ delivers cost minimisation in storage and handling is 
problematic.  
 
Irving et al.’s (2000, p.65-67) presentation of growers’ perceived disadvantages statutory 
wheat marketing appears to be used to counter the benefits of regulation, as claimed by the 
“majority” of growers. Portrayed as an independent study, this demonstrates Irving et al.’s 
subtle marginalisation of growers’ support for the AWB. This is further underlined in Irving 
et al.’s (2000, p.6) conclusion that they were presented with no “clear, credible or 
unambiguous evidence” of the benefits of statutory marketing. Thus, the inquiry considered 
submissions from the “overwhelming” proportion of wheat growers supporting statutory 
marketing as lacking sufficient clarity and credibility to influence their conclusions (Irving et 
al. 2000, p.82). 
Similarly, ACIL Tasman (2004, p.20) examined the impact of grain market deregulation, in 
relation to the deregulated barley and canola markets. In outlining its methodology, ACIL 
Tasman argue: 
Canvassing views from growers was not deemed necessary. As well as being time consuming 
and expensive, grain selling patterns and utilisation of new products provides sufficient 
indication of grower reactions and attitudes. 
 
This reduces growers’ capacity to communicate information to their decision making in 
markets. Thus, markets are constructed as the only reliable indicator of growers’ preferences, 
values and opinions. This construction dehumanises growers, by narrowing all that is 
significant about their experience of grain market deregulation to their market transactions. 
This asserts the primacy of markets as a communicator of credible information, while further 
diminishing the value of the social world.  
 
Difficult to Document 
Policy discourses around wheat industry deregulation construct qualitative data, particularly 
that received from growers, as “difficult to document” (ACIL Tasman 2004, p.20; Allen 
Consulting 2000a, p.22). Data pertaining to the social world is eschewed in favour of the 
“concrete evidence” (Chang, Martel and Berry 2003, p.16) provided by quantifiable data that, 
in this case, monopolises the term ‘evidence’.   
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In assessing the impacts of deregulation of grain markets, ACIL Tasman consulted industry 
and rural media to identify concerns arising from this shift. This included largely economic 
matters. Additional concerns mentioned “were the social and environmental effects”, which 
ACIL Tasman claim were mostly cited by those who opposed deregulation (ACIL Tasman 
2004, p.20). ACIL Tasman adopt two strategies in deflecting these concerns. First, the report 
tacitly claims that those raising the social and environmental effects of deregulation held a 
pre-existing bias, without considering that participants may have formed their view of 
deregulation based on their observations of negative social and environmental consequences 
of this shift. Second, ACIL Tasman (2004, pp.20-21) dismiss the credibility of these concerns 
by claiming that they are “not very well articulated”, “difficult to document” and therefore 
unsupported by evidence. This delegitimises these concerns as potential consequences of 
deregulation, as their articulation did not fit the ACIL Tasman’s methodological framework.  
Similarly, Allen Consulting (2000b, p.22), in its examination of the ‘The Social Impacts of 
Competitive Restrictions’ in the wheat export market cite a report by the Senate Select 
Committee (2000) into the Socio-economic Consequences of the National Competition 
Policy. According to Allen Consulting (2000b, p.22): 
A recent Senate Committee found that as a result of the application of NCP, “There is 
anecdotal evidence of a loss of social cohesion, amenity and human capital in small rural and 
remote communities” [Senate Select Committee 2000]. The Allen Consulting Group 
considers this conclusion difficult to justify given the limitations in assessing the broader 
impacts associated with removal of the single desk and the difficulties in determining the 
extent to which changes would reinforce existing structural change (ie, and possibly have 
only a marginal impact) or create new forces of change. 
 
Rather than engaging with this report, or the rich academic literature which draws similar 
conclusions (Alston 2004; Vanclay 2003; Gray and Lawrence 2001; Pritchard 2000), Allen 
Consulting dismiss this research, contending that social impacts specifically arising from 
wheat export deregulation are too difficult to measure. This raises the question: if the 
negative social consequences of deregulation cannot be measured, do they exist? Rather than 
considering the broader social consequences of economic restructuring, Allen Consulting 
(2000b) focus their assessment of ‘social impacts’ upon economic impacts, such as changing 
wheat price premiums. This is a clear example of policy making narrowing the complexity of 
an issue, through the desire to create simple, easy-to-generate, quantifiable data. Resultantly, 
this undermines the potential social and environmental consequences of deregulation as 
legitimate concerns in the policy making process.   
 
Individualising the social consequences of deregulation 
Following the deregulation of the wheat export market in 2008, the Productivity Commission 
published an assessment of these reforms in 2010. This report is striking in its incapacity to 
absorb wheat growers’ negative experiences of deregulation. As an example, the following 
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comment attributed to a submission from the ‘Pike Family Trust’ identifies the additional 
responsibilities of grain marketing as a significant social impact of deregulation: 
Although this ‘brave new world’ is welcomed by some it puts pressure on our business and 
families as there is not enough time to attend to all that one must, is required to and would 
like to within the farm let alone a life ‘after hours’. (Pike Family Trust, sub. 18, p. 1). 
 
Rather than identifying the important issues of increased workload, reduce leisure time and 
increased pressures of families, the Productivity Commission (2010, p.86) argue that wheat 
export market deregulation is necessary and that growers’ will adapt: 
Australian farmers, particularly grain growers, are resilient and resourceful and have a proven 
track record of adjusting to international market developments and domestic cost pressures 
(so-called declining terms of trade) by improving their productivity. This can mean short-term 
pain for some, but will deliver long-term gains in the form of a competitive and efficient 
wheat export industry.  
 
Effectively, the supposed “short-term pain” of growers is constructed as less significant than 
the creation of a competitive wheat industry. Similarly, in predicting the social impacts of 
deregulation, Allen Consulting state (2000b, p.47):  
It is clear that removal of the single desk will benefit some producers and disadvantage 
others. Those who are efficient and are able to manage risks (ie, financial risks, make 
appropriate choices as to how to market, chose appropriate wheat types, etc) will be the likely 
winners. It is likely that those producers who are unable to appropriately manage risks will 
exit the industry and there will be a round of farm consolidations [Emphasis added]. 
 
In other words, the negative social consequences of deregulation, such as increased pressure 
on farm families, reduced leisure time and in the worst cases, farmers exiting the industry, are 
portrayed as the problems of individual farmers rather than the structural change itself. 
Furthermore, these consequences of structural change are intentionally referred to in detached 
and distant language. The terms “short-term pain” and “a round of farm consolidations” do 
not convey the full extent of these outcomes. For farmers, exiting the industry creates a deep 
sense of loss, as farmers lose their connection to the land, their occupation, social networks 
and status as farmers (Kuehne 2012). Policy discourses purporting to examine the social 
consequences of deregulation mask these negative consequences, which are framed as 
unfortunate, though necessary, externalities.  
In relation to the example of wheat export market deregulation, I argue that policy discourses 
have used quantification in conjunction with assemblages of technologies of performance, to 
construct quantifiable data, such as wheat prices and supply chain costs, as legitimate 
knowledge. Conversely, qualitative data such as farmers’ observations and experiences are 
delegitimised, greatly undermining the capacity of farmers to contribute to debates around 
wheat export market deregulation. In addition, the negative social consequences of 
deregulation are either portrayed abstractedly, or as illegitimate concerns which pale in 
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significance in relation to the ‘national interest’. In this regard, the social world, in contrast to 
the economic, is marginalised through policy discourses which frame the social as a barrier to 
economic reform.  
 
Conclusion 
This article analyses the process of Australian wheat export market deregulation, by focusing 
on policy makers’ attempts to define, measure and assess the value of the Australian Wheat 
Board as a statutory marketing authority. Policy makers sought to address the issue of wheat 
industry regulation, by using quantification to reduce this complex industry to simplistic and 
narrow measures such as wheat prices and supply chain costs. These measures are 
constructed as legitimate knowledge and used to determine Australian wheat export market 
policy. This portrayed the Australian wheat industry in simplistic terms and in isolation from 
the impact of structural change upon farmers and their rural communities. Equity was 
constructed as a peripheral issue, and subjective information such as experiences and 
perspectives as untrustworthy data, with assessments of the wheat industry instead favouring 
knowledge produced by statistical methods such as econometric modelling. 
This shift was designed to shape the Australian wheat industry by establishing performance 
objectives which could be quantitatively measured. This compelled the AWB to focus on its 
objective of maximising growers’ returns. Any activity not specifically focused on this 
objective was framed as evidence of inefficiency. This created a substantial problem for the 
AWB, which was essentially established to equalise returns among growers, while relieving 
growers of the burdens of risk, workload and associated stress. Yet through narrowing the 
AWB’s purpose to focus on maximising returns from wheat sales, policy makers constructed 
these roles as having little value, and as being oppositional to the more important goal of 
maximising industry efficiency. 
Subsequently, inquiries performed by the National Competition Policy Review panel (Irving 
et al. 2000), the Productivity Commission (2010, 2000a), and consultancy firms (ACIL 
Tasman 2004; Allen Consulting 2000a, 2000b), focused on addressing the question of 
whether wheat export market regulation delivered net gains to farm businesses and the 
broader community. This research specifically focused on whether the AWB, or firms 
competing in a deregulated market, would be able to deliver premium prices to growers, 
while minimising supply chain costs. These studies are portrayed as disinterested 
investigations, designed to establish the costs and benefits of wheat export market regulation. 
However, this research marginalises growers’ attempts to participate, through portraying 
submissions based on experiences and observations gleaned through working in the industry 
as unreliable, biased and not supported by ‘evidence’. Conversely, this research considers 
statistical data, particularly generated through economic modelling, as credible, neutral and 
disinterested representations of reality. In this regard, policy makers’ use of quantification 
and technologies of government depoliticises the decision to deregulate the Australian wheat 
export market. This is instead portrayed as the actions of a responsible government, based on 
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an unbiased representation of reality. Thus, the project of wheat export market liberalisation 
is legitimised as a prudent policy change, rather than a processual shift driven by ideology.  
Importantly, this shift also subtly transfers importance from ‘value’ to ‘performance’. The 
performance of statutory wheat marketing supplants the value that wheat growers ascribe to 
this regulation. Research such as that conducted by Irving et al. (2000) and the Productivity 
Commission (2010, 2000a) focuses on measuring performance: of the economy, the industry 
and of the AWB. These objects, such as the economy and the wheat market, are constructed 
as real, performing entities. On the other hand, the social world is erased. The relationships 
between farmers, their families, family histories, land and communities are overlooked, and 
considered as ancillary concerns which simply distract attention from the central purpose of 
wheat marketing policy, which is to maximise industry efficiency.  
The detachment of the economic performance of the AWB and the wheat industry from its 
social context in particular, is made possible through technologies of performance such as 
audit, performance objectives, cost benefit analysis and econometric modelling. These 
technologies delegitimise the social as having any significance in relation to wheat marketing 
policy. In this process, farming is constructed as having value exclusively in its capacity to 
convert resources into commodities. Conversely, the social consequences of deregulation and 
structural adjustment, such as farmer exits and declining rural communities, are portrayed as 
the necessary, though unfortunate consequences of such policy shifts, which, policy 
discourses claim, are in the national interest.  In this process, the social world is 
conceptualised as a barrier to the economic performance of the industry and the enhanced 
contribution of the wheat industry to the national economy. Through assemblages of 
governmental technologies, policy discourses minimise this barrier by delegitimising the 
importance of the social world in industry policy. This leads to the potential for further 
research examining the experiences of wheat farmers and their communities, following this 
policy shift. Whereas this article argues that the social world has been delegitimised through 
this process of policy change, qualitative research through interviews with actors subjected to 
this process could enhance our understanding of the implications of deregulation.  
Quantification enables this process to occur, by constructing a reality which reflects a 
simplistic, reductionist wheat industry. Technologies such as audit and assessment are 
applied by policy makers to act upon this constructed reality. My use of sociology of 
quantification and governmentality shows how this process was made possible, and how 
alternate discourses were marginalised in favour of rationale of markets, efficiency and 
competition.   
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Contribution of article to thesis 
Policy makers claimed that wheat export market deregulation would provide growers with 
market power, in an environment where numerous firms would be competing for their wheat. 
As I showed in Chapter 5, this environment has not eventuated, as markets are consolidated. 
To a large extent, this consolidation has been exacerbated through the supply chain 
management strategies of firms, such as mergers and acquisitions, which have removed 
smaller participants from the market. In this article, I explore firms’ use of these strategies as 
a means of developing market power and protecting market share. In addition, I analyse 
firms’ use of corporate political action as a strategy of influencing policy making and 
reducing the risks associated with regulation restricting their capacity to expand into new 
geographical areas and markets.  
In Chapters 5, 6 and 7, in particular, I analyse the construction of a reality of markets, firms 
and consumers, which I suggest is underpinned by the assumption that firms lack power in 
markets. This article shows this assumption to be incorrect.  
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Supply chain management strategies of agricultural corporations: A resource 
dependency approach 
 
Abstract  
The Australian federal government introduced deregulation of the wheat export market in 
2008, as a means of creating a competitive wheat industry. However, this initiative did not 
sufficiently consider the potential for agricultural corporations to proactively seek to shape 
their environment. Utilising resource dependency theory, this article analyses the strategies 
employed by agricultural corporations, such as acquisitions, integration and geographic 
expansion, to develop control of supply chains and markets, and mitigate risks associated 
with resource supply and competition. Despite leading to concentration of markets and 
consolidation within supply chains, agribusiness corporations manipulate discourse around 
food to promote these strategies as necessary to enhance global food security. Furthermore, 
this article analyses the use of political lobbying by agricultural corporations to create a 
regulatory environment which enables integration and expansion. This article enables 
resource dependency theory to be more directly observable, through analysing tangible 
examples of these associated practices, implemented by agricultural corporations. In addition, 
this article contends that through heightening our awareness of how firms respond to 
deregulation, resource dependency theory provides the tools to reflect critically on the aims 
and methods of government deregulation initiatives.  
 
Introduction 
The global agribusiness firms known as the ABCD companies, Archer Daniels Midland 
(ADM), Bunge Limited (Bunge), Cargill and Louis Dreyfus, employ vertically integrated 
supply chain management strategies, with each of these firms employing tens of thousands of 
workers globally, across numerous geographically diverse regions (Murphy, Burch and 
Clapp, 2012; Cargill, 2015a; ADM, 2016b; Louis Dreyfus, 2011; Bunge, 2016). The ABCD 
companies describe their activities as being focused on improving food security, which they 
contend is achieved through their capacity to develop integrated supply chains, established 
through investment strategies including mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures (Louis 
Dreyfus, 2011; MacLennan, 2014, ADM, 2016c, Bunge, 2015a). While these strategies are 
often framed as necessary to mitigate risk, the result of this approach is consolidation within 
agricultural industries such as wheat (Clapp, 2015a, 2015b; Murphy et al., 2012; Ahmed, 
Hamrick and Gereffi, 2014; ADM, 2013). However, this is incongruent with government 
approaches to developing competitive industries and markets, through implementing 
programs of deregulation. This article explores strategies such as integration and 
consolidation, ostensibly implemented by the ABCD companies as a means of reducing risk, 
to understand how this may impact the objective of the Australian federal government to 
develop competition within the wheat export market.  
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In analysing perceptions of, and subsequent strategies designed to mitigate, risk and 
uncertainty by the ABCD companies, this article employs resource dependency theory as a 
lens through which to understand this activity. Developed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), 
resource dependency theory contends that firms will seek to develop their resources, through 
strategies such as mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures, to sustain competitive advantage 
on the one hand, and reduce uncertainty, on the other (Crook and Coombs, 2007; Bretherton 
and Chaston, 2005; Connelly et al., 2013). Though this theory is particularly well suited to 
analysing the use of integration by agribusiness, this framework has rarely been applied 
within an agricultural context. Furthermore, while studies have sought to explore changes in 
wheat prices following deregulation of the Australian wheat export market (Curwen et al., 
2016; Williams, 2012), and the impacts of deregulation upon wheat farmers (O’Keeffe, 
2014b; Head et al., 2011), the actions of companies within this recently deregulated market 
are yet to be explored.  
To understand why these strategies of integration are employed by the ABCD companies, this 
article analyses annual reports, media releases, statements to investors, speeches and 
comments attributed to company spokespeople in news articles. In particular, statements from 
these sources relating to the ambitions of the company, merger and acquisition activity, risk 
and uncertainty, geographical diversification, or which contribute to discourse around trade 
and food security have been included in this analysis. Understanding the employment of 
organisational strategies by the ABCD companies, through analysing discourse, builds upon 
the work of Murphy et al. (2012) and Clapp (2015a), who argue that these companies seek to 
shape discourse around food policy. Furthermore, this article focuses upon the ABCD 
companies due to their position as the dominant global agribusiness companies, controlling 
over 70 per cent of the global grain trade (Murphy et al., 2012; Clapp, 2015a).  
This article commences with an outline of resource dependency theory, focusing on how this 
theory understands firm behaviour with regard to resources, relationships and risk, before 
exploring how this theory perceives political action by firms. Following this, the deregulation 
of the Australian wheat industry is examined. This article then focuses on the strategies that 
are employed by the ABCD companies to develop resources, reduce risk and influence policy 
development. Following this, implications for the deregulated Australian wheat export market 
are considered. This article will argue that while strategies of integration and expansion are 
framed by the ABCD companies as risk-reducing, risk is managed through approaches which 
provide the company with control of grain networks and markets. As these strategies are 
dependent upon government regulations which allow companies to freely implement these 
strategies, the companies seek to mitigate the risks posed by policy shifts by exerting 
influence over policy development. This article contends that while governments may intend 
to create competition by deregulating agricultural industries, such policy may not achieve this 
objective without sufficient consideration of how firms may respond in deregulated 
environments.   
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Resource Dependency Theory 
Resource dependency theory provides an important framework for understanding the power 
of organisations, and how these organisations interact with their environment (Davis and 
Cobb, 2010; Wry, Cobb and Aldrich, 2013). This develops upon Emerson’s theory of power-
dependent relations (1962), which contends that the more dependent firm 1 is upon firm 2, 
the more power firm 2 has over firm 1. In addition, the work of Blau (1964), in analysing the 
instability of these relationships was particularly influential. According to resource 
dependency theory, the survival of firms is directly related to their capacity to reduce 
uncertainty of resource supply, particularly through reducing their dependencies upon other 
firms (Bretherton and Chaston, 2005; Hessels and Terjessen, 2010; Cascario and Piskorksi, 
2005; Drees and Huegens, 2013). Resources could be defined as physical, financial, political 
or informational (Wry, Cobb and Aldrich, 2013). With regard to agribusiness, resources 
could include the raw commodity; physical assets such as grain elevators, ports or transport; 
financial resources necessary to make acquisitions; or the political resources that may assist 
the firm in influencing policy development. Studies employing resource dependency theory 
therefore seek to understand how firms use existing resources, what motivates firms to 
develop new resources, and how resource dependent relationships with other firms are 
managed (Bretherton and Chaston, 2005; Mottner and Smith, 2009; Paulraj and Chen, 2007; 
Hofer, 2012; Elg, 2000). In developing their resource base, resource dependency theory 
contends that firms will proactively seek to influence their environment (Drees and Huegens, 
2013; Gulbrandsen et al., 2009). This underscores the differences in approach to other 
organisational theories such as population ecology, which contends that firms adapt to, rather 
than change, their environments (Nienhuser, 2008; Davis and Cobb, 2010). This relates to the 
mitigation of risks and uncertainties arising from the environment of the firm, which will now 
be explored.  
 
Risk and Uncertainty 
Resource dependency theory posits that firms will seek to reduce the uncertainties existing 
within their environment.  Uncertainty is described by Pfeffer and Salancik (2003, p.67) as 
being the “degree to which future states of the world cannot be anticipated and accurately 
predicted”. From within this framework, the external environment, that which is beyond the 
immediate and direct control of the firm, will be the greatest source of uncertainty for a firm 
(Nienhuser, 2008). The exposure of a firm to uncertainty and risk can be caused by 
relationships with other firms, competition from rival firms and the dependency of a firm 
upon another for access to key resources (Mottner and Smith, 2009; Finkelstein, 1997; Carter 
and Rogers, 2008). Uncertainty may be caused by an unstable, or unfavourable, political 
environment (Hillman et al., 2009). These uncertainties may centre on access to necessary 
resources, the potential actions of competitors, government policies and regulations, and 
further environmental changes that were not anticipated by the firm (Nienhuser, 2008, Chen, 
Chen and Ku, 2012; Malatesta and Smith, 2014). Studies which have sought to understand 
mergers and acquisitions implemented by firms have found that the prevalence of these 
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strategies is increased when uncertainty is present within the operating environment 
(Nienhuser, 2008; Drees and Huegens, 2013; Pfeffer, 1972; Paulraj and Chen, 2007).  
Less attention has been focused upon the uncertainties resulting from competition, and the 
strategies that may be employed by firms to reduce exposure to these uncertainties (Sheppard, 
1995). In addition, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) contend that the uncertainties arising from 
competition can be mitigated through horizontal integration. In this sense, a firm may engage 
in mergers or acquisitions to reduce competition within a segment of a supply chain. This 
may result in the reduction in the number of competitors present within the market, and 
therefore increase the market share, and market power, of the firm. Associated with this, is 
the reduced risk that the firm may be subject to price competition. Furthermore, these 
strategies may be employed as a defensive strategy, aimed at reducing the potential for 
external firms to enter a market through acquisitions.   
Uncertainty is a broadly defined term in resource dependency theory. However, if uncertainty 
is created by the external environment of the firm, and it is governments that regulate that 
environment, then in many ways uncertainties can be related to policy governing firm 
behaviour. For example, government policy could potentially limit the use of strategies such 
as vertical integration, or limit the growth of a firm within a market by restricting horizontal 
integration. Therefore it is now important to focus on the development of political resources 
by firms.  
 
Corporate Political Action  
Resource dependency theory helps us to understand how the firm may seek to alter their 
environment to create a more favourable business climate (Wry, Cobb and Aldrich, 2013; 
Johnson, 1995; Nienhuser, 2008; Davis and Cobb, 2010; Getz, 1997; Bouwen, 2002). The 
environment can be considered to include external firms, though also encapsulates the 
regulations and policies established by governments, which can restrict or protect behaviours 
that a firm may engage in (Hillman et al., 2009). Hillman et al. (2009) contend that an 
important chapter from ‘External Control’ is frequently overlooked; specifically chapter “The 
Created Environment: Controlling Interdependence Through Law and Social Sanction’”. 
Wry, Cobb and Aldrich summarise the implications of this neglected chapter well (2013, 
p.449): 
Pfeffer and Salancik’s idea was straightforward: if firms are unable to reduce uncertainty and 
dependence, they will seek to create a new, more favourable environment by establishing, 
altering, or dismantling government regulations.  
 
This is particularly relevant, the previous section has suggested, because competition and 
government regulation may be conceptualised by firms as a source of uncertainty. This can 
also lead to coalitions of firms developing, who may have shared ambitions with regard to 
how government policy is influenced (Henry, 2011). Henry (2011, p.379) states that these 
coalitions “are held together by power seeking relationships that better enable individual 
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network actors to affect policy change”. Henry (2011, p.379) refers to the development of 
relationships between firms, termed “advocacy coalitions”, which are based upon shared 
policy ideas, and the contention that these firms should seek to influence policy.  
The development of political resources by firms as a means of creating a more favourable 
environment is a relatively undeveloped area of resource dependency theory. Studies 
exploring this aspect of firm behaviour have focused particularly on the use of board 
interlocks and political ties (Hillman, 2005; Mullery et al., 1995; Boyd, 1990; Haunschild, 
1990). Yet surprisingly little research has been conducted with regard to attempts of firms to 
influence policy through shaping discourse. Furthermore, studies have tended to focus on the 
development of political resources, while not connecting this with the identification of 
sources of uncertainty which may be mitigated through the deployment of these resources. 
This article will now turn to the Australian wheat industry, to explore how and why 
deregulation of the export wheat market came to be implemented, before conducting a 
preliminary analysis of the outcomes of deregulation.  
 
Deregulation of the Australian Wheat Export Market 
The deregulation of the Australian wheat export market effectively ended the export 
monopoly held by the Australian Wheat Board (AWB). This followed more than two decades 
of debate concerning the position of the AWB as a Statutory Marketing Authority, which had 
been established in 1948 with the intention of providing wheat growers with security and 
stability in their wheat marketing (Higgins and Lockie, 2002; Botterill, 2012; Whitwell and 
Sydenham, 1991). Throughout much of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, the Industries Assistance 
Commission (later known as the Productivity Commission) contended that deregulation was 
essential to expose the wheat industry to competition, which would theoretically lead to 
improvements in efficiency and productivity (Industries Assistance Commission, 1983; 1988; 
Irving, Arney and Linder, 2000; Productivity Commission, 2005a). This perception 
ultimately informed wheat export market deregulation, implemented by the Australian federal 
government in 2008 (The Age, 2008).  
However following deregulation, the bulk handling companies such as GrainCorp (in the 
Eastern states of Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland), Glencore (South Australia) 
and CBH (Western Australia) control between 30 to 50 per cent of the export market in their 
respective states (Stretch, Carter and Kingwell, 2014; Australian Crop Forecasters, 2015). 
These bulk handling companies manage the infrastructure developed while these supply 
chains were under the regulated management and ownership of the state governments through 
the state-based bulk handling authorities (Stretch et al., 2014). To a significant extent, the 
control of the supply chains has been used by the bulk handling companies to extract a 
substantial share of the export market (Stretch et al., 2014; Boaitey, 2013).  
The strong position of the vertically integrated bulk grain handlers within the Australian 
export market highlights the relationship between control of the supply chain as a means of 
developing a substantial share of a market. This article will now analyse the merger and 
acquisition strategies which have been employed by Archer Daniels Midland, Bunge Limited, 
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Cargill and Louis Dreyfus, known as the ABCD companies, as a means of developing their 
control of supply chains within Australia, and subsequently, developing their share of the 
Australian wheat market.  
 
Supply Chain Management Strategies of the ABCDs 
The larger transnational agribusiness companies have yet to develop supply chains to rival 
those of the bulk handling companies such as GrainCorp and CBH. Subsequently, the bulk 
handling companies have become targets for acquisition. For example, Archer Daniels 
Midland launched a A$3.4bn takeover of GrainCorp, which was rejected by the Australian 
government in 2013 (Hockey, 2013b). However, the ousting of former Liberal Prime 
Minister Tony Abbott has led to speculation that ADM may make another bid for GrainCorp 
(Sydney Morning Herald, 2015).  
While the ownership of GrainCorp remains a significant issue for the Australian wheat 
industry, numerous acquisitions of integrated companies have occurred in recent years. The 
most notable of these is Viterra’s acquisition of ABB Grain in 2009, and was in turn 
purchased by Glencore in 2011 (Sydney Morning Herald, 2012). Viterra’s control of the 
wheat supply chain in South Australia, in particular, enabled Glencore to increase their share 
of the Australian wheat export market from 6.7 per cent in 2010 to 22.0 per cent in 2013 
(Australian Grain Growers Co-operative, 2014). This established Glencore as the second 
largest exporter of wheat from Australia (Australian Grain Growers Co-operative, 2014). 
Also in 2011, Cargill acquired AWB Grainflow, including their 22 grain receival sites in the 
Eastern states (Sydney Morning Herald, 2011). Louis Dreyfus acquired fertiliser company 
Ravensdown in 2014 (Farm Weekly, 2014), which followed their establishment of a joint 
venture with Asciano in 2011 to develop a grain handling facility in Newcastle (ABC, 2014). 
Bunge have thus far focused primarily on building their own infrastructure, including a 
A$20m port in Geelong, Victoria, and A$40bn port in Bunbury, Western Australia; in 
addition to substantial storage facilities intended to supply these ports (The Australian, 2014c, 
The Land, 2015).  
Numerous acquisitions have been completed following the deregulation of the export wheat 
market in 2008, which raises the question of why these strategies are being employed, and 
also what the impact of these strategies has been. At this point, we must now turn to the 
broader strategic motivations of these companies, particularly with regard to the development 
of resources, and the management of risk and uncertainty as a means of understanding the 
implementation of acquisitions, mergers and joint ventures within the context of the 
Australian wheat industry.  
 
Relationships and Resources 
As indicated by the merger and acquisition activity occurring within the Australian wheat 
industry, companies controlling wheat supply chains, or simply infrastructure supporting 
these supply chains, are particularly susceptible to acquisition from the major global 
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agribusiness companies. The attempted acquisition of GrainCorp by ADM reflects a focus of 
this company upon investing in integrated firms. In addition to the existing 19.8 per cent 
interest of ADM in GrainCorp, this includes the 32.2 per cent interest of ADM in Pacificor, 
which owns grain elevators in Washington and Oregon; and a 100 per cent ownership of 
Alfred C. Toepfer International (ADM, 2015a, p.6). Louis Dreyfus have also targeted 
integrated firms in their acquisition strategies, having completed a takeover of Ilomar 
Holding N.V., (Louis Dreyfus, 2014), an acquisition which Jean-Marc Foucher, CEO of 
Louis Dreyfus Commodities for Europe and the Black Sea, claims “is consistent with the 
ambition of Louis Dreyfus Commodities to grow its fixed asset base and provide customers 
globally with integrated supply chain management solutions, from origin to final destination” 
(Louis Dreyfus, 2014). This integration and expansion is explained in the 2014 Louis Dreyfus 
Annual Report in relation to the “core expertise” of the company, which is outlined as 
“Securing supplies of food in a changing world” (Louis Dreyfus, 2015, p.3). 
Bunge describe themselves as an “active acquirer of other companies” (Bunge, 2015b, p.12). 
This focus is part of Bunge’s “Winning Global Footprint” plan, where the company seeks to 
“Invest in origination and distribution network to expand grain flows” (Bunge, 2014a). In 
addition, Executive Vice President of ADM, Ray Young, states that “Despite the 
macroeconomic headwinds that we’re facing, we have an incredible portfolio of businesses 
and products and a geographic footprint that’s really unparalleled” (ADM, 2016b, p.8). In 
each of these statements the development of resources in geographically diverse locations 
through acquisitions, is considered as essential in reducing risks associated with access to 
inputs, and also revenue volatility. Conversely, the “limited control over governance and 
operations” associated with the use of joint ventures is highlighted by Bunge (2015a, p.12), 
which results in “certain operating, financial and other risks relating to these investments”. 
This implies that control within supply chains is perceived as being of significant importance, 
and is counter posed with risk. In that sense, risk is created when control is ceded. This is 
exemplified by a statement from Louis Dreyfus (2016): 
We strive to strictly manage the journey from farm to fork…The greater the control we have, 
the greater the security and value we provide to our customers.  
 
Control in this instance is mentioned with regard to security and value, concerning the 
capacity of the company to ensure quality of product is maintained. Joint ventures restrict this 
ability to control “the journey from farm to fork”. This indicates that acquisition is the 
preferred strategy of agribusiness corporations, while also suggesting that these firms may 
engage in joint ventures with some reluctance. Yet as emphasised by ADM CEO Juan 
Luciano (ADM, 2015b, p.5), control of value chains maximises profitability: 
…we can capture value as value sometimes shifts from one place in the value chain to the 
other. So this long view allows us to profit a lot from our system. 
 
This reflects Bunge’s emphasis on enhancing profitability through focusing on “value-added” 
activities, coupled with an intention to reduce revenue volatility (Bunge 2015c, p.23). The 
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idea of control is also particularly interesting in this instance, and differs significantly from 
the approach of modern corporations described by Davis (2013), which eschew control of 
supply chains through direct ownership. Integral to this, is the notion of risk, and the 
relationship between risk and control within agribusiness.  
 
Expansion: size and scope 
This relationship between control and risk is particularly interesting with relation to the key 
strategies that are employed by global agribusiness companies. In particular, ambitions of 
agribusiness companies to expand their presence in global markets, and expand into 
geographic locations throughout the world, are of interest to this analysis.  
Rather than producing food, the ABCD companies describe the management of supply chains 
as their core business; however this is frequently constructed as serving a higher principle. As 
Serge Schoen, then CEO of Louis Dreyfus explains, “Our ambition is to feed and clothe 
people around the world by connecting farms to forks in every place where there is a need” 
(Louis Dreyfus, 2011, p.3). Cargill CEO David MacLennan (MacLennan, 2014) describes the 
activities of his company in a similar manner, stating “We move food and crops from times 
and places of surplus to time and places of deficit”. According to Bunge (2015a, p.15), “As 
we deliver on our strategies, the benefits will accrue not only to our shareholders but to 
society as a whole. This is because what Bunge does is fundamental…connecting harvests to 
homes”. ADM explain that their fundamental purpose is “To serve vital needs”, also achieved 
by “connecting the harvest to the home” (ADM 2016d). The implication of these comments 
is that these firms are integral to global food networks, conveying a considerable level of 
power. This suggests that to disrupt the capacity of these companies to connect farms with 
consumers would be to disrupt global food security. In meeting these ambitions, Alberto 
Weisser, former Bunge CEO contends that agribusiness companies need to “be large and 
present in all different regions, well capitalised, have a complete portfolio” (cited in Ahmed, 
Hamrick and Gereffi, 2014, pp.12-13). Therefore, according to Weisser, consolidation of 
markets and also supply chains is essential. A comparable approach is demonstrated in 
ADM’s 2014 10-K report (ADM, 2015a, p.12), who describe their strategy as “Expanding the 
volume and diversity of crops it merchandises and processes, expanding the global reach of 
its core model”. This provides a sense that expansion, and also the capacity to expand, is 
critical to these firms.  
Expansion of business into new countries and new regions, referred to as ‘geographical 
diversification’, is frequently cited by large agribusiness corporations as being fundamental to 
their global strategy (ADM, 2015a, 2015b; Louis Dreyfus, 2012; Bunge, 2014b). This is often 
portrayed as being important in securing consistent access to resources, thereby minimising 
revenue volatility (ADM, 2015b, p.4). From this perspective, developing a diversified global 
footprint is a means through which risk and uncertainty associated with resource supply can 
be mitigated. In the case of climatic events which may restrict the flow of resources from one 
region, a geographically diversified company is able to offset this reduction in resource 
supply through focusing on procuring resources from another region. Furthermore, as food 
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production is seasonal, geographical expansion and diversification allows companies to 
ensure a consistent supply of resources, and consistent revenue streams, throughout the year. 
This geographical expansion is associated with the ambition to access new and developing 
markets (ADM, 2015c, p.4).  
While geographical expansion is portrayed as essential in reducing the risks associated with 
resource supply and revenue volatility, the expanded reach of these companies places them in 
a position of significant power over global food networks. This power manifests through a 
presence in markets and locations across the world, which is frequently alluded to when 
companies provide a description of their activities and their global presence. For example, 
Juan Luciano of ADM states that: 
So ADM, as of December 31, was about $33 billion market cap[italisation]. It's 
certainly a global leader in origination of grain, processing of grain and ingredients. 
We have more than 750 facilities around the world (ADM, 2015b).  
 
In that sense, geographic expansion, expressed through the number of facilities ADM 
controls, is used to portray the company as being powerful. Associated with this geographical 
expansion of ADM in this statement, is the enhanced profitability and value of the company. 
This omnipresence is described by Louis Dreyfus (2016) in the “A glass of orange juice 
poured for breakfast. A bowl of rice steamed for lunch. A cup of coffee served in a 
neighbourhood café. Throughout the day and throughout the world, Louis Dreyfus 
Commodities plays a vital role in nourishing the world’s population”. Such statements 
illustrate the importance of Louis Dreyfus and other ABCD companies in feeding 
populations, however also convey a pervasiveness which could be interpreted as an 
expression of power and control.  
This research has highlighted the desire of agribusiness, specifically the ABCD companies, to 
develop their ownership of integrated supply chains, particularly through investments such as 
acquisitions. This analysis contends that such an approach serves the dual purpose of 
reducing the exposure of the company to risk, while allowing the company to develop control 
within food systems. In addition, this enables such companies to maximise the profit that can 
be extracted from these chains. In that sense, control is integral, and loss of control is equated 
with risk. These strategies are typically framed as integral to meeting key objectives such as 
connecting ‘harvests to homes’ or ‘farms to forks’, portraying the firms as being integral to 
food security. This reflects an attempt to shape discourse around food policy, with 
government regulations restricting these strategies framed as threatening global food security. 
Therefore, this article will now focus on the perceptions of agribusiness toward the risks 
posed by regulation and government policy.  
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Risk and Uncertainty 
Regulation  
While the integration of supply chains may be employed to reduce risks associated with the 
supply of resources, and conversely, may assist agribusiness companies in developing control 
within food networks and subsequently capture value, the following analysis explores how 
risks to strategies of integration, consolidation and expansion – particularly government 
regulation and competition - are viewed by the companies.  
ADM highlight the inherent risks that may inhibit their operation with regard to a broad range 
of policy areas, “including anti-trust and competition law, trade restrictions, food safety 
regulations, and other government regulations and mandates” (ADM, 2015a, p.12). A similar 
statement is provided by Bunge (2015a, p.11), mentioning that “Governmental policies 
affecting the agricultural industry, such as taxes, tariffs, duties, subsidies, import and export 
restrictions…can influence industry profitability”. While these statements draw the 
connection between the capacity of the company to expand into new markets and regions; 
regulation and policy restricting this expansion is viewed as being a considerable risk to the 
profitability of the company.  
This article has cited geographic expansion, expansion into new markets and unrestricted 
trade as being fundamental to the strategies employed by global agribusiness companies. 
However as stated in the Bunge 10-K report for 2014 (Bunge, 2015b, p.11), “agricultural 
commodity production and trade flows are significantly affected by government policies and 
regulations”. This indicates that regulation which may disrupt trade, and limit the capacities 
of companies to cross borders and enter new markets, represents a substantial risk to global 
agribusiness. Associated with this, is the discourse developed by the ABCD companies in 
particular, which articulates that free trade, movement of capital and the intervention of these 
global agribusiness companies into markets and regions throughout the world is of net benefit 
to societies. However, if these strategies are constructed as providing net benefits to societies 
within nations, then this may reduce the risk of regulation that restricts the capacity of global 
agribusiness companies to execute these strategies which appear fundamental to their 
profitability.  
 
Competition  
The perception of the ABCD companies of regulation as a risk, suggests their preference 
towards market based approaches to economic organisation. This is further emphasised by 
the consistent advocacy of the ABCD companies for unrestricted trade, and their 
endorsement of the power inherent within markets (Page 2014; MacLennan, 2014; Conway, 
2013; Murphy et al., 2012). However, the vertically integrated approaches of ADM and 
Bunge, for example, indicate that the companies structures their activities to avoid 
participating in open markets, and avoid engaging in relationships with competing firms.  
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While deregulation may be implemented by governments as a means to create competition 
within agricultural markets, for agribusiness companies, competition is perceived as a risk to 
their operation. As stated by ADM (2015a, p.11), “Competition impacts the Company’s 
ability to generate and increase its gross profit”. While mergers, acquisitions and joint 
ventures are portrayed by firms as a means through which access to resources can be secured, 
and associated uncertainties can be reduced, such activity from competing companies can be 
perceived as a threat to their own viability. As stated by ADM (2015a, p.11):  
…continued merger and acquisition activities resulting in further consolidations result in 
greater cost competitiveness and global scale of certain players in the industry that could 
impact the relative competitiveness of the Company.  
 
This statement suggests that in some ways, mergers and acquisitions are engaged as defensive 
manoeuvres, aimed at reducing the capacity of competitors to strengthen their position in 
global markets and appropriate market share. The following statement illustrates this 
relationship between the capacity to compete, and the establishment of market share:  
To compete effectively, the Company focuses on…developing and maintaining appropriate 
market share (ADM, 2015a, p.11). 
 
A similar concern regarding the risks associated with competition, the potential loss of 
market share, as well as increased costs and reduced revenue are articulated by ADM and 
Bunge in these statements:  
Competition could cause us to lose market share…increase marketing or other expenditures 
or reduce pricing, each of which could have an adverse effect on our business and 
profitability (Bunge, 2015b, pp.12-13). 
 
In this sense, competition is portrayed by ADM and Bunge as being a risk to their financial 
performance. Furthermore, profitability is connected to market share, suggesting that from 
the perspective of the company, the protection and expansion of their market share is 
essential. These statements suggest that competition is not viewed favourably by agribusiness 
corporations, which indicates that these companies may be inclined to explore means through 
which exposure to competition may be reduced. This relates to the use of integrated value 
chains as a means of reducing exposure of companies to open markets, and to reduce the 
competitiveness of a market.  
Considering the operating environment of the company and the emphasis of companies on 
reducing the risks associated with competition, this raises the risks that may be associated 
with competition or antitrust policy. In particular, government policies regulating 
competitiveness of markets are also perceived by Bunge as being a risk to their profitability, 
which may be motivated by increasing commodity prices. As mentioned by Bunge (2015a, 
p.6): 
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High commodity prices and regional crop shortfalls have led, and in the future may lead, 
governments to impose price controls, tariffs, export restrictions and other measures designed 
to assure adequate domestic supplies and/or mitigate price increases in their domestic 
markets, as well as increase the scrutiny of competitive conditions in their markets. 
 
While governments may seek to open markets and encourage investment from agribusiness 
companies, the companies included in this research view competition and government policy 
designed to enhance competition within markets as significant risks to their profitability. This 
indicates that there is a disjuncture between the ambition of governments to develop 
competition in markets and the organisational strategies that are adopted by global 
agribusiness companies. The conceptualisation of competition as a risk implies that strategies 
utilised by these companies to reduce risk, will involve approaches which seek to reduce 
competition. In practice, the employment of strategies to reduce risk associated with 
competition, and avoid markets through vertically integrated structures, is at odds with the 
rhetoric from companies such as Cargill, Bunge, ADM and Louis Dreyfus, who actively 
promote free trade and free markets.  
 
Corporate Political Action 
The preceding sections have highlighted the perceived need of agribusiness to continually 
expand, in terms of geographic reach and also to develop control within value chains. This 
expansion is often facilitated by acquisitions, and in particular, acquisitions of integrated 
companies. However, as this article has shown, agribusiness corporations view government 
regulation which impacts trade, markets and the competitiveness of markets as potentially 
undermining these strategies. This article will now explore the use of political action by 
agribusiness as a means of reducing the potential impact of these risks.  
An example of an attempt to shape policy discourse is reflected in the comments of ADM, 
contained within a submission to the Submission to the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs 
and Transport References Committee, essentially convened in response to the attempted 
takeover of GrainCorp by ADM (2013, p.6): 
There is a clear worldwide trend towards consolidation in agribusiness, where economies of 
scale and global market reach are increasingly essential in maintaining competitiveness 
(ADM, 2013, p.6).  
 
This statement illustrates the contention of global agribusiness that competitive advantage is 
achieved through continual development and accumulation of resources. While the risks 
associated with competition are indicated through this statement, in addition, the risks that are 
posed by regulation seeking to maintain competitiveness in markets are apparent. Through 
presenting consolidation of agricultural markets as inevitable, this comment seeks to 
normalise consolidated markets. Furthermore, this seeks to connect the performance of ADM, 
achieved through economies of scale, with broader outcomes related to improved 
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performance in food networks. In that sense, this statement aims to influence the Australian 
federal government’s decision to either allow or prevent ADM’s acquisition of GrainCorp.  
In this instance, ADM’s attempt at exerting influence was in response to the environmental 
circumstances; however intervention of global agribusiness in policy discourse is often 
proactive. Potentially, this reflects the concern about “future government policies” (ADM, 
2015a, p.12), which may impact strategies of geographic expansion and consolidation. To 
minimise these risks and protect their power and also profitability, agribusiness companies 
such as the ABCD’s may seek to influence their environment through corporate political 
activity. As explained by former CEO of Cargill, Greg Page, who contended that “It is not for 
us to take on the roles of governments, although we should seek to inform their deliberations” 
(Page, 2014). According to Cargill Vice Chairman Paul Conway, “we advocate for policies 
and practices to help ensure that the world can feed itself” (Conway, 2013). The focus of the 
latter half of this sentence returns to the power held by the ABCD companies with regard to 
global food security. This is not only a significant expression of power, however this 
comment suggests that firms such as Cargill are best positioned to determine how food 
security can be achieved. Page (2015) elaborates on the position of Cargill in this regard, 
stating that food security can be reached through enabling “open trade”, which therefore 
requires the discouragement of “political leaders worldwide from pursuing food self-
sufficiency, imposing export barriers and taking other actions that inhibit food from moving 
freely across borders”. Similarly, CEO of Cargill, David MacLennan (2015), and Conway 
(2012) contend free trade is required to mitigate the risks to food security that may be caused 
by climate change, or government intervention in markets. Conway (2012) summarises his 
speech by stating that in depicting the importance of free trade, he has outlined the 
“environments that governments can provide to help give the right incentives to farmers”. 
The implication is that governments seeking to intervene in the activities of Cargill may risk 
the food security of their nation. Yet to some extent this also illustrates Cargill’s vulnerability 
to government regulation, and highlights their perceived need to maintain some level of 
influence over government policy.  
For example, if ADM (2014b) or Bunge (2014b) consider that government regulations across 
areas such as competition policy and environmental regulation pose a risk to their strategy of 
expansion within markets and across borders, then these firms will seek to influence the 
development – or withdrawal – of these regulations. This can also lead to coalitions of firms 
developing, who may have shared ambitions with regard to how government policy is 
influenced (Henry, 2011).  Examples of this activity in agribusiness include lobby group 
Food and Drink Europe, which represents member companies such as Cargill, Kellogg, 
Unilever and Coca-Cola (Food and Drink Europe, 2015). In addition, Cargill has been 
particularly active in lobbying for the endorsement of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
trade agreement, as “a founding member of the U.S. Business coalition for the TPP” (Cargill, 
2015b). As stated by Cargill Vice President of Corporate Affairs Devry Boughner Vorwerk, 
the “TPP will allow food to move more freely across international borders, which is crucial to 
feed a growing world population” (Cargill, 2015b). According to MacLennan, (Cargill, 
2015c) this freedom will “[benefit] farmers and consumers around the world”. Similarly, 
ADM CEO Juan Luciano contends, “The TPP will help reduce barriers to trade and open new 
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markets, benefiting American farmers and ranchers, the U.S. economy and ADM”, while 
subsequently “supporting more American jobs and strengthening our rural communities” 
(ADM, 2015d).  
With the profitability of operations of global agribusiness cited in this article as being 
dependent upon freedom of trade and capital flows, it is clear the TPP offers significant 
benefits for companies such as Cargill and ADM. However, it is important to note that these 
freedoms, provided by such an agreement, are portrayed by Vorwerk as being essential to 
“feeding a growing world population”, or providing increased opportunities and employment 
for farmers. In that sense, policy which benefits Cargill and ADM, is constructed as 
ultimately benefitting the global community (Cargill, 2015c; ADM, 2015d). Crucially, in this 
argument it is not the power that can be amassed by these companies through the creation of 
such a trade environment, it is the benefits which are argued to be achieved by farmers and 
consumers, which are constructed as being relatively powerless. According to this argument, 
Cargill and ADM are able to empower these producers and consumers, while enhancing food 
security (Cargill 2012). 
These attempts to intervene in policy and discourse around policy development are indicative 
of the tension between risk and control. Competition, and policy which may seek to enhance 
competitiveness of industry, is viewed as being a significant risk to the capacity of 
agribusiness to implement strategies such as integration and expansion. As with the perceived 
need to control risks associated with access to resources, quality of product and profit capture 
in value chains, intervention in policy is applied to seek some level of control over 
governmental decisions, and discourses informing those decisions.  
 
Discussion 
The Australian wheat industry, which was deregulated in 2008, provides an interesting 
environment to examine through the lens of resource dependency theory. The deregulation of 
the industry ensured that Australian and transnational grain traders were able to enter the 
market. However bulk handling companies such as GrainCorp in Australia’s Eastern states 
control the supply chains that were once owned by state authorities, which held monopolies 
over these networks until privatisation in the 1990s and early 2000s. In developing ownership 
of integrated supply chains, companies such as GrainCorp, Viterra and CBH have become 
acquisition targets, particularly from global agribusiness companies such as ADM, Bunge, 
Cargill and Louis Dreyfus, who are intent on developing integrated supply chains. Associated 
with this emphasis on integration, is the focus of these companies upon expanding their reach 
into new markets and new geographic regions.  
This discussion therefore turns to understanding the strategies employed by these companies; 
specifically, exploring why these strategies are favoured, and the implications of this. In 
analysing documentation produced by the ABCD companies, such as media releases, 
speeches, annual reports, this research has highlighted risk as a key factor in the intention of 
these firms to develop integrated supply chains. This strategy ensures resource supply and 
minimises dependencies upon other companies – who may be competitors – within the 
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supply chain. In addition, this enables the companies to reduce their exposure to revenue 
volatility. Associated with the minimisation of risk is the use of integration as a means to 
establish control of supply chains. From this perspective, the loss of control is perceived by 
the companies as creating risk. This is reflected in the use of integration to as a means of 
avoiding exposure to markets. In that sense, the need for control is motivated by the 
perceived correlation between control of supply chains and profit capture.  
These strategies are designed to maintain the global stability of the company, in terms of 
access to commodity, and consistency of revenue. In turn, this is also associated with the 
ambitions of the ABCD companies to expand in size and scope, through the approach of 
‘geographical diversification’. However, this strategy is dependent upon the approach of 
governments towards regulation of trade and markets. Therefore, government regulation and 
policy (and future policies which may restrict this activity) is framed by the ABCD 
companies as representing a significant risk. The contention of this article is that companies 
aiming to minimise risk in their environment will seek to influence government policy.  
Firstly, the ABCD companies seek to shape discourse around trade and food security, in 
constructing their activities as ultimately delivering societal benefits. The companies portray 
themselves as being best placed to deliver food security on a global scale, which can be 
achieved if they are afforded the freedom to implement strategies of integration and 
expansion. Conversely, the companies outline their existing power within global food 
networks; routinely expressed in terms of global reach, size, employee numbers and market 
capitalisation. This effectively communicates the power of these companies to governments 
who may seek to regulate their activities, raise barriers to commodity and food trade, or 
develop a degree of self-sufficiency within national food networks. Also communicated are 
the financial and political resources that the companies may be able to implement to develop 
influence. As this research has highlighted, this is evident in the formation of business 
coalitions, including the U.S. Business Coalition for the TPP, Food and Drink Europe, and 
the Australian Grain Exporters Association.  
Further to the potential risks associated with the regulation of trade, is the regulation of 
competition within markets. In deregulating the Australian wheat industry, the Australian 
federal government claimed that this was necessary to ensure greater competition, and 
resultantly, improved wheat prices for wheat farmers. However, regulation of competition 
within markets, and within supply chains, is perceived by the ABCD companies as 
potentially restricting their capacity to consolidate and expand the scope of their activities. In 
that regard, efforts by government to restrict the consolidation of markets are portrayed as not 
only lacking cognisance of the preference of ‘the market’ for large, well-capitalised 
companies; but are ultimately futile, in the face of the global shift towards market 
consolidation. Coupled with the risks that are posed by the regulation of competition, is the 
perception of risk created by competitors. This in turn leads to the employment of investment 
strategies such as acquisitions to protect market share. While companies such as Cargill or 
ADM advocate for the liberalisation of trade and the power of markets, in practice, the 
control of supply chains effectively shields the companies from markets and restricts 
competition.  
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The deregulation of the Australian wheat export market was intended to create competition. 
However, this paper contends that such an ambition does not correspond with the strategies 
of integration employed by global agribusiness. While integration is employed to reduce risk, 
this approach to risk management is focused on the establishment of control within supply 
chains. In addition, the targeting of investments such as acquisitions towards integrated 
companies leads to further consolidation. As a result of not considering these significant 
factors in the deregulation of the Australian wheat industry, the Australian government was 
therefore not able to substantially account for the power that could be developed by 
agribusinesses corporations within the deregulated environment. Accordingly, the unintended 
consequences of deregulation, such as a consolidation of the wheat export market, which may 
have been predictable, were not adequately considered.  
 
Conclusion 
This article has explored resource dependency theory as a framework for understanding the 
strategies of agricultural corporations in a deregulated market. Through analysing annual 
reports, media releases, statements to investors and SEC filings of the ABCD companies, this 
article has explored how these companies perceive risk and implement strategies such as 
acquisitions as a means of reducing risks associated with access to resources, revenue 
volatility and the actions of competitors. Expansion into new regions, framed as geographic 
diversification, is a key strategy designed to reduce these risks, and is employed in 
conjunction with an intention to develop integrated supply chains, often through acquisitions. 
Such strategies which reduce risk invariably involve the development of control. In that 
sense, the loss of control is framed as inherently creating risk. This article contends that the 
ABCD companies seek to shape discourse around food to justify these strategies through the 
contention that global food security is enhanced as a result. Associated with this, are attempts 
to lobby governments to reduce restrictions of trade and scrutiny of markets; actions which 
are framed by the ABCD companies as harmful to food security, farmers and consumers. 
Through exploring the tangible implications of strategies which seek to reduce risk, develop 
market share and expand geographically, this article makes a substantial contribution to 
resource dependency theory literature.  
Utilising resource dependency theory to explore the power of firms in this context, the 
tension between firms reliant upon unencumbered transnational trade, and the sovereignty of 
individual nations, offers considerable potential. However, in studying the practices of the 
ABCD companies, such as the use of acquisitions, the shaping of discourse around food and 
food security, and intervention in policy, this paper makes resource dependency theory more 
relatable to the tangible implementation of corporate strategy, and therefore, more 
observable.  
Application of resource dependency theory is eminently relevant to the Australian wheat 
export market, which was deregulated by the federal government in 2008 to create a 
competitive industry. However, this policy shift was implemented without due consideration 
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for the power of firms, or the capacity of firms such as the ABCD companies to proactively 
implement strategies with the intention of creating a favourable environment.  
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Discussion 
Throughout this work, I aim to understand how the Australian wheat industry came to be 
deregulated, and what the outcomes of this policy shift have been. At its core, I suggest, this 
policy shift was engineered by policy makers across three decades. As I argue in this 
discussion, wheat export market deregulation was engineered as part of a broader 
restructuring of Australian society, which necessitated the reconstruction of knowledge, 
policy values and identities to accord with the rationality of markets, competition, efficiency 
and individualism. Governmental technologies, such as audit, performance objectives, cost-
benefit analysis and quantification have been used to construct a governable society, 
according to these rationalities. This process has shifted power towards private interests such 
as institutional investors and corporations.  
Taking advantage of the diversity of analyses permitted by the PhD by Publication approach, 
in this discussion I pan back from the individual articles in order to interpret the articles 
themselves as a special kind of ‘data’. I draw on these articles here as a body of work rather 
than as separate pieces, seeking to understand what this collection in aggregate can reveal 
about the restructuring of Australian society, economy and agriculture, and how power has 
been shifted from citizens and ‘the public’, towards consumers and corporations.  On this 
basis, I use this discussion to identify themes emerging in the articles which are not 
necessarily apparent when considering the articles as individual pieces. As such, I extend this 
analysis beyond the key points raised by these articles, to develop new findings.  
In undertaking this analysis, I have organised this discussion under three key headings:  
 
1. Creating a reality of markets, firms and consumers 
Here, I focus on ideas such as competition, efficiency and markets, and how discourses have 
sought to create a policy environment which makes these ideas appear as logical guidelines 
for good policy. In particular, I explore the construction of markets, firms and consumers and 
their roles within this environment.  
2. Making society governable: The case of Australian wheat export market 
deregulation  
In this section, I turn to the deregulation of Australian agriculture – specifically the 
deregulation of the wheat export market. I focus on the technologies used by government to 
make the rationality articulated in the first section operable.  
3. Emerging corporate power in Australian agriculture 
This final section focuses on the emergence of firms within Australian agriculture, most 
particularly, the wheat export market, as powerful actors.  
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Creating a reality of markets, firms and consumers 
The production and reproduction of ideas 
Policy discourses have sought to establish competition, efficiency and productivity as guiding 
principles by which Australian society should be organised. Policy discourses repeatedly 
assert that these ideas are unequivocally good ideas which benefit society. The logic 
connecting liberalised markets, competition, efficiency and productivity with societal benefits 
is framed as common sense. This idea is not portrayed as a theory of how markets and firms 
operate; this is a self-evident reality. Competition is normalised as a part of everyday life. 
Furthermore, markets are described as apolitical mechanisms that simply organise 
transactions. I argue that this construction is used to frame markets as technical, rather than 
the result of political and economic interests. Conversely, policy discourses describe State 
intervention as politicised. At the same time, there is little reflection on whether this is 
actually a bad thing, given that, in many cases, including statutory wheat marketing, political 
intervention in markets aims to protect the collective interests of market participants such as 
producers. Furthermore, the liberalisation of markets, labour, finance and capital is portrayed 
as inevitable. This construction is designed to weaken opposition to these policy shifts, to 
instead focus attention on what form this restructuring will take.  
The neoliberalisation of Australian society, I suggest, has been a political project, which 
policy makers have implemented by shaping what matters, what has value and how value is 
created, by establishing the rules, values and norms that govern society. These discursive 
constructions shape policy responses to questions of how social and economic life should be 
organised and to delimit the potential responses to these questions, contributing to policy 
shifts, such as the deregulation of the wheat export market. The extension of this logic to 
previously non-commercial aspects of Australian life, such as education, social security and 
human services, shows the pervasiveness of these ideas, but also has the potential to re-shape 
how services are delivered in these fields, and how people relate to these services. In this 
discussion, I draw on analyses of broader discourses, such as that focused on competition 
policy, economic policy, labour markets, industrial relations and human services, which I 
suggest can help to reveal what policy makers have intended through the deregulation of the 
wheat market.  
 
Shifting roles and relationships  
In this section, I draw upon the discursive construction of the State, firms, consumers and 
workers, which I suggest is an important aspect of transferring the rationality of markets into 
the domain of reality. This construction helps to create a framework for making market 
liberalisation appear as a logical, common sense shift that is in society’s interests. I focus on 
the roles of these institutions and actors, their relationships and how they have been shaped to 
facilitate economic restructuring in Australia, with particular attention to agriculture. As I 
argue in this section, these constructions helped operationalise policy makers’ intention to 
create an economic environment facilitating firms’ access to previously restricted areas of 
Australian society. This goal of corporatising parts of Australian society previously thought 
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of as ‘public’ has contributed, I suggest, to the emergence of corporate control in Australian 
agriculture.  
 
The State and the market 
The construction of concepts such as efficiency and competition as policy truths re-
configures the role of the State. This perspective was articulated in 1986 by then Prime 
Minister Bob Hawke and Minister for Primary Industry John Kerin, who argued that the 
State’s role was to create the economic conditions necessary for the most efficient and 
productive market participants to survive and prosper. This change in approach represents a 
significant shift away from the collectivist policies of the 1950s and 1960s. Rather than 
focusing on creating a secure and stable economic environment supporting its citizens, in 
more recent decades, policy discourses have constructed the idea that the State’s role is to 
protect the efficient operation of markets. Markets, as apolitical mechanisms for organising 
transactions, are claimed to reward innovation and effort, and in doing so, create a fair 
society. This marketised society, it is assumed, will allow individuals to use their self-
reliance, ingenuity and entrepreneurialism to secure their own welfare. In this sense, risk and 
responsibility is devolved from the State towards individuals.   
Furthermore, markets are portrayed by the State as disinterested producers of information. 
Transactions in markets reveal what people – as consumers – think. In doing so, markets 
reveal what has value and what the value of that service or object is. As I argue in this thesis, 
the policy focus upon markets also limits what is valuable to that which can be traded in 
markets. The pre-eminence of this construction has significant implications for policy 
making. For example, the policy debate around wheat export marketing deregulation in 
Australia was narrowed to focus on wheat prices and supply chain costs. Non-economic 
social and environmental consequences of this shift were externalised and portrayed as of 
lesser significance. In this regard, that which ‘matters’, in a policy sense, is that which can be 
measured and apportioned value in markets. The question of State organisation of society 
then becomes focused on how to maximise production of that which is deemed valuable in 
markets.  
This shift is part of the State’s primary agricultural policy objective to facilitate the 
productive use of the Nation’s agricultural resources. Policy makers assume increased 
resource productivity will contribute to good performance in economic measures such as 
GDP and multifactor productivity growth. These indicators, based largely on information 
communicated by markets, are constructed as indicators of societal well-being. These 
constructions legitimise policy measures designed to improve economic performance, as 
measured by these indicators. However, this construction relies upon a distancing of the State 
from society. If the State’s ambition is to maximise the productive use of resources measured 
through economic indicators such as GDP or multifactor productivity growth, society needs 
to be rationalised as a collection of resources which policy makers can be assemble to meet 
this aim. In this sense, society is made to appear less complex. However, this simplicity helps 
make society governable. Rather than making decisions concerning people, communities or 
194 
 
environments, policy makers focus on equations involving units of resources. In addition, 
policy change enhancing economic performance indicators, such as GDP, is justified as being 
in the national interest, regardless of its negative impacts upon people or communities, or the 
potential inequalities which figures such as GDP might conceal.  
This process is evident in the case of structural adjustment in agriculture, which necessitates a 
distancing of policy makers from farmers and their communities and a reconfigured 
relationship between farmers and their land. Structural adjustment has been used in 
Australian agriculture as a means of increasing productive resource use through the re-
allocation of resources. As Gray et al. (2014, p.5) explain:  
At an industry level, ongoing resource reallocation is an important source of productivity 
gains…In particular, exits of less efficient farm businesses release scarce resources for use by 
more efficient farms, which are able to expand and increase productivity, increasing the 
efficiency of resource use as a whole. 
 
This statement highlights policy makers’ reductionist approach to agriculture, whereby the 
critical policy question is focused upon how to maximise productivity. Gray et al. (2014) 
rationalise the exits of farmers from the land as desirable in addressing this question, 
externalising the impact of adjustment on farmers, their families and rural communities. This 
process of externalisation is made possible by conceiving of agriculture as a collection of 
resources, and of the State’s role as creating the environment which promotes the actors 
which are best able to maximise the productive use of these resources. In this example, it is 
overall productivity that matters, justifying the exclusion of farmers from the industry.  
 
Firms  
Policy discourses construct privately owned firms as the key actors which can help the State 
to maximise productivity and efficiency of resource use. Whereas the State is problematised 
as inefficient and slow-moving, policy discourses suggest firms are compelled by the 
commercial disciplines of the market to maximise efficiency. In this competitive process, the 
firms which are least able to meet this aim will fail, whereas the most efficient firms will 
succeed and prosper. Firms’ success is portrayed as evidence of their superior management, 
superior efficiencies and of their responsiveness to changing consumer needs.  
The increased presence of firms is argued to benefit society through a number of ways. First, 
the presence of efficient firms in industries and markets will ensure resources are used 
productively, leading to improved economic performance. Second, firms will return 
efficiency gains to consumers, through lower prices. In addition, consumers will benefit from 
a greater range of better quality products and services. In this construction, the consumer has 
power whereas firms are portrayed as lacking the capacity to exert power over markets. Even 
in the case of monopoly, duopoly or oligopolies, policy discourses presume firms lack power 
in these scenarios, due to the threat of potential competitors entering the market and seizing 
their market share.  
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Thus, it is claimed the presence of large firms in markets is simply reflective of their superior 
efficiency, innovation and responsiveness. According to this argument, efficiency is related to 
scale. Harper et al. (2015), among others, even use the term ‘efficient scale’, implying that in 
some industries, firms require a certain size before achieving efficiency gains. As a result of 
this logic, policy discourses have fostered the idea that regulation restricting the growth of 
firms is harmful to society. In particular, policy discourses portray regulation restricting 
firms’ capacity to develop market share as an unfair penalty upon the most successful, most 
efficient firms. This penalty is claimed to undermine the power of incentives for driving 
innovation and efficiency gains, and to reward the mediocre, less-efficient and less-capable 
firms. Thus, policy discourses imply that market regulation restricting the capacity of the 
largest firms to develop a dominant market share, for example, injures the economy and 
therefore, injures consumers.  In this regard, instead of a positive mechanism for protecting 
the interests and rights of citizens, regulation is negatively portrayed as something which 
undermines fairness and well-being. Within this narrative, firms are constructed as actors 
whose enhanced participation in society, enabled by the State, can lead to greater well-being, 
particularly through consumer satisfaction.  
Therefore, rather than curtailing the success of firms and removing incentives for firms to 
grow, policy discourses claim that the State should instead aim to create a business-friendly 
environment. This environment, it is claimed, will stimulate investment and create more jobs, 
while benefitting consumers’ living standards. In this regard, the interests of business become 
the interests of society.  
The construction of firms and their power is integral to this narrative. Firms are portrayed as 
having limited power to influence markets, regardless of their market share or the absence of 
real (as opposed to potential) competition. Rather, consumers are cast as the powerful actors 
in this relationship. Consumers, their needs and desires, are portrayed as the key adjudicators 
regarding a firms’ performance. Thus, firms are directed by consumers’ interests and through 
real and potential competitors also seeking to satisfy consumers’ needs and desires. The 
construction of this relationship between firms and consumers, moderated by markets, is 
presented as integral to creating a business-friendly environment. If a society consisted of 
consumers and firms, and if peoples’ needs and desires were limited to their needs and 
desires as consumers, then it could be argued (as policy makers do), that firms must be 
liberated to meet those needs and desires. Furthermore, policy discourses argue that the 
success of this relationship should be extended to other, previously restricted, areas of 
society. For example, the Harper Review of Australia’s competition policy claims that human 
services should be marketized, portraying service users as consumers, and service provision 
as the responsibility of corporations.  
 
People as consumers  
Policy discourses have sought to narrow value to that which can be created and traded in 
markets. In concert with this narrow construction of what has value, people are constructed as 
consumers. Furthermore, consumers’ wants are limited to that which is deliverable in markets 
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by firms. Thus, ‘what matters’, in a policy sense, is reduced to this relationship. As services 
previously delivered by the State are privatised, deregulated and marketised, such as 
education, health care, telecommunications, human services and social services, there are 
fewer examples where it could be argued that people are not primarily considered as 
consumers.  
This construction fundamentally re-shapes peoples’ relationship to the state. Essential 
services are met by private firms, with a profit motive, rather than the State. In the case of 
service provision by the State, People relate to the service provider as a consumer, not as a 
taxpayer, voter and citizen. Whereas people ostensibly have the ability to exercise power over 
the State in a democracy, the scope for exerting power in the customer and firm relationship 
is restricted. People relate to the service provider as a consumer. Their power can be 
exercised through choice, in the case that choice exists, and not as a taxpayer, voter and 
citizen. Furthermore, in the case that choice between service providers does exist, what does 
that choice entail? Is there a marked difference between different private health care 
providers, or job recruitment agencies? How does the power to exercise choice between these 
providers measure against the power that citizens can exert over the State?  
Consumers are conceived of as the ultimate beneficiaries of competition and efficiency gains 
stemming from market liberalisation. As policy makers frequently assert, competition 
benefits consumers by increasing quality and choice of goods and services, while reducing 
costs. This process, it is claimed, enhances living standards. However, in this context, living 
standards are constructed as that which can be appeased by markets and firms. As Pusey 
(2003) has shown, however, consumables are rarely associated with key indicators of 
happiness. Rather, it is relationships, friendships, family and meaningful work that are among 
the different facets of life that contribute to happiness. Pusey’s analysis suggests the 
limitations of consumers’ ‘living standards’ as an ultimate goal of efficient and competitive 
markets. However, the pervasiveness of the more narrowly economic understanding of living 
standards (and the representation of this argument as a reality) also demonstrates the capacity 
of discourse to shape our notions of what should contribute to happiness and to construct the 
idea that markets and firms are best positioned to meet these ambitions. In this sense, the 
construct of the consumer and its needs, legitimises the extension of firms’ reach into 
previously restricted policy areas.  
 
People as Workers  
The construction of people as consumers subtly changes who policy is intended to benefit. 
Mainstream economic policy discourses assume that if policy can be developed to benefit 
consumers, then the process leading to these ultimate consumer benefits is relatively 
insignificant. While this narrative reduces people to consumers, peoples’ role as workers and 
the importance of work itself is similarly marginalised.  
Moreover, policy discourses construct consumers as powerful actors whose rights must be 
upheld, people as workers are portrayed differently. People’s right to meaningful, secure 
employment and representation, is constructed as less important than, and even oppositional 
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to, consumers’ interests. This portrays workers and consumers as representing two different 
classes of people, rather than different functions of the same person. Furthermore, workers 
are constructed as a resource of the ‘business-friendly environment’, which is developed by 
the State to enable firms to deploy that resource most efficiently.  
Policy makers claim this environment will attract private investment, therefore improving 
economic performance and prosperity. However, it is unclear which sections of society 
benefit. Labour, in particular, is undermined through this restructured society. This 
development is evident in increasing inequality, casualised employment and the decline in 
full-time work, diminished workers’ rights and representation. In particular, regulation 
protecting workers’ rights is constructed as a barrier which threatens the business-friendly 
environment. Therefore, similar to regulation restricting firms’ capacities to grow and 
develop market share, regulation upholding workers’ rights is portrayed as harmful to the 
nation’s economic performance.  
These changes in employment affect vulnerable sections of society most acutely, including 
particularly single parents, young people and low-skilled employees. Consequently, the well-
being of many is eroded. However, this shift is legitimised through the individualisation of 
people as workers. Policy discourses contend that people must adapt to this business-friendly 
environment, by making themselves attractive to business. Thus, peoples’ employment is 
dependent upon their capacity as individuals to perform this role. By contrast, the State’s 
reconfigured role is not to provide people with work, but to create conditions which enable 
the most innovative and entrepreneurial workers to succeed, as a result of their skill and 
ingenuity. This process is claimed to create a more efficient economy, through encouraging 
self-reliance, individualism and entrepreneurialism. Removing barriers to a business-friendly 
environment, such as regulation protecting workers, is legitimised in this context.  
 
People as Farmers 
Similarly, this approach applies to agricultural policy discourses which construct farmers as 
business minded, economically rational individuals and which seek to enable these ‘good’ 
farmers to prosper. Just as policy discourses construct large firms as efficiency maximisers 
and therefore desirable market participants, this same logic is applied to farmers. For 
example, policy such as the Rural Adjustment Scheme compels farmers to adopt productivist 
farming methods, including use of inputs and also expansion of their farms. Farmers unable 
to adapt to this environment risk being cast as ‘unviable’ and exiting the industry.  
As I discuss in the next section, this approach necessitates a mechanistic construction of 
agriculture. The value of farmers is narrowed to their ability to maximise efficiency. Farming 
is portrayed in one-sided terms. Rather than being constructed as a way of life entailing a 
deep association with rural communities, connection to land and to a family history of 
working on that land, farming is instead reduced to the process of converting resources to 
commodities. Farming is framed as a calculable operation that can be governed by addressing 
the simple question of what industry structure maximises efficiency. Larger farms are 
presumed to be the most efficient – through economies and scale, and also through the 
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capacity to most effectively deploy technologies. Consolidated farms, operated by business 
people, are framed as the actors which will help the State meet the broader aims of improving 
the economic performance of agriculture.  
In that regard, policy discourses construct consolidated farms and consolidated firms as 
actors which enhance industry efficiency. Policy frameworks are developed to support these 
actors. This development then raises the question of whether such constructions are desirable, 
and what the potential implications of these constructions could be, particularly for farmers 
and rural communities. 
 
And what of society?  
As I argue throughout this thesis, this process of economic restructuring entails a re-shaping 
of the roles of the State, firms and people. In focusing social and economic policy on the 
policy truths of efficiency, competition and productivity, policy discourses, I suggest, have 
sought to shift power away from people – as citizens, workers and farmers, for example – 
towards an ill-defined population of consumers and firms. It could be generous to say that 
this shift has been presumed to lift Australia’s overall economic performance and enhance the 
well-being of the Australian population. However, given that this restructuring of society has 
led to increased economic inequality, farmer exits, precarious employment and stagnating 
wages, the weaknesses of the assumptions which have underpinned Australian policy become 
clear. Thus, it could be argued that this shift, at least on a structural level, expresses or has 
been motivated by something other than the well-being of the Australian citizenry. This 
observation raises an important question: are the negative consequences of economic and 
social restructuring simply the unfortunate side effects of ill-conceived policy, or should they 
be seen as intentional? Are the arguments underpinning Australian policy discourses in recent 
decades simply flawed and misguided, or are they disingenuous and deceptive? This is a 
difficult question to answer in the confines of this thesis; however, it is an important question 
to raise and, in the analysis below, I identify some suggestive components of an answer.  
Regardless of how this question is answered, it is clear that mainstream policy discourses 
have treated society as an externality, as Michael Pusey has argued. As this thesis has shown, 
workers, farmers and regional Australia are particularly affected. In exploring the changing 
roles of people, the State and firms, and the relationships between these actors, this thesis 
shows how policy discourses have sought to create the conditions for the private ownership 
and control of society, particularly in relation to agriculture.  
 
Making society governable: The case of Australian wheat export market deregulation  
This thesis explores the themes outlined in the previous section by focusing on the case study 
of wheat export market deregulation. This policy shift entailed a substantially different 
approach to the collective organisation underpinning statutory wheat marketing. Liberalising 
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wheat export markets was portrayed by policy makers, and in mainstream policy discourses, 
as an obvious, common sense policy shift. The distillation of wheat marketing policy to a 
focus on wheat prices and supply chain costs, the construction of the AWB’s purpose as 
being centred on the maximisation of growers’ returns and the discursive formation of the 
individual, self-reliant farmer who is focused principally on maximising their returns, are all 
central elements to this. As I show in Chapters 9, 10 and 11, these constructions are integral 
to understanding how the Australian wheat export market came to be deregulated.  
In this manner, the liberalisation of the wheat export market was made to appear as an 
obvious, self-evident shift. This logic was portrayed as common-sense. If liberalised markets 
provide the mechanism through which growers’ wheat prices can be maximised, then this 
policy shift is not only in growers’ best interests, but it represents the action of a responsible 
government. Thus, wheat export market deregulation is not the result of an ideological 
contest: it is simply good policy. In this thesis, I analyse how policy discourses constructed 
this logic as a reality, used to shape wheat marketing policy.  
I examine this case study by constructing a genealogy a wheat export market deregulation. I 
show how policy discourses carefully and subtly shifted representations of farming values 
and identity, constructed competition and efficiency as the credible objectives of industry 
policy and used technologies of performance to govern the AWB, and then eventually 
dismantle the AWB’s single desk for wheat exports. Furthermore, I show how ‘the social’ 
was erased by policy discourses, how concepts such as equity were marginalised and how 
social and environmental concerns regarding deregulation were externalised.  
 
Rationality 
The restructuring of Australian agriculture, particularly the wheat industry, is made possible 
by the discursive construction of markets as key mechanisms for increasing prosperity. As I 
discussed in the previous section, this shift relies on the construction of prosperity in terms of 
the material conception of consumers’ living standards, which is achievable through efficient 
resource use. Efficiency, it is claimed, is increased by real and potential competition between 
firms. Competition requires liberalised markets. Thus, policy discourses connect prosperity 
with deregulated markets.  
In Australia, the project of reducing State assistance and liberalising markets commenced in 
the 1970s. The Industries Assistance Commission is central to making this shift possible. As 
its title suggests, the IAC initially focused on scrutinising State assistance provided to 
Australian industries. As successive Commonwealth Governments rescinded programs of 
direct financial assistance for industries such as farming, the IAC’s attention turned to 
programs which created barriers to competitive markets. This included the statutory 
marketing boards such as the AWB.  
This is highlighted in its 1983 report ‘The Wheat Industry’. In this report, the IAC questions 
the justification for wheat market regulation, claiming the argument that growers needed to 
be protected from volatile global grain markets and predatory grain traders may have applied 
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in the 1930s, but was now outdated. The IAC suggests that the AWB’s equal redistribution of 
returns among growers distorted market signals and undermined efficiency. Clearly, this 
report highlights the IAC’s preference for liberalised wheat markets. However, as the IAC 
laments, there were no governmental technologies in place to demonstrate the superior 
performance of markets. Furthermore, the collectivism which underpinned Australian 
agricultural policy, such as statutory wheat marketing, remained politically entrenched.  
Thus, I suggest, for agricultural restructuring to occur, policy makers needed to firstly 
reconstruct agriculture and its value to the Australian community. Second, policy makers 
needed to establish technologies such as audit, cost-benefit analysis and performance 
objectives to construct the wheat industry as something which could be governed.  
 
Shaping ‘What Matters’ 
Central to the construction of policy truths such as efficiency, competition and the market, is 
the shaping of knowledge. By shaping what can be known, policy discourses frame how 
problems can be understood and the potential solutions to these problems. This process 
determines what can be considered as legitimate knowledge. In some ways, this can be 
interpreted as a contest between the objective and the subjective, in which policy discourses 
concerning industry, competition, economic and agricultural policy have sought to 
marginalise subjective knowledge as untrustworthy, biased and inaccurate. On the other hand, 
policy discourses have actively worked to establish that ‘objective’ data provides the only 
reliable means of establishing the sorts of ‘concrete’ evidence upon which policy decisions 
can legitimately be made. In particular, knowledge produced by markets, such as prices and 
costs, is constructed as objective, unquestionable data which can be used to determine what 
‘the truth’ of a matter is. For example, in its report into the impacts of grain market 
deregulation, ACIL Tasman (2004) declined to consult growers. Instead, ACIL Tasman 
claimed that growers’ buying and selling activity in markets could indicate their preferences, 
and thus communicate all relevant information growers could provide on the topic of grain 
market deregulation.  
Privileging quantification is integral to this process of producing and legitimising knowledge. 
Quantitative data, such as that produced by markets, is constructed as reliable, objective and 
neutral. In Australian policy discourses, quantification is often used interchangeably with 
measurement, as though the acts of quantifying and measuring are the same. However, more 
than simply providing the means of establishing reality, quantification enables policy makers 
to act upon that reality. This form of action necessitates simplifying knowledge, narrowing 
what can be known to that which can be quantified. This enables policy makers to view 
industries such as agriculture in mechanistic, reductionist terms, thereby reducing highly 
complex industries such as agriculture to matters which can be made solvable through 
calculation (Scott 1998). In turn, quantification enables policy questions to be reduced to 
equations which can be solved through the manipulation of numbers which are distant of the 
world they are claimed to represent. Policy discourses then portray these calculations as a 
reality. Examples include the Royal Commission into Grain Storage, Handling and Transport 
(RCGHST 1988) and its calculation of the $10 per tonne loss incurred to Australian farmers 
201 
 
through regulation of the grain supply chain. Furthermore, Allen Consulting (2000a) and the 
Centre for International Economics (Joint Industry Submission Group 2000) calculated that 
regulation of wheat export marketing cost Australian society up to $360 million per year. 
This data simplifies the role performed by regulation, without considering the value growers 
and supply chain employees may have placed in these regulations. However, econometric 
modelling also provides policy makers with clear, unambiguous data, which can be easily 
communicated as truth. The accuracy of this data, in many ways, is irrelevant. What matters 
is that, in a context where quantitative data is constructed as an objective distillation of what 
reality looks like, calculations concerning the costs of regulation can be used to great political 
effect. In the case of the wheat export industry in Australia, these calculations were used as 
primary evidence of the failures of statutory wheat marketing.  
Conversely, Australian agricultural policy discourses, in particular, have largely constructed 
qualitative data as unreliable evidence. This marginalises evidence based on lived 
experiences and observations. Policy discourses have eschewed the value of subjective data, 
indirectly restricting policy making to those who can produce quantitative data. However, this 
restriction also limits what can be considered in policy debates. Not all phenomena lend 
themselves to quantification. In particular, the social and environmental concerns arising 
from deregulation of Australian agricultural industries are often not easily quantified. As I 
show in Chapter 11, policy makers have consistently rejected the legitimacy of such 
concerns, claiming that they are based on data which is poorly articulated, ambiguous, not 
grounded in evidence and difficult to document.  
This process of constructing legitimate knowledge, through quantification in particular, is 
integral to shaping how the wheat industry can be understood. This narrow construction of 
knowledge simplifies the industry, shearing it of complexity. Importantly, that which matters, 
according to this construction - including prices, productivity, costs and efficiency - is 
decontextualized from the complexities of the social world. Thus, the industry is made 
governable, by legitimising markets and separating the act of restructuring from the perceived 
social and environmental consequences of this structural shift. Furthermore, this separates 
policy makers from the need to substantially consider the social and environmental 
ramifications of this shift. Whereas this process helps to reinforce the distance between policy 
makers and society, policy makers are able to further justify this approach by claiming that 
processes such as allocative efficiency contribute to productivity and raise living standards, 
as indicated by quantitative data generated by markets. Thus, whereas the social world is 
largely erased through this process, structural shifts such as farm consolidation and farmer 
exits are legitimised as being in the nation’s interest.  
 
Policy values: The economic and the social  
The discursive construction of quantitative information as the primary lens through which the 
issue of wheat export marketing can be understood is central to the dismantling of the AWB’s 
single desk. Associated with this legitimation of quantitative data as knowledge, policy 
discourses sought to construct the industry’s economic performance, measurable through 
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growers’ returns, as the only legitimate objective of wheat marketing policy. As with the 
marginalisation of the social through the discrediting of subjective data, policy discourses 
sought to portray socially-focused policy objectives, such as employment and equity, as 
antagonistic towards the primary ambition of efficiency. This process further narrowed the 
values and objectives which could legitimately be included in policy deliberations.  
The IAC helped establish efficiency as the primary goal of industry and agricultural policy. 
Efficiency was claimed to be maximised through liberalised markets, which communicate 
undistorted market signals. This presumption further highlights the claimed importance of 
markets as producers of information. Conversely, this shows how regulation distorting or 
impeding the production of this information was constructed as contrary to the interests of the 
Australian society. Thus, policy discourses sought to separate efficiency from equity in 
policy. Policy makers claimed industry policy should focus on maximising efficiency, 
whereas equity could be more appropriately addressed through mechanisms such as welfare. 
Policy makers use this argument to justify policy designed to enhance allocative efficiency, 
such as structural adjustment policies. Policy discourses claim equity-enhancing measures 
restrict the desired re-allocation of resources towards the most productive resource managers, 
while implying that farmers who are structured out of the industry can receive equitable 
treatment through mechanisms such as welfare. Clearly, for farmers’ sense of well-being, 
purpose and self-esteem, and connection to their land, occupation and community, the 
experience of being forced out of farming and into a reliance on welfare is not commensurate 
with equity. However, equity is portrayed as a welfare issue, not an industry policy issue. 
Thus, policy makers concerned with industry policy need not concern themselves with issues 
related to equity.  
From its genesis, and from the 1948 Wheat Stabilisation Plan in particular, the AWB was 
conceptualised as a mechanism for providing growers with representation and equalising 
growers’ returns. Thus, as mainstream discourses have shifted towards the rationale of 
markets and competition, these central aims of the AWB have been constructed as antithetical 
to the modern policy focus of maximising efficiency. The IAC, among others, claimed the 
AWB distorted markets, due to its role in redistributing returns equally among growers. 
Separating equity and efficiency in wheat marketing policy, constructs this role as irrelevant 
to wheat marketing policy debates. This weakens the legitimacy of arguments favouring the 
maintenance of statutory marketing on the basis that it equalised growers’ returns.  
Policy discourses separate equity from efficiency in industry, economic and competition 
policy. However, equity itself is marginalised as a legitimate policy objective. Policy 
discourses deride equity as reliant upon subjective interpretation. Hence, equity is constructed 
as a vague and value laden concept, as opposed to the certainty communicated by markets 
and objectivity of information such as that expressed through prices and costs. In this regard, 
policy makers construct equity as being difficult to define and quantify. First, policy 
discourses portray equity as having different interpretations. Thus, agreement on what equity 
is, presents a significant challenge. Conversely, it is presumed that markets communicate 
with surety. The market price of a commodity, such as a tonne of wheat, represents the value 
of this commodity, based on market demand. Second, whereas value can be measured 
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through price, equity is less easily quantified. In this context, if equity cannot be quantified, 
then it cannot be based on objective data. In this manner, policy discourses subtly undermine 
the credibility of equity in policy making.  
In addition, competition policy discourses, in particular, claim that liberalised markets are the 
best mechanisms for creating an equitable society. However, in making this claim, policy 
discourses replace equity with fairness. Furthermore, markets are constructed as mechanisms 
for creating fair outcomes. Yet fairness and equity are two different concepts. A system that 
is fair may be impartial and non-discriminatory; however, this system may not necessarily be 
equitable. Socially equitable policy recognises that “there are some things which people 
should have, that there are basic needs that should be fulfilled, that burdens and rewards 
should not be spread too divergently across the community” (Falk, Hampton, Hodgkinson, 
Parker and Rorris 1993, p.2). However, Australian policy discourses present fairness as 
related to an individuals’ capacity to develop and utilise their skills, to assess and manage 
risks, and to respond to market signals. A fair outcome, in this regard, is one which 
appropriately rewards the capacity of an individual in these areas. 
Markets are portrayed as fair, arising from their construction as impartial and neutral 
mechanisms, which produce and respond to objective data. However, markets are equipped to 
communicate prices based upon supply and demand of a product or service, not to understand 
the personal circumstances of a particular buyer and seller. Thus, what matters is the final 
product or service which is being presented to the market by a seller, and the ability of a 
consumer to pay for that product or service. In this manner, removing the concept of equity 
from agricultural policy is significant. Measuring farmers’ value through the wheat they 
produce, for example, removes the significance of context. In farming, context is important. 
The location and quality of land, rainfall and other environmental factors such as frost, fire 
and storms, can all greatly influence a farmer’s capacity to produce wheat for markets. 
Furthermore, structural factors may also influence farmers’ participation in markets. Limited 
marketing knowledge, for example, may undermine farmers’ market participation. However, 
fairness, as constructed by markets, does not consider these factors. Rather, as I discuss in the 
next section, a farmer’s inability to develop their skills, manage risks and respond to markets 
is portrayed as a result of their own failings. Thus, if farmers are not able to learn to market 
their wheat or to protect their farms against drought, then, policy discourses suggest, it is fair 
if markets do not reward farmers for anything other than the value of the wheat they are able 
to produce, regardless of the circumstances.  
 
Technologies of Government 
As Miller and Rose (1990, p.8) suggest, political rationalities, such as the concept of markets 
as apolitical mechanisms for creating efficient and productive industries, “render reality into 
the domain of thought”. In turn, technologies of government “translate thought into the 
domain of reality […] to establish ‘in the world of persons and things’ space and devices for 
acting upon those entities of which they dream and scheme”. Thus, quantification is used to 
construct markets as legitimate producers of knowledge which communicates the reality of 
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farming, for example. This construction, I suggest, makes farming amenable to governing. In 
the case of the Australian wheat industry, wheat prices and costs are constructed as legitimate 
information. In this reality, wheat prices and costs matter, whereas other worlds have been 
erased. Technologies of government make this reality “operable” (Miller and Rose 1990, 
p.8). This process is essential in the deregulation of the wheat export market. Throughout the 
1980s, policy discourses around the wheat industry constructed competition, efficiency and 
markets as policy truths (O’Keeffe 2016c). Farming organisations, as distinct from farmers, 
adopted these concepts and applied them in their vociferous critique of wheat supply chain 
regulation (O’Keeffe 2016c). Yet, despite the legitimation of this rationality, the wheat export 
market was not deregulated until 2008, following the AWB’s involvement in a major 
international scandal. This is a curiosity. As I argue in this thesis, whereas the rationality of 
markets was normalised in policy discourses around the wheat industry, governing regimes 
lacked the technologies to make deregulation possible. In particular, two key actors, farmers 
and the AWB, needed to be reconstructed as subjects which were amenable to governing.  
 
Farmers 
Quantification is used to construct farmers as isolated individuals who are distant from their 
families, communities and land. Farmers’ value is reduced to the capacity to maximise the 
productive use of resources. This constructs farmers as a productive unit to be operationalised 
by the State. Technologies of agency provide governing regimes with the policy architecture 
to make this possible.  
There is a substantial body of research exploring the creation of the self-reliant, self-
governing farmer (for example, Higgins 2002a, 2002b; Higgins and Lockie 2002; Cheshire 
and Lawrence 2005). Policy discourses construct farmers as rational, economic individuals. 
Good farmers are portrayed as those who are competitive, value choice and freedom and 
respond to incentives, as communicated by markets. The good farmer is not reliant upon 
government assistance and does not desire government support. Rather, the good farmer 
makes calculated decisions based upon their interpretation of market signals. Thus, whereas 
this farmer seeks to minimise risk, they also understand risk as being their responsibility to 
manage. In this regard, entrepreneurialism is constructed as moral, responsible behaviour. 
Policy discourses also construct good farming as an attitude, and as an adherence to a set of 
values, which by design, reflect the broader ambitions of deregulation. Fundamentally, good 
farmers are constructed as interested solely in maximising their returns. The intention to 
maximise returns, above all else, is portrayed as common sense.  
If this construction is portrayed as representative of the good farmer, then policy makers 
argue that policy must support these farmers. Thus, if good farmers desire the choice, 
freedoms and potential to maximise returns promised by deregulation, then it can be argued 
that deregulation is for farmers. Conversely, policy discourses then construct regulation, not 
only as inhibiting the good farmer, but as supporting the less-efficient, less-responsible and 
less-skilled farmers. Statutory marketing regulation is constructed as bad policy for two key 
reasons. First, market regulation undermines industry efficiency by preventing the re-
205 
 
allocation of resources that may occur in a liberalised market, as farmers who are less 
equipped to manage the risks associated with marketing exit the industry. Second, policy 
discourses construct this as an issue of fairness. In this sense, regulation is unfair as it taxes 
the good farmers, while supporting less-capable farm managers.  
To support this construction of the ‘good farmer’, and the portrayal of efficiency and 
productivity as the key guiding principles of agricultural production, policy discourses 
employ technologies of agency to shape farmers’ conduct. Policy such as wheat export 
market deregulation, or the ‘Agriculture – Advancing Australia’ package, is premised upon 
the idea that farmers should prioritise skill development, particularly marketing, financial 
management and business management. These skills are framed as necessary attributes of the 
good, modern farmer. The State constructs itself as a facilitator, enabling farmers to develop 
these skills. The State as enabler is framed as a means of promoting individual empowerment. 
Yet I argue that this framing is coercive and designed to re-construct the role of farmers, 
primarily to assist successful policy implementation. Farmers unwilling or unable to develop 
these skills and attitudes are constructed as bad farmers. Yet, this construction is based upon 
what the State – governed by a set of constructed truths – needs from farmers, rather than 
what farmers perceive to be reflective of good or bad farming. Furthermore, farmer exits are 
legitimised. Farm exits are portrayed as the result of individual failings, as the necessary 
process of shedding the least efficient farmers from the industry. In turn, policy discourses 
communicate to farmers that, if they want to remain in farming, they must adopt farm 
practices which prioritise efficiency and productivity. Thus, alternatives to productivism in 
Australia receive limited support from policy makers.  
The Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper is a further extension of this discursive 
construction. This paper portrays farms as investment targets. Rather than critique the 
structural changes which have undermined farmers’ security, such as consolidated 
commodities markets, the White Paper aims to support farmers to source the necessary 
private capital to survive in this environment, which it constructs as a part of farming. The 
White Paper laments the limited private investment in Australian farming as a weakness 
which farmers must address to remain competitive. This framing, I suggest, transfers State 
responsibility for farming towards the individual capacities of farmers to attract capital.  
Thus, the construction of the good farmer as a business minded, economically rational 
individual who does not value their connection to land or community, is an essential part of 
agricultural deregulation. In the past two decades in particular, Australian agricultural policy 
has sought to nurture this construction, which helps to make the political rationality of 
markets governable. Related to the narrowing of wheat marketing policy to the maximisation 
of growers’ returns, as well as to the construction of growers as being primarily interested in 
maximising their returns, to further the project of wheat industry deregulation, policy makers 
reconstructed the AWB’s value to focus on maximising growers’ returns.   
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The AWB 
In 1983, the IAC identified the absence of performance objectives for the AWB as a key 
limitation in assessing its performance, which it presents as a key barrier to deregulation of 
the wheat export market. Thus, the IAC recommended establishment of performance 
objectives to allow policy makers - specifically, members of parliament - to assess the 
AWB’s performance against these objectives. Performance objectives are presented as a 
means of making the AWB more accountable and transparent. However, I suggest that this 
shift intentionally narrows the AWB’s purpose.  
As a result, the AWB’s role was narrowed to focus on maximising growers’ returns while not 
taxing domestic consumers (IAC 1983, p.59). This objective simplifies the AWB and makes 
its performance visible and legible, in the sense that its success can be easily estimated by 
examining the returns it is able to achieve for growers. In turn, the AWB is compelled to 
focus upon improving its performance according to this objective. Thus, any roles performed 
by the AWB which are external to its stated performance objective, are diminished. In turn, 
the AWB also begins to perceive its value in this manner. This focus on maximising returns 
is thus constructed by policy makers as a reality, and accepted by the AWB as such. This 
acceptance then legitimises the narrowing of the AWB to focus on this objective. If the AWB 
argues that its value lies in its capacity to obtain premium prices through exerting market 
power, then policy makers can justifiably argue that its purpose should be assessed 
accordingly.  
There is a more subtle shift associated with this use of technologies of performance. The 
implementation of performance objectives and measurement of performance through audit, 
reconceptualises statutory marketing from having value for growers, towards being 
considered in terms of its measurable performance, which is presumed to be in consumers’ 
interests. Critically, this performance is calculable; however, it is not comparable to the 
performance that would otherwise be achieved in liberalised markets. This perceived need to 
compare performance in regulated and unregulated markets undergirds the significance of 
econometric modelling in constructing an alternate reality, albeit one that is based upon 
questionable assumptions of firms and market behaviour. Nevertheless, this technology 
enabled policy makers to project the performance of liberalised markets, and compare this 
performance with that of the AWB as a statutory marketer. All the factors that are potentially 
significant, in relation to this debate around wheat export market deregulation, are narrowed 
to the much simpler question of which of these market structures perform better, in terms of 
maximising growers’ returns without taxing domestic consumers. This focus marginalises 
arguments favouring wheat export market regulation which do not relate to growers’ returns 
and costs borne by consumers. Subsequently econometric modelling such as that performed 
by Allen Consulting (2000a) showed that liberalised markets would outperform market 
regulation. The limitations of this modelling, such as the assumption that deregulation of the 
wheat export market would result in a $5 per tonne drop in supply chain costs, escaped 
scrutiny, amidst the easily communicable findings of this research, which placed a monetary 
value on the costs of regulation upon the nation.  
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Consolidated farms as efficiency maximisers  
Allen Consulting’s acknowledgement that deregulation is likely to create “winners and 
losers” (2000b) implies that the losers are those who cannot adapt. Farmer exits are 
constructed as an individual problem of poor planning and limited adaptability, rather than a 
structural problem. This focus on adaptability is constantly highlighted throughout policy 
discourses around agriculture. For example, the Productivity Commission’s 2010 assessment 
of wheat export market deregulation and its impacts, responds to growers’ legitimate 
concerns about deregulation by asserting that growers need to adapt to this new reality. 
Furthermore, the 2015 Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper calls on farmers to develop 
“adaptive farm and business management strategies that take account of the risks they face” 
(Commonwealth Government 2015, p.78). As a result, farmers’ concerns around policy 
shifts, such as the deregulation of the wheat export market, are not received as legitimate 
policy criticisms. Instead, policy makers respond by implying that these changes are in the 
national interest and that farmers must simply adapt their practice and expectations to fit this 
new reality.  
Policy discourses suggest that farmers who are unable to do so, may incur the “short term 
pain” of exiting the industry (Productivity Commission 2010, p.86). However, this ‘pain’ is 
portrayed as an insignificant problem, in relation to the presumed national benefits of 
restructuring. The facilitation of farmer exits involves the re-allocation of farm resources 
from the presumably least efficient farmers to the most efficient, which is constructed as 
beneficial for society. This argument legitimises farm consolidation, which is assumed to be 
an important aspect of maximising productivity. In this sense, policy discourses prioritise the 
large, consolidated farms as actors which are able to maximise productive use of the nations’ 
resources, while turning attention away from the structural problems created through this 
process.  
Emerging corporate power in Australian agriculture 
The central aims of this thesis are to understand how agricultural restructuring - specifically, 
the deregulation of the Australian wheat export market - was made possible in Australia. 
Further to this, I aim to understand why this policy shift was implemented. Who did policy 
makers envisage would benefit from wheat export market deregulation? What was this shift 
intended to achieve? Ostensibly, wheat export market deregulation was claimed to benefit 
wheat growers. However, as I demonstrated in the previous section, this claim is based on a 
construction of wheat growers as entrepreneurial, economically rational individuals. I suggest 
that this construction is designed to make agricultural restructuring possible, by focusing 
growers’ identity upon economic ambitions, while decontextualising growers from their 
families, communities and connection to land. Therefore, if the claim that growers benefit 
from deregulation is based on a politicised construction, the question of why this policy shift 
was implemented remains unanswered.  
I suggest that it is important to view this policy shift in relation to broader policy discourses 
around competition policy, labour market reform, and reform in other agricultural industries. 
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In doing so, I return to the rationality of markets as mechanisms for increasing competition 
and therefore maximising efficiency and productivity. I pose the question: Which market 
structures and which actors do policy makers consider are best equipped to maximise 
efficiency? Throughout this thesis, I draw upon a collection of primarily mainstream policy 
discourses, produced by the Commonwealth Government, government authorities and 
departments and consultancy firms employed by government. These documents focus on the 
wheat industry, though they also have a broader focus on agriculture, competition policy and 
labour markets and employment.  
The common theme in these documents is that competitive markets (with competition defined 
as real or potential competition) maximise efficiency and productivity, which is essential in 
raising living standards. In addition, firms are portrayed as integral to this process. Driven by 
commercial disciplines, firms either operate efficiently and productively, or they succumb to 
more efficient and productive firms. However, there is a clear preference for large firms, 
believed to be the most efficient actors. Thus, policy makers are ambivalent towards 
consolidated markets featuring dominant, though presumably efficient, firms. Contestability 
theory legitimises this approach. This theory redefines competition, allowing oligopolistic 
and monopolistic markets to be portrayed as competitive.  
This portrayal of firms, markets and competition leads to the construction of the ‘business-
friendly environment’ as a vehicle for improving living standards. According to this 
argument, an environment which encourages corporate investment will attract firms and 
stimulate employment growth. However, the great weakness of this argument is that, in 
creating a business-friendly environment – one which, however, features precarious 
employment, underemployment and limited employee rights and representation - the quality 
of life of many Australians has been affected. Nevertheless, policy makers continue to 
construct firms and firms’ investment as integral to maximising Australia’s economic 
performance, which, in turn, is presumed to reflect the well-being of Australian citizens.  
This approach is particularly evident in the Australian Government’s Agricultural 
Competitiveness White Paper, which emphasises farmers’ need to make their farms attractive 
to investors such as domestic superannuation funds and private equity funds. This goal is 
related to the Commonwealth Government’s perception of agriculture as the next potential 
driver of economic growth, following the decline of the mining boom. To fulfil this ambition, 
private capital is required. Thus, farmers are important in operationalising this aim. The 
White Paper illustrates a range of potential investment options, each of which involve farmers 
ceding some level of ownership and control over their farms. The construction of private 
investment as integral to farming raises the possibility for farm decision-making to be driven 
by the needs of private investors, a development which in turn has the potential to re-shape 
agricultural production in Australia. The White Paper laments the long-term nature of 
farming as a potential inhibitor of investment, such as that from private equity, which has 
typically been used to extract short-term profits for investors. The potential land-use change 
emerging from this shift could exacerbate environmental problems, linked to an over-reliance 
on productivist farming methods (Lawrence et al. 2013; Pritchard et al. 2007). In addition, 
increased private investment in Australian farming could ensure that food production 
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decision-making in Australia is driven by investors, who may not make their decisions in 
either the national interest or farmers’ interest.  
This shift towards private investment is framed by the White Paper as an essential aspect of 
modern farming. Rather than rely upon government support, farmers instead must make their 
farms appealing to investors to attract the necessary capital to maintain and expand their 
properties. This reconstruction of farms, and of farming, has the potential to undermine 
farmers’ autonomy, while shifting control of Australia’s food production to private investors 
such as private equity firms or superannuation funds. This shift is either predicated on policy 
makers’ assumption that private investors will not develop control over agriculture due to 
investments in farmland, or reflects an ambivalence towards this potential occurring.  
Returning to the concept of the ‘business-friendly environment’, and policy makers’ desire to 
attract investment into Australian industries, I now turn to the deregulation of the wheat 
export market. Proponents of this shift argued that it was in farmers’ interests, and that it was 
all about farmers’ ability to choose whom they sold their grain to. These arguments 
constructed a perception of competitive wheat markets featuring large numbers of buyers, 
with farmers holding power in their relationships with buyers. Yet the reality of wheat export 
market deregulation is very different. Regional grain markets, in particular, are highly 
concentrated. State wheat markets are controlled by dominant market actors. The dominant 
firms are typically those which control supply chain infrastructure. Thus, wheat markets 
across Australia, and wheat supply chains, are highly concentrated. For growers, this situation 
may not reflect the choice and freedom promised by policy makers.  
The relationship between supply chain ownership and market share is particularly important. 
Firms recognise that, unless they develop their own supply chain infrastructure, through 
acquisitions or new developments, their capacity to develop a share of the wheat market will 
be limited. Thus, there is a significant cost associated with developing substantial market 
share. Consequently, as I show in this thesis, these markets are not contestable. Entry is 
ostensibly free, but market share is dependent upon sizable investments. Thus, entry is only 
genuinely available to those firms capable of making these investments. As a result, two 
major developments have occurred. First, firms that own infrastructure have become 
acquisition targets for larger firms seeking to gain entry to this market. This process has 
exacerbated market concentration. Second, investments in the industry, in ports and storage 
facilities, have only been initiated by well-capitalised, transnational value chain managers. 
These firms, such as Bunge, Louis Dreyfus, COFCO, Wilmar and Cargill, perceive the 
Australian wheat industry as a part of their global wheat sourcing network. The Australian 
wheat industry represents a “piece of the puzzle” (Singh 2015a), which, until the wheat 
export market was deregulated, was not accessible by these firms.  
Policy makers could have anticipated these developments - which raises the question of 
whether this is an intended outcome of deregulation. Firms are constructed by policy 
discourses as integral to efficiency and productivity. Creating a business-friendly 
environment is portrayed as integral to enhancing living standards. Policy discourses assume 
that firms lack power and desire to influence markets and policy makers. Thus, in the 
examples drawn upon in this thesis, it is clear that policy makers in Australia in practice 
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desire the involvement of large, well-capitalised firms in markets and industries. Therefore, it 
is difficult to reach any other conclusion than that concentrated wheat markets featuring 
primarily vertically integrated, transnational firms, was at the very least desired by policy 
makers, as a scenario which would likely enhance the wheat industry’s efficiency and 
economic performance.  
I now address the assumption that agricultural firms do not have power in markets, nor 
influence policy development. In Chapter 12, I drew upon resource dependency theory to 
explore how agricultural corporations use strategies such as acquisitions and mergers to 
develop and maintain power. Drawing upon documentation produced by firms participating 
in the Australian wheat industry, I show how firms perceive competitors as a potential profit 
risk, and use horizontal and vertical mergers and acquisitions to either reduce the level of 
competition in markets, or to deter potential competitors. Furthermore, firms view regulation 
and trade barriers as a risk to their capacity to expand into new geographic regions and 
markets. Responding to this risk, firms draw together political resources to shape their 
regulatory environment. Firms lobby governments to reduce restrictions of trade and scrutiny 
of markets; actions which are framed by the ABCD companies as harmful to food security, 
farmers and consumers. Firms use discursive techniques to construct their strategies of 
expansion and growth as being integral to global food security. In this construction, firms 
portray food security as an issue which can only be addressed if national governments and 
governance agencies remove restrictions on trade and finance, and allow them to fulfil their 
key task of connecting ‘harvests to homes’. In that sense, firms portray their goals and 
purpose as being shared by national governments and international governance agencies, yet 
also actively shape discourse around food industry regulation to produce a favourable policy 
environment.  
Thus, the assumptions that firms do not have power over policy and markets are clearly false, 
yet are uncritically applied to Australian industry and competition policy. Policy discourses 
often construct firms as inherently good. Firms are described as maximising efficiency and 
returning gains from these efficiencies to consumers. They are constructed as responding to 
markets, not as influencing markets. In this regard, they are portrayed as not having power. 
Instead, the consumer has power. The firms’ role is to satisfy consumer needs, through 
responding to changing preferences, as articulated by market signals.  
However, this interpretation of firm behaviour is flawed. Firms use resources to develop and 
protect their power through markets and policy interventions. Through the inability, or 
unwillingness, to recognise this power, policy makers have created an environment which 
allows firms to develop and use their power – not just in markets, but in policy formation. 
Fundamentally, this environment transfers power in the industry towards agricultural 
corporations. Policy makers’ incapacity to account for this power is a fundamental 
shortcoming. In addition, if we return to the basic assumptions under which the wheat export 
market was deregulated – that competitive pressure will compel firms to increase efficiencies 
and return the gains of these efficiencies to consumers - then this greater narrative is revealed 
as having numerous flaws. First, in the absence of competitive pressure, through actual or 
potential competition, it could be presumed that firms will not prioritise efficiency, and will 
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not return any gains from efficiency to consumers, or producers. Subsequently, the economic 
projections of cost savings in a deregulated market appear to hold little weight. Instead, what 
has occurred is the shift in control from a statutory marketing authority, towards privately 
owned firms which retain regional monopolies, yet have minimal compulsion to either 
support growers or consumers. Thus, wheat export market deregulation should be viewed as a 
substantial failure, which has ultimately facilitated a shift in industry control towards 
privately-owned firms.   
Summary 
This thesis analyses the case study of wheat export market deregulation, which I argue should 
be viewed as part of the broader restructuring of Australian society and economy. To 
understand the liberalisation of the wheat export market and how it was made possible, I have 
drawn on areas of research which at first glance might appear tacitly connected (or 
disconnected) from wheat export market policy. In analysing how the deregulation of the 
wheat export market has been made possible, I examine the construction of knowledge, 
values and identities, to conform to the rationality of liberalised markets. These constructions 
create a reality which makes the shift from the public to the private appear as a logical, 
common sense solution to the challenges facing society. I use the case study of farming and, 
specifically, wheat export market deregulation, to show how this shift has been made possible 
in this context.  To make this reality operable, I show how governmental technologies, such 
as audit, the entrepreneurial individual, cost-benefit analysis, performance objectives, 
econometric modelling and the consumer were used to act upon society, to make the shift 
towards liberalisation of the wheat export market happen. The construction of firms as 
efficiency-maximisers which are relatively powerless in relation to markets and consumers is 
central to this shift. As a consequence, policy makers have either ignored, or failed to 
recognise, the capacity of firms to shape their external environments to create favourable 
operating conditions: a ‘business friendly environment’. Thus, the interests of firms have 
been portrayed by policy makers as essentially being the interests of the broader society. In 
the case of wheat export market deregulation, the liberalisation of this market has enabled 
transnational firms to expand their geographical footprint and extend their global value 
chains. On the other hand, farmers, whom policy makers claimed were the primary 
beneficiaries of wheat export market deregulation, contend with consolidated markets instead 
of choice, declining autonomy rather than individual freedom and, in some cases, feelings of 
disempowerment and disenfranchisement.  
 
 
212 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
213 
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Conclusion 
Phd by Publication 
As I argue throughout this thesis, Australian wheat export marketing policy has been 
narrowed to focus on economic concepts such as efficiency, and market indicators such as 
prices and costs. The wheat industry, however, is substantially more complex than this 
construction suggests. Thus, in this research, I have sought to understand how this construct 
has been made possible, how it has been used to govern the wheat industry and, to understand 
what the outcomes of this shift have been.  
There are three key parts to this research, each of which has required different, albeit related, 
approaches. I am able to explore many of complex dimensions of this issue by using the PhD 
by Publication as an approach to research and learning. As Dowling et al. (2012) have 
highlighted, the PhD by Publication is well-suited to multi-disciplinary research, as this thesis 
is. However, rather than identifying a research method, and a theoretical approach (or a mix 
of different methods and approaches) at the commencement of this research, I have used the 
flexibility of the PhD by Publication to address the research questions through a series of 
discrete, individual articles, drawing on different theoretical approaches as necessary. For 
example, at the outset of this study, I did not envisage using sociology of quantification. 
However, throughout my research it became apparent that quantification was a significant 
factor in making agricultural restructuring possible. I used the flexibility of the PhD by 
Publication to then investigate this problem.  
In addition, my use of the PhD by Publication has allowed me to develop a richer analysis 
than may otherwise have been possible through traditional approaches. In treating my 
published articles as a form of ‘data’, my analysis in the discussion chapter was then able to 
interpret what these articles, as a body of work, reveal about the broader restructuring of 
Australian society. Thus, I was able to analyse this body of work, in the way that traditional 
forms of empirical data could be analysed, by drawing out key themes emerging from the 
aggregate collection of articles, which are not necessarily apparent when considering the 
articles as individual pieces. This approach enabled me to first avoid developing a discussion 
chapter which repeated the discussion sections of my individual articles and, second, to 
reveal new findings which may not have emerged otherwise.  
In this sense, this research helps to contribute to understanding of how a PhD by Publication 
can be approached and how it can be used. More than a means of developing publication 
outputs throughout candidature, this method can be used as an approach to the research itself.  
 
Creating a reality of markets, firms and consumers  
In this thesis, I analyse discursive constructions of the market, consumers, producers, 
efficiency, competition and productivity, and their application to the Australian wheat 
industry. Drawing on the work of Rose (1996, 1993), Miller and Rose (2008, 1991, 1991), 
Dean (1999), Higgins (2005, 2002a, 2002b, 2001a, 2001b) and Higgins and Lockie (2002) in 
particular, I analyse the discursive construction of the rationality of markets, firms and 
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consumers. I argue that policy makers have sought to construct this rationality as a reality, 
around which society must be organised. Central to the construction of this reality, is the 
shaping of knowledge, values and identities.  
Policy discourses construct knowledge as the result of quantitative analysis. In this sense, to 
quantify something is to know it. This construction of knowledge has significant implications 
for how we understand and interpret the World. In addition, it influences what matters in 
relation to policy, particularly policy which is portrayed by policy makers as ‘evidence-
based’. Furthermore, policy discourses have sought to shape what we value as citizens and as 
a society. For example, quality of life, as an overarching policy ambition, has been subtly 
replaced by living standards, which are portrayed as consumption-centric and can be 
appeased by firms in liberalised markets. In this regard, what we value, or what policy 
discourses suggest we should value, is achievable through the construction of an environment 
where firms’ involvement in our lives is enhanced and markets are portrayed as the co-
ordinator of these firms. Thus, a ‘business-friendly environment’ is framed as a good 
development for society. Coupled with these shifts, is the construction of identities as an 
important facet in the neoliberalisation of Australian society. Citizens are reconstructed as 
consumers. This claim is not novel. However, in this thesis I argue that it is central to the 
reality of markets and firms, the rationality of neoliberalism. In addition, as I expand upon in 
the next section, farmers construction as individualistic and entrepreneurial business people 
shapes what it is to be a ‘good farmer’. This creates a reality where increased private 
investment is portrayed as common sense. Furthermore, the construction of firms’ identities 
is also important to this narrative. Firms are cast as being central to the betterment of society, 
as having an interest in society’s welfare above all else. This construction is clearly 
misleading in the modern society, where the shareholder and their interests have been 
constructed as the primary concern of the firm.  
I examine the creation and re-production of these truths, their instrumentalisation to facilitate 
wheat export market deregulation, and the shortcomings of these ideas in relation to this 
policy change. This analysis then leads to the question of whether this shift simply an 
example of an ill-conceived policy, based on flawed logic? Or, is there a broader purpose? In 
this thesis, I argue that deregulation of the wheat export market should not be viewed as an 
isolated policy change, but part of what can be understood as a broader project of societal 
restructuring. Which raises the question, if deregulation is a project, then what purpose was 
this project intended to serve?  
This question, I have suggested, could be addressed by analysing what this project has 
created. That is, concentrated wheat export markets populated with vertically integrated 
transnational firms. I argue that this shift was at the very least desired by policy makers, and 
was driven by the assumption that, through supporting these actors, industry efficiency would 
be maximised. Throughout this thesis I develop this argument by showing how discourses 
around industry and competition have constructed large firms as being favourable actors, 
which assist the State to increase efficiency and productivity. Large, consolidated firms are 
portrayed as having the capital and organisational resources which can enable them to 
contribute to increased industry efficiency, thus raising the contribution of agriculture to the 
216 
 
national economy. The resultant oligopolistic market structure is legitimised by the 
application of contestability theory in Australian industry and competition policy. 
Contestability theory posits that while wheat markets may appear concentrated, potential 
competition governs incumbent firms. However, as I show in Chapter 5, this is a flawed 
theory, which is misused in the case of the wheat export market. Furthermore, deregulation 
was implemented on the flawed assumption that firms did not exercise power over their 
environment. As I show in Chapters 12, building upon growers’ expressions of 
disempowerment and exploitation from grain traders (O’Keeffe and Neave 2017), this 
assumption of firm behaviour is clearly misplaced. The result is an industry in which 
transnational firms control the wheat supply chain and export market, in a policy environment 
where it is presumed that they do not possess power over markets.   
 
Re-allocating resources 
The structural adjustment policies of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s are an important, related 
policy area which has contributed to the neoliberalisation of Australian agriculture. Policy 
makers argued that generalised financial assistance created inefficiencies, through supporting 
the least efficient farmers, in terms of productive outputs, to remain in the industry. 
Removing this support was framed as a positive development that was in the Nation’s 
economic interests, as it facilitated the re-allocation of resources from the least efficient, least 
productive farms, to the most efficient farm managers. However, I suggest, the normalisation 
of this process depends upon a reductionist approach to agriculture, which decontextualises 
farmers from their communities, families and land. Farmers are constructed as replaceable 
and movable instruments, whose purpose is to facilitate the productive use of resources. 
Thus, farmers’ value is narrowed to their capacity to achieve this aim, externalising the social 
dimensions of farming. Structural adjustment is portrayed as an essential and, in some cases, 
desirable policy outcome, which increases efficiency. The effect upon farmers, their families 
and communities, is not adequately recognised by policy makers, who presume that welfare 
is the most appropriate mechanism for meeting farmers’ needs. This construction has allowed 
policy makers to distance policy such as wheat export marketing deregulation, from its 
broader social consequences.  
 
Making society governable: The case of Australian wheat export market deregulation  
This project is made possible through discursive constructions of knowledge, value and 
identity. These constructions support the rationale of markets as mechanisms for maximising 
the productive and efficient use of the Nation’s resources. This conceptualisation of markets 
underpins wheat export market deregulation in Australia, where policy was narrowed to focus 
on the question of how to maximise growers’ returns on their wheat. As such, efficiency, 
rather than stability, security or equity, was constructed as the primary policy objective. 
Equity, for example, was constructed as an ambition which undermined the more pertinent 
ambition of efficiency. Thus, equity was separated from efficiency. Beyond this 
externalisation of equity as a legitimate objective of industry policy, equity was also 
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discredited as an overarching ambition of government policy. Equity is replaced with 
fairness, which, policy makers have argued, is best achieved through markets which reward 
endeavour and innovation.  
The prioritisation of economic efficiency over social and environmental objectives leads to 
the importance of knowledge and how it has been used to influence policy in Australia. In the 
example of wheat export marketing, wheat price premiums and supply chain costs were 
constructed as the only legitimate data which could determine the market structure which 
enhanced growers’ returns. Therefore, data produced by markets and economic projections 
through modelling is constructed as representing the ‘truth’. The construction of markets as 
apolitical, objective mechanisms for creating knowledge and showing the behaviours and 
intentions of market participants is integral to this process. This framing reduces that which 
matters, in a policy sense, to the information communicated through markets. Quantification 
is integral to this process, as is the systematic dismantling of qualitative, subjective data, 
portrayed by policy discourses as biased, unreliable and ambiguous. Conseqeuntly, growers 
were marginalised, as their capacity to contribute to the policy debate around wheat export 
market deregulation, in a way that policy makers deemed to be meaningful, was substantially 
undermined. For example, inquiries completed by Irving et al. (2000) and the Productivity 
Commission (2010) dismissed growers’ articulation of their experiences and observations as 
having little empirical value in comparison with quantitative analyses such as the 
econometric modelling projections of Allen Consulting (2000a).  
 
Reconstructing farmers 
Furthermore, the construction of growers as self-reliant, business-minded and economically 
rational actors is pivotal to agricultural restructuring. First, this construction enables policy 
makers to portray farmers as wanting what deregulated markets supposedly offer, such as 
choice, freedom and the capacity to maximise incomes. In addition, policy discourses have 
portrayed farmers who desire these objectives as ‘good farmers’. This construction has been 
developed through a series of policies, such as the Agriculture – Advancing Australia 
package, the Structural Adjustment Policies which preceded it, the 1992 National Drought 
Policy, and policy documents such as the 2015 Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper 
and the 2016 policy paper ‘Smart Farming’. These documents prioritise entrepreneurialism 
and risk management as good behaviours, and similarly, portray productivist farming, such as 
farm consolidation and the use of technology, as integral to this idea of the good farmer. 
Thus, these behaviours, attitudes and practices are rewarded through policy. Government 
constructs itself as an enabler of these good behaviours, though, as I argue in this thesis, 
government coercively shapes farmers’ behaviours and values, instrumentalising farmers to 
meet the broader ambitions of maximising efficiency and productivity of resource use. 
Farmers, in this regard, are ‘governed at a distance’. Farmers are told to be independent and 
self-reliant. Ironically, through attracting private investment, farmers’ autonomy and 
independence is potentially undermined, as business decisions affecting the farm may be 
driven by investors’ interests.  
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The construction of the good farmer normalises agricultural restructuring, which is framed as 
a common-sense policy shift in farmers’ interests, reflecting responsible governance. The 
good farmer eschews government assistance, embraces competition and risk and, accepts 
their successes or failures as their own. Conversely, this construction enables policy makers 
to discredit farmers’ opposition towards deregulation as grounded in nostalgic support for 
statutory marketing that is based upon familiarity, rather than objective policy analysis. 
Furthermore, these farmers are implicitly framed as reliant upon government assistance, and 
therefore as inefficient farmers which undermine efficiency through their presence in the 
industry. Thus, structural adjustment and programs such as wheat export marketing which 
facilitate structural adjustment are constructed in beneficial terms, as it will facilitate the exits 
of these farmers from the industry.  
 
Technologies of Performance 
The concept of performance, as opposed to value, is important in this process. Farmers’ 
performance, and therefore worth to society, is captured through their efficiency and 
productivity. The perceived need to assess the AWB’s performance caused policy makers to 
first establish performance objectives for the AWB and then to measure performance using 
audit. As farmers were constructed as primarily focused on maximising their returns, the 
purpose of the AWB was narrowed to focus on this performance objective. Audit was 
ostensibly used to improve the AWB’s transparency. However, this technology shaped how 
the AWB perceived its own role, and what it considered to be important. Furthermore, the 
AWB, among other proponents of statutory marketing, then justified statutory marketing in 
these terms, legitimising this shift. Policy makers then used cost-benefit analysis and 
econometric modelling to demonstrate the limitations of statutory marketing in maximising 
growers’ returns. The effectiveness of these technologies is in their apparent unimportance. 
They are portrayed as simple, relatively boring policy instruments which can present an 
unbiased and objective reality. Furthermore, in the case of cost-benefit analysis, audit and 
econometric modelling, these technologies use data produced by markets, which are similarly 
constructed as apolitical and pure mechanisms for determining value and revealing 
behaviours. However, as I argue in this thesis, these constructions are used to shape how 
value is created, what has value and how this value can be understood. Furthermore, through 
focusing on knowledge created in markets, policy discourses around agricultural restructuring 
and wheat export market deregulation have delegitimised the social.  
Developing a genealogy of wheat export marketing regulation allows me to examine wheat 
industry deregulation as a project of neoliberalism, by identifying the seemingly minor 
discursive shifts which have made deregulation possible. As early as 1983, the year that the 
Hawke Government was elected and the IAC released its significant inquiry into the wheat 
industry marketing and assistance, policy makers began to construct the rationale of markets, 
competition and commercial firms as integral to Australia’s prosperity. This construction was 
portrayed as a reality, underpinned by objective and neutral data produced by markets. 
Technologies of agency and performance were used to make this reality operable, by shifting 
constructions of individuals, organisations and policy values. Genealogical research has 
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allowed me to trace these constructions, and to connect them to the broader projects of wheat 
export market deregulation and agricultural restructuring.  
 
Emerging corporate power in Australian agriculture  
Wheat export market deregulation has created concentrated regional export markets. This 
shift has not substantially lessened the bulk handling companies’ control of wheat supply 
chain networks, including storage and port facilities, as predicted by Allen Consulting’s 
(2000a) influential study. It could be argued that this shift has failed to achieve its promised 
outcomes. However, in broader policy discourses, focused on competition policy, for 
example, there are distinctly different interpretations of what competition is. Drawing on 
contestability theory, competition is claimed to represent potential and real competition. 
Thus, the aim of policy which intends to create competitive markets, is not simply to 
facilitate the involvement of numerous firms in this market. Rather, it is to reduce the barriers 
to competition which create the possibility for potential new market entrants to challenge 
incumbents. Policy makers claim that this threat potential competition will compel incumbent 
firms to maximise efficiency. Therefore, markets featuring monopolistic or oligopolistic 
firms are tolerated, as long as there is the potential for new firms to challenge their market 
position. There are two significant problems with the application of this idea to the Australian 
wheat export market. First, this argument presumes that the removal of regulatory barriers to 
entry will be sufficient to make a market contestable. However, the capacity of firms to 
develop a share of the wheat export market is dependent upon their ownership of supply 
chain infrastructure. Therefore, external firms need to either acquire incumbents which own 
infrastructure, or develop new facilities. This effectively represents a market entry cost, 
which only transnational firms which are well-capitalised have the capacity to meet. 
Therefore, the market may be open to competition, though this competition is restricted and 
market access costs incoming firms. Second, growers were promised choice in whom they 
sold their wheat to. This portrayed growers as possessing power in deregulated markets. 
However, this is not necessarily the case. Where markets are concentrated, choice is 
fundamentally restricted. As found by O’Keeffe and Neave (2017), this limited competition 
has fundamentally undermined growers perceptions of their own market power.  
Therefore, if policy makers were ambivalent towards the actual levels of competition in 
markets, what does this tell us about policy makers’ perceptions of firms? First, firms are 
portrayed as lacking the desire and capacity to exert power over policy development and also 
markets. Thus, the presence of large firms controlling significant market share is excused by 
policy makers, who rely upon contestability theory to claim that, in such cases, markets are 
still competitive. Furthermore, policy discourses construct the idea of large firms as having 
achieved a dominant market position due to their superior management and capacity to meet 
the needs of consumers. Therefore, it is claimed that, despite markets appearing to be 
concentrated, privatisation, marketization and the facilitation of firms’ entry into areas of 
social and economic life previously controlled by governments will improve efficiency, 
productivity and consumers’ living standards. This construction leads to the idea of the 
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business-friendly environment, which supposedly encourages firms to invest in the Australian 
economy, to the betterment of Australian society.  
By narrowing the criteria for ‘what matters’ to that which is apportioned value in markets and 
constructing firms as the key actors which are able to maximise this value, policy discourses 
frame market liberalisation and the incursion of firms into Australian society as being a 
common-sense shift. This construction is silent on the capacity of firms to exert power over 
markets, supply chain participants and consumers.  Thus, it is argued that the restructuring of 
society, while in the interests of firms, is in the broader interests of Australian people, 
specifically, Australian consumers.  
However, this approach has the potential to create a substantial power imbalance in the 
industry. Firms which have been attracted to the deregulated wheat export market, such as 
ADM, Cargill, Bunge, Louis Dreyfus, COFCO and Glencore, should be viewed as global 
value chain managers. These firms develop profitability by extending their value chains into 
new regions and markets. This strategy provides these firms with extensive power within 
global agriculture. In behaving as though firms do not possess power, policy makers have 
exposed Australian growers, millers and logistics firms to significant power imbalances in 
their relationships with these firms. Rather than improving the capacity of growers to 
maximise their incomes from wheat, growers and other wheat industry participants are placed 
in a vulnerable position, undermining their security in the wheat industry.  
 
Further Research 
Furthermore, in considering these firms as managers of global, vertically integrated value 
chains, it is important to consider their capacity to use their control of global wheat markets, 
for example, to develop information on these markets. As Clapp (2015a) and Salerno (2017) 
have suggested, firms have the capacity to develop extensive market information, which they 
can transfer to their financial subsidiaries. Subsequently, this information can be used to then 
derive profits from financial markets (Salerno 2017; Isakson 2014; Freebairn 2014; Murphy 
et al. 2012). This profitable use of information raises the question of the role of information 
as a form of tacit knowledge which can drive vertical integration in firms’ global value 
chains. Furthermore, this leads to the question of how firms perceive the importance of their 
entry into the deregulated wheat export market. In one sense, as I argue in Chapter 12, the 
liberalisation of this market allows firms to expand geographically, providing firms with an 
increased presence in the Asia Pacific region. However, this outcome could potentially be 
achieved through arm’s length relationships, particularly given wheat is a standardised 
product and transactions involving wheat should be manageable in such a scenario. However, 
transnational agricultural corporations typically exhibit high levels of integration, raising the 
question of whether it is information on wheat stocks and markets, and the desire to monetise 
that information through financialisation, which is a further contributor to vertical integration.  
These questions lead to the Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper and its aim to increase 
private investment in Australian farmland and farm businesses. This shift has the potential to 
undermine farmers’ autonomy and potentially effect farming communities, as farm decisions, 
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such as sourcing of equipment and inputs, is shifted from the farmer to the corporate owner. 
Furthermore, this transference of ownership and power raises questions about how 
agricultural production will be affected, if, for example, private equity firms become a 
significant investor in Australian farm land. Perhaps most pertinently, how does this shift 
change farming, and the relationship between Australian society, farmers and farm land? In 
conjunction with the consolidation of deregulated agricultural commodities markets such as 
wheat, and the potential for increased financialisation of Australian farm land, it is important 
to reflect on the emergence of corporate power in Australian agriculture and food networks, 
and how this shift might impact upon farmers, rural communities and the broader Australian 
society. Research is needed to understand the potential for these shifts to occur, and their 
implications.  
 
Why does this matter?  
Whereas the deregulation of the wheat industry was framed as being in the interests of wheat 
farmers, this policy shift has created an environment where wheat farmers and their 
communities are disenfranchised and undermined. Instead, wheat export market deregulation 
has been introduced to encourage transnational agri-food firms to extend their participation in 
Australian agriculture. This policy environment has been designed to nurture the interests of 
these actors, in the flawed assumption that their increased power and control over Australian 
agriculture will benefit Australian society. In justifying policy change such as wheat export 
market deregulation as ‘in the national interest’, policy makers obscure the effect of policies 
such as this upon people and communities. In the case of wheat export market deregulation, 
and related policies such as structural adjustment and Agriculture – Advancing Australia, the 
broad aim is to maximise industry efficiency and productivity, which is assumed to lead to 
greater contribution of agriculture and industries such as wheat to the national economy. 
However, these policies also reduce the importance of farmers and communities, distorting 
and externalising the negative social consequences of these policy shifts. Farmer exits are 
referred to vaguely as ‘adjustments’, which are the necessary consequences of these policy 
changes, which in any case, only impact farmers’ of lesser competence. The social impact of 
these shifts is masked as ‘short term pain’, without acknowledging the potential for farmer 
exits to undermine rural communities and social capital of rural towns. Furthermore, if there 
are benefits to these shifts which accrue to ‘the nation’, it is unclear which sections of the 
community receive these benefits, and what these benefits might look like. It could be argued 
that this is measurable through a greater contribution of agriculture to Australia’s GDP. This 
argument presumes that consumers might ultimately benefit. However, this implies that the 
benefits to consumers (however unclear or unequally shared) outweigh the real and 
perceptible negative consequences for rural Australia - most particularly, farmers, their 
families and communities reliant upon the farming population. The obvious beneficiaries of 
agricultural and related-economic restructuring are transnational firms and their shareholders, 
whose access to Australian markets allows them to expand their geographic footprint and 
therefore develop new markets and sources of supply, as well as institutional investors, whom 
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the Australian Government is encouraging to increase their investment in Australian 
farmland.  
Beyond the Australian wheat industry and agriculture, this thesis contributes to research 
highlighting the flawed arguments and assumptions which have underpinned the restructuring 
of Australian society in recent decades. The processes and technologies which I highlight are 
not confined to the Australian wheat industry. Policy discourses have shaped perceptions of 
how we know, what we know and what we value. These constructions have shaped policy to 
focus on increasing efficiency, competition and individualism. The resulting ‘business-
friendly environment’, which is claimed to improve people’s well-being, is characterised by 
the transference of power away from the public towards corporations, reflected through an 
increasingly unequal society where scarce and precarious employment, declining access to 
housing and rental markets and privately owned services such as public transport and health 
care are the new normal.  
Throughout this thesis, particularly in Chapters 6 and 7, as well as in my articles in 
preparation which explore policy makers’ use of the technology of the consumer in human 
services and social services policy, this process can be observed in many facets of Australian 
society. In addition to human services and social services, this thesis also draws upon 
corporatist changes to employment and higher education, which emphasise individualism and 
performativity.  
My research has highlighted this process in relation to farming. This study focuses on 
farming, specifically the wheat industry, to show how technologies of agency and 
performance have been used to operationalise the reality of markets, consumers and 
competition. However, the policy tools which have been used to make this shift happen – 
quantification, performativity, individualism, firms as efficiency maximisers, efficiency 
maximisation and living standards, consumer choice and freedom - are endemic throughout 
Australian society. These constructions are buttressed by the argument that increased 
allocative efficiency, increased private firms’ participation in society and maximised resource 
productivity are in the ‘national interest’. In this regard, the ‘national interest’ is crystallised 
in constructed indicators such as the unemployment rate, GDP and multifactor productivity 
growth. The process by which GDP is increased, the legitimacy of this indicator or the 
distribution of the gains which improved economic performance GDP is claimed to reflect, 
are portrayed by policy discourses as secondary concerns. Is this in the national interest? I 
suggest that it is not.  
Throughout this thesis I argue that policy discourses have changed ‘what matters’, in terms of 
the welfare of Australian society and policy governing society. Policy discourses have 
changed what counts as legitimate, credible knowledge and, in the process, have changed 
what counts as legitimate, credible policy objectives. This changed reality has been 
operationalised by technologies of performance and agency, which have facilitated a shift 
from the public to the private. This shift is not necessarily a transference of power from the 
State to corporations, or a retraction of the State’s powers. However, this shift is encapsulated 
by a shift in power from the public to the private - a creation of privatised spaces, where 
public spaces once existed. The market is constructed as a producer of information, as a 
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decider of what is fair and what is not, and as an organiser of society. The key participants in 
markets, consumers and firms, are integral to this construction. Critically, policy makers have 
constructed a corporatised society, by assuming that in the relationship between these market 
participants, consumers have the power. This assumption is incorrect. Consequently, this 
reconstruction of society has shifted power from the public to private interests, which I argue, 
is not in Australian society’s interests, or the interests of the nation.  
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Appendix 1: Experiences of wheat growers in Victoria’s western Wimmera following 
deregulation of the export wheat market 
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wrote this article during my Candidature. However, this article is based upon data collected in 
2013 to support my Honours research. I include this article in the Appendix to my PhD thesis, 
as it is work that I have helped develop during my time as a PhD candidate, and is informed 
by my research and learning during this education.  
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Experiences of wheat growers in Victoria’s western Wimmera following deregulation of 
the export wheat market 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In 2008, the statutory marketing powers held by the Australian Wheat Board (AWB) were 
dismantled, with the decision by the Federal Government to deregulate the export wheat 
market. This article snowball sampled 22 small-to-medium sized wheat growers in Victoria’s 
western Wimmera to qualitatively research how they perceived this policy affected their 
operations. Although deregulation was intended to create a competitive market, wheat 
growers felt the level of competition in their region, specifically, at local receival sites, was 
minimal and referred to instances where they had lost money from selling to grain traders 
who became insolvent, owing significant sums of money which substantially affected 
growers’ wheat marketing. Additionally, participants felt they lacked power in the open 
market, which was counter-posed by the power, and occasionally predatory behaviour, of 
some grain traders, and contributed to feelings of insecurity. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the 1970s, global agricultural reform has been underpinned by neoliberal ideologies 
and deregulation practices have been extensive (Coleman & Skogstad, 1995). Agricultural 
industries in New Zealand, South Africa (Van Zyl, Vink, Kirsten, & Poonyth, 2001), Canada 
(Coleman & Skogstad, 1995) and the United States (Skogstad, 1998) are now all extensively 
deregulated. Likewise, the Australian wool, sheep, and dairy industries were deregulated over 
this period, suggesting deregulation of the wheat industry would be consistent with 
Australian and global policy trends (Cocklin & Dibden, 2002; Coleman & Skogstad, 1995).  
The shift towards deregulation in Australia, with its removal of trade protection and the 
exposure of agricultural industries to international competition, has been underpinned by an 
assumption that reduced government intervention results in increased growth (Talbot & 
Walker, 2007; Dibden & Cocklin, 2010; Lawrence, Richards, & Lyons, 2013). Within this 
context, deregulation is viewed as essential in repositioning agricultural markets at the centre 
of the Australian economy (Dibden & Cocklin, 2010). Subsequently, the ongoing existence 
of Statutory Marketing Authorities, such as the Australian Wheat Board (AWB), was cited as 
an impediment to competition, productivity, and efficiency. This eventually led to the 
removal of single desk status held by the AWB in 2008 (Banks, 2005; McCorriston & 
MacLaren, 2007; McCorriston & MacLaren, 2005). As then Federal Minister for Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries, Tony Burke argued, deregulation was necessary to increase 
competition within the export market, stating, “only then will returns to growers be 
maximised” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2008, p. 1774). Wheat growers, however, 
remained sceptical of such claims, fearing they would lose control of the industry and have 
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difficulty competing in a global market (Irving, Arney, & Linder, 2000; Productivity 
Commission, 2010).  
Indeed, the AWB was created to provide security to growers to counter the widely 
held belief that wheat farmers were being exploited within what had previously been a 
deregulated industry (Whitwell & Sydenham, 1991). Founded in 1939, the AWB became a 
Statutory Marketing Authority in 1948. This made the AWB the only permitted marketer of 
Australian wheat, both domestically and internationally, a monopoly arrangement often 
referred to as the ‘single desk’ (McCorriston & MacLaren, 2007; Botterill, 2011). The wheat 
industry was further stabilised by the agricultural policies of the Menzies Government in the 
1950s-1960s, before the election of the Whitlam government in 1972 led to major changes 
within the Australian agricultural industry in general (Cockfield & Botterill, 2007; Whitwell 
& Sydenham, 1991). Following the election of the Hawke Government in 1983, focus on 
government intervention in agricultural policy intensified. Inquiries initiated by government 
(Royal Commission into Grain Handling, Storage & Transport, 1988; Hilmer, Rayner, & 
Taperell, 1993; Irving et al., 2000), and government authorities (Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics, 1987; Industry Assistance Commission, 1988) challenged statutory wheat 
marketing, contending this undermined industry efficiency, reduced grower freedom and 
choice, and prevented growers from maximising the returns on their wheat. Fundamentally, 
this body of work concluded the AWB did not provide growers with higher wheat prices than 
could otherwise be achieved in a deregulated export market. Ultimately, these arguments 
influenced the Federal Government decision to dismantle the single desk in 2008 (Botterill, 
2011).  
This policy shift remains contentious due to the reliance of many growers upon export 
markets. In 2014-2015, 71% of Australia’s total wheat production (23,373kt) was exported 
(ABARES, 2016). The proportion of wheat sold to export markets differs according to 
location. Approximately 50% of the wheat produced in Victoria, New South Wales, and 
Queensland is exported, yet 85-95% of South Australian and West Australian wheat is made 
available for export market (Stretch, Carter, & Kingwell 2014). In the 2011-2012 marketing 
year (October-September) four companies (Cargill/AWB, Glencore, CBH and Graincorp) 
accounted for 65% of all Australian wheat exports (Grain Producers Australia, 2013). This 
level of concentration is more pronounced at the state level, with grain exports dominated by 
GrainCorp in New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria, Glencore (through subsidiary 
Viterra) in South Australia, and grower owned co-operative, CBH in Western Australia 
(Australian Crop Forecasters, 2015).  
Literature exploring Australian wheat industry deregulation is primarily situated in the 
agricultural economics discipline, focusing on changes to wheat prices, or costs incurred by 
regulation (Chang, Martel, & Berry, 2003; McCorriston & MacLaren, 2007; Mugera, 
Curwen, & White, 2016; Curwen, Mugera, & White, 2011; Williams 2012). The presumption 
of these studies is that the success, or otherwise, of wheat market structure, can be interpreted 
through narrow indicators such as wheat price changes. The few existing studies that have 
deviated from this approach are broadly from the geography field (Talbot & Walker, 2007; 
Head, Atchison, Gates, & Muir, 2011). This is valuable research, which refers to the effects 
of wheat industry deregulation upon growers, though incidentally, as part of broader studies. 
This article therefore builds on Head et al. (2011) and Talbot and Walker (2007) by 
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specifically seeking to understand how farmers have been affected by wheat export market 
deregulation, thereby making a unique contribution to economic geography research in 
Australia that addresses a significant gap in our understanding of how wheat growers have 
experienced deregulation of the export market.   
 
Literature review and theory 
The inquiries into the wheat industry conducted by the Industries Assistance Commission 
(IAC) (1988), Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAE)(1987), Royal Commission into 
Grain Storage, Handling and Transport (1988) and the Productivity Commission (2010) have 
been particularly influential in framing debate around wheat industry deregulation within 
Australia. These inquiries focused policy attention on wheat prices and regulatory costs, as 
being the key measures by which wheat market and industry structure could be assessed. 
Subsequently, this field is dominated by agricultural economics (Chang et al., 2003; 
McCorriston & MacLaren, 2007; Mugera et al., 2016; Curwen et al., 2011; Williams 2012; 
Watson 1999) and such research employs quantitative measures that insufficiently capture the 
lived experience of wheat growers in a deregulated industry.  
Prior to deregulation of the wheat export market, numerous studies attempted to analyse 
the capacity of the AWB to influence global wheat prices. As stated by Watson (1999, p. 
429), “The most interesting technical economic argument concerns the validity of claims that 
statutory marketing authorities with export monopoly power can obtain higher prices”. 
Studies conducted by Chang et al. (2003) examined wheat price and quantity data from 1961-
2000 and McCorriston and MacLaren (2007) sought to measure the net welfare benefit of 
statutory wheat marketing to the Australian community. Both sought to understand the power 
that could be exerted by the AWB in global markets to extract high wheat prices and found 
the AWB had a negligible impact on wheat prices. Contrastingly, O’Donnell, Griffith, 
Nightingale and Piggott (2007) concluded product manufacturers exerted market power in 
their relationships with producers. This study differs from previous agricultural economics 
research which presumes grain traders would not have the capacity to exert power in a 
deregulated market and would instead be compelled by commercial disciplines to maximise 
growers’ incomes and reduce costs (IAC, 1988).  
Of the studies that have sought to determine impacts of wheat export market 
deregulation, Mugera et al. (2016), Williams (2012) and Williams and Malcolm (2012) are 
the most prominent. These studies focus on problems such as market volatility or declining 
prices and seek to determine if they are attributable to deregulation. Mugera et al. (2016) 
measured wheat prices between 2003 and 2010, finding deregulation did not result in a 
decline in wheat prices received by wheat growers, while Williams (2012) analysed wheat 
price volatility, contending deregulation is not associated with the fluctuating prices received 
by growers following deregulation. Rather than portraying volatility as inherently negative, 
Williams (2012) contended market volatility should be encouraged because such 
environments enable growers to respond to market signals and therefore achieve the highest 
profit. Surveying growers’ risk perception, Williams and Malcolm (2012) additionally found 
growers devised marketing strategies aimed at reducing risk which, to an extent, undermines 
the argument that deregulation allowed growers to maximise their incomes, as many growers 
preferred safer, more reliable options.  
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Additionally, studies by Wait and Ahmadi-Esfahani (1996), the Productivity 
Commission (2000; 2005) and the Royal Commission into Grain Handling Storage and 
Transport (1988) have sought to understand the cost of regulation, and conversely, estimate 
potential cost savings achieved through deregulating segments of the wheat industry. For 
example, in their 2005 Review of National Competition Policy Reforms, the Productivity 
Commission (2005) referred to submissions by Allen Consulting and the Centre for 
International Economics, which estimated deregulation of the wheat industry would result in 
significant cost benefits through increased national welfare and substantial savings. Such 
estimates, however, do not consider the human impact associated with job losses incurred 
through rationalisation, the resultant impact of deregulation upon farmers, or the power that 
could be exerted by corporations in a liberalised market. This research also prioritises 
quantifiable measures such as costs, prices, and productivity, downplaying qualitative 
evidence due to its subjectivity and perceived unreliability. As mentioned by Chang et al. 
(2003, p. 16), “it is essential that concrete evidence and strongest arguments can be put 
forward for the retention of the single desk”. ‘Concrete evidence’, in this sense, is considered 
to be statistically-based. Qualitative research, on the other hand, is collected by inquiries 
informing wheat industry policy and treated with suspicion due to its subjective nature 
(Productivity Commission 2010; Irving et al. 2000). As a result, opinions of wheat growers 
are not provided the same authority as quantitative measures such as wheat prices or costs of 
moving wheat through the supply chain.   
 Subsequently, research addressing the question of wheat industry regulation, through 
the lens of either price or cost changes, offers a narrow picture of how deregulation has 
affected wheat growers. Such research presumes growers are exclusively interested in which 
market structure will allow them to procure the best price from the market while ignoring the 
many concerns held by growers (Irving et al., 2000). Irving et al. (2000) found, 
overwhelmingly, growers wanted to see the single desk retained and while they believed the 
AWB managed to extract high prices from export markets, the AWB provided numerous 
benefits beyond prices, owing to its control by growers and contribution to social well-being 
in regional Australia. Yet, these opinions are dismissed by Irving et al. (2000, p. 6) who could 
not. “find, clear, credible, and unambiguous evidence that the current arrangements for the 
marketing of export wheat are of net benefit to the Australian community”, supporting 
findings by McCorriston and MacLaren (2007), Chang et al. (2003) and Watson (1999).  
 The present article aims to address such methodological oversights by emphasising the 
value of growers’ experiences and interpretations, as producers with an intimate 
understanding of the effects of wheat export market deregulation. Subsequently, it lends more 
weight to growers’ opinions and aims to develop a greater understanding of the concerns 
expressed by participants in inquiries conducted by the Productivity Commission (2010) and 
Irving et al. (2000), which downplayed opinions based upon the understanding such data was 
not a reliable indicator of market conditions. Although not specifically focusing on wheat 
export market deregulation, as part of a broader study focused on understanding farmers’ 
responses to climate change, Head et al. (2011) found growers had differing capabilities 
regarding wheat marketing, which, in some cases created additional stress and work load, and 
alluded to issues arising from this policy of relevance to this article. Such issues will be 
explored in further detail here. Similarly, research from the geography discipline using a 
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social capital lens to explore wheat export market deregulation found some wheat growers 
felt their political and bargaining power was limited in the deregulated domestic market 
(Talbot & Walker, 2007). Thus, issues emerging from deregulation, such as work load, 
disempowerment, and limited market power, have been referred to as part of a broader 
conversation. The present article contributes to and furthers such research by focusing 
specifically on understanding how a small sample of small-to-medium sized wheat growers in 
Australia perceive they have been affected by wheat export market deregulation.  
 
Research methods 
This exploratory qualitative research uses a phenomenological approach, including semi-
structured interviews with current and retired wheat farmers from the western Wimmera 
region in Victoria, Australia. A phenomenological approach was used as a form of inquiry to 
understand the experiences of wheat growers and to explore the meaning that wheat growers 
give to these experiences (Wythes & Lyons, 2006; Seidman, 2013). This method was chosen 
for its suitability to prioritise growers’ experiences as a valid source of data and recognise 
growers as holding important knowledge for exploring wheat growers’ perceptions about 
wheat export market deregulation (Head et al., 2011; Mugera et al., 2016; Williams, 2012; 
McCorriston & MacLaren, 2007; O’Donnell et al., 2007).  
 
Research site 
This research was conducted in the western Wimmera region of Victoria, Australia, close to 
the border with South Australia (Figure 1). This area is heavily reliant upon agriculture, 
particularly broad-acre cropping, with 44% of people employed in the West Wimmera Shire 
working within this sector (Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), 2012; Department of 
Environment and Primary Industry, 2014). The boundaries of the study region are Broughton 
(North), Nhill (East), Edenhope (South) and Serviceton (West). All farms were family run. 
The average farm size operated by participants was 1,511 hectares (3,735 acres), well below 
the average size of a Victorian wheat farm (2,227 hectares or 5,503 acres) (ABS, 2006), and 
most properties were between 800 and 2,400 hectares (2,000 and 6,000 acres), considered 
small to medium for this region. Farms in the most productive region (Kaniva) tended to be 
smaller than those in the less productive regions (Broughton, Serviceton).  
 
Figure 1: Study region map 
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Participants 
Interviews were conducted with current and recently retired farmers who owned small to 
medium sized farms in the study region and produced multiple grain varieties, including 
wheat, barley, and legumes. Farmers located in the central area of Kaniva only grew crops 
and legumes, while those in the north (Broughton) and south (Edenhope) of the study region 
also raised sheep, pigs, and yabbies. All came from farming operations that produced 
substantial quantities of wheat, primarily for the export market and were typically from 
families that had farmed in the area for three to five generations. The descriptors used to 
differentiate farmers are presented in Table 1 and include ‘farm size’, ‘location’, and 
‘employment status’ (active or retired). Location reflects the approximate location of the 
farming business, with ‘Central’ referring to the area surrounding Kaniva, ‘North’ referring to 
the area surrounding Broughton. 
 
Table 1: Application of descriptors to interview transcripts 
Interview  Participants Location Size of Operation (Acres) Status 
A A1 Central 2,000 – 4,000 Active 
B B1 South <1,000 Retired 
C C1, C2, C3 North 2,000 – 4,000 Active 
D D1 Central 2,000 – 4,000 Active 
E E1, E2 North West 6,000 – 10,000 Active 
F F1 Central 6,000 – 10,000 Active 
G G1 Central 6,000 – 10,000 Active 
H H1 East 1,000 – 2,000 Retired 
I I1, I2, I3 South 2,000 – 4,000 Active 
J J1, J2 South 2,000 – 4,000 Active 
K K1 Central 1,000 – 2,000 Active 
L L1 Central 6,000 – 10,000 Active 
M M1, M2 North 4,000 – 6,000 Active 
N N1, N2 North 4,000 – 6,000 Active 
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Recruitment and sampling 
Snowball sampling and a key informant approach to recruit research participants (Noy, 
2008). In May 2013, initial contact was made with three key informants, including a local 
councillor, representative of an agricultural organisation, and a community group, each whom 
referred the researcher to different groups of farmers. Contact lists were used to establish 
initial interviews, with participants in this first series of interviews asked to refer the 
researcher to other potential participants. This sampling and recruitment design limits the 
study’s representativeness as only farmers who felt strongly about the issue of deregulation 
may have agreed to participate and/or people with similar opinions may have been nominated 
as potential interviewees.  
 
Data collection and analysis 
This research received ethics approval by the Design and Social Context College Human 
Ethics Advisory Network, a sub-committee of the RMIT Human Research Ethics Committee 
(Project number: CHEAN A-2000866-04-13) and no conflict of interest was experienced in 
the conduct of this research. Informed consent was sought from all participants and each was 
given the option to withdraw at any time. Furthermore, participants were afforded the 
opportunity to review their own interview transcripts and make any amendments they felt 
necessary. A total of 14 interviews with 22 wheat farmers were conducted in June 2013. 
Interviews included all family members involved in the farming operation who made 
themselves available. One interview was conducted per property (i.e., multiple interviewees 
at the same time) and two interviews were conducted with two participants together who each 
ran separate farming operations. Notes were sparsely taken and interviews were digitally 
recorded. 
Interviews included questions on growers’ experiences of 1) wheat marketing after 
deregulation of the export market 2) changes to the occupation of farming and 3) community 
impacts following deregulation. These areas were based upon previous studies conducted by 
Head et al. (2011) and Talbot and Walker (2007), which alluded to these issues without 
substantially developing these ideas. Similar to the process adopted by Wythes and Lyons 
(2006), transcripts were thematically analysed to identify recurring thoughts and reflections 
emerging from the data and provide a basis for coding. Codes were categorised according to 
the themes which reflected the key issues raised by participants with relation to their 
experience of wheat export market deregulation (Wythes & Lyons, 2006). The data analysis 
is limited by the questions posed, potential researcher bias in data interpretation, and could be 
perceived as limited by the data’s subjectivity. As the research intent is to understand the 
subjective experiences of wheat growers, however, this design reflects the well-established 
strengths and limitations of qualitative research. 
Four themes were central to participants’ experiences of deregulation (power, 
competition, complexity, and insecurity) and were discussed by growers in accordance with 
the following definitions: 
 
Power - centred on the notion of control which growers felt was lost through the 
dismantling of the single desk. Growers associated political power with their political 
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voice and representation, marketing power with their capacity to use marketing skills, 
and knowledge to extract good prices from the market.  
 
Competition - was borrowed from the interpretation of competition raised in 
parliamentary debates around wheat export market deregulation, portraying a 
competitive market as one which featured numerous buyers competing for growers’ 
wheat.  
 
Complexity – was discussed in relation to additional duties that required new skills 
and knowledge, such as understanding markets and new financial products, created by 
wheat market deregulation which added to the difficulty of farming.   
 
Insecurity - related to growers’ insecurity related to the lack of certainty associated 
with using limited marketing skills and knowledge, without the support of the AWB.  
 
The codes ascribed to each theme, drawn from terms frequently mentioned in the interviews, 
are presented in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Themes and codes derived from thematic analysis of interviews 
Themes Codes 
Power  Market power, political power, ownership, privatisation of infrastructure 
Competition Benefits to growers, influence of large grain traders, grain traders going broke 
Complexity Added workload, new skill set required, less time for social and family activities 
Insecurity Exposure to global markets, unstable price, limited marketing skills 
 
 
Findings 
Findings are presented within the context of the four key themes of power, competition, 
complexity and insecurity utilising interviewees’ quotes to qualitatively explore how wheat 
growers experienced deregulation.  
 
Theme 1: Power - Marketing Power 
A number of growers considered a major result of deregulation is grain traders do not offer a 
price for grain if it does not suit them to buy it. This creates a situation whereby growers feel 
they have less leverage to seek an acceptable price for their grain. As mentioned by 
participant I3, At [our local receival site] for example, we went days where there was no one 
buying wheat out of those silos. Not one buyer. This suggests despite increased competition 
among buyers nationally, in some regional locations, the level of competition is not 
particularly strong. Whereas the AWB was compelled to buy grain from growers, grain 
traders can either decide to not offer a price, or offer a low price for grain knowing the costs 
associated with transporting grain to a different silo could prohibit the growers from selling 
their grain elsewhere. As the exchange between growers I2 and I3 demonstrates, this may 
lead to wheat farmers either having to accept the price on offer at their nearest receival point, 
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or incurring greater transport costs to deliver their grain to a location where prices are being 
offered: 
 
I3: You have got to take the grain further, to make sure that you have got enough people 
buying at a site…Freight costs are higher, margins are gone again. 
 
I2: And no choice. So you have only got one price there, and that is the price that you are 
going to accept if you are only a small operator. 
 
This issue is further exacerbated by the recent closure of smaller receival points throughout 
the eastern states. In June 2014, GrainCorp announced a $200 million ‘Project Regeneration’ 
which included the closure of several key receival sites in the study region, including Goroke, 
Kaniva, and Serviceton (Weekly Times Now, 2014a). Growers highlighted that prior to this 
initiative, the continued centralisation of receival points and closures had increased 
transportation costs. As participant B1, a retired grower, mentioned:   
 
To me, the consequences [of deregulation] for growers are that some of their delivery options 
have been taken away from them, and some of the railway siding, storage facilities have 
gradually been taken out of use, because companies like GrainCorp don’t want to maintain 
them…It simply means that there are fewer options for farmers. And because delivery points 
are made more specialist, so if you have a particular type of wheat or barley or whatever, 
there might only be one place in the area where you can take it…I don’t know at what point 
these delivery points will all just disappear. I mean, they can’t expect farmers to transport to 
Horsham, Bordertown, Mount Gambier or Naracoorte. It’s just not viable. 
 
Concerns regarding additional transport costs reflect findings from a 2014 report produced by 
the Australian Export Grains Innovation Centre which found supply chain costs, such as 
transport, comprised the single largest cost in the production of grain throughout Australia, 
starting at approximately $65-70 per tonne (Stretch et al., 2014).  
 
Power - Political Power 
Many growers felt sidelined politically with the abolition of the single desk. This potentially 
affected how growers perceived deregulation. Participant F1, who supported deregulation of 
the domestic wheat market, described, What I’m so annoyed about, is that our wishes have 
been totally ignored and we had no say in it. That’s what I am so mad about. Farmers who 
expressed opposition to deregulation in general contended its implementation demonstrated a 
lack of concern for their welfare by politicians and policy makers. We feel very 
unappreciated (C1). This powerlessness was also expressed in relation to a feeling of 
disillusionment with the major political parties. There’s just not enough votes in us I don’t 
think. We don’t count anymore (C2). C1 and C2, a couple managing a farm together, 
illustrates the perception that farmers’ political standing in Australian society has diminished 
as the number of farmers has declined in recent decades. 
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Theme 2: Competition 
A key objective of deregulation was to increase competition within the wheat industry 
(Lawrence et al., 2013). Growers, however, reported numerous grain trading and 
manufacturing companies had gone into liquidation following deregulation. Farmers 
concerned about the financial stability of grain traders expressed a preference towards selling 
to larger, more established buyers which they perceived as more stable, less likely to become 
insolvent, and more likely to be able to pay growers for their wheat. As stated by H1: 
 
I tried to deal with the bigger companies, the ones that had the best chance of paying me. 
They weren’t going to go broke. If you start chasing the best dollar, through a small niche 
marketer, well maybe you are not going to get paid. You are better off to take $10 a tonne less 
and be paid, than $10 a tonne more and miss out on the whole load. 
 
H1 was another grower who had retired from the wheat industry after deregulation of the 
export market. His comments reflect the cautious approach taken by many growers, who 
frequently mentioned that a ‘sensible’ strategy involved seeking an average price from a 
secure trader, rather than the best available price. This practice calls into question the 
argument that deregulation leads to higher prices at the farm gate. While higher prices may be 
available as a result of deregulation, participants in this study reflected an unwillingness to 
take the highest price on offer unless they trusted the company offering that price would not 
become insolvent. One exchange, featuring grain growers J1 and J2 who managed different 
properties in the southern region of the study area, is indicative of the frequency with which 
smaller grain buyers and manufacturers experience financial difficulty: 
 
J1: I think that what deregulation has done to the wholegrain industry is actually put a lot of 
companies to the wall. You hear a lot more now of crowds going bung, than what you did 
when it was the single desk set up.  
 
J2: Key seeds, they went. Then you had Lowan themselves. Klein Foods in Warracknabeal. I 
mean, you can start rattling off a heap of blokes that trade grain; that have gone. 
 
Unless these losses are accompanied by new entrants into the market, this minimises the 
choices available to growers and is in opposition to one of the key benefits that purportedly 
would be an outcome of dismantling the single desk for wheat exports. Many grain traders 
have become insolvent in recent years, however, owing creditors such as wheat farmers 
significant sums of money, with Sapphire Pty Ltd, Convector Grain, LGL Commodities and 
One World Grain key examples of companies who have gone into administration, 
highlighting the precarious nature of some wheat transactions in the deregulated environment 
(Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2013; Weekly Times Now, 2014b). This environment 
undermines the perceived degree of choice available to growers who feel compelled to sell to 
the largest grain traders. Additionally, H1 suggested the similarity in prices being offered by 
grain traders were not representative of a truly competitive market: 
 
According to the government that [deregulation] creates a better market because you have got 
competition, but I don’t know that there is too much competition. The prices within a day 
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seem to be all lined up the same and you’ve only got $1 or $2 difference. It’s like the petrol 
prices. 
 
Coupled with the limited number of grain companies being active at each receival site, and 
the lack of confidence in the smaller and less established grain traders, the level of 
competition within this particular region does not appear to be high.  
 
Theme 3: Complexity 
Key challenges presented by grain marketing after deregulation were described as farming’s 
increased complexity and additional work loads and stresses. Participants noted frustration 
that despite extra work and worry, they did not feel financially better off. Deregulation 
ensured wheat growers were responsible for the marketing of their own wheat. For wheat 
farmers who had operated with the single desk for the duration of their farming careers, this 
required significant readjustment, as A1 stated:  
 
How can you expect a grain grower from Kaniva, to suddenly be a clever marketer, when 
he’s never ever done it in his life?...So suddenly the grain growers were given the job of 
marketing. It was like me telling you, ‘In five years’ time you are going to fly to the moon, you 
had better start building your rocket.’ Where would you start? It threw growers into all sorts 
of turmoil. I think that for some people it was just all too hard. 
 
Growers expressed considerable insecurities about marketing. Most felt not only were returns 
diminished under the deregulated system, they also took more risks and experienced more 
stress. Deregulation ensured growers have to utilise an unfamiliar set of skills and their 
success in this aspect of their business largely determines how successful their farming 
operation will be overall.  
 
Theme 4: Insecurity 
As a result of deregulation, growers are now trading on the world market, without the 
protection they had previously been afforded by the AWB. The insecurity created by this 
situation is highlighted by participant I3: 
 
There’s no stability. Grain pricing has never been about the price. It was about securing 
contracts and relationships in that world market that gave it a ‘floor’, for the want of a better 
word. Certainty is gone. People who set out to dismember the wheat board are those 
international players who now own, not only the people who take in the grain and store it, but 
they also own the grain. So they own it all. The supply chain, right through. 
 
This comment reflects a reduction in security for growers, although it also indicates power 
within the industry has shifted to the grain companies. Many growers mentioned declining 
wheat prices at harvest time, which they felt unfairly affected their business. For those 
experiencing a significant amount of debt, there was a compulsion to sell at harvest time to 
generate cash flow and service debt levels which diminishes marketing options, as indicated 
by M1 and M2, a couple who manage a property together in the north of the study region:  
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M1: Generally by harvest we are right up to the end of our overdraft limit, and you just need 
to start getting some money in the system. And all the time that you are not selling, you are 
losing 9 or 10% interest. You have got to look at the cost of what it is costing you to not sell 
it. Just the fact that you are paying interest on money with your bank, by being in debt.  
 
M2: You’ve got that grain sitting in your silos, unsold, and you are still paying interest.  
 
M1: To me, even above the cost of storage, when you take all of that into account…I think 
that at the time when we were looking at the pools, it ended up that even though with the 
quarterly distribution you did end up getting a bit more, by the time you took into account the 
interest that we had paid on not having that money, we were actually worse off.  
 
M2: It was taking 12 months to get $5 a tonne more.  
 
M1: That’s the thing, marketing changes completely, whether you are in debt or you are not 
in debt. 
 
This exchange illustrates the lived experiences of wheat growers and the additional options 
available through deregulation. For this couple, the financial pressures created by debt 
ensured they had little option but to accept the cash price being offered at harvest time. This, 
in association with uncertainty around price, the viability of the grain traders, and declining 
prices at harvest time, led to a considerable feeling of insecurity.  
The level of insecurity experienced by growers was reflected in perceptions that grain 
traders are seeking to take advantage of growers’ limited skills and experience in wheat 
marketing, as highlighted by A1’s perceptions of the use of wheat pools by private 
companies: 
 
The organisations are now trading off farmers who have always thought that pools were a 
good idea. Nowadays they are just being taken to the cleaners by these companies…I have a 
massive element of distrust toward companies that are running pools now.  
 
This suggests an adversarial relationship between small to medium sized growers and grain 
traders. As A1 mentioned, for grain traders, the exploitation of farmers with minimal 
marketing knowledge, was like shooting fish in a barrel, and indicates a power shift that 
markedly favours grain traders and undermines growers’ perceived security, reminiscent of 
the environment that led to the creation of the AWB in the 1930s.  
 
Discussion and conclusion 
Numerous studies have argued wheat growers will benefit from deregulation, with the 
resulting competition, choice, and flexibility of a free market ensuring that growers are able 
to seek premium prices for their grain (Williams, 2012; Mugera et al., 2016; Wait & Ahmadi-
Esfahani, 1996; Chang et al., 2003; Irving et al., 2000; Watson, 1999). The present study, 
however, found most participants expressed concerns that they were not yet experiencing 
such benefits from the deregulation of their industry. Participants communicated a feeling 
that their power had been undermined as a result of deregulation. Without the security 
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provided by the AWB, which had an obligation to buy grain, growers reported there were few 
companies offering a price for wheat at their local receival sites and occasionally no buyers 
active at all, suggesting competition among grain traders has not developed in the study 
region. Wheat growers argued abolition of AWB’s statutory powers was enacted without 
their endorsement. This was viewed as a reflection of growers’ limited power within the 
context of Australian politics and reinforced the perception that growers were politically 
expedient, further contributing to a strong sense of disillusionment from growers previously 
found towards the major political parties at Federal and State levels (Talbot & Walker, 2007).  
The frequency with which grain traders and wholefoods companies went into 
administration considerably undermined the perception of competition participants held about 
the wheat industry. Some growers refined their marketing strategies and preferred to sell their 
wheat to the large, established grain traders to reduce risk, a cautious approach that became 
restricted with marketing options and suggests the market power of the large grain traders 
was enhanced following deregulation. This finding supports other research noting growers 
preferred not to take a risk or sell wheat to unknown traders (O’Donnell et al., 2007; 
Williams & Malcolm, 2012). Participating wheat growers favoured the reliability and 
security of the system under the AWB, as opposed to the riskier, though potentially more 
lucrative, open market.  
In addition to the decline in choice caused by grain trader insolvencies, the financial 
position of each grower fundamentally determined how they marketed their wheat. Growers 
with significant debt levels felt compelled to take the cash price offered at harvest, whether or 
not they were particularly happy with that price. Deregulation might theoretically result in 
increased marketing choices for growers, but, in reality, the level of choice available to some 
growers was strongly curtailed by their financial position. This indicates quite high insecurity 
for some growers in the deregulated industry which, in some cases, was greatest when 
confronting the new and complex world of wheat marketing (Head et al., 2011). Some 
participants felt they had limited skills and knowledge of wheat marketing. This resulted in 
feelings of vulnerability and some growers suggested companies took advantage of this 
limited experience. Although, as qualitative research, all findings specifically reflect the 
perceptions of participants and ought not be generalised widely beyond the sample, the key 
insight gained from the study reveals the growers interviewed felt deregulation of the export 
wheat market was introduced without their endorsement which was interpreted as a 
diminishment in the political power of these small to medium sized farmers.  For some, the 
optimism generated in the lead-up to deregulation diminished and has been replaced by a 
sense of injustice. As M1 stated: 
 
At the time, I was very naïve. I just thought, ‘But it’s got to be good for us. Because there is going 
to be competition.’ Now I see exactly what [my husband’s father] means. Now I understand 
Cargill as well. All of it is to get control away from farmers. 
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